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Abstract	
Objectives	This	study	evaluates	the	impact	of	an	expanded	national	health	insurance	programme	in	Indonesia,	focusing	on	three	outcomes:	access	to	health	care,	as	measured	by	utilisation	of	health	care	services;	financial	protection,	as	measured	by	out-of-pocket	(OOP)	health	expenditure	and	catastrophic	health	expenditure	(CHE)	indicators;	and	health	status,	as	measured	by	levels	of	blood	pressure	and	rates	of	diagnosed,	treated	and	controlled	hypertension.		
Research	Methods	This	study	uses	longitudinal	data	from	the	Indonesian	Family	Life	Survey	(IFLS)	collected	from	13	Indonesia’s	provinces,	a	total	of	22,711	adults	in	2007	who	were	followed	up	in	2014.	The	JKN	enrolees	are	categorised	into	two	groups:	a	contributory	group	who	paid	the	premium	voluntarily,	and	a	subsidised	group,	paid	by	government.	Each	group	is	compared	with	the	uninsured	group	who	had	no	insurance	coverage	in	both	2007	and	2014.	Propensity	score	matching	combined	with	difference-in-difference	approaches	are	used	to	estimate	the	causal	effect	of	the	JKN	programme.	Heterogeneity	of	the	effects	of	JKN	is	explored	based	on	socioeconomic	status,	locality	of	residence	(urban/rural),	and	availability	of	health	facilities	in	the	area.		
Results	The	JKN	programme	increased	the	probability	of	individuals	in	the	contributory	group	seeking	outpatient	and	inpatient	care	as	well	as	the	volume	of	care	provided.	The	subsidised	group	also	showed	increased	utilisation,	but	the	magnitude	of	the	effect	is	much	smaller	than	in	the	contributory	group.	In	relation	to	financial	protection,	the	JKN	programme	had	no	statistically	significant	effect	on	OOP	health	expenditure	or	catastrophic	health	expenditure.	In	terms	of	health	outcomes,	while	the	programme	had	no	significant	effect	on	systolic	or	diastolic	blood	pressure,	the	data	suggest	a	positive	effect	on	increasing	awareness	and	treatment	of	hypertension	among	the	contributory	group	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	the	subsidised	group.		
Conclusions	The	JKN	programme	encouraged	individuals	in	the	contributory	group	to	use	more	medical	treatment,	which	had	no	effect,	on	average,	on	their	health	expenditure.	The	subsidised	group	appears	not	to	have	been	able	to	maximise	the	JKN	benefit,	possibly	due	to	other	barriers	in	access	to	care,	such	as	the	inadequate	supply	of	health	facilities.	The	impact	of	the	JKN	programme	on	health	status	is	yet	to	be	confirmed	as	sufficient	time	has	not	passed	for	the	programme’s	effect	on	health	status	to	be	realised	
	 4	
	
List	of	Contents	
	
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………….…….……	3	
List	of	Contents	………………………………………………………………………………….……….……5	
List	of	Tables	………………………………………………………………………………………..………		11	
List	of	Figures	……………………………………………………………………………………...…………13	
Acknowledgement	…………………………………………………………………..……………….…….15	
Declaration	…………………………………………………………………………………………………….17	
Chapter	1 Introduction	....................................................................................................	15 
Chapter	2 Theories	in	health	insurance	.....................................................................	21 
Section	2.1 Health	insurance	characteristics	....................................................................	21 2.1.1 Demand	for	health	insurance	....................................................................................................	21 2.1.2 Moral	hazard	.....................................................................................................................................	22 2.1.3 Adverse	selection	............................................................................................................................	25 2.1.4 Government	intervention	in	demand	for	health	insurance	.........................................	27 
Section	2.2 Health	financing	system	in	the	low-	and	middle-income	countries	....	29 2.2.1 State-funded	insurance	................................................................................................................	31 2.2.2 Community-based	health	insurance	.......................................................................................	33 2.2.3 Private	health	insurance	..............................................................................................................	34 2.2.4 Social	health	insurance	(SHI)	....................................................................................................	36 
Chapter	3 Profile	of	Indonesia	.......................................................................................	39 
Section	3.1 Demographic,	economic,	and	health	profile	...............................................	39 
Section	3.2 Health	expenditure	trends	................................................................................	44 
Section	3.3 Administrative	structure	of	local	government	in	Indonesia	.................	50 
Section	3.4 Health	service	delivery	system	in	Indonesia	..............................................	52 
Section	3.5 The	health	financing	system	in	Indonesia	...................................................	57 
 Community-based	health	insurance	.......................................................................................	58 
 Expansion	of	the	private	insurance	market	........................................................................	59 
 Social	security	net	post	the	economic	crisis	1997/1998	..............................................	60 
 Moving	towards	a	unified	social	security	system	in	Indonesia	..................................	61 
 JKN	programme	for	all	..................................................................................................................	64 
Section	3.6 Summary	.................................................................................................................	68 
	 5	
Chapter	4 Review	of	systematic	review	of	the	impact	of	health	insurance	on	
access	to	care,	financial	protection,	and	health	status	...............................................	69 
Section	4.1 Introduction	...........................................................................................................	69 
Section	4.2 Methods	...................................................................................................................	69 
 Selection	of	studies	.........................................................................................................................	69 
 Types	of	participants	.....................................................................................................................	70 
 Types	of	interventions	..................................................................................................................	70 
 Types	of	outcomes	measures	.....................................................................................................	71 
 Information	sources	......................................................................................................................	72 
 Data	collection	process	.................................................................................................................	72 
 Assessment	of	review	quality	....................................................................................................	73 
Section	4.3 Findings	...................................................................................................................	74 
 Results	of	the	search	......................................................................................................................	74 
 Criteria	for	quality	assessment	of	primary	studies	..........................................................	79 
 Access	to	health	care	.....................................................................................................................	84 
 Financial	protection	.......................................................................................................................	85 
 Health	status	.....................................................................................................................................	88 
Section	4.4 Discussion	...............................................................................................................	89 
Section	4.5 Conclusion	..............................................................................................................	94 
Chapter	5 Updated	systematic	review	of	the	impact	of	health	insurance	......	97 
Section	5.1 Introduction	...........................................................................................................	97 
Section	5.2 Methods	...................................................................................................................	97 
 Participants	.......................................................................................................................................	98 
 Intervention	......................................................................................................................................	98 
 Control	group	....................................................................................................................................	98 
 Outcome	measures	.........................................................................................................................	98 
 Types	of	studies	...............................................................................................................................	99 
 Databases	and	search	terms	......................................................................................................	99 
 Screening	and	data	extraction	...................................................................................................	99 
 Assessment	of	study	quality	.......................................................................................................	99 
Section	5.3 Results	....................................................................................................................	101 
 Results	of	the	search	....................................................................................................................	101 
 Quality	assessment	of	the	included	studies	.......................................................................	102 
 Access	to	care	.................................................................................................................................	103 
 Financial	protection	.....................................................................................................................	109 
 Health	status	...................................................................................................................................	115 
Section	5.4 Discussion	.............................................................................................................	118 
	 6	
 Overall	effect	...................................................................................................................................	119 
 Possible	explanation	of	heterogeneity	................................................................................	120 
 Moral	hazard	...................................................................................................................................	122 
 Type	of	insurance	.........................................................................................................................	123 
 Study	limitations	...........................................................................................................................	123 
Section	5.5 Conclusion	............................................................................................................	124 
Chapter	6 Methods	for	evaluating	health	insurance	programmes	................	125 
Section	6.1 Introduction	........................................................................................................	125 
Section	6.2 Regression	methods	for	non-normally	distributed	variables	............	125 
 Binary	variables	............................................................................................................................	125 
 Count	data	........................................................................................................................................	127 
 Health	expenditure	......................................................................................................................	128 
Section	6.3 Selection	bias	......................................................................................................	131 
Section	6.4 Methods	for	controlling	selection	on	observables	.................................	135 
 Linear	regression	..........................................................................................................................	135 
 Propensity	score	matching	(PSM)	.........................................................................................	136 
Section	6.5 Methods	for	controlling	selection	on	unobservables	............................	139 
 Instrumental	variables	(IV)	......................................................................................................	139 
 Panel	data	methods	......................................................................................................................	142 
Section	6.6 Natural	experiment	..........................................................................................	142 
 Difference-in-difference	(DID)	................................................................................................	143 
 Regression	discontinuity	(RD)	................................................................................................	145 
Section	6.7 Applicable	methods	..........................................................................................	146 
Chapter	7 The	JKN	programme	and	its	impact	on	access	to	care	...................	149 
Section	7.1 Introduction	........................................................................................................	149 
Section	7.2 Conceptual	framework	of	access	to	health	care	......................................	150 
Section	7.3 Methodology	........................................................................................................	154 
 Survey	methodology	....................................................................................................................	154 
 Treatment	variables	....................................................................................................................	155 
 Outcome	and	control	variables	...............................................................................................	157 
 Estimation	model	..........................................................................................................................	159 
 Propensity	score	matching	.......................................................................................................	161 
 Difference-in-difference	.............................................................................................................	163 
Section	7.4 Findings	................................................................................................................	165 
 Descriptive	statistics	...................................................................................................................	165 
 Naïve	estimator	.............................................................................................................................	168 
 Diagnostic	tests	of	matching	algorithms	............................................................................	170 
	 7	
 Impact	estimates	from	PSM-DID	............................................................................................	174 
 Robustness	check	..........................................................................................................................	179 
Section	7.5 Discussion	.............................................................................................................	183 
Chapter	8 Financial	protection	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	.........................	186 
Section	8.1 Introduction	.........................................................................................................	186 
Section	8.2 Methodology	........................................................................................................	187 
 Outcome	variables	(health	expenditure)	............................................................................	187 
 Treatment	and	control	variables	...........................................................................................	188 
 Estimation	model	..........................................................................................................................	190 
Section	8.3 Findings	.................................................................................................................	194 
 Individual	data	...............................................................................................................................	194 
 Household	data	..............................................................................................................................	201 
 Positive	expenditures	..................................................................................................................	207 
Section	8.4 Discussion	.............................................................................................................	210 
Chapter	9 The	impact	on	blood	pressure	and	hypertension	rate	..................	212 
Section	9.1 Introduction	.........................................................................................................	212 
Section	9.2 Conceptual	framework	.....................................................................................	213 
Section	9.3 Methodology	........................................................................................................	215 
 Outcome	variables	........................................................................................................................	215 
 Independent	variables	................................................................................................................	220 
 Estimation	model	..........................................................................................................................	223 
Section	9.4 Findings	.................................................................................................................	227 
 Descriptive	statistics	...................................................................................................................	227 
 Results	from	the	difference-in-differences	(DID)	estimator	......................................	231 
 Results	from	the	difference-in-differences	(DID)	estimator	with	propensity	score	matching	(PSM)	.............................................................................................................................................	233 
 Heterogeneity	of	the	JKN	effect	..............................................................................................	233 
 Test	of	the	parallel	trends	assumption	................................................................................	242 
Section	9.5 Discussion	.............................................................................................................	242 
Chapter	10 Discussion	.....................................................................................................	247 
Section	10.1 Introduction	....................................................................................................	247 
Section	10.2 Discussion	of	findings	..................................................................................	248 
 The	health	insurance	system	..............................................................................................	248 
 Access	to	care	............................................................................................................................	250 
 Financial	protection	...............................................................................................................	256 
 Health	status	(blood	pressure)	..........................................................................................	262 
 Quality	of	care	...........................................................................................................................	264 
	 8	
Section	10.3 Strengths	and	limitations	...........................................................................	266 
Section	10.4 Policy	implications	.......................................................................................	270 
Section	10.5 Agenda	for	future	research	.......................................................................	272 
Appendices	…………………………………………………………………………................................273	
References	……………………………………………………………………………………………………311			
	 	
	 9	
List	of	Tables	
	Table	2-1	Characteristics	of	health	insurance	systems	.............................................................................	31	Table	3-1	Selected	demographic,	health	status	and	economic	indicators	for	Indonesia	...........	41	Table	3-2	Trends	in	health	expenditure	(HE)	in	Indonesia,	1995–2014	..........................................	45	Table	3-3	Distribution	of	Puskesmas	in	Indonesia	.....................................................................................	52	Table	3-4	Supporting	Facilities	for	Puskesmas	in	Indonesia	.................................................................	53	Table	3-5	Public	hospital	type	in	Indonesia	based	on	Permenkes	No.	340/menkes/per/III/2010	.........................................................................................................................	54	Table	3-6	Distribution	of	physicians	and	hospital	beds	before	and	after	adjustment	................	56	Table	3-7	Timeline	of	Health	Care	Reform	in	Indonesia	..........................................................................	58	Table	3-8	Health	insurance	coverage	in	Indonesia,	2012	........................................................................	64	Table	3-9	Monthly	contribution	for	each	type	of	JKN	member	as	of	January	2016*	...................	65	Table	3-10	JKN	members,	based	on	type	of	membership	as	of	1	April	2018	..................................	67	Table	4-1	Characteristics	of	included	full-text	reviews	(N	=	10)	..........................................................	76	Table	4-2	Methodological	quality	of	the	included	reviews	based	on	AMSTAR	criteria	(N=10)	..................................................................................................................................................................................	78	Table	4-3	Methodological	quality	of	the	included	reviews	based	on	ROBIS	tools	(N=10)	........	78	Table	4-4	Quality	assessment	criteria	used	in	the	selected	studies	(N=10)	....................................	80	Table	4-5	Summary	of	Overall	Effect	from	Selected	Reviews	(N=10)	................................................	82	Table	5-1	Summary	of	studies	reporting	utilisation	of	health	care	(N=40),	by	countries	and	year	......................................................................................................................................................................	104	Table	5-2	Summary	of	studies	reporting	financial	protection	outcome	(N=46)	.........................	110	Table	5-3	Summary	of	studies	reporting	health	status	(N=12)	..........................................................	117	Table	6-1	Summary	of	The	Included	Studies	from	the	Updated	Review	(N	=	68)	......................	133	Table	7-1	Summary	of	utilisation	profiles,	by	year	and	insurance	status	......................................	166	Table	7-2	Descriptive	statistics	for	control	variables,	by	year	and	insurance	status	................	167	1Table	7-3	Naive	estimator	for	utilisation	of	health	care	......................................................................	169	Table	7-4	Comparison	of	the	bias	across	different	matching	techniques	(command	=	psmatch2	and	pstest)	...................................................................................................................................	172	Table	7-5	Average	treatment	effects	on	treated	(ATT)	estimates	for	both	contributory	and	subsidised	groups	relative	to	the	uninsured	.....................................................................................	175	Table	7-6	PSM-DID	findings	on	the	impact	of	health	insurance	on	both	the	subsidised	and	contributory	groups,	by	socioeconomic	status	quintiles	and	urban/rural	location	........	177	Table	7-7	Heterogeneity	of	the	JKN	impact,	by	density	of	health	care	facilities	..........................	178	Table	7-8	Sensitivity	analysis	to	different	matching	bandwidths	for	Kernel	Epanechnikov	.	180	
	 10	
Table	7-9	Placebo	test	from	IFLS	2000	..........................................................................................................	180	Table	7-10	Sensitivity	analysis	of	the	JKN	effect	on	inpatient	utilisation,	by	the	year	of	interview	...........................................................................................................................................................	182	Table	8-1	Descriptive	statistics	for	OOP	Health	Expenditure	in	2007	and	2014,	in	Indonesian	Rupiah	(IDR)	....................................................................................................................................................	195	Table	8-2	Regression	table	of	raw/untransformed	OOP	health	expenditure	in	2014	..............	196	Table	8-3	Regression	table	of	the	two-part	model	analysis	on	OOP	health	expenditure	in	2014	...............................................................................................................................................................................	198	Table	8-4	Results	of	the	PSM-DID	analysis	of	the	impact	of	the	JKN	programme	on	OOP	health	expenditure	......................................................................................................................................................	200	Table	8-5	Impact	of	JKN	on	health	care	spending,	by	asset	index	quintiles	(Q1	=	poorest;	Q5	=	richest)	and	urban/rural	area	..................................................................................................................	200	Table	8-6	Descriptive	statistics	of	IFLS	household	data,	2007–2014	..............................................	202	Table	8-7	The	estimated	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	household	OOP	health	expenditure	...............................................................................................................................................................................	204	Table	8-8	The	estimated	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	catastrophic	health	expenditure	(CHE)	incidence	(in	%)	...............................................................................................................................	205	Table	8-9	The	impact	of	JKN	on	OOP	health	expenditure	(in	IDR)	and	CHE	incidence	(in	%)	stratified	by	socioeconomic	status	quintile	and	urban/rural	area	..........................................	206	Table	9-1	Descriptive	table	of	hypertension	rates,	by	year	and	insurance	status	......................	228	Table	9-2	Descriptive	table	of	control	variables,	by	year	and	insurance	status	..........................	229	Table	9-3	Blood	pressure	and	hypertension	rate	in	2007	and	2014	across	wealth	quintiles	and	urban/rural	area,	all	three	groups	(contributory,	subsidised,	and	uninsured)	........	230	Table	9-4	Effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	blood	pressure	(Outcome	variables:	Systolic	and	Diastolic	in	mmHg)	.......................................................................................................................................	236	Table	9-5	Effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	prevalence,	awareness,	treatment,	and	control	of	hypertension	(OLS	estimation)	...............................................................................................................	237	Table	9-6	Effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	prevalence,	awareness,	treatment,	and	control	of	hypertension	(Logit	estimation)	.............................................................................................................	238	Table	9-7	The	effect	of	JKN	programme	estimated	by	PSM-DID	........................................................	240	Table	9-8	Heterogeneity	of	the	JKN	effect,	by	urban/rural	area	and	socioeconomic	status	(OLS	estimation)	............................................................................................................................................	241	Table	9-9	Placebo	test	of	the	JKN	effect	on	systolic	and	diastolic	......................................................	242		
	 	
	 11	
List	of	Figures	
	Figure	2-1	Revenue	sources	and	contribution	mechanisms.	Source:	WHO	(2017)	.....................	29	Figure	3-1	Indonesia	map	......................................................................................................................................	39	Figure	3-2	Population	Pyramid	in	1970,	2010	and	2050	(the	projection	for	2050	is	represented	by	a	dashed	line).	...................................................................................................................	40	Figure	3-3	Health	expenditure	per	capita	converted	using	2011	purchasing	power	rates	(PPP),	Southeast	Asia	(SEA)	countries	in	2014.	Source:	World	Development	Indicators	(World	Bank,	2018)	........................................................................................................................................	46	Figure	3-4	Annual	average	growth	rate	of	health	expenditure	per	capita	(in	PPP	international	$),	Southeast	Asian	(SEA)	countries	1995–2014.	Source:	World	Development	Indicators	(World	Bank,	2018)	........................................................................................................................................	46	Figure	3-5	Total	health	expenditure	as	a	%	of	GDP	among	Southeast	Asian	(SEA)	countries	in	2014.	Source:	World	Development	Indicators,	The	World	Bank	(2018)	................................	47	Figure	3-6	Government	expenditure	on	health	as	a	share	of	total	government	expenditure,	Southeast	Asian	countries	in	2014.	Source:	World	Development	Indicators,	The	World	Bank	(2018)	.......................................................................................................................................................	48	Figure	3-7	Out-of-pocket	health	expenditure	as	a	%	of	THE,	Southeast	Asian	(SEA)	countries	in	2014	..................................................................................................................................................................	49	Figure	3-8	Out-of-pocket	health	expenditure	as	a	%	of	THE,	selected	Southeast	Asian	(SEA)	countries	from	1995–2014	..........................................................................................................................	49	Figure	3-9	Administrative	structure	of	Indonesia	(the	terms	in	brackets	indicate	the	leader	of	the	named	area)	...............................................................................................................................................	50	Figure	3-10	Structure	of	the	public-sector	health	care	system	in	Indonesia	..................................	51	Figure	3-11	Ratio	of	hospital	beds	in	Southeast	Asian	countries	(World	Bank,	2014)	..............	55	Figure	4-1	Flow	chart	for	included	and	excluded	systematic	reviews	following	recommendation	of	PRISMA	(Moher	et	al.,	2009)	.............................................................................	75	Figure	4-2	Pathway	from	health	insurance	leading	to	improvement	of	health	status	...............	92	Figure	5-1	PRISMA	flow	diagram	for	included	and	excluded	studies	..............................................	101	Figure	5-2	Summary	of	the	impact	of	health	insurance	on	access	to	care	.....................................	103	Figure	5-3	Summary	of	the	impact	of	health	insurance	on	financial	protection	.........................	110	Figure	5-4	Summary	of	the	impact	of	health	insurance	on	health	status	.......................................	116	Figure	7-1	Andersen’s	behavioural	model	of	access	to	care,	early	version	(Andersen,	1968).	................................................................................................................................................................................	150	Figure	7-2	The	behavioural	framework	of	access	to	care	(a	more	recent	model)	......................	152	Figure	7-3	Map	of	Indonesia	showing	IFLS	provinces	and	population	density	...........................	155	Figure	7-4	Summary	of	main	sample	from	IFLS	2007	and	2014	........................................................	155	Figure	7-5	Number	of	visits	by	type	of	care,	year	and	insurance	status	.........................................	166	Figure	7-6	Support	and	balance	after	kernel	matching	..........................................................................	173	
	 12	
Figure	8-1	Support	and	balance	after	propensity	score	matching	....................................................	199	Figure	8-2	Parallel	trend	for	OOP	health	expenditure	(in	IDR),	2000–2014	................................	207	Figure	9-1	Conceptual	model	of	the	relationships	between	health	insurance	and	health	status	...............................................................................................................................................................................	213	Figure	9-2	Scatterplot	of	measured	systolic	and	diastolic	....................................................................	215	Figure	9-3	Histogram	of	systolic	and	diastolic,	by	year	..........................................................................	216	Figure	9-4	Summary	of	hypertension	measurement	in	IFLS	2007	and	2014	..............................	219	Figure	9-5	Bias	reduction	from	propensity	score	matching	.................................................................	239 		 	
	 13	
Acknowledgement	I	am	very	grateful	to	both	of	my	thesis	supervisors,	Prof	Karen	Bloor	and	Dr	Shehzad	Ali	for	their	invaluable	advice	and	supervision	throughout	these	years.	They	have	been	very	patient	with	my	trial	and	error	in	writing	this	thesis.	I	am	also	very	grateful	to	Prof	Andrew	Jones	and	Prof	Martin	Bland	for	their	valuable	advices	on	methodological	aspect	of	this	thesis.	I	would	also	like	to	thank	numerous	people	working	within	the	Department,	particularly	Sally	Evans	and	Di	Stockdale,	members	of	the	Health	Services	and	Policy	Research	Group,	and	the	Contract	Research	Forum.			I	owe	my	gratitude	to	the	participants	of	the	3rd	Southeast	Asian	Studies	Symposium	2016	(Oxford,	UK),	the	3rd	Indonesian	Health	Economics	conference	(Yogyakarta,	Indonesia),	the	3rd	IRDES	workshop	on	Applied	Health	Economics	and	Policy	Evaluation	(Paris,	France),	the	International	Health	Economics	Association	Congress	2017	(Boston,	USA),	and	the	4th	European	Health	Economics	Conferences	(Lausanne,	Switzerland),	in	which	parts	of	this	research	work	was	presented.	The	comments	received	during	the	presentations	were	very	useful	to	this	project.			I	am	particularly	thankful	to	Lembaga	Pengelola	Dana	Pendidikan	(LPDP),	for	providing	me	with	the	funding	to	undertake	my	PhD	studies	at	University	of	York.	Without	their	support,	this	study	would	not	have	been	possible.		My	friends	at	the	University	of	York	have	provided	support	and	laughter	along	the	way.	I	would	like	to	thank	everyone	I	have	shared	an	office	with,	including,	Anna	Carnegie,	Hannah	Kershaw,	Suehyun	Noh,	Ana	Castro,	Eric	Hoddy,	Andy	Mprah,	Helen	Stinson,	Kyunghwan	Kim,	and	Helen	Anderson.	I	am	also	thankful	for	the	hospitality	from	the	Indonesian	society	at	University	of	York.	My	life	in	York	has	been	made	much	easier	with	their	support.			I	could	not	have	completed	this	thesis	without	the	support	of	my	mother	who	always	send	her	prayer	to	me.	Lastly,	I	am	very	grateful	for	my	partner,	Kris,	who	has	been	very	supportive	in	my	journey	completing	this	thesis.		 	
	 14	
Declaration		I	declare	that	this	thesis	is	a	presentation	of	my	original	work	and	I	am	the	sole	author.	This	work	has	not	previously	been	presented	for	an	award	at	this,	or	any	other,	University.	Information	included	from	other	sources	(e.g.	journal	articles	and	books)	has	been	fully	acknowledged	and	correctly	referenced.			Darius	Erlangga	September	2018			 	
	 15	
Chapter	1 	Introduction			In	recent	decades,	achieving	universal	health	coverage	(UHC)	has	been	a	major	health	policy	focus	globally	(UN	Economic	and	Social	Council,	2016;	Marten	et	al.,	2014;	Savedoff	et	al.,	2012).	The	inclusion	of	UHC	in	the	health	section	of	the	United	Nations	Sustainable	Development	Goals	(SDGs)1	has	created	renewed	momentum	for	national	health	insurance	schemes	(United	Nations,	2016).	Low-	and	middle-income	countries	(LMICs)	face	a	particular	challenge	in	achieving	UHC	due	to	poor	public	resources	for	health	care,	large	population	sizes	and	challenging	geographic	terrains	(World	Health	Organization,	2010b).	In	addition,	evidence	suggests	that	access	to	health	care	and	the	burden	of	financial	cost	in	LMICs	tend	to	be	worse	for	the	poor,	often	resulting	in	forgone	care	(Kankeu	et	al.,	2013;	ILO,	2008;	Stevens,	2004).	Considering	that	the	majority	of	the	global	poor	live	in	developing	countries,	the	progress	in	achieving	UHC	can,	therefore,	be	regarded	as	one	of	the	most	important	metrics	in	alleviating	extreme	poverty	and	improving	collective	welfare	(Cotlear	et	al.,	2015).			Three	key	problems	have	been	identified	by	LMICs	in	their	quest	to	moving	closer	to	UHC:	limited	resources,	over-reliance	on	direct	payments,	and	the	inefficient	and	inequitable	use	of	resources	(World	Health	Organization,	2010b).	Consequently,	there	is	a	greater	need	for	policy	makers	in	LMIC	countries	to	develop	a	more	innovative	health	financing	strategy,	taking	into	account	the	strengths	and	constraints	of	each	country.	In	the	past	two	decades,	many	innovative	health	financing	strategies	have	been	implemented	across	the	world	(Palmer	et	al.,	2004).	This	thesis,	however,	focuses	on	the	role	of	health	insurance.	Health	insurance	refers	to	the	pooling	of	pre-paid	funds	which	allows	for	the	transfer	of	risk	by	shifting	the	financial	consequences	of	utilising	health	services	from	one	individual	to	the	collective	pool	(Folland,	Goodman	and	Stano,	2014).	Health	insurance	can	be	financed	and	managed	in	various	ways.	Ultimately,	the	decision	about	the	type	of	health	financing	strategy	a	country	needs	to	implement	depends	largely	on	the	available	financing	resources	and	the	size	of	the	formal	sector	economy	from	which	taxes	and	payroll	contributions	can	be	collected	(Wang	et	al.,	2012).	Introducing	and																																																									
1	SDG	3.8	is	to	“achieve	universal	health	coverage,	including	financial	risk	protection,	access	to	quality	essential	health-care	services	and	access	to	safe,	effective,	quality	and	affordable	essential	medicines	and	vaccines	for	all”	(Source:	https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg3).	
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increasing	the	coverage	of	publicly	organised	and	financed	health	insurance	is	widely	seen	as	the	most	promising	way	of	achieving	UHC	(Jowett	and	Kutzin,	2015;	Maeda	et	al.,	2014),	since	private	insurance	is	mostly	unaffordable	for	the	poor	(Kutzin,	2012).			Indonesia	has	attempted	to	establish	national	health	insurance	since	the	beginning	of	the	20th	century.	In	January	2014,	the	government	launched	a	new	public	health	insurance	programme	called	Jaminan	Kesehatan	Nasional	(JKN)	with	the	aim	of	covering	100	percent	of	the	population.	Prior	to	this	reform,	only	selected	groups	within	the	population	had	access	to	health	insurance,	many	of	whom	either	worked	in	formal	sector	employment	or	were	eligible	to	receive	government	assistance	for	health	care	(Thabrany	and	Mundiharno,	2012).	The	formal	sector	enjoyed	better	health	insurance	coverage,	beginning	as	one	of	the	benefits	of	taking	up	an	employment.	Meanwhile,	the	poor	received	several	types	of	social	assistance	under	the	government’s	attempt	to	alleviate	poverty,	including	the	provision	of	health	insurance.			The	desire	to	bring	all	public	health	insurance	schemes	together	never	became	a	national	priority.	The	economic	crisis	in	1997–1998,	when	the	value	of	Indonesia’s	currency	(IDR)	dropped	dramatically	within	six	months	from	IDR	2,000	for	1US$	to	IDR	20,000	for	1	US$,	triggered	a	reformation	era	that	brought	significant	restructuring	to	numerous	supporting	systems	in	Indonesia,	including	its	health	care	system	(Waters,	Saadah	and	Pradhan,	2003;	Sadli,	1998).	One	of	the	most	historic	steps	in	Indonesian	health	care	reform	was	the	ratification	of	the	National	Social	Security	Act	in	2004,	guaranteeing	the	provision	of	medical	care	and	access	to	pensions	and	life	insurance	(Thabrany,	2012).	Indonesia’s	constitution	mandates	that	everyone	shall	have	the	right	to	obtain	medical	care.	Thus,	the	ultimate	aim	of	this	new	reform	is	to	extend	health	insurance	coverage	to	everyone,	including	non-poor	people	who	work	in	the	informal	sector,	who	had	been	overlooked	prior	to	the	introduction	of	JKN	programme.	This	thesis	is	aiming	to	evaluate	whether	the	JKN	programme	has	been	successful	in	meeting	its	objectives.				
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Evaluating	the	effectiveness	of	health	insurance,	however,	is	not	straightforward	because	those	who	are	insured	may	have	different	characteristics	that	also	influence	health	care	consumption.	This	is	often	called	insurance	selection	bias.	The	proper	evaluation	of	health	insurance	needs	to	control	this	insurance	selection	bias	in	order	to	establish	the	causal	effect	of	health	insurance(Ali,	Cookson	and	Dusheiko,	2017).	In	statistics,	the	gold	standard	for	impact	evaluation	is	the	randomised	study.	Randomisation,	if	done	correctly,	is	able	to	eliminate	any	confounding	factor,	including	insurance	selection	bias.	Randomised	studies	are	very	common	in	medicine,	but	their	application	in	health	policy	evaluation	is	still	limited	in	developing	countries.	If	the	health	programme	of	interest	has	been	implemented	nationally,	a	randomised	study	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	that	programme	is	no	longer	feasible.	Therefore,	non-randomised	studies	can	still	have	their	place	in	informing	policymakers	of	the	health	policy’s	impact.	The	use	of	longitudinal	data	in	non-randomised	studies	can	also	improve	the	robustness	of	the	findings,	although	it	is	more	data-intensive	than	using	cross-sectional	data	(Jones	and	Rice,	2011).			For	the	reason	mentioned	above,	this	thesis	will	focus	on	the	impact	of	the	JKN	programme	on	newly-insured	individuals,	who	were	previously	uninsured	in	the	baseline	period	and	enrolled	in	the	JKN	programme	in	the	follow-up	year.	For	the	analysis,	the	Indonesia	Family	Life	Survey	(IFLS)	–	the	only	longitudinal	data	available	in	Indonesia	that	covers	the	periods	before	and	after	the	introduction	of	the	JKN	programme	–	will	be	employed.	The	rich	information	provided	by	the	IFLS	data	enables	the	identification	of	the	insurance	status	of	individuals	over	time.	IFLS	data	also	provide	a	great	amount	of	information	on	health	care	utilisation,	health	expenditure,	and	health	status	at	an	individual	level	(Strauss,	Witoelar	and	Sikoki,	2016).	Furthermore,	the	IFLS	survey	collected	information	of	the	availability	of	health	care	facilities	and	characteristics	of	the	community	which	may	provide	additional	supply-side	control	for	health	insurance	analysis.			Demand	for	health	insurance	is	generated	by	the	need	to	access	medical	care	that	is	not	affordable	in	the	absence	of	health	insurance	(Folland,	Goodman	and	Stano,	2014).	When	an	individual	already	has	access	to	health	care	services,	the	next	step	is	to	decrease	the	loss	of	income	due	to	increased	use	of	medical	treatment.	By	meeting	the	demand	for	health	care	without	incurring	excessive	expenditure,	it	is	expected	
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that	there	will	be	an	improvement	in	an	individual’s	health	(Comfort,	Peterson	and	Hatt,	2013).	Therefore,	the	purpose	of	this	thesis	is	to	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	the	JKN	programme	by	focusing	on	three	broader	objectives:	1. Access	to	health	care	measured	by	utilisation	of	health	care	services	2. Financial	protection	measured	by	out-of-pocket	(OOP)	health	expenditure	and	catastrophic	health	expenditure	3. Health	status	looking	at	blood	pressure	and	hypertension	rate		I	identify	several	key	gaps	in	the	literature	in	the	context	of	Indonesia:	
• A	lack	of	health	insurance	studies	that	analyse	inpatient	care	services	in	Indonesia,	even	though	this	outcome	is	likely	to	be	more	sensitive	to	the	presence	of	health	insurance.		
• OOP	health	expenditure	analyses	in	Indonesia	have	not	looked	at	self-treatment	expenditure.	
• No	study	has	looked	at	the	impact	of	health	insurance	on	health	status	in	Indonesia.	
• This	is	the	first	study	to	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	the	JKN	programme	using	IFLS	data.			This	thesis	is	organised	into	10	chapters:		1) Chapter	2	provides	an	overview	of	basic	health	insurance	theories,	then	proceeds	to	discuss	it	into	health	financing	system	in	LMICs	with	specific	reference	to	the	context	in	Indonesia.		2) Chapter	3	presents	the	background	information	of	Indonesia	followed	by	the	history	of	the	health	insurance	programme	before	and	after	the	1998	economic	crisis,	and	the	detail	of	the	JKN	programme.		3) Chapters	4	and	5	present	a	systematic	review	of	the	effect	of	health	insurance	in	LMICs	in	terms	of	access	to	care,	financial	protection	and	health	status.	In	chapter	4,	I	provide	an	overview	of	the	systematic	review	and	identify	the	review	which	has	the	best	quality	among	the	selected	reviews.	The	search	strategy	of	the	chosen	best	review	is	updated	to	include	more	recent	evidence	and	its	findings	are	presented	in	chapter	5.		
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4) Next,	chapter	6	will	present	an	overview	of	regression	method	to	deal	with	non-normally	distributed	variables.	Then,	it	will	describe	the	difficulties	of	selection	bias	in	health	insurance	evaluation	study	and	explain	statistical	methods	that	may	overcome	this	bias,	informed	by	the	review	of	the	literature	in	chapter	5.		5) Chapters	7	to	9	present	the	empirical	results	of	the	JKN	programme	evaluation	analysis.	Chapter	7	examines	the	JKN	effect	on	utilisation	of	health	care	at	the	individual	level.	Chapter	8	analyses	the	effect	on	OOP	health	expenditure	at	both	individual	and	household	levels	and	the	incidence	of	catastrophic	health	expenditure	at	household	level.	Chapter	9	explores	the	impact	of	JKN	on	blood	pressure	and	hypertension	in	terms	of	prevalence,	awareness,	treatment	and	controlled	rate.		6) Finally,	Chapter	10	concludes	with	a	discussion	of	the	JKN	effect	on	health	care	utilisation,	financial	protection	and	health	status	in	Indonesia	based	on	the	current	health	care	systems	and	the	empirical	studies	provided	in	the	previous	chapters,	with	a	view	to	drawing	policy	implications	for	the	future	improvement	of	health	care	financing.	In	addition,	study	limitations	are	discussed	and	suggestions	for	further	studies	are	provided.				 	
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Chapter	2 	Theories	in	health	insurance	This	chapter	will	provide	an	overview	of	health	insurance	theories	including	the	demand	for	health	insurance,	moral	hazard,	adverse	selection,	and	the	need	for	governments	to	intervene	in	the	provision	of	health	insurance.	Furthermore,	it	will	give	an	overview	of	the	most	common	health	insurance	systems	in	the	low-	to	middle-income	countries	(LMICs),	with	a	special	focus	on	social	health	insurance	because	it	has	been	adopted	by	Indonesia	to	extend	health	insurance	coverage	to	the	poor	and	workers	in	the	informal	sector.				
Section	2.1 Health	insurance	characteristics	
2.1.1 Demand	for	health	insurance	When	faced	with	random	events	of	illness,	individuals	often	encounter	situations	in	which	they	are	required	to	spend	unpredictable	sums	of	money	to	restore	their	health,	to	as	close	to	their	condition	before	the	illness.	In	order	to	protect	their	income	from	unpredictable	shocks	relating	to	illness,	individuals	can	either	borrow	money	from	a	financial	institution	or	their	family,	or	set	aside	a	proportion	of	their	income	into	savings	(Brown	and	Churchill,	1999).	Borrowing	money	might	not	be	a	viable	option	for	the	poor	since	credit	institutions	tend	to	have	less	confidence	in	the	poor’s	ability	to	settle	loans.	Savings	might	be	sustainable	for	dealing	with	minor	illness,	but	not	suitable	for	more	catastrophic	medical	bills	(for	example,	heart	surgery	or	stroke	management),	even	for	more	affluent	individuals.	Individuals	might	also	need	to	curtail	a	big	proportion	of	their	consumption	to	pay	off	sizeable	medical	bills	when	they	have	no	insurance	(Cutler	and	Zeckhauser,	2000).	With	its	ability	to	pool	the	risk	from	other	individuals,	insurance	is	superior	to	protect	one’s	consumption	pattern	from	unpredictable	illness	consequences.	Thus,	a	demand	for	health	insurance	can	be	seen	as	a	demand	for	certainty	to	cover	the	costs	of	seeking	medical	treatment	(Friedman	and	Savage,	1948).			In	the	event	of	random	illness,	insurance	is	able	to	pool	the	risk	of	financial	impact	due	to	illness	and	make	the	risk	more	predictable	by	requiring	individuals	to	pay	a	small	fixed	premium	upfront	(Blomqvist,	2011,	p.258).	This	is	one	of	the	most	attractive	features	of	insurance;	insurance	is	able	to	reduce	the	financial	risk	for	one	
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person	and	spread	the	risk	to	everyone	else	in	the	pool.	In	other	words,	insurance	is	able	to	transfer	income	from	the	healthy	pool	to	the	sick	pool	while	still	maximising	total	utility	(Nyman,	2003;	Cutler	and	Zeckhauser,	2000).			Assuming	the	premium	is	set	at	an	actuarially	fair	price,	the	expected	utility	theory	predicts	that	when	the	expected	utility	of	insurance	exceeds	the	expected	utility	of	no	insurance,	an	individual	will	purchase	such	insurance	(Mas-Colell,	Whinston	and	Green,	1995,	pp.	187–188).	However,	the	decision	to	purchase	health	insurance	also	depends	on	people’s	willingness	to	pay	for	the	insurance,	which	is	influenced	by	the	value	of	marginal	medical	care	to	one’s	utility	and	the	financial	risk	avoided	(Manning	and	Marquis,	1996).	In	a	study	assessing	the	relationship	between	premium	reduction	and	participation	in	employer-sponsored	health	plans	by	low-income	workers,	a	lower	premium	increased	participation	in	health	insurance	plans,	but	even	full	subsidies	did	not	induce	all	workers	to	purchase	health	insurance	(Chernew,	Frick	and	Mclaughlin,	1997).	It	is	suggested	that	how	people	value	their	healthy	times	in	their	life	can	also	interfere	with	the	value	of	health	insurance	(Cutler	and	Zeckhauser,	2000).	If	individuals	place	little	value	on	money	when	sick,	health	insurance	becomes	unnecessary.	In	an	extreme	case,	some	individuals	may	still	hold	a	traditional	belief	that	favours	non-materialistic	well-being	which	reduces	the	need	for	money.	In	a	less	extreme	case,	individuals	may	not	have	choices	about	the	pleasurable	activities	they	can	engage	in,	thus	making	them	indifferent	to	whether	they	are	sick	or	not.			
2.1.2 Moral	hazard		Moral	hazard	describes	any	change	in	consumer	behaviour	occurring	in	response	to	the	decision	to	insure	(Pauly,	1968).	Through	the	pooling	of	risk,	health	insurance	decreases	the	marginal	costs	of	medical	care	to	consumers	and	consumers	anticipate	this	price	reduction	by	utilising	more	health	care	services	(Folland,	Goodman	and	Stano,	2014).	Consumers,	therefore,	tend	to	overuse	care,	more	than	they	would	have	if	they	were	paying	for	the	medical	care	at	full	cost	by	themselves.	However,	the	cost	of	medical	care	stays	the	same	for	the	health	provider.	Thus,	the	additional	health	care	consumed	is	less	than	the	actual	cost	which	reflects	a	welfare	loss	(Cutler	and	Zeckhauser,	2000).		
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	In	classic	insurance	theory,	the	cost	sharing	mechanism	is	an	economic	incentive	to	discourage	moral	hazard	(Folland,	Goodman	and	Stano,	2014).	This	incentive	may	include	coinsurance,	co-payment	and	deductibles.	Coinsurance	refers	to	the	percentage	of	medical	bills	paid	by	the	insured;	co-payment	refers	to	the	fixed	payment	paid	by	the	insured	per	one	use	of	care;	and	deductible	refers	to	the	minimum	amount	the	consumer	has	to	pay	out-of-pocket	before	the	insurer	covers	the	bills.	The	requirement	of	cost	sharing	discourages	unnecessary	claims	or	visits	by	alerting	the	insured	to	the	true	costs	of	purchased	medical	treatment.			Empirical	evidence	regarding	moral	hazard	comes	from	the	Rand	Health	Insurance	Experiment	that	randomised	the	participants	into	different	insurance	plans	ranging	from	zero	cost	sharing	to	80	percent	cost	sharing.	Participants	with	cost	sharing	made	one	to	two	fewer	physician	visits	annually	and	had	20	percent	fewer	hospitalisations	than	those	with	no	cost	sharing	(Manning	et	al.,	1987).	The	magnitude	of	moral	hazard	is	therefore	positively	related	to	the	generosity	of	the	insurance	(Manning	and	Marquis,	1996;	Zeckhauser,	1970).	Thus,	it	creates	a	tension	between	offering	a	more	generous	plan	which	provides	better	financial	protection	and	placing	stricter	cost	sharing	mechanisms	to	reduce	moral	hazard.	The	use	of	cost-sharing	also	receives	some	criticism	as	it	may	prevent	the	consumption	of	necessary	care	(Fels,	2017),	in	particular	among	low-income	households	(Kim,	Ko	and	Yang,	2005;	Lohr	et	al.,	1986,	pp.20–28;	Beck,	1974)	and	chronically-ill	populations	(Hsu	et	al.,	2006).			The	conventional	concept	of	moral	hazard	applies	to	certain	routine	medical	treatments	for	minor	illness	or	elective	surgeries	(Pauly,	1983).	For	example,	an	insured	individual	may	visit	the	outpatient	clinic	more	often	to	seek	treatments	for	conditions	such	as	colds	and	headaches	which	can	otherwise	be	treated	with	over-the-counter	medicine	from	a	pharmacy.	An	insured	pregnant	woman	with	no	complications	might	also	elect	for	a	caesarean	birth	but	choose	differently	if	she	did	not	have	the	insurance.	However,	this	theory	is	not	appropriate	in	explaining	the	demand	for	treatment	of	major	illness	because	it	implies	that	a	healthy	insured	
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individual	would	also	demand	more	open	heart	surgery,	for	example,	just	because	the	insurance	reduces	its	price	to	zero	(Nyman,	2003).			An	alternative	to	the	conventional	understanding	of	moral	hazard	described	above	is	the	concept	of	essential	moral	hazard.	Nyman	(1999)	proposed	that	health	insurance	is	also	a	demand	for	an	income	transfer	from	the	healthy	to	the	ill.	The	insured	individuals	would	gain	additional	benefits	from	the	transferred	income	when	they	became	ill.	This	income	transfer	therefore	allows	the	insured	to	gain	access	to	health	care	that	would	be	otherwise	unaffordable	(Nyman,	2003).	Considering	the	above	example	of	open-heart	surgery,	its	prices	may	fall	for	all	who	purchase	health	insurance,	but	only	those	who	have	a	heart	condition	will	respond	to	this	price	reduction.	Since	only	the	ill	consume	more	medical	care	due	to	this	income	transfer,	the	additional	care	generates	a	welfare	gain.	Furthermore,	Nyman’s	theory	assumes	that	the	loss	of	income	by	the	healthy	would	not	generate	substantial	reductions	in	health	care	consumption,	assuming	the	income	elasticity	of	the	healthy	is	close	to	zero.			There	have	been	very	few	empirical	studies	that	test	the	argument	for	efficient	moral	hazard.	A	simulation	study	using	the	Medical	Expenditure	Panel	Survey	of	the	American	population	showed	empirical	evidence	of	efficient	moral	hazard	but	it	varies	from	one	disease	to	another,	with	diabetes	and	cancer	having	the	largest	proportion	of	efficient	moral	hazard	(Nyman	et	al.,	2018).	Another	study	argued	that	inefficiency	caused	by	moral	hazard	is	influenced	by	the	severity	of	the	illness	and	this	correlation	is	likely	to	be	parabolic:	less	problematic	for	minor	and	major	conditions	but	most	problematic	for	intermediate	cases	(Eisenhauer,	2006).			While	the	above	discussion	has	only	focused	on	the	moral	hazard	generated	by	the	consumer,	there	is	also	the	threat	of	provider-generated	moral	hazard,	especially	in	a	health	system	that	still	uses	the	fee-for-service	method	as	its	provider	payment	system.	It	is	also	often	called	supplier	induced	demand	(SID).	While	a	doctor	acts	as	the	agent	of	the	patient	by	helping	in	the	interpretation	of	the	patient’s	signs	and	symptoms,	and	delivering	the	medical	treatment	to	cure	the	patient’s	condition,	the	doctor	is	also	a	supplier	whose	income	is	related	to	the	volume	of	services	delivered	
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(Fuchs,	1978).	In	a	fee-for-service	setting,	it	creates	strong	economic	incentives	for	the	doctors	to	overprescribe	their	services	and	influence	patients’	decisions	towards	services	which	yield	the	highest	revenue	(Evans,	1974).			Empirical	data	on	SID	has	attracted	debate	among	the	experts	(Rice	and	Labelle,	1989;	Feldman	and	Sloan,	1988).	Early	evidence	showed	that	the	increased	availability	of	surgeons	significantly	affected	surgery	rates	(Cromwell	and	Mitchell,	1986;	Evans,	1974),	but	those	studies	have	been	criticised	for	having	flawed	econometric	specifications	so	that	the	evidence	of	supplied-induced	demand	is	confounded	by	other	coefficients	(Feldman	and	Sloan,	1988;	Auster	and	Oaxaca,	1981).	More	recent	evidence	showed	that,	on	average,	a	1	percent	increase	in	the	supply	of	doctors	will	result	in	a	0.46	percent	increase	in	the	quantity	of	services	demanded	(Peacock	and	Richardson,	2007).	However,	this	induced	demand	may	not	always	harm	the	patients:	a	study	in	Norway	found	that	increased	availability	of	physicians	is	associated	with	greater	consumer	satisfaction,	assuming	it	is	a	good	proxy	to	measure	patient’s	utility	(Carlsen	and	Grytten,	2000).			In	the	context	of	Indonesia,	moral	hazard	due	to	the	JKN	programme	may	pose	a	problem	in	overcrowding	the	public	health	facilities,	both	primary	care	clinic	and	hospitals.	However,	it	can	also	be	argued	that	the	moral	hazard	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	may	be	efficient	instead	as	it	may	help	its	enrolees	access	the	care	that	would	have	been	unaffordable	without	the	insurance.	In	addition,	supplier-induced	demand	may	not	be	problematic	in	the	context	of	Indonesia	because	the	JKN	programme	does	not	use	fee-for-service	payment	system	to	reimburse	the	costs	of	medical	treatment	consumed	by	its	enrolees.			
2.1.3 Adverse	selection	Adverse	selection	is	the	consequence	of	asymmetric	information	between	the	consumers,		who	know	more	about	their	expected	health	expenditure	in	the	future,	and	the	insurer,	which	is	assumed	to	have	no	means	of	predicting	the	health	status	of	the	consumers	(Rothschild	and	Stiglitz,	1976;	Akerlof,	1970).	Sicker	consumers	will	be	attracted	to	the	insurance	plan	which	provides	more	generous	benefits,	while	the	healthier	consumers	prefer	to	enrol	in	a	plan	with	lower	premiums	compensating	for	
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less	generous	benefits.	Thus,	the	higher	health	risks	tend	to	drive	out	the	lower	health	risks	from	the	market.	Adverse	selection	therefore	creates	three	types	of	inefficiencies	(Cutler	and	Zeckhauser,	1998):		
• Firstly,	the	premium	will	not	be	set	at	the	marginal	costs	for	the	consumers.	Adverse	selection	forces	the	more	generous	plans	to	increase	their	premium	to	compensate	for	higher	risk	pooling.		
• Secondly,	risk	spreading	is	no	longer	effective.	The	higher	premium	due	to	adverse	selection	further	deters	healthier	people	from	joining	the	more	generous	plan.	Assuming	no	intervention	from	the	government,	the	insurance	market	would	be	divided	into	two	ends	in	which	low-risk	and	high-risk	individuals	are	separated	from	each	other	(Blomqvist,	2011).	The	high-risk	would	have	to	pay	higher	premiums	to	the	point	that	it	is	no	longer	affordable,	leaving	them	unprotected.		
• Thirdly,	the	insurer	may	manipulate	or	alter	their	benefits	in	order	to	deter	the	sick	and	attract	the	healthier.	The	insurer	has	an	incentive	to	distort	their	benefits	in	order	to	gain	more	profits	by	enrolling	greater	numbers	of	healthier	people.	The	under	provision	of	services	to	high-risk	patients	is	often	termed	‘skimping’	while	‘cream-skimming’	refers	to	the	over	provision	of	services	to	low-risk	patients	(Ellis,	1998).	Consequently,	the	surviving	insurance	plans	would	only	offer	limited	benefits	which	means	that	the	high-risk	individuals	have	no	protection	against	more	catastrophic	medical	bills	(Blomqvist,	2011).			Cutler	and	Zeckhauser	(1998)	provided	an	example	of	classic	adverse	selection	from	a	case	study	on	employer-sponsored	insurance	plans	for	employees	in	an	American	private	university.	The	first	plan	adopted	a	Preferred	Provider	Organisation	(PPO)	system	which	offered	more	freedom	to	see	any	GPs	and	specialists	without	referral,	whereas	the	second	plan	adopted	a	Health	Maintenance	Organisation	(HMO)	system	which	provided	managed	care	to	their	enrolees.	Following	a	series	of	university	policies	to	contain	the	rapidly-rising	health	care	expenditure,	the	HMO	plan	was	able	to	reduce	their	premium	while	the	PPO	plan	kept	their	premium	constant.	As	a	result,	the	enrolment	rate	for	the	PPO	plan	dropped	from	20	percent	to	9	percent	within	two	years	and	those	who	switched	to	the	HMO	plan	were	healthier	and	younger	than	those	who	remained.	The	PPO	plan	consequently	collapsed	due	to	unsustainable	risk	
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pooling	and	rising	health	care	costs.	Adverse	selection	creates	a	death	spiral	which	will	force	a	riskier	plan	out	of	business	(Cutler	and	Zeckhauser,	1998).			Voluntary	health	insurance	models,	including	community-based	health	insurance	which	has	become	popular	among	LMICs	in	recent	decades,	are	more	susceptible	to	adverse	selection	and	therefore	suffer	from	low	enrolment	rates	(Carrin,	2003,	pp.6–11).	Wang	et	al.	(2006)	documented	adverse	selection	in	the	voluntary	health	insurance	scheme	for	the	rural	population	in	China.	The	scheme	used	the	household	as	the	unit	for	enrolment	to	reduce	adverse	selection,	but	the	scheme	only	allowed	partial	enrolment.	The	authors	found	that	the	non-enrolled	individuals	in	the	partially-enrolled	households	were	healthier	compared	to	the	enrolled	individuals	in	the	partially-enrolled	households	(Wang	et	al.,	2006).	Furthermore,	the	government	subsidy	to	encourage	enrolment	among	the	poor	did	not	help	to	reduce	inequity	in	enrolment	(Zhang	and	Wang,	2008).			The	case	for	adverse	selection	in	Indonesia	may	be	more	problematic	than	moral	hazard.	Since	the	JKN	programme	accepts	voluntary	membership	without	restriction	on	pre-existing	condition,	sicker	individuals	are	more	likely	to	enrol	and	consume	more	medical	care.	Compulsory	enrolment	may	alleviate	this	adverse	selection	problem,	but	it	may	be	proven	difficult	to	enforce	it	in	Indonesia	considering	the	decentralisation	system	adopted	since	early	2000s.	More	discussion	about	the	background	of	Indonesia	political	and	health	system	will	be	explained	in	Chapter	3.			
2.1.4 Government	intervention	in	demand	for	health	insurance		The	health	care	market	is	beset	with	asymmetric	information	among	consumers,	health	providers	and	insurers,	and	it	thus	creates	an	adverse	selection	problem.	This	asymmetric	information	also	prompts	supplier	induced	demand	in	which	the	health	providers	have	an	incentive	to	prescribe	more	health	care	services	to	primarily	increase	their	income.	In	addition,	certain	health	issues	often	have	externalities,	such	as	vaccinations,	smoking	and	obesity	(Cutler,	2002,	pp.	2146–2147).	Therefore,	private	market	in	health	care	may	create	inefficiencies	and	welfare-decreasing	for	the	society.	A	government	may	be	capable	of	allocating	resources	more	efficiently	or	of	
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distributing	income	more	equitably	compared	to	the	private	health	care	market	(Stiglitz,	1989).			Two	general	economic	theories	explain	the	motivation	for	governmental	intervention	in	health	care	systems.	The	first	is	the	public	interest	theory	in	which	a	government	attempts	to	fix	market	failure	in	order	to	increase	efficiency	and	equity	(Santerre	and	Neun,	2010,	p.	248).	However,	government	intervention	is	predicted	to	create	more	inefficiencies	and	inequity.	The	second	theory	is	the	special	interest	group	theory	in	which	the	politicians	in	power	have	an	incentive	to	implement	policies	that	support	special	interest	groups,	shifting	the	wealth	away	from	the	general	public	(Becker,	1983).	Even	though	a	group	of	consumers	can	have	a	large	number	of	members,	individuals	in	a	special	interest	group	are	collectively	more	powerful,	more	organised	and	share	a	common	single	interest.	In	the	real	world,	it	is	likely	that	governments	are	motivated	for	both	reasons	(Santerre	and	Neun,	2010).			In	the	context	of	Indonesia,	both	reasons	are	equally	likely	in	influencing	the	establishment	of	a	unified	public	health	insurance	system.	Acknowledging	the	importance	of	safety	net	for	the	most	vulnerable	after	the	monetary	crisis	in	1998	and	the	failure	of	existing	government-run	health	insurance	system	in	covering	the	informal	workers	who	are	more	likely	to	be	uninsured,	the	government	passed	the	
SJSN	Law	No.	40/2004	as	the	first	law	regulating	the	establishment	of	the	Social	Security	System	in	Indonesia	that	includes	health	insurance	and	pension.	However,	various	stakeholders	in	employer	associations	challenged	the	implementation	of	this	law.	They	opposed	the	mandatory	nature	of	the	system	arguing	that	it	would	hurt	their	businesses	by	placing	more	burdens	on	them	in	addition	to	the	current	contribution	for	social	security	(Thabrany,	2012).	Instead,	they	proposed	that	the	market	system	should	provide	the	health	insurance.	The	implementation	of	the	SJSN	law	was	further	delayed	by	a	long	debate	among	existing	public	health	insurance	providers	on	who	would	administer	the	national	social	security	programme.	This	political	debate	among	various	vested	interest	parties	was	responsible	for	the	late	establishment	of	the	solid	social	security	programme	in	Indonesia	(Aspinall,	2014)			
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A	government	may	act	as	a	provider	of	health	insurance	or	impose	regulations	on	the	existing	health	insurance	market.	The	WHO	has	advocated	for	a	greater	government	role	in	ensuring	that	everyone	has	access	to	health	care	services	and	does	not	experience	a	catastrophic	financial	event	associated	with	access	to	care	(World	Health	Organization,	2010a).	This	is	often	described	as	universal	health	coverage	(UHC).	There	are	four	guiding	principles	in	the	development	of	a	health	financing	system	capable	of	delivering	UHC:	revenue	raising,	pooling	revenues,	purchasing	services,	and	benefit	design	and	rationing	mechanisms.	In	the	context	of	this	thesis,	I	will	focus	in	more	detail	on	the	role	of	the	government	in	raising	and	pooling	revenues.		
Section	2.2 Health	financing	system	in	the	low-	and	middle-income	
countries	
	
Figure	2-1	Revenue	sources	and	contribution	mechanisms.	Source:	WHO	(2017)		Figure	2-1	presents	an	overview	of	the	major	revenue	sources	and	contribution	mechanisms.	Populations	contribute	to	health	financing	systems	either	by	paying	out-of-pocket	at	the	point	of	use	or	making	a	pre-payment	in	advance	and	in	exchange	for	full	or	partial	coverage	against	future	health	expenditure.	In	general,	health	insurance	schemes	can	be	managed	by	either	the	public	or	private	sector.	
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Premium	contributions	for	private	insurance	are	typically	voluntary,	whereas	public	insurance	generates	revenues	from	either	mandatory	pre-payment	or	taxes,	which	can	be	direct	taxes	or	indirect	taxes.	In	addition,	private	insurance	may	impose	cost-sharing	mechanisms	to	discourage	excessive	use	of	health	care	services	(i.e.	moral	hazard)	and	this	type	of	payment	contributes	to	out-of-pocket	payment.	Public	insurance	can	also	charge	some	cost	sharing	but	only	at	the	margins	and	it	is	aimed	to	generate	more	revenue	rather	than	to	discourage	use	of	care	(Chalkley	and	Robinson,	1997,	pp.	28–29).	Informal	or	unofficial	payment	also	contributes	to	out-of-pocket	payment,	particularly	in	developing	countries	and	countries	undergoing	economic	transitions	(Ensor,	2004;	Lewis,	2007).		Gottret	and	Schieber	(2006)	described	four	types	of	health	insurance	that	are	commonly	used	in	LMIC	to	raise	revenues	and	pool	risks:	1. State-funded	systems	or	general	tax-funded	systems	2. Community-based	health	insurance	3. Private	health	insurance	4. Social	health	insurance		In	this	section,	I	will	briefly	explain	the	characteristics,	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	each	type	and	provide	more	detail	on	social	health	insurance	as	this	is	the	type	of	insurance	that	is	being	implemented	in	Indonesia.		
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Table	2-1	Characteristics	of	health	insurance	systems	
Type	of	
insurance	
Revenues	
sources	
Nature	of	
contributions	
Earmarked	
for	health?	
Membership	
State-funded	
insurance	
Direct/Indirect	taxes	 Mandatory	(taxpayers)	 No	 All	citizens	
Community-
based	health	
insurance	
Prepayment	premium	 Voluntary	 Yes	 Contributing	members	(and	their	dependents	
Private	
insurance	
Prepayment	premium	 Voluntary		 Yes	 Contributing	members	(and	their	dependents	
Social	health	
insurance	
Contributions	from	wages	and	salaries	
Mandatory	 Yes	 Contributing	members	(and	their	dependents	
Source:	Adapted	from	(Hsiao	et	al.,	2007,	p.16)			
2.2.1 State-funded	insurance		State-funded	insurance	is	the	most	widespread	health	insurance	system	in	the	world,	used	by	more	than	half	of	the	countries	of	the	world	(Savedoff,	2004).	This	system	is	often	called	a	national	health	service	system	because	it	provides	access	to	a	network	of	public	health	providers	funded	through	general	tax	revenues	for	the	entire	population.	Theoretically,	this	system	avoids	the	problem	of	adverse	selection	and	risk	selection	by	providing	health	care	services	to	everyone.	However,	moral	hazard	on	routine	medical	services	still	poses	a	substantial	threat	that	may	contribute	to	rising	health	expenditure.	Furthermore,	this	system	requires	a	strong	tax	administration	in	place	in	order	to	raise	sufficient	revenues	(Wagstaff,	2009).			In	general,	state-funded	insurance	has	three	strengths:	
• Comprehensive	coverage	of	the	population.	This	system	can	be	easily	extended	to	cover	100	percent	of	the	population	because	it	does	not	depend	
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on	specific	contributions.	Due	to	its	comprehensive	coverage,	its	risk	management	can	be	potentially	more	effective	and	equitable	than	other	financing	systems	(Gottret	and	Schieber,	2006).	
• Large	scope	for	raising	revenues.	The	government	can	generate	revenues	from	direct	taxes	(for	example,	personal	income	tax,	corporate	income	tax	and	property	tax),	indirect	taxes	(for	example,	value-added	taxes	and	import	taxes)	or	a	mixture	of	both	(Wagstaff	et	al.,	1999).	An	earmarked	tax	can	also	be	utilised	to	make	the	system	more	transparent	and	responsive	to	taxpayer	preferences	(Wilkinson,	1994).	Due	to	the	larger	scope	for	raising	revenues,	the	burden	of	contribution	can	be	extended	to	a	larger	share	of	the	population,	implying	a	potentially	more	effective	risk	spreading	mechanism.	However,	not	all	types	of	taxes	are	equitable	and	effective	in	raising	revenues.	A	more	recent	body	of	literature	argues	that	progressive	taxes	are	more	preferable	to	regressive	taxes	as	the	latter	is	associated	with	higher	post-neonatal	mortality,	infant	mortality	and	under-5	mortality	LMICs	(Reeves	et	al.,	2015).	
• Less	complicated	governance	with	the	potential	for	cost	control.	This	system	allows	for	integration	between	the	provider	and	the	payer	roles,	providing	an	opportunity	to	organise	the	health	system	more	efficiently	by	lowering	the	costs	of	administration.	In	contrast,	a	more	fragmented	system	tends	to	have	disordered	relationships,	poor	information	flows	and	misaligned	incentives	that	lead	to	degraded	care	quality	and	increased	costs	(Cebul	et	al.,	2008).	
	State-funded	insurance	also	has	some	weaknesses	which	are	described	below.	
• Unstable	funding.	The	funding	for	health	is	subject	to	annual	budget	negotiations	and	has	to	compete	with	other	government	priorities,	such	as	education,	infrastructure	and	defence.	Furthermore,	the	state-funded	system	is	more	vulnerable	to	changes	in	political	priorities	(Gottret	and	Schieber,	2006).	
• Potential	inefficiencies	in	health	care	delivery.	National	health	insurance	has	been	the	subject	of	criticism	for	its	inefficiency	in	delivering	care	to	the	population	concerning	ageing	infrastructure,	long	waiting	lists	for	non-emergency	care	and	unresponsive	staff.	If	the	health	care	provider	is	employed	as	a	civil	servant,	it	tends	to	have	fewer	incentives	to	innovate	and	
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be	less	responsive	to	consumers’	needs,	compared	with	employment	in	a	more	competitive	mechanism	(Savedoff,	2004).	Consequently,	this	system	is	more	likely	to	receive	lower	levels	of	public	satisfaction	compared	to	social	health	insurance	(van	der	Zee	and	Kroneman,	2007;	Elola,	1996).		
2.2.2 Community-based	health	insurance	Community-based	health	insurance	(CBHI)	is	found	throughout	the	world, but	it	is	particularly	prevalent	in	Sub-Saharan	Africa.	It	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	mutual	health	organisations,	micro	insurance	schemes	or	mutuelles	de	santé	(Gottret	and	Schieber,	2006).	Despite	the	wide	heterogeneity	of	CBHI	schemes	around	the	world	in	terms	of	population	coverage,	regulation,	management	and	benefits,	CBHI	can	be	identified	by	three	main	aspects:	affiliation	is	based	on	community	membership	with	the	strong	involvement	of	the	community	in	management;	enrolees	are	excluded	from	other	kinds	of	health	insurance;	and	enrolees	share	a	set	of	social	values,	for	example,	voluntary	participation,	solidarity	and	reciprocity)	(Jakab	and	Krishnan,	2001).	The	strength	of	CBHI	lies	in	its	ability	to	fill	in	the	gaps	left	by	the	existing	health	financing	schemes	(Dror	and	Jacquier,	1999).	The	target	populations	of	CBHI	schemes	are	often	individuals	who	are	excluded	from	existing	health	insurance,	such	as	individuals	working	in	informal	sectors.	Employees	in	formal	sectors	may	already	receive	health	insurance	from	their	employers	or	a	social	health	insurance	system.	Thus,	CBHI	is	theoretically	able	to	extend	coverage	to	those	excluded	groups	who	would	otherwise	not	be	insured	(Jakab	and	Krishnan,	2001).	For	example,	Ghana	launched	a	new	reform	in	2004	to	increase	health	insurance	coverage	to	informal	workers	by	providing	mutual	health	insurance	schemes	at	a	district	level	(Kusi	et	al.,	2015).	Similarly,	Tanzania	also	launched	two	separate	voluntary	insurance	schemes	for	informal	workers	based	on	where	they	live:	the	Community	health	fund	(CHF)	for	rural	dwellers	and	Tiba	kwa	Kadi	for	urban	dwellers	(Kapologwe	et	al.,	2017).			Despite	its	potential,	CBHI	suffers	from	some	weaknesses	that	prevent	it	from	contributing	more	significantly	to	the	overall	health	care	system.	First,	CBHI	tends	to	work	in	small	and	poor	communities	which	limits	its	potential	to	pool	the	risk	effectively.	Because	of	its	limited	capability	in	risk	pooling,	CBHI	can	only	offer	limited	benefits	packages	for	its	enrolees.	Inadequate	benefits	packages	have	been	
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described	as	a	barrier	to	enrolment	and	renewal	decisions	in	some	CBHI	schemes	(Dror	et	al.,	2016).	The	small	scale	of	CBHI	also	implies	weak	managerial	capacity	that	is	a	critical	factor	in	improving	the	performance	of	CBHI	(Carrin,	Waelkens	and	Criel,	2005).			Secondly,	poor	people	who	are	the	target	population	of	CBHI	are	likely	to	have	stricter	budgets,	limiting	their	ability	to	afford	insurance	premiums,	which	further	limits	the	risk	pooling	ability	of	the	CBHI	(Kapologwe	et	al.,	2017).	As	a	consequence	of	unattractive	benefits	packages	and	low	willingness	to	pay	among	the	poor,	CBHI	tends	to	suffer	from	low	enrolment	rates	which	threatens	its	sustainability	in	the	long	term	(Dror,	2002;	De	Allegri	et	al.,	2009).	Indonesia	introduced	a	CBHI	programme	named	“Dana	Sehat”	in	1969	but	this	also	suffered	from	a	low	enrolment	rate	due	to	limited	benefits	package.	Consequently,	it	was	discontinued	in	the	late	1990s	(Thabrany,	2012).			
2.2.3 Private	health	insurance	Private	health	insurance	is	defined	as	any	health	insurance	provided	by	private	organisations	and	paid	for	by	voluntary	mechanisms	(Sekhri	and	Savedoff,	2005).	It	is	distinguished	from	social	health	insurance	by	the	lack	of	mandated	payments	which	form	an	essential	part	of	social	health	insurance	(Gottret	and	Schieber,	2006).	In	some	LMICs,	private	health	insurance	can	be	the	only	means	of	protecting	against	future	catastrophic	health	expenditure	and	commonly	it	covers	upper-middle	and	high	income	individuals,	often	working	in	the	formal	sector	(Sekhri	and	Savedoff,	2005).	In	contrast,	high-income	countries	tend	to	have	private	health	insurance	as	secondary	coverage,	except	in	the	USA,	Switzerland	and	Australia.	Private	insurance	can	function	as	a	supplementary	insurance	that	provides	a	greater	choice	of	providers	(for	example,	the	UK	and	Sweden),	as	a	complementary	insurance	to	pay	cost	sharing	in	a	publicly	funded	health	insurance	system	(for	example,	France	and	Belgium)	or	as	a	substitutive	insurance	for	the	excluded	population,	customarily	for	the	high	earners	(for	example,	Germany)	(Thomson	and	Mossialos,	2009,	p.13).			
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Strengths	of	private	health	insurance:	
• Private	health	insurance	affords	financial	protection	(compared	with	out-of-pocket	expenditure)	and	enhanced	access	to	health	services	for	those	who	can	afford	it.	Thus,	it	can	help	to	redirect	tax	revenues	to	provide	health	care	for	the	poor	(Sekhri	and	Savedoff,	2005).	
• Private	insurance	can	fill	in	the	gaps	created	by	an	existing	publicly	funded	health	insurance	system	by	acting	as	a	supplementary,	complementary	or	substitutive	insurance.	It	can	also	enhance	patients’	access	to	timely	hospital	care	in	some	OECD	countries	(for	example,	Ireland,	Australia	and	the	UK)	(Siciliani	and	Hurst,	2005).	
• Private	insurance	may	be	able	to	increase	service	capacity	and	promote	innovation	given	enough	room	for	market	competition.	Private	insurers	can	be	more	receptive	to	individuals’	demands	and	find	innovative	and	flexible	coverage	plans	(Tapay	and	Colombo,	2004,	pp.	287–288).		
Weaknesses	of	private	health	insurance:	
• Private	plan	is	unable	to	solve	other	financial	barriers	to	access,	for	example,	affordability	and	price	volatility)	(Gottret	and	Schieber,	2006).	
• Private	health	insurance	may	create	two-tiered	access	to	health	care	services	(Tapay	and	Colombo,	2004,	pp.	281–282).	When	the	health	providers	are	able	to	operate	in	both	public	and	private	health	insurance,	two-tiered	access	may	induce	an	unequal	form	of	access	that	is	pro-rich.	Health	providers	may	focus	their	time	and	energy	on	serving	patients	with	private	insurance,	thereby	abandoning	patients	covered	by	public	health	insurance.		
• Private	insurance	system	tends	to	increase	total	health	expenditure	in	several	OECD	countries	because	they	bring	more	financial	resources	into	the	health	care	system,	do	not	have	the	strict	cost-control	that	is	found	in	the	public	insurance	system,	and	have	less	bargaining	power	over	the	price	and	quantity	of	care	(Tapay	and	Colombo,	2004,	p.293).	
• There	are	high	administrative	costs,	especially	from	overhead	costs	such	as	underwriting	and	marketing,	which	are	mostly	absent	in	public	insurance	(Woolhandler,	Campbell	and	Himmelstein,	2003).		
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2.2.4 Social	health	insurance	(SHI)	While	more	than	one	definition	of	social	health	insurance	exists,	two	characteristics	emerge	as	the	most	important	in	almost	all	existing	SHI	schemes.	It	is	funded	through	a	mandatory	contribution,	typically	through	the	payroll	taxes	of	formal	sector	workers,	and	a	quasi-independent	organisation	is	responsible	as	the	managing	body	and	the	payer	(Wagstaff,	2010b;	Normand	and	Busse,	2002).	SHI	can	be	crudely	distinguished	from	state-funded	insurance	by	its	clearer	link	between	contributions	and	the	benefits	entitlements	promised	to	the	enrolees	(Hsiao	et	al.,	2007,	p.15).	Since	SHI	was	historically	designed	to	cover	employees	in	the	formal	sector,	low-	and	middle-income	countries	often	need	to	design	a	special	arrangement	for	citizens	not	employed	in	formal	sectors.	Countries	may	vary	in	this	special	arrangement,	for	example,	the	Philippines	and	Vietnam	allow	both	formal	and	informal	workers	to	contribute	to	one	unified	scheme,	whereas	China	and	Mexico	have	a	separate	contributory	scheme	instead	(Wagstaff,	2010b).	The	advantages	and	drawbacks	of	social	health	insurance	are	described	below.		
Strengths	of	social	health	insurance:	
• Risk-independent	and	transparent	contributions.	Contributions	are	not	linked	to	the	health	status	of	members	and	can	normally	be	extended	to	their	direct	family	(Saltman,	2004).	Social	contributions	may	be	easier	to	collect	as	the	citizens	can	trace	the	money	earmarked	for	health	spending	(Gottret	and	Schieber,	2006,	p.	86).	The	relationship	between	the	insurer	and	the	enrolees	tends	to	be	more	contractual	which	demands	a	clearly	defined	set	of	benefits	entitled	to	the	enrolees	(Normand	and	Busse,	2002,	p.73).	
• Less	dependence	on	budget	negotiations.	Compared	to	state-funded	insurance,	SHI	is	less	sensitive	to	budget	negotiations	and	political	pressure	(Hsiao	et	al.,	2007,	p.15).	A	government	may	subsidise	contributions	for	specific	populations	(for	example,	poor	people	and	veterans)	and	this	subsidy	does	not	free	from	budget	negotiations	either.		
• Strong	solidarity	value.	SHI	can	be	viewed	as	a	way	of	empowering	citizens	through	participation.	In	countries	with	long-established	SHI	systems	(for	example,	Germany	and	the	Netherlands),	SHI	is	not	regarded	solely	as	insurance,	but	rather	“a	key	part	of	a	broader	structure	of	social	security	and	
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income	support	that	sits	at	the	heart	of	civil	society”	(Saltman,	2004,	p.6).	Strong	support	from	the	population	may	contribute	to	the	sustainability	of	SHI	systems	in	those	countries	(Gottret	and	Schieber,	2006,	p.86)	and	high	levels	of	satisfaction	among	the	population	(Normand	and	Busse,	2002,	p.75).		
• High	degrees	of	redistribution.	Both	state-funded	insurance	and	SHI	are	more	progressive	than	privately-funded	health	insurance	but	SHI	tends	to	be	less	progressive	than	state-funded	insurance	(Wagstaff	et	al.,	1999).		
Weaknesses	of	social	health	insurance:	
• Complex	and	expensive	to	manage.	SHI	requires	a	more	complex	system	involving	many	different	agents	and	complicated	tasks.	The	managing	organisation,	often	called	sickness	funds,	has	to	collect	social	contributions,	negotiate	contracts	with	providers,	reimburse	the	care	used	by	the	insured,	and	manage	the	collected	funds	(Gottret	and	Schieber,	2006).	Another	important	issue	related	to	SHI	is	evasion	and	avoidance	of	SHI	contributions,	especially	among	the	non-poor	employees	who	work	in	the	informal	sector	which	forces	sickness	funds	to	spend	extra	money.	This	leads	to	higher	administrative	costs	together	with	its	already	complex	management	(Wagstaff,	2009).		
• Escalating	health	expenditure.	Some	empirical	evidence	has	suggested	that	SHI	leads	to	higher	health	expenditure.	Looking	at	28	countries	in	Eastern	Europe	and	Central	Asia,	out	of	which	14	countries	switched	from	a	tax-funded	system	to	SHI,	Wagstaff	and	Moreno-Serra	(2009)	demonstrated	that	SHI	raises	health	spending	per	capita	by	11	percent.	Wagstaff	(2009)	also	conducted	a	similar	analysis,	but	on	OECD	countries	only,	and	he	found	that	SHI	raises	per	capita	total	health	spending	by	3	percent.	The	increase	in	health	spending,	however,	does	not	contribute	to	better	health	outcomes	(Wagstaff,	2009;	Wagstaff	and	Moreno-Serra,	2009).	
• Negative	economy	impact	of	payroll	contributions.	SHI	may	contribute	to	a	growing	informality	of	the	economy	that	may	reduce	the	government’s	ability	to	collect	tax	revenues	(Wagstaff,	2010b).	Informal	workers	typically	pay	less	contribution	to	an	SHI	system	compared	with	formal	workers.	For	instance,	informal	workers	pay	a	flat-rate	contribution	in	Vietnam	and	Indonesia	and	report	just	enough	income	to	pay	the	lower	rate	contribution	in	Mexico	and	
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Chile	(Baeza	and	Packard,	2006,	pp.	104–107).	Some	individuals	therefore	have	an	incentive	to	avoid	working	in	the	formal	sector	to	retain	more	income	and	keep	the	health	coverage.			In	the	2010	World	Health	Report,	the	WHO	did	not	recommend	any	particular	type	of	health	financing	model	to	attain	the	universal	health	coverage	goal.	Therefore,	many	low-	and	middle-income	countries	have	experimented	with	different	mechanisms	of	raising	revenues,	strategic	purchasing	and	provider	payment	systems,	taking	into	account	the	strengths	and	limitations	of	each	system.	Indonesia	has	been	experimenting	with	its	health	financing	system	over	the	past	20	years	and	finally	introduced	the	national	health	insurance	(Jaminan	Kesehatan	Nasional	/	JKN)	programme	that	unifies	all	separated,	non-private	insurance	schemes	into	a	single	payer	system	with	myriad	rules	for	collecting	contribution.	In	the	next	chapter,	more	detail	on	the	history	of	public	health	insurance	system	in	Indonesia	will	be	explained	with	particular	focus	on	the	JKN	programme.				 	
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Chapter	3 	Profile	of	Indonesia		
Section	3.1 Demographic,	economic,	and	health	profile		Indonesia	is	a	large	archipelago	country	consisting	of	17,508	islands	but	only	58	percent	of	them	are	inhabited.	It	is	the	largest	country	in	the	Southeast	Asian	region	in	relation	to	both	country	and	population	size.	The	five	largest	islands	are	Papua,	Kalimantan,	Sumatra,	Sulawesi	and	Java	(the	most	populous	island).	With	its	capital,	Jakarta,	located	in	Java,	it	is	expected	that	Java	will	undergo	more	rapid	facilities	development	compared	to	the	other	islands,	including	hospitals,	clinics	and	public	health	centres.			
	
Figure	3-1	Indonesia	map		
(source:	CIA	publication	-	https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/)		Indonesia	is	divided	into	three	time	zones:	Western	(Sumatra,	Java,	West	and	Central	Kalimantan),	Central	(the	rest	of	Kalimantan,	Sulawesi,	Bali	and	Nusa	Tenggara)	and	
Eastern	(Maluku	and	Papua)	Indonesian	time.	Anecdotally,	this	division	also	characterises	the	degree	of	economic	development	among	the	provinces	in	Indonesia.	The	eastern	region	tends	to	be	less	developed	than	the	western	and	central	regions.	Papua	consistently	has	more	than	20	percent	of	its	population	living	in	extreme	poverty	(BPS	Indonesia,	2017b).	
	 40	
	Indonesia	also	faces	significant	challenges	in	relation	to	natural	disasters.	Indonesia	lies	on	a	major	juncture	of	the	Earth’s	tectonic	plates	making	it	susceptible	to	seismic	activity	and	tsunamis.	A	recent	major	tsunami	hit	Aceh	province	in	2004,	killing	approximately	131,000	people	and	leaving	500,000	people	displaced	from	their	homes	(Cluff,	2007).	In	addition,	Indonesia	has	a	very	large	number	of	active	volcanoes	in	the	world	with	127	active	volcanoes.	Fortunately,	fatalities	caused	by	volcano	eruptions	have	been	minimised	due	to	active	surveillance	and	quick	responses	from	the	government.			In	2015,	Indonesia	had	population	of	258	million	people,	or	about	3.5	percent	of	the	world’s	population	(BPS	Indonesia,	2016),	but	its	population	is	unevenly	distributed.	The	population	density	outside	Java	and	Bali	is	under	250	people/km2,	in	contrast	with	over	800	people/km2	in	Java	and	Bali.	Thus,	even	though	Java	island	represents	only	7	percent	of	the	total	land	area,	it	is	home	to	more	than	60	percent	of	the	Indonesian	population.	Over	time,	Indonesia’s	demography	has	changed	due	to	a	decline	in	the	fertility	and	mortality	rates.	Figure	3-2	depicts	the	change	in	age	distribution	from	1970	to	2010	with	a	projection	to	2050	(McDonald,	2014).	Compared	to	40	years	ago,	Indonesia’s	working	age	population	is	now	the	largest	group	and	the	youngest	age	group	is	growing	more	slowly.			
	
Figure	3-2	Population	Pyramid	in	1970,	2010	and	2050	(the	projection	for	2050	is	represented	by	a	dashed	line).			
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Table	3-1	depicts	selected	demographic,	health	status	and	economic	indicators	for	Indonesia.	The	fertility	rate	has	decreased	dramatically	from	5.7	births	per	woman	in	1960	to	2.5	births	per	woman	in	2000	due	to	an	aggressive	family	planning	campaign	that	began	in	the	1980s	with	a	very	popular	slogan	“two	children	are	enough”	(Booth,	1992).	Furthermore,	Indonesia	has	improved	its	education	system	by	extending	compulsory	education	from	6	years	to	9	years	in	1994	and	to	12	years	in	2016.	The	adult	literacy	rate	has	also	increased	significantly	from	67.3	percent	in	1980	to	95.2	percent	in	2015.			
Table	3-1	Selected	demographic,	health	status	and	economic	indicators	for	Indonesia	
Selected	Indicators	 1960	 1970	 1980	 1990	 2000	 2010	 2015	Population,	total	(in	million)	 	88		 115		 147		 181		 311		 242		 258	Fertility	rate,	total	(births	per	woman)	 5.7	 5.5	 4.4	 3.1	 2.5	 2.5	 2.4	Life	expectancy	at	birth,	total	(years)	 48.6	 54.5	 59.6	 63.3	 66.2	 68.2	 69	Mortality	rate,	infant	(per	1,000	live	births)	 148	 113	 85	 62	 41	 27.5	 23	Mortality	rate,	under-5	(per	1,000	live	births)	 222	 165	 120	 84	 52	 33	 27	Prevalence	of	undernourishment	(%	of	population)	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 17.8	 12.5	 7.9	Literacy	rate,	adult	total	(%	of	people	ages	15	and	above	 n/a	 n/a	 67.3	 81.5	 n/a	 n/a	 95.2	GDP	per	capita	growth	(annual	%)	 n/a	 4.7	 7.3	 5.3	 3.5	 4.8	 3.6	Unemployment,	total	(%	of	total	labour	force)	(national	estimate)	 n/a	 n/a	 1.7	 2.5	 6.1	 5.6	 4.5	Waged	and	salaried	workers,	total	(%	of	total	employment)	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 31.9	 36.9	 40.2	
Source:	World	Development	Indicators	(World	Bank,	2018)		With	a	GDP	per	capita	annual	growth	rate	of	7.3	percent	in	1980,	Indonesia	used	to	be	one	of	the	fastest	growing	Asian	economies	due	to	the	surplus	of	oil	boom	in	1980.	Compared	to	the	average	GDP	growth	rate	in	East	Asia	and	the	Pacific,	excluding	high	income	countries	(6%)	and	LMICs	(3.3%)	in	1980,	Indonesia’s	economic	growth	looked	promising.	This	oil	surplus	was	also	invested	into	the	health	care	system	with	the	development	of	hundreds	of	public	health	centres	as	a	primary	contact	point	for	
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people	to	access	basic	health	care	services	(Booth,	1992).	The	unemployment	rate	during	the	oil	boom	period	was	maintained	below	3	percent	between	1980	and	1990.	Unfortunately,	the	Asian	financial	crisis	in	1997/98	instigated	an	extreme	economic	slowdown	in	Indonesia.	Indonesia’s	currency,	the	Rupiah,	lost	85	percent	of	its	value	in	1999	and	the	inflation	rate	rose	to	78	percent	(Suryahadi,	Hadiwidjaja	and	Sumarto,	2012).	The	unemployment	rate	escalated	to	as	high	as	6.1	percent	in	2000	and	it	never	bounced	back	to	its	pre-crisis	figure.	The	crisis	caused	approximately	13.4	million	job	losses	and	a	rise	in	the	number	of	poor	people	from	17	to	40	percent	of	population	(Hopkins,	2006).		The	economic	crisis	did	not	just	leave	a	long-lasting	effect	on	the	Indonesian	economy;	it	triggered	massive	political	unrest	culminating	in	the	resignation	of	President	Soeharto	in	May	1998,	32	years	after	his	inauguration.	Soeharto	maintained	an	authoritarian	regime	with	a	centralised	government	aiming	to	unify	a	very	diverse	Indonesia.	His	fall	provided	an	opportunity	to	reverse	the	centralised	government	with	the	introduction	of	Law	No.	22/1999,	providing	more	devolved	political	power	to	the	provinces	and	districts	(Carnegie,	2008).	This	decentralisation	policy	also	affects	the	health	care	system:	district	health	offices	have	more	autonomy	in	developing	health	programmes	which	are	responsive	to	local	needs,	while	the	provincial	health	offices	handle	cross-district	programmes.	The	central	ministry	(the	Ministry	of	Health	or	MoH)	is	responsible	for	issuing	national	guidelines	and	providing	health	research	and	development,	but	it	now	relies	on	the	districts	to	voluntarily	report	health	indicators,	creating	an	incomplete	health	database	(Lieberman,	Capuno	and	Minh,	2005).	Decentralisation	gives	more	power	to	the	provinces	and	districts	but	the	implementation	of	“big	bang”	decentralisation	in	Indonesia	has	created	confusion	and	overlapping	responsibilities	between	provincial	health	offices	and	district	health	offices,	resulting	in	inefficiencies	in	carrying	out	the	health	programme	(Fahlevi	and	Fa ̈rber,	2014).			The	economic	crisis	also	had	a	negative	impact	on	the	health	sector	in	Indonesia.	Increases	in	the	price	of	drugs	and	medical	supplies	reduced	people’s	personal	budget	share	devoted	to	health	(Waters,	Saadah	and	Pradhan,	2003).	In	addition,	the	increase	in	price	caused	a	shortage	of	drugs	and	medical	supplies	in	government-run	health	facilities	due	to	a	reduced	health	budget	following	a	decline	in	overall	
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government	expenditure	(Hotchkiss	and	Jacobalis,	1999).	The	utilisation	of	outpatient	care	in	the	past	four	weeks	in	both	public	and	private	facilities	also	declined	from	8	percent	in	1997	to	3.5	percent	in	1998	(Waters,	Saadah	and	Pradhan,	2003).	Moreover,	the	economic	crisis	resulted	in	psychological	distress	for	the	most	affected	groups,	including	the	less	educated,	the	rural	landless	and	residents	in	the	hardest	hit	cities	(Friedman	and	Thomas,	2009).		Indonesia’s	performance	in	terms	of	health	indicators	reveals	a	mixed	picture.	On	average,	Indonesian	people	in	2015	had	a	life	expectancy	of	69	years,	higher	than	the	average	in	LMICs	(67.7)	but	lower	than	the	average	for	the	Southeast	Asian	countries	(72.3).	Likewise,	mortality	rates	for	infants	and	children	under	5	years	shows	a	similar	pattern	(The	World	Bank,	2018).	Indonesia	had	seen	an	improvement	in	reducing	its	maternal	mortality	ratio	(MMR),	from	390	in	1994	down	to	228	per	100,000	live	births	in	2007.	However,	this	downward	trend	has	not	continued:	the	most	recent	estimate	reveals	an	increased	ratio,	359	maternal	deaths	per	100,000	live	births	in	2012		(BPS	Indonesia,	2013,	pp.209–215).	Despite	some	technical	limitations	and	wide	confidence	intervals	in	MMR	calculation	(Hill	et	al.,	2006),	this	non-decreasing	trend	may	prove	that	Indonesia	is	still	far	from	reaching	its	goal	to	reduce	its	MMR	by	75	percent	(Millennium	Development	Goal)	or	even	to	less	than	70	per	100,000	live	births	(Sustainable	Development	Goal)	(United	Nations,	2016).			Regional	differences	are	inevitable	in	Indonesia	given	its	diversity,	both	culturally	and	geographically.	Most	of	the	western	and	central	regions	of	Indonesia	have	Muslim	majorities,	defined	as	at	least	80	percent	of	the	population	identifying	as	Muslim,	whereas	all	provinces	in	the	eastern	region	(Maluku,	North	Maluku,	West	Papua	and	Papua)	have	a	25	percent	or	larger	non-Muslim	population.	Regarding	employment,	only	Jakarta	Special	Region	and	Riau	Islands	have	more	than	64	percent	of	the	working	age	population	(15	years	and	older)	employed	in	the	formal	sector.	By	contrast,	the	remaining	provinces	have	an	average	of	30	percent,	with	even	lower	percentages	for	the	eastern	region	(BPS	Indonesia,	2010).	While	most	provinces	have	achieved	at	least	85	percent	in	terms	of	the	adult	literacy	rate,	a	few	of	the	less	developed	provinces	(i.e.	West	Sulawesi,	Nusa	Tenggara	Islands	and	Papua)	have	rates	lower	than	85	percent	(BPS	Indonesia,	2010).		
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	The	regional	differences	in	health	indicators	are	also	quite	significant.	The	eastern	region	had	higher	rate	of	neonatal	mortality	and	under-5	mortality	compared	to	the	rest	of	the	provinces	in	2012	(BPS	Indonesia,	2013)	and	they	are	still	categorised	as	an	endemic	region	for	Malaria	with	the	Annual	Parasite	Index	(API)	score	ranging	from	4.5	to	42.6	per	1,000	people	in	2013	(Johansson	Århem	et	al.,	2015).	Furthermore,	the	eastern	region	still	suffers	from	some	Neglected	Tropical	Diseases,	such	as	Filariasis	(a	worm	infestation	in	the	lymph	vessels)	and	Yaws	(a	contagious	bacterial	infection	causing	deep	ulcers)	(Wibawa	and	Satoto,	2016).	In	addition,	more	than	20	percent	of	children	living	in	West	Papua	and	Papua	did	not	receive	any	kind	of	vaccination	in	2012	(BPS	Indonesia,	2013).	Papua	lags	behind	in	almost	all	development	indicators	which	can	be	attributed	to	its	long	history	of	marginalisation	and	internal	conflicts	since	its	incorporation	as	a	province	of	Indonesia	in	1969	(Widjojo	et	al.,	2008,	p.2).	
Section	3.2 Health	expenditure	trends		The	amount	a	country	spends	on	health	and	the	rate	at	which	that	spending	grows	depends	on	a	wide	range	of	social	and	economic	factors,	including	the	financial	and	organisational	structures	of	a	country’s	health	system.	There	is	a	strong	relationship	between	the	overall	income	level	of	a	country,	usually	measured	by	a	country’s	gross	domestic	product	(GDP),	and	how	much	the	population	of	that	country	will	spend	on	health	(World	Health	Organization,	2014b,	pp.4–5).	For	example,	European	countries	with	high	incomes	(for	example,	Luxembourg,	Switzerland,	Norway	and	Germany)	spend	more	money	on	health	compared	to	European	countries	with	lower	incomes	(for	example,	Romania,	Montenegro	and	Albania)	(OECD/EU,	2016).	While	there	is	no	recommendation	on	the	“right”	level	of	spending	on	health,	increased	higher	spending	is	associated	with	better	health	outcomes	especially	for	developing	countries	(World	Health	Organization,	2014b,	p.10).			The	trends	in	health	expenditure	for	Indonesia	from	1995	to	2014	are	summarised	in		Table	3-2.	Indonesia	displays	a	characteristic	typical	of	developing	countries	in	which	private	expenditure	dominates	over	public	expenditure.	Over	the	span	of	nearly	20	
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years,	Indonesia	has	increased	its	health	expenditure	(HE)	per	capita	by	3.5	times.	Compared	to	its	neighbours,	Indonesia’s	HE	per	capita	is	relatively	low,	as	shown	in	Figure	3-3.	Even	neighbouring	countries	with	lower	GDP,	for	example	Vietnam	and	The	Philippines,	have	higher	HE	per	capita	than	Indonesia.	Nevertheless,	Indonesia’s	annual	growth	on	health	expenditure	still	demonstrates	a	positive	trend,	higher	than	the	average	for	Southeast	Asian	countries	and	mainly	after	the	Asian	economic	crisis	during	1997/98	(see	Figure	3-4).		
	
Table	3-2	Trends	in	health	expenditure	(HE)	in	Indonesia,	1995–2014	Expenditure	 1995	 2000	 2005	 2010	 2012	 2014	THE*	(%	of	GDP)	 1.96	 1.98	 2.79	 2.74	 2.90	 2.85	THE	(nominal	term	US$,	in	billion)	 3.95	 3.26	 7.97	 20.07	 20.66	 20.53	HE	per	capita	in	real	terms**	 85.90	 91.04	 169.85	 227.31	 273.83	 299.41		       Government	HE	(%	of	GDP)	 0.71	 0.72	 0.80	 1.03	 1.15	 1.08	Government	HE	(%	of	THE)	 36.24	 36.63	 28.79	 37.69	 39.61	 37.78	Government	HE	(%	of	gov't	expenditure)	 4.93	 4.35	 4.24	 6.12	 6.09	 5.73		       Private	HE	(%	of	GDP)	 1.25	 1.25	 1.99	 1.71	 1.75	 1.77	Private	HE	(%	of	THE)	 63.76	 63.37	 71.21	 62.31	 60.39	 62.22	External	resources	for	health	(%	of	THE)	 1.54	 9.04	 1.35	 1.18	 1.08	 1.06		 	 	 	 	 	 	Out-of-pocket	HE	(%	of	private	HE)	 72.94	 72.66	 76.70	 75.76	 75.09	 75.32	Out-of-pocket	HE	(%	of	THE)	 46.51	 46.04	 54.62	 47.21	 45.35	 46.87	
*THE	=	Total	Health	Expenditure;	**Based	on	PPP	(Purchasing	Power	Parity)	
Source:	World	Development	Indicators	(World	Bank,	2018)	
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Figure	3-3	Health	expenditure	per	capita	converted	using	2011	purchasing	power	rates	(PPP),	Southeast	Asia	(SEA)	
countries	in	2014.	Source:	World	Development	Indicators	(World	Bank,	2018)		
	
Figure	3-4	Annual	average	growth	rate	of	health	expenditure	per	capita	(in	PPP	international	$),	Southeast	Asian	
(SEA)	countries	1995–2014.	Source:	World	Development	Indicators	(World	Bank,	2018)		In	terms	of	total	health	expenditure	(THE)	as	a	share	of	GDP,	Indonesia	only	allocated	2	to	3	percent	of	its	GDP	to	the	health	sector	between	1995	and	2014,	as	shown	in		Table	3-2.	Moreover,	the	trend	for	THE	as	a	share	of	GDP	shows	an	erratic	up	and	down	movement	despite	a	continuously	positive	trend	on	health	expenditure	per	capita.	Higher	THE	in	2005	and	2012	compared	to	2010	might	be	caused	by	the	introduction	of	many	other	social	assistance	programmes	at	the	same	time,	which	increased	overall	government	expenditure.	In	fact,	all	three	indicators	for	government	expenditure	on	health	showed	an	inclining	trend	from	2005	to	2010	(see		
98
102
103
183
299
329
390
600
815
1,040
1,778
4,047
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500
Lao PDR
Myanmar
Indonesia
Vietnam
SEA
Brunei D
Health expenditure per capita, PPP
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
Bru
ne
i D
Lao
 PD
R
Th
aila
nd
Tim
or-
Les
te SE
A
Ma
lay
sia
Ind
on
esi
a
Ph
ilip
pin
es
Ca
mb
od
ia
Sin
gap
ore
Vie
tna
m
An
nu
al
 A
ve
ra
ge
 G
ro
w
th
 R
at
e
95-98
99-2014
	 47	
Table	3-2).	This	suggests	that	while	Indonesia	enjoyed	strong	economic	growth	after	the	economic	crisis	of	1997/98,	the	health	sector	was	not	the	top	priority	in	the	national	budget.	For	instance,	government	expenditure	on	education	increased	substantially	from	1	percent	of	GDP	in	1995	to	3.3	percent	of	GDP	in	2014,	whereas	government	expenditure	on	health	increased	only	slightly	from	0.7	percent	in	1995	to	1.1	percent	of	GDP	in	2014	(The	World	Bank,	2018).			Compared	to	its	neighbours,	Indonesia	had	a	lower	than	average	THE	as	a	percentage	of	GDP	in	2014,	as	shown	in	Figure	3-5.	Moreover,	the	private	sector	still	dominates	total	health	expenditure,	but	this	is	comparable	with	half	of	the	SEA	countries,	including	Lao	PDR,	Myanmar,	The	Philippines,	Singapore	and	Cambodia.	However,	if	we	observe	government	health	expenditure	as	a	share	of	total	government	expenditure	in	Figure	3-6,	it	is	clear	that	Indonesia	is	lower	than	the	average	found	in	SEA	countries,	together	with	other	lower-income	SEA	countries.	In	its	current	economic	position,	Indonesia	still	has	the	capacity	to	put	more	investment	into	its	health	system.			
	
Figure	3-5	Total	health	expenditure	as	a	%	of	GDP	among	Southeast	Asian	(SEA)	countries	in	2014.	Source:	World	
Development	Indicators,	The	World	Bank	(2018)			
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Figure	3-6	Government	expenditure	on	health	as	a	share	of	total	government	expenditure,	Southeast	Asian	countries	
in	2014.	Source:	World	Development	Indicators,	The	World	Bank	(2018)	
	The	private	sector	continues	to	be	the	dominant	source	of	health	care	financing,	with	households’	out-of-pocket	(OOP)	payments	accounting	for	72–75	percent	of	private	HE	between	1995	and	2013.	Moreover,	the	OOP	spending	share	of	THE	is	still	relatively	high	at	46.87	percent	in	2014,	higher	than	the	average	of	SEA	countries	at	40.92	percent	(see	Figure	3-7).	Figure	3-8	presents	trends	in	OOP	health	expenditure	as	a	percentage	of	THE,	comparing	Indonesia	with	its	comparable	neighbours	in	terms	of	GDP.	Overall,	there	is	no	clear	pattern	in	OOP	trends,	but	a	sharp	increase	appeared	in	2005,	the	year	when	the	government	launched	a	health	insurance	scheme	for	the	poor.	This	sharp	increase	might	be	the	spillover	effect	of	the	unconditional	cash	transfer	(UCT)	programme	which	was	launched	in	the	same	year.	UCT	might	allow	poor	people	to	spend	their	additional	income	on	accessing	private	health	facilities,	which	were	not	previously	covered	by	the	health	insurance	scheme.	Furthermore,	it	is	discouraging	to	see	a	non-decreasing	trend	in	OOP	health	expenditure	despite	the	expansion	of	the	public	health	insurance	system	over	the	past	15	years.	While	Indonesia	still	fares	better	than	Cambodia	and	The	Philippines,	Thailand	and	Vietnam	display	stronger	progress	in	decreasing	the	incidence	of	OOP	health	expenditure.	Vietnam	had	a	higher	OOP	share	compared	to	Indonesia	in	1995,	but	has	shown	a	significantly	decreasing	trend	since	2005,	outperforming	Indonesia	since	2010.			
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Figure	3-7	Out-of-pocket	health	expenditure	as	a	%	of	THE,	Southeast	Asian	(SEA)	countries	in	2014		
	
Figure	3-8	Out-of-pocket	health	expenditure	as	a	%	of	THE,	selected	Southeast	Asian	(SEA)	countries	from	1995–
2014	
Source:	World	Development	Indicators,	The	World	Bank	(2018)					
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Section	3.3 	Administrative	structure	of	local	government	in	
Indonesia			Before	the	economic	crisis	in	1998,	Indonesia	used	to	have	27	provinces	but	the	youngest	province,	East	Timor,	became	an	independent	nation	following	the	independence	referendum	in	1999.	Moreover,	Law	No.	22/1999	on	Region	Decentralisation	triggered	the	development	of	new	provinces	and	districts.	By	2016,	there	were	a	total	of	34	provinces	including	5	special	regions:	Jakarta	as	the	capital	city	of	Indonesia,	Yogyakarta	which	still	recognises	the	existence	of	the	Javanese	monarch	as	its	governor,	Aceh	which	has	received	special	autonomy	to	implement	Islamic	sharia	law	since	2003,	and	Papua	and	West	Papua	both	of	which	receive	special	autonomy	to	form	a	different	legislative	body	representing	the	indigenous	tribes	instead	of	the	political	parties	(BPS	Indonesia,	2016).			
	
Figure	3-9	Administrative	structure	of	Indonesia	(the	terms	in	brackets	indicate	the	leader	of	the	named	area)	
President
Province (Governor) 
Districts: Kabupaten/Regency (Regent) 
or Kota/City (Mayor)
Kecamatan/sub-district (Head of sub-district)
Kelurahan/Townships (Head of townships) or Desa/Village (Head 
of village)
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Figure	3-10	Structure	of	the	public-sector	health	care	system	in	Indonesia		Figure	3-9	summarises	the	five-tier	government	hierarchy	in	Indonesia.	Each	province	is	governed	by	a	governor	who	is	directly	elected	by	popular	vote	of	the	people.	Provinces	are	further	divided	into	districts.	There	are	two	types	of	district:	
kabupaten/regencies	which	tend	to	have	larger	rural	areas	and	kota/cities.	The	heads	of	districts	(regent/mayor)	are	also	elected	by	popular	vote.	Districts	have	more	power	in	the	provision	of	public	services,	such	as	education	and	public	health.	They	are	divided	into	kecamatan/sub-districts	and	sub-districts	are	further	divided	into	either	kelurahan/townships	(urban)	or	desa/villages	(rural).	The	heads	of	sub-districts	and	townships	are	appointed	by	the	regents	or	mayors,	but	the	heads	of	villages	are	elected	by	the	popular	vote.			Figure	3-10	summarises	the	management	of	the	public	health	care	system	in	Indonesia.	It	almost	mimics	the	structure	of	government	hierarchy	in	Figure	3-9.	Prior	to	the	decentralisation	policy	in	the	early	2000s,	the	decision-making	structure	for	the	health	sector	followed	a	clear	top-down	structure	with	the	Ministry	of	Health	(MoH)	acting	in	a	very	dominant	role.	However,	after	the	implementation	of	decentralisation	policy,	the	major	decision-making	roles	were	taken	over	mostly	by	the	district	health	offices	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	the	provincial	health	offices	(Suwandono	et	al.,	2003).	District	health	offices	are	accountable	to	the	MoH	and	local	governments	(regents/mayors),	but	they	do	not	answer	to	provincial	health	offices.		
Ministry 
of Health
Provincial health offices
Public hospitals type A and B
District health offices
Public hospitals type C and D
Puskesmas
Pustu, Posyandu, Pusling, Polindes, village midwives
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Section	3.4 	Health	service	delivery	system	in	Indonesia		The	Indonesian	health	care	sectors	represent	a	mix	of	public	and	private	providers.	
Puskesmas	(Pusat	Kesehatan	Masyarakat/community	health	centre)	is	the	smallest	unit	of	the	publicly-funded	health	facilities	located	in	a	kecamatan/sub-district.	In	2014,	there	were	9,671	units	of	Puskesmas	providing	primary	health	care	services	(for	example,	policlinics,	child	and	maternal	care,	and	basic	dental	services)	and	health	prevention	programmes	(for	example,	hygiene,	sanitation	and	health	promotion).	A	Puskesmas	is	designed	to	have	a	doctor,	a	dentist,	nurses,	midwives	and	a	public	health	specialist	at	the	minimum.	However,	approximately	25	percent	of	the	total	number	of	Puskesmas	in	rural	areas,	particularly	in	the	eastern	region,	have	only	nurses	and	midwives	providing	all	Puskesmas	programmes	(Harimurti	et	al.,	2013).	The	coverage	area	of	a	Puskesmas	is	determined	by	the	population	density,	geographical	characteristics	and	the	condition	of	transport	infrastructure.	A	Puskesmas	is	designed	to	cover	approximately	30,000	people,	but	in	densely	populated	urban	areas	it	can	cover	up	to	150,000	people.			
Table	3-3	Distribution	of	Puskesmas	in	Indonesia		
	
2004	 2014	Total	Puskesmas	 Inpatient	and	Outpatient	 Outpatient	Only	 Total	Puskesmas	 Inpatient	and	Outpatient	 Outpatient	Only	SUMATERA	 1844	 490	 1354	 2477	 833	 1644	JAVA	and	BALI	 3473	 780	 2693	 3697	 1161	 2536	NUSA	TENGGARA	 345	 88	 257	 528	 243	 285	KALIMANTAN	 694	 196	 498	 835	 308	 527	SULAWESI	 814	 325	 489	 1270	 544	 726	MALUKU	and	PAPUA	 380	 131	 249	 864	 232	 632											TOTAL		 7550	 2010	 5540	 9671	 3321	 6350		Source:		Historically,	the	Puskesmas	was	designed	to	provide	outpatient	care	only,	but	some	big	Puskesmas	in	urban	areas	also	provide	very	limited	inpatient	care	that	does	not	require	the	presence	of	any	specialist	doctors.	Table	3-3	provides	data	on	the	distribution	of	Puskesmas	in	the	six	big	islands	of	Indonesia	from	2004	to	2014.	In	the	past	decade,	the	MoH	has	pushed	for	the	development	of	more	Puskesmas	with	inpatient	care,	either	by	building	a	new	Puskesmas	or	upgrading	the	existing	ones.	
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There	were	3,321	Puskesmas	providing	inpatient	care	in	2014,	a	65	percent	increase	from	2004.	In	addition	to	the	main	Puskesmas	in	the	sub-district,	a	Puskesmas	is	also	supported	by	several	smaller	facilities,	such	as	Posyandu	(Health	and	Nutrition	Integrated	Service	Post),	Pustu	(Mini	Puskesmas),	Pusling	(Mobile	Puskesmas)	and	
Polindes	(Village	Midwives).	These	supporting	facilities	aim	to	expand	the	main	Puskesmas’	coverage	to	more	remote	areas.		Aside	from	abundant	public	facilities,	private	facilities	are	also	available	in	many	areas	of	Indonesia.	Many	of	the	private	practices	are	public	physicians	who	open	a	private	practice	after	the	close	of	the	Puskesmas’	working	day	(Berman	and	Cuizon,	2004).	Based	on	data	from	the	1993	Indonesian	Family	Life	Survey,	80	percent	of	public	sector	physicians	also	work	in	private	practices	(Bir	and	Eggleston,	2003).	Patients	may	prefer	to	visit	a	doctor’s	practice	after	working	hours	for	convenience	and	private	practices	become	a	suitable	alternative	for	these	people.	Even	though	Puskesmas	are	able	to	offer	cheaper	prices	and	are	even	free	of	charge	for	eligible	people,	the	poorest	(especially	in	urban	areas)	choose	more	expensive	private	providers	over	Puskesmas	care	(Bir	and	Eggleston,	2003).	
	
Table	3-4	Supporting	Facilities	for	Puskesmas	in	Indonesia	
Facilities	 Number	(Year)	 Coverage	 Services	Puskesmas	 9,671	(2014)	 30,000	–	150,000	 Basic	health	care	services,	child	and	maternal	care,	family	planning,	sanitation,	health	prevention	and	promotion		Pustu	 23,875	(2013)	 2,500	–	10,000	 An	extension	of	Puskesmas	to	reach	villages,	but	with	more	limited	facilities	Posyandu	 280,225	(2013)	 50	children	under	5-years	of	age	and	their	mothers	 Family	planning,	maternal	care,	child	nutrition	(e.g.	growth	monitoring,	supplemental	feeding),	immunisation	Pusling	 8,009	(Four-wheels)	958	(Boats)	(2013)	
Access	to	more	remote	areas;	Either	by	four-wheel	vehicle	or	boat	
Basic	health	care	services,	immunisation,	family	planning	
Polindes	 42,656	(2013)	 One	village	 Maternal	care,	promotion	and	preventive	health	services	
Source:	Indonesia	health	system	review	(Mahendradhata	et	al.,	2017)		
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The	MoH	uses	public	hospitals	to	provide	secondary	care	and	the	referral	facilities	for	the	Puskesmas.	There	were	2,228	hospitals	in	2013;	70	percent	of	them	were	publicly	funded.	Public	hospitals	in	Indonesia	can	be	categorised	into	four	types,	with	type	A	as	the	highest	and	type	D	as	the	lowest	(Mahendradhata	et	al.,	2017).	According	to	the	regulations,	hospital	categorisation	is	based	on	facilities	and	the	number	of	specialised	types	of	care	provided	by	the	hospitals	(see	Table	3-5	for	more	detail).	Hospital	types	A	and	B	typically	cover	the	area	of	a	province,	whereas	types	C	and	D	only	cover	a	district	or	lower.	There	is	also	a	specialist	hospital	which	can	provide	only	one	or	two	types	of	specialised	care.	One	of	the	most	popular	specialist	hospitals	is	the	Maternal	and	Child	Hospital	(RSIA/Rumah	Sakit	Ibu	dan	Anak)	that	provides	paediatrics,	and	obstetrics	and	gynaecology	services.	There	were	503	units	of	specialty	hospitals	in	2013:	32	percent	of	them	were	RSIA	and	19	percent	were	obstetrics	hospitals	only.			
Table	3-5	Public	hospital	type	in	Indonesia	based	on	Permenkes	No.	340/menkes/per/III/2010	Hospital	type	 Basic	specialist	care*	 Supportive	specialist	care**	 Other	specialist	care†	 Subspecialist	care††	 Number	of	beds	(minimum)	A	 4	 5	 12	 13	 400	B	 4	 4	 8	 2	 200	C	 4	 4	 0	 0	 100	D	 2	 0	 0	 0	 50	
*	Basic	specialist	care:	Internal	medicine,	general	surgery,	paediatrics	and	obstetrics	&	gynaecology	
**	Supportive	specialists	care:	Anaesthesiology,	radiology,	medic	rehabilitation,	clinical	pathology	and	anatomical	
pathology	
†	Other	specialists	care:	Ophthalmology,	Ears,	Nose	and	Throat	(ENT),	neurology,	cardiology,	dermatovenereology,	
psychiatry,	respiratory,	orthopaedic,	urology,	neurosurgery,	plastic	surgery	and	forensic	medicine.		
††	Subspecialists	care:	Any	subspecialist	care	from	either	basic	or	other	specialists	care		In	addition	to	the	different	types	of	hospital,	there	are	also	several	classes	of	inpatient	ward	in	each	hospital	namely	VIP,	first,	second	and	third	class.	The	MoH	does	not	issue	a	specific	regulation	in	determining	the	classes	of	inpatient	wards,	meaning	that	the	standard	of	the	third-class	inpatient	wards	can	differ	from	one	hospital	to	another.	Nevertheless,	the	third-class	inpatient	ward	is	always	the	lowest	class	in	which	patients	have	to	share	the	ward	with	four	to	six	patients	and	only	the	VIP	class	can	allow	one	patient	per	room.	The	difference	in	inpatient	ward	classes	mostly	determines	the	amount	of	non-medical	facilities,	but	all	patients	should	receive	a	
	 55	
similar	quality	of	medical	service	regardless	of	the	class.	This	inpatient	ward	division	is	important	in	determining	the	amount	of	contribution	under	the	JKN	scheme	which	will	be	explained	in	the	next	section.			The	health	care	supply	in	Indonesia	has	two	main	problems.	Firstly,	Indonesia	has	relatively	low	hospital	density	and	uneven	distribution	across	the	country.	In	2013,	its	ratio	of	hospital	beds	was	only	0.93	per	1,000	people,	which	is	very	low	compared	to	neighbouring	countries	such	as	Thailand,	The	Philippines	and	Vietnam	(see	Figure	3-11).			
	
Figure	3-11	Ratio	of	hospital	beds	in	Southeast	Asian	countries	(World	Bank,	2014)					
	Table	3-6	provides	the	distribution	of	physicians	and	hospital	beds	across	all	34	provinces.	The	ratio	of	hospital	beds	does	not	fully	reflect	the	variation	in	area	coverage	or	the	population	density	in	any	given	area.	Based	on	the	unadjusted	ratio,	West	Papua	and	Maluku	have	a	higher	ratio	compared	to	the	national	average	(0.93).	While	both	provinces	may	have,	on	average,	one	hospital	bed	per	1,000	population,	the	coverage	of	one	bed	spans	a	much	wider	area	compared	to	provinces	that	have	denser	populations,	for	example,	West	Java	or	West	Sumatra.	I	therefore	use	the	
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inverse	of	the	share	of	the	province	size,	defined	as	[province	size/total	Indonesia	size]	x	100%,	as	a	multiplier	to	adjust	the	ratio.	This	adjustment	factor	will	give	more	weighting	for	provinces	with	a	large	area.	Based	on	this	adjustment,	both	provinces	have	a	much	lower	ratio	while	DKI	Jakarta,	as	the	capital	city	region,	has	the	highest	ratio.	DKI	Jakarta	has	the	fourth	largest	number	of	beds	but	its	area	size	is	the	smallest	compared	to	the	other	provinces.	The	adjusted	ratio	provides	stronger	evidence	of	the	uneven	distribution	of	health	facilities	in	Indonesia.			Secondly,	Indonesia	also	has	a	relatively	low	density	of	health	providers,	especially	physicians	and	dentists,	and	they	are	further	concentrated	in	more	developed	areas.	As	shown	in	Error!	Reference	source	not	found.,	the	density	of	physicians	is	relatively	low	compared	to	neighbouring	countries	in	Southeast	Asia.	The	same	problem	occurs	with	the	ratio	of	hospital	beds:	simply	dividing	the	number	of	physicians	by	the	number	of	populations	does	not	reveal	the	geographical	variation	among	the	provinces.	DKI	Jakarta,	which	is	the	most	developed	area	and	the	capital	city	of	Indonesia,	has	the	same	unadjusted	ratio	as	Maluku,	one	of	the	underdeveloped	provinces	in	the	eastern	region	with	many	small	islands.	According	to	the	unadjusted	ratio,	Maluku	has	more	than	one	doctor	per	1,000	population,	but	their	doctor	has	to	cover	larger	area	than	their	counterpart	in	Jakarta.	If	the	ratio	is	adjusted	to	control	for	geographical	variation,	Jakarta	has	the	highest	density	of	physicians	compared	to	the	others	and	Maluku	has	a	much	smaller	density	compared	to	the	national	average.			
		
	
Table	3-6	Distribution	of	physicians	and	hospital	beds	before	and	after	adjustment	
Province	 Ratio	of	hospital	bed	 Adjusted	ratio	of	hospital	bed	 Density	of	Physician	 Adjusted	Density	of	Physician	Aceh	 	1.12		 	0.37		 	0.31		 	0.10		North	Sumatera	 	1.36		 	0.36		 	0.23		 	0.06		West	Sumatera	 	1.08		 	0.49		 	0.34		 	0.16		Riau	 	0.83		 	0.18		 	0.19		 	0.04		Jambi	 	0.84		 	0.32		 	0.21		 	0.08		South	Sumatera	 	0.69		 	0.14		 	0.14		 	0.03		Bengkulu		 	0.91		 	0.87		 	0.24		 	0.23		Lampung	 	0.51		 	0.28		 	0.13		 	0.07		
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Bangka	Belitung	Islands	 	0.84		 	0.98		 	0.25		 	0.29		Riau	Islands	 	1.04		 	2.42		 	0.29		 	0.68		DKI	Jakarta	 	1.99		 	57.30		 	0.26		 	7.56		West	Java	 	0.62		 	0.33		 	0.10		 	0.05		Central	Java	 	0.96		 	0.56		 	0.14		 	0.08		Yogyakarta	 	2.85		 	17.35		 	0.41		 	2.51		East	Java	 	0.83		 	0.33		 	0.11		 	0.05		Banten	 	0.55		 	1.09		 	0.11		 	0.23		Bali	 	1.20		 	3.98		 	0.25		 	0.83		West	Nusa	Tenggara		 	0.47		 	0.49		 	0.12		 	0.12		East	Nusa	Tenggara	 	0.74		 	0.29		 	0.12		 	0.05		West	Kalimantan	 	0.93		 	0.12		 	0.13		 	0.02		Central	Kalimantan	 	0.70		 	0.09		 	0.20		 	0.03		South	Kalimantan	 	1.00		 	0.50		 	0.20		 	0.10		East	Kalimantan	 	1.38		 	0.20		 	0.23		 	0.03		North	Kalimantan	 	-				 	-				 	0.40		 	0.10		North	Sulawesi	 	1.83		 	2.53		 	0.43		 	0.59		Central	Sulawesi	 	0.99		 	0.30		 	0.19		 	0.06		South	Sulawesi	 	1.18		 	0.48		 	0.17		 	0.07		Southeast	Sulawesi	 	0.80		 	0.40		 	0.19		 	0.09		Gorontalo	 	0.90		 	1.53		 	0.25		 	0.42		West	Sulawesi	 	0.57		 	0.65		 	0.19		 	0.21		Maluku			 	1.32		 	0.54		 	0.24		 	0.10		North	Maluku	 	1.07		 	0.64		 	0.27		 	0.16		West	Papua	 	1.23		 	0.07		 	0.27		 	0.02		Papua	 	0.88		 	0.17		 	0.22		 	0.04		National	Average	 	0.93		 		 	0.16		 									
Section	3.5 	The	health	financing	system	in	Indonesia		Indonesia	has	a	long	history	of	experimenting	with	various	health	financing	strategies,	from	community-based	health	insurance	(CBHI)	in	earlier	years	to	social	health	insurance	today.	The	history	of	the	health	financing	system	in	Indonesia	will	be	explained	in	five	sections:	section	3.5.1	presents	Indonesia’s	attempt	to	establish	CBHI	to	support	poor	people;	section	3.5.2	provides	a	brief	history	of	the	expansion	of	the	private	health	insurance	market	in	Indonesia;	section	3.5.3	explains	the	social	security	net	in	response	to	the	Asian	economic	crisis	in	1997/98;	section	3.5.4	gives	a	brief	history	of	the	foundation	of	national	health	insurance;	and	lastly	section	3.5.5	
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describes	the	most	current	public	health	insurance	scheme,	the	JKN	programme,	in	more	detail.			
 	Community-based	health	insurance		In	early	1970,	Indonesia	attempted	to	introduce	a	programme	of	community-based	health	insurance	(CBHI)	which	was	called	Dana	Sehat/Healthy	Funds	(Saludung,	1997).	This	programme	aimed	to	cover	the	rural	population	who	needed	financial	assistance	to	access	health	care	services.	The	exact	coverage	rate	was	unclear	due	to	conflicting	reports	from	different	sources	(Thabrany,	2012;	Hsiao,	2004;	Saludung,	1997).	The	local	community	was	involved	in	deciding	on	the	benefits	of	being	a	member.	The	premium	of	most	healthy	funds	was	relatively	affordable,	0.5	percent	of	household	income	on	average	(Nugroho	and	Elliott,	1977),	yet	too	low	to	generate	adequate	risk	pooling.	With	no	subsidy	from	the	government,	this	low	amount	of	contribution	led	to	limited	benefits	which	could	only	cover	basic	health	services	from	the	Puskesmas.	In	addition,	many	small-sized	Healthy	Funds	in	the	villages	did	not	have	the	capacity	and	experience	in	insurance	management	and,	therefore,	could	not	expand	the	pooling	and	manage	the	fund	efficiently.	A	fee-for	service	system	instead	of	prepayment	was	the	main	reimbursement	mechanism	indicating	a	lack	of	cost	control	(Hsiao,	2004).	The	dropout	rate	after	the	first	year	was	60	to	70	percent	because	ex-members	perceived	that	joining	the	scheme	was	not	worth	the	money	anymore.			
Table	3-7	Timeline	of	Health	Care	Reform	in	Indonesia		
Year	 Reform	1968	 Askes,	the	first	health	insurance	scheme	for	civil	servants.	Also,	Taspen	for	pensioners	in	the	public	sector	and	Asabri	for	the	armed	forces	and	police	1970	 Dana	Sehat	(Health	Fund)	was	first	introduced.	Similar	to	community-based	health	insurance	1978	 Astek	(Social	security	for	private	labour)	was	first	introduced,	only	covered	workplaces	>	500	employees	1992	 Astek	was	reformed	into	Jamsostek,	now	covered	workplaces	>	100	employees	
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1992	 JPKM	(similar	to	HMO	in	the	USA)	was	first	introduced	1996	 Kartu	Sehat	(Health	Card)	was	first	introduced	to	provide	subsidised	health	care	to	the	poor	1998	 JPS	(Social	Safety	Net)	in	response	to	the	financial	crisis	with	the	help	of	an	ADB	loan;	re-introduced	the	Health	Card	programme	2004	 JPKM	and	Healthy	Fund	were	no	longer	supported	due	to	their	failure	in	expanding	its	coverage	2004	 National	Social	Health	Insurance	(SJSN)	Act	was	enacted	2005	 Askeskin	(Health	Insurance	for	Poor	Population)	was	first	established;	managed	by	PT	Askes	2008	 Askeskin	was	transformed	into	Jamkesmas	and	managed	by	the	MoH	2011	 Social	Security	Administrator	Agency	(BPJS)	Act	was	enacted	following	lawsuits	from	labour	unions	2014	 Askes,	Jamsostek	and	Jamkesmas	were	unified	under	one	agency,	BPJS-Kesehatan.	The	unified	scheme	is	called	Jaminan	Kesehatan	Nasional	(JKN)/National	Health	Insurance	
Sources:	(Hsiao,	2004;	Thabrany	and	Mundiharno,	2012;	Thabrany,	2012;	Mahendradhata	et	al.,	2017)		
 Expansion	of	the	private	insurance	market		Recognising	the	failure	of	Healthy	Funds	to	expand	more	widely,	the	government	introduced	several	health	financing	reforms	in	the	early	1990s	that	favoured	the	growth	of	the	private	insurance	system.	In	1992,	the	government	ratified	Law	No.	3/1992	on	the	re-introduction	of	a	social	security	scheme	named	Jamsostek	that	expanded	the	coverage	for	employees	in	the	formal	sectors,	excluding	civil	servants.	Furthermore,	the	government	reformed	the	health	insurance	scheme	for	civil	servants	by	changing	the	status	of	its	management	from	a	government	agency	to	a	state-owned	company,	which	was	called	PT	Askes,	with	higher	autonomous	status.	More	importantly,	the	government	also	issued	Law	No.	2/1992	on	the	regulation	of	the	insurance	market	which	permitted	private	insurance	companies	to	sell	health	insurance	products,	regulated	and	supervised	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance.	To	stimulate	the	growth	of	the	private	health	insurance	market,	the	government	also	allowed	the	employers	to	opt	out	from	the	Jamsostek	membership	if	they	could	purchase	a	better	health	insurance	plan	from	private	plans	and	permitted	PT	Askes	to	sell	commercial	health	insurance	products	to	non-civil	servants.	By	1997,	an	
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estimated	1.6	million	persons	were	covered	by	commercial	indemnity	health	policies,	up	from	450,000	in	1993	(Lieberman	and	Marzoeki,	2002).		Lastly,	under	Law	No.	23/1992	the	MoH	actively	promoted	the	managed	care	model	to	reduce	government	expenditure	on	the	health	care	system.	Jaminan	Pemeliharaan	
Kesehatan	Masyarakat	(JPKM)/Community	Health	Maintenance	Organisation)	is	Indonesia’s	interpretation	of	the	Health	Maintenance	Organisation	(HMO)	model,	which	was	very	popular	in	the	USA	in	the	1990s	prior	to	its	downfall	in	the	early	2000s	(Mechanic,	2004).	The	MoH	as	the	licensor	would	give	the	JPKM	license	to	private	businesses	willing	to	adopt	the	managed	care	model	and	become	the	Bapel,	an	acronym	for	Badan	Penyelenggara/Executing	Agency.	Thabrany	(2003)	argued	that	JPKM’s	failure	to	expand	its	membership	and	provide	adequate	financial	protection	was	due	to	the	low	technical	capacity	of	the	MoH	to	regulate	and	supervise	the	conduct	of	health	insurance	businesses;	the	MoH	did	not	even	consider	JPKM	as	part	of	the	health	insurance	product.	JPKM	still	had	to	compete	with	other	private	plans,	but	it	had	two	disadvantages.	Firstly,	Indonesian	people	did	not	have	much	experience	in	understanding	the	risk	transfer	mechanisms	in	insurance	or	managed	care.	Secondly,	the	managed	care	required	its	members	to	utilise	the	contracted	providers	only,	whereas	other	private	plans	could	offer	a	wider	selection	of	providers	(Marzolf,	2002,	p.20).	Today,	the	MoH	has	stopped	providing	new	JPKM	licenses.			
 	Social	security	net	post	the	economic	crisis	1997/1998		In	1998,	the	government	received	a	big	loan	from	the	Asian	Development	Bank	(ADB)	to	alleviate	the	impact	of	the	Asian	economic	crisis	in	1997/1998.	The	government	introduced	a	range	of	safety	net	programmes	in	key	sectors,	such	as	food,	education	and	health.	For	the	health	sector,	the	government	re-introduced	the	Kartu	
Sehat/Health	Card	programme.	It	was	first	launched	in	1996	but	it	failed	to	reach	its	target	population	due	to	poor	management	at	Puskesmas	level.	This	programme	was	targeted	towards	the	population	most	vulnerable	to	economic	shocks.	The	targeting	strategy	utilised	a	combination	of	geographic	and	community-based	targeting	instruments,	mostly	based	on	the	outdated	database	from	the	National	Family	Program	Coordinating	Agency	(BKKBN).	Furthermore,	district	health	officials	and	
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community	members	created	additional	criteria	based	on	local	needs	(Sparrow,	Suryahadi	and	Widyanti,	2013).	The	Health	Card	programme	paid	health	facilities	Rp	10,000	(50	pennies)	per	year	per	person.	It	only	permitted	the	beneficiaries	to	utilise	public	health	care	providers	to	seek	medical	treatment	(Hsiao	et	al.,	2007).		In	the	end,	this	programme	just	operated	as	a	price	subsidy	programme	for	accessing	public	health	care	facilities	with	less	attention	to	expanding	its	coverage.	Johar	(2009)	evaluated	the	Health	Card	programme	by	analysing	panel	data	from	the	Indonesia	Family	Life	Survey	(IFLS)	1,	2	and	3	(1993,	1997,	and	2000).	She	argued	that	this	programme	had	little	or	no	effect	on	the	utilisation	of	health	care	explained	by	its	inelastic	demand	(Johar,	2009).	The	lack	of	other	incentives	on	the	demand	side,	compounded	by	the	inadequate	supply	of	the	public	health	system,	meant	that	the	Health	Card	programme	had	little	power	to	increase	utilisation.	In	a	different	paper,	she	also	asserted	that	the	Health	Card	programme	further	reduced	the	quality	of	public	health	centres	in	rural	areas	by	reducing	health	workers’	commitment	to	public	jobs	(Johar,	2010).	Since	they	received	a	fixed	capitated	income	from	the	Health	Card	programme,	they	sought	additional	income	by	opening	private	practices	outside	of	working	hours.		
 	Moving	towards	a	unified	social	security	system	in	Indonesia			Meanwhile,	the	government	realised	that	the	Health	Card	programme	was	not	sufficient	to	support	the	health	system	in	the	long	run.	The	government	passed	the	
SJSN	Law	No.	40/2004	as	the	first	law	regulating	the	establishment	of	the	Social	Security	System	in	Indonesia.	Due	to	the	gridlock	of	political	debate	in	legislative	bodies,	the	government	rebranded	the	Health	Card	program	into	a	new	programme	called	Askeskin	(Asuransi	Kesehatan	Miskin/Health	Insurance	for	the	Poor)	as	a	temporary	measure	to	partially	address	the	SJSN	law.	However,	some	regarded	this	attempt	as	a	justification	for	the	reduction	of	the	fuel	subsidy	at	the	beginning	of	2005	(OECD,	2010).	The	Askeskin	programme	was	administered	by	PT	Askes,	the	state-owned	company	responsible	for	managing	the	health	insurance	scheme	for	the	civil	servants.	The	Askeskin	programme	was	funded	by	general	tax	revenue,	initially	by	the	surplus	from	the	reduction	of	fuel	subsidy.	It	targeted	only	the	poor	population	identified	a	priori	based	on	various	means-tested	criteria.	Statistics	Indonesia	(BPS)	
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was	responsible	for	supplying	the	updated	database	on	the	poor	population	in	Indonesia,	replacing	the	outdated	version	held	by	BKKBN	used	for	distributing	the	Health	Card	programme	in	1998.	It	was	targeted	to	cover	60	million	people,	which	made	it	the	biggest	health	insurance	provider	in	Indonesia.			Another	improvement	of	the	Askeskin	programme	in	comparison	to	the	Health	Card	was	the	expansion	of	the	benefits	on	offer.	It	included	more	specialist	services	through	a	larger	network	of	private	practices	and	hospitals.	In	addition,	while	the	Health	Card	programme	used	a	capitation	strategy	to	contain	the	cost,	Askeskin	reimbursed	the	full	cost	of	services	delivered	in	both	public	and	private	health	care	facilities	(i.e.	fee-for-service).	While	the	doctor	received	more	compensation	in	delivering	services	for	Askeskin	patients	compared	to	the	Health	Card,	the	reimbursement	of	the	costs	was	often	delayed	for	months.	Despite	the	problems	with	its	implementation,	Askeskin	was	considered	to	be	successful	in	increasing	the	utilisation	of	outpatient	care	(Sparrow,	Suryahadi	and	Widyanti,	2013)	but	there	is	inconclusive	evidence	about	whether	it	provided	adequate	financial	protection	to	its	enrolees	(Sparrow,	Suryahadi	and	Widyanti,	2013;	Aji	et	al.,	2013).	In	2008,	the	government	reformed	Askeskin	into	a	new	programme	called	Jamkesmas/Community	Health	Insurance.	The	MoH	took	over	the	management	of	Jamkesmas	from	PT	Askes,	who	had	previously	managed	Askeskin.	One	of	the	aims	of	this	reform	was	to	address	the	many	complaints	from	hospitals	in	terms	of	the	delays	in	reimbursement	(Aji	et	al.,	2013).	Following	government	mandates,	Jamkesmas	expanded	the	target	population	to	include	not	only	the	poor	population,	but	also	the	near	poor	population.	In	2012,	Jamkesmas	covered	76.4	million	people,	32	percent	of	the	total	population.	Beneficiaries	were	identified	by	a	combination	of	means	testing,	conducted	by	Statistics	Indonesia	(BPS),	and	local	eligibility	criteria.	BPS	issued	a	quota	of	Jamkesmas	members	per	district	and	the	district	had	the	power	to	alter	the	quota	based	on	their	own	criteria.	One	critical	problem	in	the	enrolment	process	was	the	poor	distribution	of	membership	cards.	Harimurti	et	al.	(2013)	reported	that	after	matching	the	number	of	poor	people	who	had	Jamkesmas	cards	and	the	number	of	Jamkesmas	cardholders	who	were	actually	poor,	there	was	an	indication	of	a	leakage	rate	of	52.4	percent.	In	one	local	survey	by	IBP	Indonesia,	the	utilisation	of	the	Jamkesmas	quota	by	local	officials	to	distribute	the	Jamkesmas	card	varied	greatly	from	57	percent	to	99	percent	(Dwicaksono,	Nurman	and	Prasetya,	2012).			
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	Central	government	realised	that	the	Jamkesmas	programme	would	not	cover	all	of	the	people	who	needed	medical	treatment	but	were	not	eligible	to	receive	Jamkesmas.	Therefore,	they	also	mandated	district	and	provincial	governments	to	initiate	local	schemes	which	would	adopt	a	similar	principle	to	Jamkesmas	in	order	to	cover	the	uninsured	population	who	were	not	eligible	for	Jamkesmas.	These	local	initiatives	are	jointly	called	Jaminan	Kesehatan	Daerah/Jamkesda	(Local	Health	Insurance).	In	2011,	approximately	32	million	people	were	covered	by	Jamkesda	in	367	districts	(Thabrany	and	Mundiharno,	2012,	p.48).	The	evaluation	of	Jamkesda	has	proven	difficult	due	to	the	heterogeneity	of	the	schemes’	designs,	including	benefits	structure,	provider	payment	systems	and	eligibility	criteria.	While	all	Jamkesda	schemes	included	allocations	from	the	local	budgets,	a	few	required	payments	from	beneficiaries	or	offered	only	limited	benefits	according	to	income	(Aspinall,	2014;	Tangcharoensathien	et	al.,	2011).
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 JKN	programme	for	all		The	discussion	in	the	previous	section	has	shown	that	health	financing	in	Indonesia	was	fragmented	on	the	basis	of	job	sector.	Government	employees	were	covered	by	Askes	and	employees	in	the	formal	sector	were	covered	by	Jamsostek	or	private	insurance.	Unemployed	people	and	workers	in	the	informal	sector	could	be	covered	by	either	Jamkesmas	if	they	were	eligible	or	Jamkesda	if	it	was	available	in	their	district/province;	the	rest	were	uninsured.	However,	beginning	on	the	1	January	2014,	most	of	these	different	schemes	have	been	unified	under	one	scheme	called	
Jaminan	Kesehatan	Nasional	(JKN)/	National	Health	Insurance	programme	managed	by	a	semi-independent	agency	named	Badan	Pengelola	Jaminan	Sosial	–	
Kesehatan	(BPJS-K)/Social	Security	Administration	Agency	–	Health.	According	to	Table	3-8,	it	is	estimated	that	88	million	people	(37	percent)	were	still	uninsured	in	2012.	Jamsostek	only	represented	2.3	percent	of	the	population	even	after	20	years	of	its	implementation.	The	JKN	programme	was	introduced	to	address	the	gaps	in	health	insurance	coverage	in	Indonesia.	In	this	thesis,	the	JKN	programme	will	be	the	main	programme	of	interest.			
Table	3-8	Health	insurance	coverage	in	Indonesia,	2012		Type	of	health	insurance	 Total	(in	millions)	 Percentage	Askes	for	Civil	Servants	 17.3	 7.2%	Askes	for	Military/Police	 2.2	 0.9%	Jamkesmas	 76.4	 31.9%	Jamsostek	 5.6	 2.3%	Jamkesda	 31.8	 13.3%	Private	insurance	 15.4	 6.4%	Askes	(private	plan)		 2.9	 1.2%	Total	Insured	 151.5	 63.2%	Total	Uninsured	 88.1	 36.8%	Total	Population	 239.7	 100.0%	
Source:	Peta	Jalan	JKN	2014-2019	(Thabrany	and	Mundiharno,	2012)		Reiterating	the	discussion	in	the	previous	sub-section,	the	basis	of	the	JKN	programme	originated	from	the	SJSN	Law	No.	40/2004.	Based	on	this	law,	the	central	
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government	launched	a	new	scheme	called	Askeskin	targeting	the	poor	population,	reformed	it	into	Jamkesmas	in	2008	with	an	expanded	target	population	and	new	management,	and	mandated	local	governments	to	initiate	Jamkesda	in	order	to	cover	people	who	were	ineligible	for	Jamkesmas.	The	law	also	dictated	that	it	was	necessary	to	create	a	semi-independent	agency	to	manage	the	health	insurance	for	all	citizens,	but	it	took	seven	years	for	the	Indonesian	parliament	to	ratify	the	BPJS	law	to	establish	the	Social	Security	Administration	Agency/BPJS	in	October	2011.	This	delay	was	driven	by	a	change	in	the	political	regime	that	occurred	soon	after	the	SJSN	law’s	enactment	in	2004	(Kwon	and	Kim,	2015)	and	heavy	resistance	from	Askes,	Jamsostek	and	lobbyists	from	private	health	insurance	companies	(Aspinall,	2014).		
Table	3-9	Monthly	contribution	for	each	type	of	JKN	member	as	of	January	2016*	
	 Premium	 Paid	by	 Benefit	(inpatient	ward)	†	1.	Penerima	Bantuan	Iuran	(PBI)	/Contribution	Assistance	Recipients		 Jan	2014	–	Mar	2016:	IDR	19,225	 	 3
rd	class		
2.	Veterans	and	their	dependants		 2.25%	of	third-grade	civil	servants’	basic	payroll*			 	 1st	class		3.	Peserta	Pekerja	Penerima	Upah	(PPU)/	Salaried	workers	including	their	dependants	(max	4):	
	 	 	
3a.	Government	employees	(including	civil	servants,	military	and	police	officers)	 5%	 3%	employer	2%	employee	 Grades	1-2:	2
nd	class		Grade	3	and	above:	1st	class		3b.	Government	employees	in	state-owned	companies	and	private	employees	 5%	 4%	employer	1%	employee	 Salary	up	to	1.5	times	non-taxable	income:	2nd	class		Salary	1.5-2	times	non-taxable	income:	1st	class		3c.	 Extra	 dependant	 (fourth	child	 and	 more,	 parent	 and	parent-in-law)	 1%	per	person	 Employee	 Follow	3a	or	3b	4.	Non-salaried	workers	(PBPU)	and	Non-workers	including	their	family	members	
IDR	25,500	for	3rd	class		IDR	42,500	for	2nd	class		IDR	59,500	for	1st	class		 	 According	to	the	premium	
Source:	Official	BPJS-K	website:	https://bpjs-kesehatan.go.id		(available	in	English).		
*	Starting	from	March	2016,	the	contribution	paid	by	the	government	for	PBI	beneficiaries	has	increased	to	IDR	
23,000.	The	contribution	for	PBPU/non-salaried	workers	and	non-workers	increased	to	IDR	30,000,	IDR	51,000,	and	
IDR	80,000	respectively	from	3rd	class	to	1st	class.		
†	Inpatient	ward	can	be	classified	into	VIP	class,	1st	class,	2nd	class	and	3rd	class	(the	lowest).	JKN	does	not	cover	VIP	
class	which	allows	the	patient	to	not	share	a	ward	with	other	patients.	If	the	patients	want	to	upgrade	their	class,	
they	have	to	pay	the	bill’s	difference	between	their	current	class	and	the	upgraded	class.			Under	the	BPJS	law,	BPJS	is	divided	into	two	separate	bodies:	one	for	health	and	another	one	for	pensions.	BPJS-Kesehatan/BPJS-Health	is	the	main	actor	for	
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administering	the	JKN	programme.	BPJS-K	have	two	types	of	goal:	a	key	goal	and	several	intermediate	goals.	The	key	goal	is	to	achieve	universal	health	coverage	by	2019.	The	main	intermediate	goal	is	to	unify	the	management	of	Askes,	Jamsostek	and	Jamkesmas	under	one	single	payer	system;	approximately	121.6	million	people	(Thabrany	and	Mundiharno,	2012).		For	this	new	scheme,	Indonesia	has	adopted	a	social	health	insurance	model	with	two	distinct	characteristics:	the	informal	workers	are	allowed	to	contribute	to	the	same	pool	as	the	formal	workers	and	the	government	pays	the	contribution	for	the	most	vulnerable	population.	Table	3-9	provides	the	details	of	the	contribution	schedule	for	different	groups	of	members.	In	general,	there	are	two	big	groups:	(1)	the	subsidised	group	or	Penerima	Bantuan	Iuran	(PBI)/Contribution	Assistance	Recipients	including	the	poor	population	and	totally	disabled	individuals	whose	contributions	are	paid	for	by	the	government,	and	(2)	the	contributory	group	which	consists	of	Peserta	Pekerja	
Penerima	Upah	(PPU)	/salaried	employees	(government	and	private)	and	their	dependants,	Peserta	Pekerja	Bukan	Penerima	Upah	(PBPU)/non-salaried	workers,	and	Peserta	Bukan	Pekerja/non-workers	(see	Table	3-9	for	more	detail).	To	minimise	fraudulent	membership,	late	payment	is	penalised	with	a	membership	deactivation.	Members	who	re-activate	their	membership	and	use	JKN	to	pay	any	inpatient	care	services	within	45	days	after	the	first	day	of	re-activation	must	pay	a	certain	amount	of	fine,	capped	at	30	million	rupiahs	(8.5	times	the	regional	minimum	monthly	wage	in	Jakarta)	(Kesehatan,	2017).	Based	on	Table	3-10,	JKN	had	covered	195	million	people	or	76	percent	of	the	total	population	by	April	2018.	Assuming	private	insurance	and	Askes	private	plans	grow	at	a	constant	rate,	the	uninsured	population	has	decreased	from	36.8	percent	in	2012	to	14.4	percent	in	2018.	In	addition,	JKN	has	attracted	32	million	workers	in	the	informal	sector	and	unemployed	people	who	might	not	have	had	any	insurance	before	the	introduction	of	the	JKN	programme.							
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Table	3-10	JKN	members,	based	on	type	of	membership	as	of	1	April	2018	
Type	of	members	 Number	of	members	 Proportion	1.	The	subsidised	group	=	PBI	 116,982,202	 59.9%	2.	The	contributory	group	=	PPU	+	PBPU	 	 	2a.	Civil	servants,	military,	and	police	officers	 16,849,975	 8.6%	2b.	Private	and	state-owned	companies		 29,235,691	 15.0%	2c.	Non-salaried	workers	and	non-workers	 32,102,415	 16.4%	Total	 195,170,283	 100%	
Source:	Official	website	of	BPJS-K.	Accessed	at	9	April	
2018.https://bpjskesehatan.go.id/bpjs/index.php/jumlahPeserta			In	terms	of	benefits	packages,	JKN	offers	comprehensive	benefits	packages,	covering	outpatient	and	inpatient	care	at	primary	level	up	to	tertiary	hospital	level,	with	the	exclusion	of	a	few	types	of	care.	The	JKN	does	not	cover:	(i)	services	that	are	not	in	accordance	with	protocols;	(ii)	materials,	tools	or	procedures	for	cosmetic	purposes;	(iii)	general	check-ups;	(iv)	prosthetic	dental	care;	(v)	alternative	therapy	(for	example,	acupuncture,	traditional	healers);	and	(vi)	in	vitro	fertilization	and	infertility	programmes	including	treatment	for	impotence	(Mahendradhata	et	al.,	2017,	p.81).	This	represents	quite	a	bold	move	for	Indonesia	considering	some	countries	that	have	achieved	UHC	at	an	earlier	stage	(e.g.	Thailand	and	Rwanda)	tend	to	exclude	some	of	the	very	costly	treatments,	such	as	renal	dialysis	and	expensive	cancer	treatment	(Yiengprugsawan	et	al.,	2010).	In	addition,	under	JKN	regulations,	cost-sharing	is	not	allowed,	unless	the	beneficiaries	want	to	upgrade	to	a	higher	level	of	hospital	ward	class	which	will	provide	them	with	better	non-medical	facilities	but	similar	medical	treatment.	This	very	generous	benefit	with	no	cost-sharing	increases	the	overall	health	budget	and	threatens	the	sustainability	of	the	JKN	programme	in	the	long	run.			Beneficiaries	can	seek	treatment	in	the	registered	facilities	set	by	the	BPJS.	This	consists	of	all	government-owned	health	facilities	and	contracted	private	health	facilities.	BPJS	pays	primary	health	facilities	prospectively	through	capitation	and	diagnosis	related	groups	using	the	Indonesian	definitions	(INA-CBG)	for	hospital	services.	The	monthly	capitation	is	determined	by	the	number	of	registered	enrolees	in	the	health	facilities.	INA-CBG	price	schedules	are	negotiated	with	the	hospital	associations.	The	hospital	bills	are	determined	by	INA-CBG	codes,	the	case-mix	index	
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in	the	hospital,	the	regional	location	of	the	hospital	and	the	type	of	hospital	(i.e.	type	A	–	D)	(Kesehatan,	2017).		
Section	3.6 	Summary		This	chapter	has	provided	an	overview	of	the	demographic,	economic	and	health	indicators	of	Indonesia	and	has	compared	the	health	expenditure	indicators	with	other	Southeast	Asian	(SEA)	countries.	Despite	its	moderate	recovery	from	the	economic	crisis	two	decades	ago,	Indonesia	has	not	invested	adequate	resources	into	health	care:	less	than	3	percent	of	its	GDP	was	devoted	to	health	in	2012,	which	is	lower	than	the	average	for	the	SEA	countries.	Moreover,	45	percent	of	the	total	health	expenditure	comes	from	the	private	sector,	of	which	75	percent	comes	from	out-of-pocket	payments.	This	has	provided	a	strong	argument	for	the	government	to	establish	a	national	health	insurance	programme	in	order	to	remove	the	barriers	to	utilising	medical	care	and	protect	people	from	financial	distress	due	to	medical	care	consumption.			The	establishment	of	the	JKN	programme	in	2014	demonstrates	good,	albeit	slow,	progress	by	the	government	in	ensuring	access	to	health	insurance	for	everyone.	It	has	accumulated	a	big	proportion	of	enrolees	from	existing	public	health	insurance,	i.e.	civil	servants	(Askes),	formal	workers	(Jamsostek)	and	poor	people	(Jamkesmas	and	Jamkesda),	as	well	as	people	who	were	previously	uninsured	prior	to	2014.	Due	to	its	generous	medical	benefits,	it	is	expected	that	we	will	see	a	significant	impact	on	utilisation	and	out-of-pocket	health	expenditure,	but	this	may	not	be	the	case	if	we	look	at	other	countries’	experiences,	for	example,	China	(Wagstaff	and	Lindelow,	2008).	In	the	next	chapter,	I	will	review	the	evidence	on	whether	health	insurance	has	any	impact	on	access	to	care,	financial	protection	and	health	status.				 	
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Chapter	4 	Review	of	systematic	review	of	the	impact	of	
health	insurance	on	access	to	care,	financial	protection,	
and	health	status	
Section	4.1 	Introduction		Many	low-	and	middle-	income	countries	(LMICs)	have	introduced	health	insurance	programmes	in	the	last	few	decades	(World	Health	Organization,	2014a).	A	number	of	systematic	reviews	have	been	undertaken	over	the	years	to	understand	and	synthesise	the	impact	of	health	insurance	on	access	to	care,	financial	protection,	and	health	status	(Acharya	et	al.,	2013;	Giedion	et	al.,	2013;	Spaan	et	al.,	2012;	Ekman,	2004).	These	reviews	differ	in	their	focus	and	approach	and	do	not	always	include	the	same	studies	within	the	same	period.	Moreover,	there	is	also	some	concern	about	variation	in	the	quality	of	systematic	reviews	which	is	important	to	overcome	two	biases:	selection	bias	which	may	be	inherent	from	the	primary	studies,	and	reporting	bias	from	the	process	of	the	review	itself	(Moher	et	al.,	2002).	It	is	therefore	useful	to	synthesise	the	large	body	of	evidence	on	health	insurance	in	LMICs.	The	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	conduct	a	review	of	systematic	reviews	on	publicly-financed	health	insurance	programmes	in	LMICs,	taking	account	of	the	methodological	quality	of	systematic	reviews	and	to	explore	the	impact	evaluation	methodology	from	the	available	evidence.		
Section	4.2 	Methods	
 	Selection	of	studies		In	this	review	of	reviews,	I	included	studies	that	met	the	following	four	characteristics	of	a	systematic	review,	according	to	the	Preferred	Reporting	Items	for	Systematic	reviews	and	Meta-Analyses	(PRISMA)	definition	(Moher	et	al.,	2015):	(a) A	clearly	stated	set	of	objectives	with	an	explicit,	reproducible	methodology;		(b) A	systematic	search	that	attempts	to	identify	all	studies	that	would	meet	the	eligibility	criteria;		(c) Assessment	of	the	validity	of	the	findings	of	the	included	studies	(e.g.,	assessment	of	risk	of	bias	and	confidence	in	cumulative	estimates);	and		
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(d) Systematic	presentation	and	synthesis	of	the	characteristics	and	findings	of	the	included	studies.	Some	other	non-systematic	reviews	also	exist	and	could	provide	additional	insight	into	the	overview	questions.	However,	it	is	difficult	to	assess	their	qualities	because	they	do	not	follow	a	standardised	review	method	hence	their	exclusion	from	this	review.		
 	Types	of	participants		This	review	of	reviews	included	only	reviews	that	focus	on	LMICs	as	determined	by	per	capita	gross	national	income	(GNI)	estimated	using	the	World	Bank	Atlas	method	(World	Bank,	2016).	Despite	the	problems	associated	with	the	income	indicator	and	the	way	groups	are	classified	(Alonso,	Cortez	and	Klasen,	2014),	this	classification	has	been	used	for	many	systematic	reviews	in	health	sciences	(e.g.	Eaton	et	al.,	2011;	Baral	et	al.,	2007;	Joshi	et	al.,	2006).	Furthermore,	WHO	also	uses	the	World	Bank	income	groups	as	one	of	the	classification	methods	for	their	health	statistics	and	information	systems	(World	Health	Organization,	2017).	Any	review	that	considers	studies	on	all	countries	was	still	included	if	there	is	a	clear	distinction	between	findings	from	LMICs	and	high-income	countries	(HIC).			
 	Types	of	interventions		For	the	purpose	of	this	review,	I	defined	health	insurance	as	any	programme	that	attempts	to	pool	the	financial	risk	of	seeking	health	care	by	collecting	contributions	from	a	group	of	people	(Folland,	Goodman	and	Stano,	2014).	Depending	on	the	financing	sources	and	who	manages	the	risk	pools,	health	insurance	can	be	classified	into	private	and	public.	Public	insurance	is	generally	financed	through	either	taxation	systems	or	payroll	contributions	to	a	social	security	scheme,	while	private	insurance	is	financed	through	private	health	premiums	(Gottret	and	Schieber,	2006).	This	overview	focuses	on	public	health	insurance	only.	Pauly	et	al.	(2006)	provides	a	good	overview	of	the	role	of	private	insurance	in	developing	countries.	Reviews	that	
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included	both	public	and	private	health	insurance	were	also	included	if	there	is	a	clear	distinction	between	those	two	types	in	their	analyses.			Health	insurance	is	not	the	only	means	to	increase	the	demand	for	health	services.	Reviews	studying	other	types	of	financial	incentives,	such	as	voucher	schemes	or	cash	transfers,		were	excluded	(Pega	et	al.,	2015;	Grainger	et	al.,	2014;	Lagarde,	Haines	and	Palmer,	2007).	The	financing	structure	of	health	insurance	programmes	may	differ	in	revenue	collection	methods	and	provider	payment	schemes,	both	between	and	within	countries.	For	example,	local	governments	in	a	highly-decentralised	country	are	given	greater	level	of	discretion	in	determining	the	reimbursement	rate	for	any	usage	of	health	services.	This	review	did	not	place	any	restrictions	on	the	health	financing	structure	of	the	health	insurance	programme.		
 	Types	of	outcomes	measures		Three	main	outcomes	of	interest	were	included	–	access	to	healthcare,	financial	protection,	and	health	outcomes.		
• Access	to	care	is	commonly	measured	by	changes	in	utilisation	patterns	of	health	services	(e.g.	immunisation	coverage,	number	of	doctor	visits,	and	rates	of	hospitalisation).	
• Financial	protection	is	commonly	measured	by	changes	in	out-of-pocket	expenditures	(OOP)	at	either	household	or	individual	level.	I	also	considered	specific	measures	reflecting	a	more	comprehensive	picture	of	financial	protection,	including	catastrophic	health	expenditure	or	impoverishment	from	medical	expenses.	
• Changes	in	health	outcomes	measured	by	any	quantities,	such	as	nutritional	status,	morbidity	and	mortality	rates.			The	scope	of	this	overview	is	not	restricted	to	any	particular	level	of	healthcare	delivery.	All	types	of	health	services	were	included	in	this	review,	including	maternal	health	care,	chronic	diseases,	and	preventive	care.	
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 	Information	sources		A	wide-ranging	search	for	relevant	articles	was	conducted	on	7	March	2016	using	several	scientific	journal	databases,	including	the	Centre	for	Reviews	and	Disseminations	(CRD)	and	Cochrane	Database	for	Systematic	Reviews,	Medline,	Embase,	Econlit,	CINAHL	Plus	via	EBSCO,	and	Web	of	Science.	The	following	medical	subject	heading	(MESH)	terms	were	used	for	Cochrane	Reviews	“Developing	Countries”	(AND)	“Insurance,	Health”.	More	detailed	keywords	were	used	in	other	databases,	especially	in	databases	that	are	not	specific	to	systematic	reviews.	To	limit	the	search	to	include	review	papers	only,	the	filter	“review$.ti.ab”	was	used	for	Medline	and	similar	keywords	were	also	used	in	other	databases.	Inquiries	were	also	made	to	experts	in	global	health,	and	WHO	and	World	Bank	databases	were	used	to	identify	grey	literature.	The	full	search	strategy	is	outlined	in	Table	A-1	(see	Appendices).	There	were	no	language	or	publication	date	restrictions.	Translation	from	other	language	to	English	was	performed,	if	necessary,	employing	an	official	translator.			
 	Data	collection	process			Two	independent	reviewers	screened	all	titles	and	abstracts	of	the	initially	identified	reviews	to	determine	if	they	met	the	inclusion	criteria.	Any	disagreement	was	resolved	through	consensus.	Full	text	articles	were	retrieved	for	the	selected	titles.	Both	reviewers	used	a	standardised	data	collection	form	to	extract	the	relevant	information	from	the	selected	studies,	including	information	on	study	period,	language	restriction,	inclusion	and	criteria,	assessment	of	quality,	characteristics	of	the	intervention	under	consideration	and	main	findings.	Two	reviewers	graded	the	overall	findings	of	each	review	according	to	the	following	categories:	“positive	effect,”	“negative	effect,”	“no	effect,”	or	“not	assessed.”					
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 	Assessment	of	review	quality		In	order	to	determine	whether	the	identified	reviews	were	adequate	to	answer	the	research	question	while	minimising	any	bias,	the	quality	of	the	identified	reviews	was	assessed	using	the	Assessment	of	Multiple	Systematic	Reviews	(AMSTAR)	criteria,	a	widely-used	measurement	tool	to	assess	the	methodological	quality	of	systematic	reviews	(Shea	et	al.,	2009).	It	consists	of	11	specific	questions	and	each	question	is	given	a	score	of	one	if	the	specific	condition	is	met	and	zero	otherwise.	Meanwhile,	there	is	another	version	of	measurement	tool	called	Revised	AMSTAR	(R-AMSTAR).	However,	some	reviewers	had	compared	it	with	the	original	AMSTAR	tool	and	recommended	using	the	original	AMSTAR	because	it	is	easier	to	apply	with	a	comparable	validity	(Pieper	et	al.,	2015;	Kang	et	al.,	2012).	Furthermore,	a	study	compared	the	interrater	reliability	of	both	tools	using	a	weighted	Cohen’s	Kappa	statistic	and	found	that	R-AMSTAR	is	more	difficult	to	apply	consistently	across	sixty	systematic	reviews	(Popovich	et	al.,	2012).	Therefore,	AMSTAR	tool	is	more	preferred	than	R-AMSTAR.			One	caveat	of	AMSTAR	is	it	assumes	that	a	good	reporting	of	the	methodology	used	translates	to	good	methodological	quality	(Faggion,	2015).	To	complement	AMSTAR,	I	also	used	the	ROBIS	tool,	a	newly	developed	tool	to	assess	the	risk	of	bias	in	systematic	reviews	(Whiting	et	al.,	2016).	The	ROBIS	tool	covers	four	domains	through	which	bias	may	be	introduced	into	a	systematic	review:	study	eligibility	criteria,	identification	and	selection	of	studies,	data	collection	and	study	appraisal,	and	synthesis	and	findings.	The	overall	judgement	on	risk	of	bias	can	be	classified	into	three	categories:	“Low,”	“High,”	and	“Unclear.”	While	both	AMSTAR	and	ROBIS	provide	the	overall	quality	of	a	systematic	review,	ROBIS	enables	the	reviewer	to	examine	more	closely	the	potential	of	bias	in	a	systematic	review.	ROBIS	tool	is	therefore	more	explicit	in	detecting	bias,	but	AMSTAR	is	more	widely	used	in	literature.	In	this	review,	I	decided	to	apply	both	criteria	to	get	the	benefit	from	each	tool.			 	
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Section	4.3 	Findings		In	this	section,	I	start	by	describing	the	process	of	study	selection.	I	then	present	the	results	of	the	systematic	search	and	a	summary	of	characteristics	across	studies.	I	will	briefly	explain	the	quality	assessment	of	the	review	and	the	primary	studies	within	the	review	followed	by	findings	of	the	overview.			
 	Results	of	the	search		Figure	4-1	portrays	the	flow	chart	of	the	review	process.	After	a	thorough	systematic	search,	1,436	studies	were	identified	from	electronic	databases.	Two	more	studies	were	found	from	the	grey	literature	and	via	expert	consultation.	From	a	total	of	1,438	studies	identified,	27	systematic	reviews	were	selected	upon	scrutiny	of	the	title	and	abstract	against	the	above-stated	inclusion	criteria.	After	screening	the	full-text	versions	of	these	selected	reviews,	a	total	of	ten	reviews	were	included	for	further	narrative	synthesis	(Habib	et	al.,	2016;	Acharya	et	al.,	2013;	Comfort	et	al.,	2013;	Giedion	et	al.,	2013;	Robyn	et	al.,	2013;	Bucagu	et	al.,	2012;	Liang	et	al.,	2012;	Spaan	et	al.,	2012a;	Yu	et	al.,	2008;	Ekman,	2004).	The	full	description	of	both	included	and	excluded	studies	is	included	in	the	appendix	(Table	A-2).	Table	4-2	and	Table	4-3	summarise	the	findings	and	strength	of	evidence	for	each	review	based	on	AMSTAR	and	the	ROBIS	tool,	respectively.			The	quality	of	the	ten	selected	reviews	was	mixed.	Apart	from	Bucagu	et	al.	(2012),	who	limited	their	search	strategy	to	only	one	database	supplemented	by	searching	official	documents	from	the	government,	all	other	reviews	conducted	comprehensive	literature	searches,	including	grey	literature,	and	involved	at	least	two	reviewers	in	checking	the	selection	and	data	extraction.	Two	out	of	the	ten	reviews	–	Acharya	et	al.	(2013)	and	Giedion	et	al.	(2013)	–published	ex	ante	protocols	and	provided	the	complete	list	of	included	and	excluded	studies.					
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		 	1,436	records	identified	through	database	searching		 2	additional	records	identified	through	grey	literature	search		
1,100	records	screened	
27	full-text	articles	assessed	for	eligibility		
10	studies	included	in	narrative	synthesis		
1,073	records	excluded	based	on	title	and	abstract	against	inclusion	criteria	
17	full-text	articles	excluded		
Excluding	health	insurance	from	intervention	(n	=	9)	Lack	of	focus	on	developing	countries	(n	=2)	Not	a	systematic	review	(n	=	3)	The	studied	outcome	is	out	of	the	scope	(n-3)		
1,100 records after duplicates removed 	
0	studies	included	in	quantitative	synthesis	(meta-analysis)	
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Figure	4-1	Flow	chart	for	included	and	excluded	systematic	reviews	following	recommendation	
of	PRISMA	(Moher	et	al.,	2009)	
Table	4-1	Characteristics	of	included	full-text	reviews	(N	=	10)	Review		 AMSTAR	Score*	 ROBIS	score**	 Literature	Search	and	Eligibility	Criteria		 Population	 Intervention	 Outcome	Acharya	et	al.	(2013)	 9	 Low	risk	 Search	Strategy:	Comprehensive	searches	including	grey	literature	Year:	1980	-	2010	Language:	No	language	restriction	
Low-middle	income	countries	(LMIC)	
Health	insurance	 Utilisation	of	health	care,	healthcare	expenditure,	or	health	status	
Giedion	et	al.	(2013)	 7	 Low	risk	 Search	strategy:	Comprehensive	searches	including	grey	literature		Year:	2000-2011	Language:	Only	English	
LMIC	 Any	intervention	under	universal	health	coverage	scheme	
Access	to	health	care,	financial	protection	and	health	status	
Ekman	(2004)	 6	 Low	risk	 Search	strategy:	Comprehensive	searches	including	grey	literature.	Year:	Search	from	1980-2002	Language:		English,	French,	Portuguese,	and	Spanish	
Low	income	countries	 Community-based	health	insurance	 Resource	mobilisation,	quality	of	care,	provider	efficiency,	moral	hazard,	financial	protection,	OOP	spending,	and	access	to	care	
Liang	et	al.	(2012)	 6	 Low	risk	 Search	strategy:	Comprehensive	searchers	including	grey	literature.	Year:	2003-2010	Language:	English	and	Chinese	
China	 Health	insurance	reform	 Health	outcome	and	financial	protection	
Habib	et	al.	(2016)	 6	 High	Risk	 Search	strategy:	Pubmed,	Google	Scholar,	Science	Direct,	and	grey	literatures.	Year:	1995-2015.		Language:	English	
LMIC	 Micro	health	insurance	 Financial	protection		
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Spaan	et	al.	(2012)	 6	 High	risk	 Search	strategy:	Comprehensive	searches	including	grey	literature	Year:	1980-2011.		Language:	English,	French,	Spanish,	or	Portuguese	
LMIC	in	Asia	and	Africa	 Health	Insurance	 Resource	mobilisation,	service	utilisation,	quality	of	care,	financial	protection,	social	inclusion	or	community	empowerment	
Robyn	et	al.	(2013)	 5	 Low	risk	 Search	strategy:	Comprehensive	searches	including	grey	literature	Year:	up	to	January	2010	Language:	no	language	restriction	
Low-middle	income	countries	 Provider	payment	system	in	community-based	health	insurance	
Provider	participation,	satisfaction,	and	retention;	patient	demand;	quantity	and	quality	of	services	provider;	CBHI	coverage	and	financial	performance		Comfort	et	al.	(2013)	 5	 High	risk	 Search	strategy:	key	databases	and	consultation	with	panel	of	experts	Year:	1980-2011	Language:	English	only		
Low	and	middle	income	countries	
Health	Insurance	 Maternal	health	indicators	including	demand,	such	as	utilisation	and	supply,	such	as	quality	of	care	
Yu	et	al.	(2008)	 3	 High	risk	 Search	strategy:	Comprehensive	searches	including	grey	literature	Year:	1991-2008	Language:	English	and	Chinese	
Low-middle	income	countries	 Health	Insurance	 Financial	protection	
Bucagu	et	al.	(2012)	 2	 High	risk	 Search	strategy:	Pubmed	and	government	documentation.	Excluding	other	grey	literatures.	Year:	2005-2011	Language:	English	only		
Rwanda		 Performance-based	financing	and	CBHI	 Utilisation	of	maternal	health	services		
*	AMSTAR	=	A	measurement	tool	to	assess	systematic	reviews.	It	consists	of	11	questions	with	a	point	given	for	each	mark.	Higher	marks	reflect	higher	quality.		
	
**ROBIS	score	=	Risk	of	Bias.	It	divides	reviews	into	three	categories:	low	risk	of	bias,	high	risk	of	bias,	and	unclear	risk	of	bias	
	
Table	4-2	Methodological	quality	of	the	included	reviews	based	on	AMSTAR	criteria	(N=10)	
AMSTAR	criteria	
*	 Acharya	
(2013)	
Giedion	
(2013)	
Spaan	
(2012)	
Ekman	
(2004)	
Liang	
(2012)	
Habib	
(2016)		
Comfort	
(2013)	
Robyn	
(2013)	
Yu	
(2008)	
Bucagu	
(2012)	
%	meeting	
criteria		
A	priori	
protocol	
	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 20%	
Data	
extraction	
	 1	 0	 1	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0	 1	 1	 60%	
Comprehensiv
e	search	
	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 90%	
Grey	
literature	
	 1	 1	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 80%	
List	of	studies	
	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 50%	
Characteristic
s	of	included	
studies	
	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 1	 90%	
Quality	
assessment	of	
studies	
	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 0	 80%	
Inclusion	of	
study	quality	
in	formulating	
conclusions	
	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0	 70%	
Method	to	
combine	the	
findings	
	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0%	
Assessing	
publication	
bias	
	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0%	
Conflict	of	
interest	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 10%	
Total	score	 9	 7	 6	 6	 6	 6	 5	 5	 3	 2	 	
Column	
Percentage	 81%	 64%	 54%	 54%	 54%	 54%	 45%	 45%	 27%	 18%	 	
*Number	1	–	11	represents	each	of	individual	questions	from	AMSTAR	criteria			
Table	4-3	Methodological	quality	of	the	included	reviews	based	on	ROBIS	tools	(N=10)	
ROBIS	criteria	*	 Giedion	
(2013)		
Spaan	
(2012
)		
Comfort	
(2013)		
Bucagu	
(2012)	
Ekman	
(2004)		
Acharya	
(2013)		
Liang	
(2012
)		
Yu	
(2008
)	
Robyn	
(2013
)	
Habib	
(2016)	
Study	Eligibility	
Criteria	
	
Low	 High	 High	 High	 Low	 Low	 Low	 High	 Low	 High	
Identification	
and	selection	of	
Studies		
	
High	 High	 High	 High	 Low	 Low	 Low	 High	 Low	 High	
Data	collection	
and	study	
appraisal	
	
Low	 Low	 High	 High	 High	 Low	 Low	 High	 High	 High	
Synthesis	and	
findings	
	
Low	 High	 High	 High	 High	 Low	 Low	 High	 Low	 High	
Overall	risk	of	
Bias	
	
Low	 High	 High	 High	 Low	 Low	 Low	 High	 Low	 High	
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Most	reviews	provided	the	characteristics	of	the	included	studies,	but	only	less	than	half	reported	those	of	excluded	studies.	No	studies	conducted	a	meta-analysis,	which	is	not	surprising	considering	the	wide	heterogeneity	of	health	insurance	schemes	in	different	countries	and	even	among	different	schemes	within	a	country.	Only	Acharya	et	al.	(2012)	reported	funding	information	for	the	primary	studies	and	this	review	scored	highest	overall	among	the	selected	reviews.		Different	studies	had	different	strategies	in	their	search	protocol,	and	some	noted	that	their	protocol	has	been	standardised	in	a	separate	paper.	For	example,	Acharya	et	al.	(2013)	applied	a	standardised	extraction	form	for	screening	the	studies	and	grouped	the	primary	paper	based	on	the	paper’s	ability	to	address	selection	bias	or	identification	criteria.	Meanwhile,	Spaan	et	al.	(2012)	evaluated	the	extracted	studies	with	a	specified	protocol	that	assess	rigour,	bias,	validity	and	generalisability	of	the	studies.			While	most	of	the	included	reviews	attempted	to	assess	the	quality	of	primary	studies	with	variation	in	their	methodology,	the	two	lowest-scoring	reviews,	Bucagu	et	al.	(2012)	and	Yu	et	al.	(2008),	did	not	explicitly	assess	this	important	aspect	in	their	review	and	therefore	did	not	consider	the	quality	of	the	studies	in	their	discussion.	Meanwhile,	Habib	et	al.	(2016)	assessed	the	studies	using	a	checklist,	but	it	did	not	evaluate	clearly	the	selection	bias	problem.	In	their	finding,	they	claimed	to	have	convincing	argument	about	the	favourable	effect	of	micro	health	insurance	on	financial	protection	despite	this	limitation.			
 	Criteria	for	quality	assessment	of	primary	studies	In	the	process	of	conducting	a	systematic	review,	it	is	necessary	to	assess	critically	the	quality	of	individual	studies	to	ensure	whether	the	study	was	affected	by	other	endogenous	factors,	or	bias,	that	might	mislead	our	interpretation	of	its	results	(Petticrew	and	Roberts,	2006,	pp.1–5).	There	are	several	approaches	for	assessing	the	quality	of	evidence,	such	as	Grading	of	Recommendations,	Assessment,	Development	and	Evaluations	(GRADE),	which	has	been	used	extensively	by	
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Cochrane	(Cochrane,	2008).	This	approach	is	more	often	applied	to	RCTs	conducted	in	clinical	settings	instead	of	public	health	or	policy	interventions,	of	which	evaluation	of	the	latter	often	relies	on	observational	studies	or,	occasionally,	cluster	RCTs.	The	complexity	of	public	health	interventions	and	inability	to	discriminate	between	different	types	of	observational	studies	have	been	cited	as	two	common	challenges	to	applying	GRADE	in	public	health	settings	(Rehfuess	and	Akl,	2013).	In	the	context	of	this	review,	most	primary	studies	within	the	selected	reviews	are	observational	studies	with	varying	degree	of	quality;	only	very	few	studies	used	randomisation	in	allocating	the	treatment	(Thornton	et	al.,	2010;	King	et	al.,	2009).	Among	all	the	reviews,	only	one	review	utilised	the	GRADE	assessment	tool	(Robyn	et	al.	2013).	More	detailed	information	on	the	quality	assessment	used	by	each	review	is	included	in	Table	4-4.			Reviewers	have	attempted	to	assess	the	quality	of	primary	studies	using	a	variety	of	different	methods.	Different	conclusions	could	have	been	reached,	in	principle,	had	a	different	method	been	used.	In	presenting	their	results,	reviewers	often	used	a	sub-group	of	the	studies	with	the	highest	scores,	which	should	have	reduced	the	heterogeneity	of	their	findings.	In	this	review,	I	decided	to	not	exclude	any	review	based	on	AMSTAR	and	ROBIS	score	but	instead	compared	the	findings	from	low-scored	reviews	with	high-scored	reviews.			
Table	4-4	Quality	assessment	criteria	used	in	the	selected	studies	(N=10)	Author	 Quality	Assessment	 Effect	Evaluation	Acharya	et	al.	(2013)	 Based	on	whether	a	study	attempts	to	solve	selection	problems	using	standardised	method	defined	by	the	review’s	author.	Then,	it	is	classified	into	one	of	three	categories:	strongly	meeting	criteria,	partially	meeting	criteria,	or	not	meeting	criteria		
Vote	counting.	Only	papers	categorised	as	“strongly	meeting	criteria”	were	included		
Bucagu	et	al.	(2012)	 There	is	no	quality	assessment	 Vote	counting	
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Comfort	et	al.	(2013)	 It	is	not	clearly	explained,	but	sometimes	they	commented	on	the	study	method.	 Vote	counting.	No	clear	criteria	for	best	evidence	though	the	reviewers	favored	papers	using	propensity	score,	difference-in-difference,	or	instrumental	variable	method.	Ekman	et	al.	(2004)	 Quality	grading	based	on	author's	own	protocol.	Seven	questions	with	total	25	points	possible.	Grading	Scale:		-	Three	stars:	22-25	points;		-	Two	stars:	17-21	points;		-	One	star:	0-16	points	
Categorised	the	evidence	based	on	the	quality	assessment:	-	Grade	1:	Strong	evidence	(minimum	two	3	stars	studies);		2:	Moderately	strong	(one	3	stars	studies	plus	minimum	two	2	stars	studies;		3:	Weak	(minimum	two	2	stars	studies;		4:	Little	or	no	evidence	Giedion	et	al.	(2013)	 Quality	grading	based	on	qualification	matrix	which	includes	five	criteria:	Study	design,	Data,	General	methodological,	Specific	methodological,	and	Discussion;	Maximum	score:	100;		Studies	are	classified	based	on	their	overall	quality	scores	into	four	quartiles:	Lowest	(9-49),	lowest-middle	(50-63),	upper-middle	(64-70),	and	upper	(>70)	
Vote	counting,	but	only	for	the	upper	and	upper-middle	groups.	
Habib	et	al.	(2016)	 Used	a	Mirza	and	Jenkins	checklist	that	used	ten	factors:	1)	Study	objectives,	2)	Sample	size	justification,	3)	Sample	representation,	4)	Inclusion	and	exclusion	criteria,	5)	Reliability	and	validity	of	measures,	6)	Response	rate	and	dropout	rate,	7)	Data	description,	8)	Statistical	significance,	9)	Discussion	of	generalizability,	10)	Null	findings		
Vote	counting		
Liang	et	al.	(2012)	 Based	on	quality	assessment	criteria	for	quasi-experiment	study	adapted	from	Loevinshohn	(1990),	Thomas	et	al.	(2004),	and	Gersten	et	al.	(2005)	
Vote	counting	
Robyn	et	al.	(2013)	 The	Grades	of	Assessment,	Development	and	Evaluation	(GRADE),	but	the	author	only	mentioned	it	in	the	discussion	section,	not	in	their	findings	
Vote	counting	
Spaan	et	al.	(2012)	 Based	on	HOI	study	Review	Protocol	on	Health	Insurance;	point-based	scoring:	0-38	with	low	(0-14),	medium	(15-29),	and	high	(>29)	 The	impact	is	categorised	into	three:	A:	positive;	B:	negative;	C:	inconclusive.	Overall	impact	is	judged	by:	Strongly	(+):	A/(A+B+C)>60%	Weakly	(+):	A/(A+B+C)	>30%	Strongly	(-):	B/(A+B+C)>60%	Weakly	(-):	B/(A+B+C)	>30%	Yu	et	al.	(2008)	 There	is	no	quality	assessment	 Vote	counting		
Table	4-5	Summary	of	Overall	Effect	from	Selected	Reviews	(N=10)	
Author	
(Number	of	
included	
studies	
Access	to	Care	 Financial	Protection*	 Health	Status	
Acharya	et	
al.	(2013)	
(N	=	24)	
13	out	of	17	studies	reported	overall	positive	impact		 10	out	of	17	studies	reported	overall	positive	impact	on	out-of-pocket	health	expenditure	 3	out	of	6	studies	reported	overall	positive	impact	on	health	status	
Bucagu	et	
al.		
(2012)	
(N	=	3)	
3	out	of	3	studies	reported	positive	impact	 2	out	of	2	studies	that	assessed	the	impact	of	CBHI	on	out-of-pocket	health	expenditure	reported	positive	impact	 N/A	
Comfort	et	
al.	(2013)	
(N	=	7)	
3	out	of	4	reported	positive	impact	on	access	to	maternal	health	services;	the	other	study	showed	positive	impact	on	health	services	in	general,	but	not	on	maternal	health	services	
N/A	 Inconclusive	due	to	small	number	of	studies	and	conflicting	findings	among	studies	
Ekman	et	al.	
(2004)	
(N	=	17)	
8	out	of	8	studies	reported	overall	positive	impact	(one	study	with	three	stars	and	7	studies	with	two	stars)	 5	out	of	7	studies	reported	overall	positive	impact	on	out-of-pocket	expenditure	(4	studies	with	three	stars	and	3	studies	with	two	stars)	
N/A	
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Giedion	et	
al.	(2013)	
(N	=	41)	
25	out	of	29	studies	reported	positive	impact	 13	out	of	16	studies	reported	overall	positive	impact	on	out-of-pocket	expenditures;	6	out	of	9	studies	reported	overall	positive	impact	on	catastrophic	expenditures;	3	out	of	3	studies	reported	positive	impact	on	reducing	impoverishment	
9	out	of	18	studies	reported	overall	positive	impact	on	health	status	
Habib	et	al.	
(2016)	
(N	=	13)	
N/A	 10	out	of	13	studies	reported	overall	positive	impact	on	reducing	OOP	expenditure;	5	out	of	7	studies	also	reported	positive	impact	on	reducing	catastrophic	health	expenditure	
N/A	
Liang	et	al.	
(2012)	
(N	=	12)	
	
N/A	 2	out	of	4	studies	reported	positive	impact	while	one	study	reported	negative	impact.		 5	out	of	12	studies	reported	overall	positive	impact	on	health	outcomes;	3	out	of	12	studies	reported	negative	impact.		
Robyn	et	al.	
(2013)		(N	=	
34)	
One	cluster	RCT	showed	no	significant	effect	 N/A	 N/A	
Spaan	et	al.	
(2012)	
(N	=	39)	
27	out	of	28	studies	reported	overall	positive	impact	 17	out	of	24	studies	reported	overall	positive	impact	on	financial	protection	(not	specified)	 N/A	
Yu	et	al.	
(2008)	
(N	=	56)	
N/A	 42	out	of	56	studies	reported	positive	impact;	6	out	of	56	studies	reported	negative	impact;	5	out	of	56	studies	reported	no	effect;	and		3	out	of	56	studies	reported	uncertain	effect	
N/A	
	
*Positive	impact	on	financial	protection	means	that	the	insurance	scheme	either	reduce	the	out-of-pocket	health	expenditure,	reduce	the	likelihood	of	experiencing	catastrophic	health	expenditure	or	
impoverishment	due	to	health	spending
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 	Access	to	health	care		Access	to	health	care	services	was	the	most	common	measure	used	in	impact	evaluation	studies	of	health	insurance.	Many	factors	are	suggested	to	influence	people’s	access	to	healthcare	services,	which	include	the	characteristic	of	the	individual—either	fixed	or	amenable—and	of	the	system	in	terms	of	health	care	delivery	or	in	the	broader	system,	such	as	politics	environment	or	education	(Andersen,	1995;	Penchansky	and	Thomas,	1981;	Aday	and	Andersen,	1974).	Despite	this	complexity	in	defining	access	to	health	care,	empirical	studies	tend	to	focus	on	utilisation	of	health	care	as	the	external	validation	of	the	effect	of	those	various	characteristics	on	people’s	access	to	health	care	services.	Except	for	Ekman	(2004),	all	the	reviews	chose	health	care	utilisation	as	a	proxy	to	measure	access.	Utilisation	can	be	categorised	into	two	groups:	utilisation	of	general	medical	services	and	utilisation	of	specific	health	care	services,	such	as	maternal	health	or	diabetes	management.			Table	4-5	shows	the	summary	of	findings	from	the	ten	reviews	included	in	this	study.	From	seven	reviews	that	included	access	to	care	as	the	primary	outcome,	six	of	them	reported	overall	positive	effect	of	health	insurance	in	increasing	health	care	utilisation.	Spaan	et	al.	(2012)	reported	that	26	out	of	28	high-quality	studies	reported	a	positive	effect	of	health	insurance	on	increasing	the	probability	of	utilising	health	care	services	or	increases	in	the	number	of	visits	to	a	doctor	or	other	health	care	personnel.	Giedion	et	al.	(2013)	also	reported	overall	a	positive	and	statistically	significant	effect	of	health	insurance	on	health	care	utilisation	from	21	out	of	29	studies.	Ekman	(2004),	who	evaluated	the	literature	on	community-based	health	insurance,	reported	moderately	strong	evidence	of	a	positive	correlation	between	insurance	and	access	to	health	care.	However,	among	12	studies	from	which	he	based	his	conclusion,	only	one	study	scored	highly	in	quality	assessment,	and	even	that	study	did	not	control	for	endogeneity,	a	statistical	term	referring	to	correlation	between	the	independent	variable(s)	with	one	or	more	unobserved	factors	excluded	from	the	model	that	may	affect	the	outcome	variable.		
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Despite	overall	positive	results	from	other	review	papers,	Acharya	et	al.	(2013)	reported	more	nuanced	results	of	the	impact	of	state-subsidised	or	social	health	insurance	schemes	on	health	care	access.	They	argued	that	papers	using	stronger	methodology	in	terms	of	mitigating	endogeneity	tended	to	have	inconclusive	results	compared	with	papers	that	did	not	fully	account	for	endogeneity.	Of	the	17	studies	included	evaluating	access	to	care,	13	reported	significant	positive	results	on	the	utilisation	of	health	care	services.		The	reviewers	also	observed	that	impact	of	these	health	insurance	schemes	did	not	appear	to	be	homogeneous	among	different	income	levels,	with	more	economically	vulnerable	groups	getting	greater	benefits	than	more	affluent	groups,	indicating	heterogeneity	of	the	impact	across	different	populations.	Overall,	most	reviews	concluded	a	positive	correlation	between	insurance	and	access	to	health	care	measured	in	terms	of	utilisation	of	health	care	services.			
 	Financial	protection		The	direct	benefit	of	health	insurance	is	to	protect	its	enrolees	from	financial	problems	arising	from	an	expensive	medical	bill	that	could	potentially	lead	to	catastrophic	expenditure	and	pushed	below	the	poverty	line.	A	common	way	to	measure	the	protection	effect	of	insurance	is	to	measure	out-of-pocket	(OOP)	health	expenditure.	However,	the	decreasing	trend	of	OOP	health	expenditure	is	not	sufficient	to	provide	a	full	picture	of	the	financial	condition	of	a	household.	A	household	can	have	lower	OOP	health	expenditure,	but	could	still	be	forced	into	bankruptcy	as	long	as	the	post-payment	income	cannot	sustain	their	essential	needs.		Thus,	it	is	essential	to	examine	the	catastrophic	effect	of	the	health	expenditure	on	the	household	budget.	This	is	commonly	measured	by	calculating	the	proportion	of	health	expenditure	exceeding	some	pre-defined	threshold	in	relation	to	the	household’s	pre-payment	income	(Wagstaff,	2008).	However,	it	also	has	a	fundamental	limitation	in	which	it	does	not	convey	a	clear	picture	of	how	far	the	catastrophic	expenditure	pushes	the	household	into	poverty.	A	household	may	spend	40%	of	its	income	to	seek	medical	treatment,	but	still	have	enough	income	to	sustain	basic	needs.	On	the	other	hand,	a	household	may	only	need	to	spend	10%	of	its	income	to	be	pushed	into	poverty.	To	overcome	this	limitation,	another	measure,	
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impoverishment	expenditure,	can	be	used.	A	household	is	defined	as	being	impoverished	if	its	pre-payment	income	lies	above	the	poverty	line	and	its	non-medical	expenditure	lies	below	the	poverty	line	(Wagstaff	and	van	Doorslaer,	2003).	Among	the	studies	included	in	this	review,	this	measure	is	the	least	common	method	despite	its	superiority	over	the	other	methods.		Overall,	measuring	the	decrease	of	OOP	expenditure	was	the	most	common	measure,	followed	by	the	catastrophic	expenditure	using	different	thresholds.			From	Table	4-5,	there	are	eight	out	of	ten	reviews	explored	the	effect	on	financial	protection.	Compared	to	the	effect	on	utilisation,	the	overall	effect	on	financial	protection	is	less	homogenous	due	to	more	studies	showing	the	negative	effect	of	health	insurance	on	financial	protection.	It	should	be	noted	that	positive	effect	on	financial	protection	refers	to	lower	level	of	out-of-pocket	health	expenditure	or	reduced	event	of	catastrophic	health	expenditure.	Spaan	et	al.	(2012)	and	Ekman	(2004)	concurred	that	there	is	strong	evidence	that	people	with	health	insurance	had	lower	out-of-pocket	expenditure	or	lower	probability	of	having	catastrophic	health	expenditure,	even	though	some	high-quality	studies	found	that	the	effect	is	only	marginal	(Jowett,	Contoyannis	and	Vinh,	2003;	Jutting,	2001;	Carrin,	Graeve	and	Devillé,	1999).	Moreover,	Acharya	et	al.	(2013)	provided	more	mixed	evidence:	two	papers	reported	that	individuals	with	health	insurance	had	higher	out-of-pocket	expenditure	than	those	without	health	insurance.	Wagstaff	and	Lindelow	(2008)	evaluated	the	impact	of	health	insurance	in	China	on	financial	protection	using	IV	regression	estimations	with	fixed	effect.	They	found	that	overall	health	insurance	raises	OOP	health	expenditure	and	the	risk	of	catastrophic	expenditure	instead	of	reducing	them.							Giedion	et	al.	(2013)	asserted	that	overall	impact	on	financial	protection	leads	to	positive	correlation,	but	they	admitted	that	some	studies	that	comparably	have	a	more	robust	method	in	terms	of	solving	the	selection	bias	suggest	otherwise.	They	also	included	both	papers	described	earlier	that	showed	higher	OOP	expenditure	among	the	insured	(Wagstaff	et	al.,	2009;	Wagstaff	and	Lindelow,	2008).	From	a	cluster	randomised	trial	in	Nicaragua,	Thornton	et	al.	(2010)	reported	a	reduction	in	
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the	expenditures	on	laboratory	tests,	a	common	out-of-pocket	expenditure	among	the	enrolees,	but	there	is	no	reduction	in	overall	OOP	expenditures.	Higher	utilisation	may	lead	to	higher	OOP	expenditure	if	insurance	does	not	cover	the	whole	cost	of	seeking	medical	treatment,	including	transportation	cost,	drug	cost,	and	laboratory	cost.	On	the	other	hand,	King	et	al.	(2009)	investigated	the	effect	of	Mexican	social	health	insurance	using	cluster	randomised	trial	and	found	a	reduction	of	the	proportion	of	catastrophic	health	expenditures	between	23	and	55%	and	reduction	of	OOP	expenditures	for	inpatient	and	outpatient	medical	care.	Using	regression	discontinuity	approach	in	estimating	the	effect	of	health	insurance	for	poor	in	Georgia,	Bauhoff,	Hotchkiss,	and	Smith	(2010)	also	reported	a	reduction	in	both	outpatient	and	inpatient	OOP	expenditures	especially	among	the	elderly.			In	contrast	to	OOP	expenditures,	relatively	few	papers	that	have	evaluated	the	effect	of	insurance	on	catastrophic	expenditures.	In	measuring	the	impact	of	NCMS	on	providing	financial	protection	in	China,	Liang	et	al.	(2012)	only	uses	catastrophic	health	expenditure	as	the	outcome.	They	reported	that	two	out	of	four	studies	(Yan,	Fan	and	Shi,	2009;	Sun,	2005)	suggest	NCMS	reduced	the	incidence	of	catastrophic	health	expenditure,	but	the	other	two	studies,	which	have	higher	quality	scores,	reported	otherwise	(Wagstaff	et	al.,	2009;	Chinese	Ministry	of	Health,	2007).		In	other	reviews,	most	of	the	studies	reported	a	decrease	in	the	probability	of	having	experience	of	catastrophic	expenditure	for	the	insured	(Galarraga	et	al.,	2010;	Flórez	et	al.,	2009;	King	et	al.,	2009;	Wagstaff,	2007).	However,	there	is	some	variation	in	terms	of	the	threshold	determining	the	event	of	having	catastrophic	expenditure	which	can	range	from	5%	to	40%.	Only	one	study	reported	an	increase,	which	also	correlates	with	the	increase	in	OOP	expenditures	(Wagstaff	and	Lindelow,	2008).			The	last	measure,	impoverishment	expenditure,	has	been	researched	even	less	among	studies	exploring	the	impact	on	financial	protection.	There	are	only	three	papers	within	the	review	by	Giedion	et	al.	(2012)	and	all	of	them	reported	a	decrease	in	impoverishment	expenditure	events	among	people	who	were	insured	(Flórez	et	
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al.,	2009;	Yip	and	Hsiao,	2009;	Wagstaff	and	Yu,	2007).	Other	reviews	did	not	consider	this	measure	in	their	findings.			
 	Health	status		Health	status	is	often	considered	to	be	the	primary	long-term	outcome	of	health	insurance,	but	very	few	studies	attempted	to	measure	it,	and,	unlike	utilisation	and	financial	protection,	the	choice	of	health	outcome	is	not	standardised.	Below	I	reported	findings	from	three	reviews	that	included	health	status	as	the	outcome	measure.			Acharya	et	al.	(2013)	reported	only	three	out	of	six	high-quality	primary	studies	that	provided	strong	evidence	of	positive	correlation	between	insurance	and	health	status.	For	example,	a	study	in	Mexico	evaluated	reported	better	diabetic	management	among	people	who	were	insured	by	Seguro	Popular,	a	health	insurance	for	poor	(Galarraga	et	al.,	2010).	In	China,	one	study	evaluated	the	impact	of	Rural	Mutual	Health	Care	(RMHC)	a	community-based	health	insurance	in	Western	China	and	found	that	RHMC	significantly	reduced	pain/discomfort	and	anxiety/depression	as	well	as	improved	mobility	and	activities	of	daily	living	among	the	elderly	(Wang	et	al.,	2009).			Comfort	et	al.	(2013)	reported	that	among	two	studies	that	evaluated	maternal	health	status,	one	study	reported	a	decrease	in	the	maternal	mortality	rate	in	the	Sorsogon	province	of	the	Philippines,	but	the	method	used,	trend	analysis,	was	not	adequate	to	account	for	selection	bias	(Huntington,	Banzon	and	Recidoro,	2012).	Another	study	that	was	considered	to	have	a	more	rigorous	method	by	controlling	endogeneity	with	propensity	score	matching	and	difference-in-difference	found	no	effect	of	the	New	Cooperative	Medical	Scheme	(NCMS)	on	the	mortality	rate	of	young	children	and	of	pregnant	women	in	China	(Chen	and	Jin,	2012).			
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Liang	et	al.	(2012)	was	the	only	review	that	reported	studies	showing	a	negative	impact	of	health	insurance	on	health	outcomes	(Shen	and	Jiang,	2008;	Chinese	Ministry	of	Health,	2007).	However,	those	two	studies	were	scored	lower	compared	to	other	studies	that	reported	positive	or	no	impact.	Even	when	the	evidence	is	taken	only	from	the	high	scoring	group,	the	result	was	still	inconclusive	with	five	studies	reported	positive	impact	and	three	studies	reported	no	impact	of	health	insurance	on	health	status.		
Section	4.4 	Discussion			This	review	provides	an	overview	of	the	empirical	literature	on	the	impact	of	health	insurance,	as	identified	by	ten	systematic	reviews,	synthesising	the	available	evidence	captured	by	published	reviews.	With	regard	to	access	to	care,	most	of	the	reviews	focused	on	utilisation	of	health	care	facilities,	either	for	general	medical	care	or	for	maternal	health	services.	Overall,	there	is	agreement	that	health	insurance	had	a	positive	effect	on	utilisation	of	health	care	services,	although	some	of	the	studies,	particularly	those	which	better	address	endogeneity	problems,	showed	mixed	results.				There	are	several	possible	reasons	to	explain	the	mixed	findings.	First,	fees	for	treatment	are	only	one	of	several	barriers	to	accessing	care.	Penchansky	and	Thomas’s	(1981)	definition	of	access	to	medical	care	lists	five	dimensions	of	access	(availability,	accessibility,	accommodation,	affordability,	and	acceptability).	Insurance	may	ease	the	financial	barriers	associated	with	fees	for	treatment	(i.e.,	affordability)	but	may	not	be	adequate	to	facilitate	other	dimensions	to	access.	For	example,	Thornton	et	al.	(2010)	found	that	the	enrolees	perceived	lower	quality	services	and	discrimination	from	the	providers	contracted	by	the	Ministry	of	Health,	compared	to	providers	contracted	by	the	insurance	programme	for	formal	sector	employees	and	other	private	health	providers,	which	relates	to	acceptability	of	access	in	the	Penchansky	and	Thomas	model.	Similarly,	another	study	suggested	that	the	inaccessibility	of	facilities	still	deterred	beneficiaries	from	utilising	health	care	
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services	even	though	they	no	longer	had	to	pay	(Wagstaff,	2010a).	If	these	other	aspects	of	access	have	not	been	fulfilled,	improving	affordability	through	insurance	might	provide	little	benefit	toward	expanding	access	to	care.		Secondly,	the	target	population	for	health	insurance	programmes,	especially	programmes	aimed	at	improving	coverage	among	the	poor,	may	be	not	fully	aware	of	the	programme’s	benefits.	This	was	found	to	be	the	case	by	Thornton	et	al.	(2010)	in	Nicaragua	and	by	Bauhoff,	Hotchkiss	and	Smith	(2011)	in	Georgia,	where	a	medical	insurance	programme	did	not	increase	utilisation	of	health	services	among	the	poor.		Third,	the	time	between	the	introduction	of	the	programme	and	its	evaluation	for	many	of	the	papers	reviewed	may	not	have	been	sufficient	to	for	the	data	to	be	meaningful,	since	care	seeking	behaviour	and,	consequently,	utilisation	responses	can	be	expected	to	be	lagged	(Wagstaff,	2010a).	Fourth,	the	null	findings	may	reflect	a	substitution	effect	where	people	choose	to	seek	treatment	in	modern	facilities,	that	otherwise	cannot	be	accessed	without	insurance,	over	traditional	practices.	Axelson	et	al.	(	2009),	for	example,	reported	a	small	impact	on	overall	utilisation	of	health	care,	but	they	also	found	a	significant	substitution	effect	away	from	private	to	public	providers	and	from	primary	to	higher	level	of	care.	Lei	and	Lin	(2009)	found	no	increase	in	utilisation	of	formal	medical	services	but	instead	found	decrease	in	the	use	of	traditional	practices	and	increase	the	utilisation	of	preventive	care.			Evidence	on	whether	health	insurance	had	a	positive	effect	on	financial	protection	was	unclear.	Some	papers	suggested	that	the	effect	may	even	be	negative,	with	those	covered	by	health	insurance	having	increased	risk	of	incurring	high	OOP	expenditures	(Wagstaff	et	al.,	2009;	Wagstaff	and	Lindelow,	2008;	Ekman,	2007;	Dong	et	al.,	1999).	Several	reviewers	have	critiqued	the	use	of	conventional	measures	of	financial	protection,	such	as	out-of-pocket	or	catastrophic	expenditures	and	impoverishment,	as	inadequate	in	capturing	the	true	financial	consequences	of	having	an	illness	or	other	health	need	on	at	the	household	level	(Acharya	et	al.,	2013;	Giedion	et	al.,	2013).	This	implies	that	the	positive	associations	observed	likely	overestimate	the	effect	of	health	insurance.	Giedion	et	al.	(2013)	argued	that	when	people	seek	medical	treatment,	they	often	face	financial	barriers	other	than	medical	
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fees,	such	as	transportation	costs,	which	may	explain	why	distance	to	the	health	facility	may	deter	people	from	seeking	necessary	treatment	in	low-	and	middle-income	countries.	Another	shortcoming	of	conventional	measures	of	financial	protection	is	the	interpretation	of	low	or	zero	OOP	expenditures	(Giedion	et	al.	2013).	While	the	common	assumption	is	that	households	with	low	or	zero	OOP	expenditures	have	better	financial	protection,	another	possible	interpretation	is	that	these	households	may	have	been	unable	to	afford	other	health-seeking	related	costs	and	forego	the	necessary	medical	treatment	(Moreno-Serra,	Millett	and	Smith,	2011).			Several	studies	have	suggested	replacing	existing	measures	with	a	more	comprehensive	measure	of	financial	protection.		Either	a	“needs-adjusted”	estimate	based	on	utilisation	patterns	and	medical	expenditures	(Moreno-Serra,	Millett	and	Smith,	2011),	or	a	multidimensional	approach	that	uses	information	on	total	cost	of	illness,	coping	strategies,	and	household	consumption	patterns	(Ruger,	2012)	can	provide	a	more	comprehensive	financial	protection	profile.	Empirical	studies	of	the	application	of	both	methods	are	still	rare	and	future	studies	should	prioritise	investigating	the	usefulness	of	these	approaches.			This	overview	also	demonstrated	mixed	evidence	on	the	effect	of	health	insurance	on	
health	status.	Reviews	that	included	health	status	as	one	of	their	main	outcomes	offered	several	explanations	of	these	findings,	most	of	which	referred	to	flaws	in	the	evaluation	plan	for	the	insurance	schemes	(Acharya	et	al.,	2013	and	Giedion	et	al.,	2013).	First,	the	outcome	measure	may	not	have	matched	the	goals	of	the	scheme.		Second,	health	status	is	considered	a	long-term	impact,	so	more	time	is	required	for	its	effects	to	be	revealed	in	the	data.	Third,	and	probably	most	importantly,	is	the	dependence	of	health	status	on	other	short-term	effects.	Before	the	improvement	of	health	status	can	begin	to	be	revealed	in	the	data,	it	requires	a	prior	positive	correlation	between	health	insurance	and	short-term	outcomes,	such	as	utilisation	of	health	care	services.		
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*adapted	from	Comfort	et	al.	(2013)	with	modification		The	pathway	from	the	introduction	of	health	insurance	to	health	status	improvement	requires	several	conditions	to	be	met	before	any	apparent	health	effects	can	be	detected	(Figure	4-2).	Reducing	the	financial	barrier	of	treatment	fees	may	increase	access	to	health	care	and	protect	individuals	and	households	from	catastrophic	health	expenditure	and	impoverishment.	In	some	cases,	health	insurance	programmes	may	also	increase	the	quality	of	care	accompanied	by	investment	to	improve	supply.	In	that	case,	increasing	use	of	health	care	services	may	improve	health	status	if	quality	of	care	is	not	reduced.	The	underlying	pathway	of	health	insurance	to	improve	health	status	could	be	from	better	financial	protection,	not	by	only	increased	access	to	healthcare	per	se	(Quimbo	et	al.,	2011).	Increases	in	OOP	expenditure	from	other	costs	(e.g.,	co-payments,	informal	payments	or	transport	costs)	could	reduce	this	benefit	(Acharya	et	al.,	2013).	Finally,	there	are	a	number	of	external	factors	that	affect	health	status,	but	are	not	influenced	directly	by	the	introduction	of	health	insurance	scheme.	Another	way	to	interpret	the	pathway	is	that	when	a	health	insurance	scheme	does	not	increase	access	to	health	care,	improve	
Introduction	of	Health	Insurance	 Increase	access	to	health	care	
Improve	financial	protection	
Health	status	improvement	
Increase	quality	of	care	 Other	factors	not	influenced	by	health	insurance	
Figure	4-2	Pathway	from	health	insurance	leading	to	improvement	of	health	status 
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quality	of	care,	or	improve	financial	protection,	it	should	not	be	surprising	to	see	that	the	scheme	has	no	effect	on	health	status.	Indeed,	any	improvement	in	health	status	should	be	interpreted	with	caution	as	it	may	result	from	external	factors	not	necessarily	affected	by	insurance.	It	is	important	to	follow	a	pathway	of	how	insurance	would	affect	health	status	according	to	its	benefits	structure	and	payment	mechanisms.			A	final	explanation	for	negative	or	inconclusive	results	in	some	of	the	studies	evaluating	the	impact	of	the	introduction	of	health	insurance	schemes	on	health	status	is	that	other	alternatives	for	medical	care	might	exist	for	individuals	without	health	insurance.	In	outpatient	settings,	for	example,	public	facilities	often	provide	low-cost	treatment	for	everyone.	There	may	also	be	spillover	effects	from	the	existence	of	insurance	to	the	non-insured	in	terms	of	increasing	supply	of	health	care,	improving	quality	and	quantity	which	is	available	to	all,	not	just	for	the	enrolees.	Without	proper	consideration	in	their	analysis,	evaluators	might	draw	a	misleading	conclusion	that	the	programme	has	no	effect	where	actually	it	might	have	a	subtler	effect	but	concealed	with	unexpected	higher	baseline	in	the	control	group.		Heterogeneity	is	always	an	issue	for	systematic	reviews	and	can	be	exacerbated	in	an	overview	like	this.	I	found	heterogeneity	in,	first,	benefits	and	payment	structures,	which	differed	widely	among	health	insurance	schemes.	More	generous	benefits	structures	may	induce	more	utilisation	and	provide	better	financial	protection,	while	those	that	still	utilise	fee-for-service	structure	may	provide	less	protection.	For	example,	a	review	of	community-based	insurance	(CBI)	reported	that	provider	payment	can	affect	the	patient	demand	for	CBI	services,	as	well	as	population	enrolment,	risk	pooling,	and	financial	sustainability	of	CBI	(Robyn	et	al.,	2013).	In	addition,	the	inclusion	and	exclusion	criteria	for	each	review	in	this	overview	were	slightly	different.	Spaan	et	al.	(2012),	for	example,	included	only	evaluations	of	insurance	programmes	in	Asia	and	Africa,	while	Ekman	(2004)	included	only	studies	pertaining	to	CBI.	Giedion	et	al.	(2013)	had	a	wider	scope	of	interventions,	including	other	means	of	demand-side	intervention	that	promoted	universal	health	coverage.	The	differences	in	primary	studies	included	among	the	reviews	was	not	however	
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wholly	explained	by	inclusion	criteria,	but	also	by	how	thoroughly	reviewers	searched	grey	literature.	Health	insurance	studies	tend	to	be	assessed	by	health	authorities	and	there	is	less	pressure	to	publish	the	results	in	peer-reviewed	journals,	especially	if	the	study	found	no	positive	effects.	Spaan	et	al.	(2012)	reported	that	even	though	CBHI	are	quite	popular	in	Africa,	few	countries	have	published	findings	of	impact	evaluations	in	a	peer-reviewed	journal.	The	findings	from	grey	literature	are	important	to	get	a	more	comprehensive	picture	of	the	impact	of	health	insurance	on	different	health	outcomes,	but	they	also	tend	to	be	of	lower	quality	than	peer-reviewed	publications,	which	could	affect	our	confidence	in	the	overall	findings.			No	reviews	conducted	a	meta-analysis,	which	is	unsurprising	considering	the	wide	heterogeneity	of	health	insurance	schemes	in	different	countries	and	even	among	different	schemes	within	a	country.	The	included	reviews	were	all	narrative,	supplemented	by	trend	analysis	and	vote	counting	which	does	not	permit	any	kind	of	point	estimate.	Despite	wide	disagreement	in	various	outcome	indicators	of	interest	among	these	studies,	out-of-pocket	expenditure	appeared	to	be	quite	standardised	among	the	studies.	It	may	be	worth	expanding	the	review	by	Essue	et	al.	(2015),	which	has	pioneered	the	synthesis	of	OOP	expenditures	in	developed	countries.	
Section	4.5 	Conclusion		The	findings	from	this	overview	suggest	that	there	is	good	evidence	that	health	insurance	can	improve	access	to	health	care,	especially	in	increasing	utilisation	of	health	care	services.	It	should	be	noted	that	some	schemes	were	unable	to	produce	any	effect	due	to	the	inability	of	the	scheme	to	reduce	other	barriers,	such	as	acceptability	(e.g.,	negative	perception	of	the	quality	of	public	facilities),	affordability	(e.g.,	as	result	of	other	treatment-related	costs	that	are	not	covered	by	the	scheme),	and	accessibility	(e.g.,	distance).	In	addition,	some	schemes	appeared	not	to	have	been	able	to	reach	the	target	population,	which	suggests	that	low	awareness	of	the	programme	might	explain	the	observed	null	effects	of	insurance	on	utilisation.		
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Secondly,	there	is	some	evidence	to	suggest	that	publicly-funded	health	insurance	can	reduce	out-of-pocket	expenditure,	but	a	smaller	set	of	evidences	using	arguably	more	robust	methods	showed	otherwise.	It	is	possible	that	the	increased	demand	from	health	insurance	may	increase	health	care	expenditures,	particularly	if	the	insurance	does	not	cover	the	entire	cost	of	care,	although	it	is	important	to	note	that	much	of	the	evidence	for	increased	health	expenditure	came	from	China,	where	providers	are	reimbursed	in	proportion	to	the	actual	cost.	Such	reimbursement	structures	might	lead	to	the	manipulation	of	pre-reimbursed	cost	to	maximise	the	post-reimbursed	payment,	and	it	is	unclear	whether	or	not	this	increased	cost	is	associated	with	improved	health	status.		While	ultimately	improved	health	status	is	the	long-term	goal	of	health	insurance	programmes,	only	comparatively	few	studies	were	conducted	to	evaluate	this	outcome.	The	evaluator	needs	take	care	when	choosing	the	appropriate	health	status	variable,	to	ensure	that	the	selection	is	driven	by	the	framework	on	how	insurance	affects	health	outcomes,	and	this	process	may	depend	on	many	technical	aspects	of	the	scheme,	including	coverage	benefits	and	the	provider	payment	structure.		Considering	the	large	amount	of	research	in	this	field	and	rapid	new	studies	on	health	insurance	given	more	countries	were	attempting	to	introduce	health	insurance	in	national	level,	I	decided	to	update	one	of	the	most	rigorous	review	identified	in	this	chapter	with	additional	methodological	approach	in	assessing	the	quality	of	the	primary	studies.	This	updated	review	will	be	presented	in	the	next	chapter	(Chapter	5).	There	is	also	a	need	to	summarise	the	available	evaluation	methods	of	measuring	the	impact	of	health	insurance.	This	summary	will	allow	future	studies	to	learn	the	best	practice	which	may	improve	our	knowledge	about	the	impact	of	health	insurance	programme,	especially	in	LMICs.	This	method	review	(Chapter	6)	will	be	discussed	after	the	updated	review	chapter.				 	
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Chapter	5 	Updated	systematic	review	of	the	impact	of	
health	insurance	
Section	5.1 Introduction		From	the	previous	chapter,	I	have	identified	ten	systematic	reviews	with	Acharya	et	al.	(2013)	being	the	most	comprehensive	one.	The	majority	of	existing	reviews	have	suggested	that	publicly-funded	health	insurance	has	typically	shown	a	positive	impact	on	access	to	care,	while	the	picture	for	financial	protection	was	mixed,	and	the	evidence	on	the	impact	on	health	status	was	barely	existing.	This	chapter	offers	a	systematic	review	of	the	recent	fast	growing	evidence	on	the	impact	of	health	insurance	on	health	care	utilisation,	financial	protection	and	health	status	in	LMIC.	I	chose	to	update	the	search	strategy	of	Acharya’s	review	because	it	has	the	highest	quality	grading	in	terms	of	review	quality	based	on	AMSTAR	and	ROBIS.	Since	the	publication	of	Acharya	et	al.	(which	conducted	literature	searches	in	July	2010),	the	empirical	evidence	on	the	impact	of	health	insurance	has	significantly	expanded	in	terms	of	quantity	and	also	in	terms	of	quality,	with	growing	use	of	sophisticated	techniques	to	account	for	statistical	challenges	(i.e.	insurance	selection	bias)	(Cameron,	Mishra	and	Brown,	2016).	Thus,	this	study	makes	an	important	contribution	towards	our	understanding	of	the	impact	of	health	insurance	in	LMICs,	taking	particular	care	in	quality	appraising	the	studies.	Furthermore,	I	explore	evidence	of	moral	hazard	in	insurance	membership,	an	aspect	that	was	not	addressed	in	the	Acharya’s	review	(Acharya	et	al.,	2013)			
Section	5.2 	Methods		This	review	was	planned,	conducted,	and	reported	in	adherence	with	PRISMA	standards	of	quality	for	reporting	systematic	reviews	(Moher	et	al.,	2009)			
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 Participants	Only	studies	focusing	on	LMIC	are	included,	as	measured	by	per	capita	gross	national	income	(GNI)	estimated	using	the	World	Bank	Atlas	method	per	July	2016	(World	Bank,	2016).			
 Intervention	This	review	focuses	on	publicly-organised	health	insurance	only.	Primary	studies	that	included	both	public	and	private	health	insurance	were	also	considered,	if	a	clear	distinction	between	the	two	was	made	in	describing	their	finding.	Studies	examining	other	types	of	financial	incentives	to	increase	the	demand	for	healthcare	services,	such	as	voucher	schemes	or	cash	transfers,	were	excluded.			
 Control	group	An	uninsured	group	with	no	form	of	insurance	had	to	be	used	as	the	control	group.	Multiple	comparison	groups	were	allowed,	but	an	uninsured	group	had	to	be	included.		
 Outcome	measures	I	focus	on	three	main	outcomes:		
• Access	to	care	which	is	commonly	measured	by	utilisation	of	health	care	services	(e.g.	immunisation	coverage,	number	of	visits,	rates	of	hospitalisation).		
• Financial	protection,	as	measured	by	changes	in	out-of-pocket	(OOP)	health	expenditure	at	household	or	individual	level,	and	also	catastrophic	health	expenditure	or	impoverishment	from	medical	expenses.	
• Health	status,	as	measured	by	morbidity	and	mortality	rates,	indicators	of	risk	factors	(e.g.	nutritional	status),	and	self-reported	health	status.		
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The	scope	of	this	review	is	not	restricted	to	any	level	of	healthcare	delivery	(i.e.	primary	or	secondary	care).	All	types	of	health	services	were	considered	in	this	review.		
 Types	of	studies	This	review	included	randomised	controlled	trials,	quasi-experimental	studies	(or	“natural	experiments”	(Craig	et	al.,	2012)),	and	observational	studies	that	account	for	selection	bias	due	to	insurance	endogeneity	(i.e.	bias	caused	by	insurance	decisions	that	are	correlated	with	the	measured	outcomes).	Observational	studies	that	did	not	take	account	of	selection	bias	were	excluded.		
 Databases	and	search	terms	The	systematic	search	for	relevant	articles	was	conducted	on	6	September	2016	using	peer-reviewed	databases	(Medline,	Embase,	Econlit,	CINAHL	Plus	via	EBSCO	and	Web	of	Science)	and	grey	literatures	(WHO,	World	Bank,	and	PAHO).	The	search	was	restricted	to	studies	published	since	July	2010,	i.e.	just	after	the	period	covered	by	the	earlier	Acharya	et	al.	(2013)	review.	No	language	restriction	was	applied.	Full	details	of	the	search	strategy	are	available	in	Table	A-2	(see	Appendices).			
 Screening	and	data	extraction	Two	independent	reviewers	screened	all	titles	and	abstracts	of	the	initially	identified	studies	to	determine	whether	they	satisfied	the	inclusion	criteria.	Any	disagreement	was	resolved	through	mutual	consensus.	Full	texts	were	retrieved	for	the	studies	that	met	the	inclusion	criteria.	A	data	collection	form	was	used	to	extract	the	relevant	information	from	the	included	studies.			
 Assessment	of	study	quality		To	assess	the	quality	of	the	identified	studies,	I	used	the	Grades	of	Assessment,	Development	and	Evaluation	(GRADE)	system	checklist	(Guyatt	et	al.,	2008;	Cochrane,	2008)	which	is	commonly	used	for	quality	assessment	in	systematic	reviews.	However,	GRADE	does	not	differentiate	observational	studies	based	on	its	
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ability	to	control	for	selection	bias.	Thus,	I	supplemented	the	GRADE	score	with	another	checklist,	the	‘Quality	of	Effectiveness	Estimates	from	Non-randomised	Studies’	(QuEENS)	(Faria	et	al.,	2015)			A	fundamental	requirement	for	evaluating	methods	to	estimate	the	treatment	effect	in	non-randomised	studies	is	to	have	a	clear	understanding	of	the	process	of	treatment	assignment.	This	will	be	case	specific	and	therefore	it	is	expected	that	any	study	using	non-randomised	data	will	require	a	detailed	discussion	about	the	nature	of	the	data,	how	it	has	been	collected/generated	and	the	mechanism	of	treatment	assignment.	QuEENS	checklist	classifies	studies	into	three	categories:	low,	medium	and	high	risk	of	bias,	based	on	the	strength	of	study’s	arguments	to	support	several	critical	assumptions	needed	to	justify	the	appropriateness	of	the	models	and	to	substantiate	the	results.	Some	important	notes	regarding	the	grading	of	studies:		
• Randomised	studies	were	considered	to	have	low	risk	of	bias.		
• Non-randomised	studies	that	account	for	selection	on	observables	variables,	such	as	propensity	score	matching	(PSM),	were	categorised	as	high	risk	of	bias	unless	they	provided	adequate	assumption	checks	or	compared	the	results	to	those	from	other	methods	in	which	case	they	may	be	classed	as	medium	risk.		
• Non-randomised	studies	that	account	for	selection	on	both	observables	and	unobservables,	such	as	regression	with	difference-in-differences	(DiD)	or	Heckman	sample	selection	models,	were	considered	to	have	medium	risk	of	bias.	Some	of	these	studies	could	be	downgraded	or	upgraded	depending	on	sufficiency	of	assumption	checks	and	comparison	with	results	from	other	methods.		Finally,	heterogeneity	of	health	insurance	programmes	across	countries	and	variability	in	empirical	methods	used	across	studies	precluded	a	formal	meta-analysis.	I	therefore	conducted	a	narrative	synthesis	of	the	literature	and	did	not	report	the	effect	size.	Throughout	this	review,	I	only	considered	three	possible	effects:	positive	outcome,	negative	outcome,	or	no	statistically	significant	effect	(here	defined	as	p-value	>	0.1).	
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Section	5.3 Results	
 Results	of	the	search	My	database	search	identified	8,755	studies.	Five	additional	studies	were	retrieved	from	grey	literature.	After	screening	of	titles	and	abstracts,	118	studies	were	identified	as	potentially	relevant.	After	reviewing	the	full-texts,	68	studies	were	included	in	the	systematic	review	(see	Figure	1	for	the	PRISMA	diagram).	A	full	description	of	included	studies	is	presented	in	the	appendix	(Table	A-3).		
	
Records	identified	through	database	searching	(n=8,755)	 Additional	records	identified	through	grey	literatures	(n=5)	
Records	screened	
(n=8,760)	
Full-text	articles	assessed	for	eligibility	(n=118)	
Studies	included	in	narrative	synthesis	(n=68)	
8,642	records	excluded	due	to:	1703	duplications	6939	not	relevant	based	on	inclusion	criteria			
Full-text	articles	excluded	(n=50)	Little	effort	to	tackle	selection	bias	(n=33)	The	treatment	is	not	public	health	insurance	(n=4)	Uninsured	population	is	excluded	(n=5)	Outcome	variable	is	not	suitable	for	this	review	(n=2)	Not	an	impact	evaluation	study	(n=3)	Duplication	of	the	same	study	(n=3)	
Figure	5-1	PRISMA	flow	diagram	for	included	and	excluded	studies	
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 Quality	assessment	of	the	included	studies			While	Acharya	et	al.	(2012)	divided	the	included	studies	according	to	the	type	of	insurance	and	whether	they	met	the	identification	criteria	or	not,	I	separated	the	studies	by	two	different	quality	assessment	criteria:	QuEENS	and	GRADE.	Normally,	GRADE	classifies	a	study	into	four	criteria:	high,	moderate,	low,	and	very	low,	in	which	the	‘high’	is	considered	superior	to	‘low’.	However,	there	is	no	study	categorised	as	‘high’	in	this	review	even	though	three	randomised	studies	have	been	identified.	Those	three	studies	failed	to	reach	the	‘high’	category	because	of	their	lack	of	allocation	concealment	and	blinding,	which	are	almost	impossible	for	any	public	health	intervention	in	general.	In	addition,	GRADE	has	a	rule	to	classify	any	observational	study	in	the	‘low’	group	which	could	be	upgraded	if	the	treatment	effect	is	very	large,	if	the	bias	is	likely	to	underestimate	the	treatment	effect,	or	the	presence	of	the	dose	response.	However,	none	of	the	non-randomised	studies	are	eligible	for	this	upgrade.	Furthermore,	11	studies	were	downgraded	due	to	either	their	failure	to	solve	the	selection	bias	issue	or	the	lack	of	detail	in	their	estimation	methods.			The	second	criteria,	QuEENS,	is	also	further	divided	into	three	categories	based	on	their	potential	risk	of	bias:	Low,	Moderate,	and	High.	The	QuEENS	criteria	places	more	emphasis	on	the	sound	arguments	to	support	some	critical	assumptions	needed	to	justify	the	appropriateness	of	the	models	and	to	substantiate	the	results.	Therefore,	it	requires	a	detailed	discussion	on	the	methodology	aspect	of	the	studies.		In	this	review,	most	studies	in	the	‘high	risk’	category	do	not	report	adequate	discussion	of	their	estimation	model	in	their	method	section.	Meanwhile,	studies	in	the	low	risk	category	are	appraised	for	their	detail,	transparent	discussion	and	convincing	argument	underpinning	their	choice	of	estimation	methodology.		Compared	to	GRADE,	more	studies	are	classified	as	a	high	quality	based	on	QuEENS;	10	out	of	52	studies	are	judged	as	having	low	risk	of	bias	based	on	QuEENS	and	only	4	out	of	52	studies	are	classified	as	moderate	quality	based	on	GRADE.	Meanwhile,	there	are	22	studies	qualified	as	a	high	risk	of	bias	out	of	52	included	studies	which	
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implies	that	QuEENS	could	be	more	effective	to	separate	between	good	and	bad	quality	studies,	considering	the	ability	of	the	studies	to	overcome	both	observable	and	unobservable	bias.		
 Access	to	care	Figure	5-2	and	Table	5-1	collate	the	evidence	on	the	effects	of	health	insurance	on	access	to	healthcare	services.	Despite	the	complexity	of	defining	access	to	care,	many	studies	have	chosen	to	proxy	access	by	measuring	the	utilisation	of	health	care	services.	Out	of	40	studies,	32	studies	reported	positive	effect	of	increased	utilisation	of	care,	with	a	mixed	quality	of	evidence.	Among	the	higher	quality	studies,	i.e.	those	that	suitably	controlled	for	selection	bias	reflected	by	moderate	or	low	GRADE	score	and	low	risk	of	bias	(score	=	3)	on	QuEENS,	seven	studies	reported	a	positive	relationship	between	insurance	and	utilisation,	one	study	(Raza	et	al.,	2016)	reported	statistically	non-significant	effect,	and	another	study	found	a	negative	effect	(Sheth,	2014).		
	
Figure	5-2	Summary	of	the	impact	of	health	insurance	on	access	to	care	
*	Queens	score:	1	=	high	risk	of	bias;	2	=	moderate	risk;	3	=	low	risk	
†	Grade	score:	Low	=	low	quality;	Moderate	=	moderate	quality	
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Positive effect No effect Negative effect
Nu
m
be
r o
f s
tu
di
es
Access to Care (N = 40)
3 and Moderate 3 and Low 2 and Low 1 and Low
		 104	
	The	evidence	on	utilisation	can	also	be	grouped	based	on	type	of	care:	curative	or	preventive	care.	The	evidence	on	the	utilisation	of	curative	care	mostly	suggested	a	positive	effect,	with	30	out	of	38	studies	reporting	a	positive	and	statistically	significant	effect.	However,	the	evidence	on	preventive	care	is	less	clear	with	4	out	of	7	studies	reporting	a	positive	effect,	two	studies	found	a	negative	effect	and	one	study	reported	no	effect.		Next,	I	will	present	the	findings	grouped	based	on	country	location	of	the	studies	to	minimise	the	heterogeneity	in	the	structure	of	health	insurance	scheme.		
Table	5-1	Summary	of	studies	reporting	utilisation	of	health	care	(N=40),	by	countries	and	year	Study	 Country	 Insurance*	 Effect	 QUEENS**	 GRADE†	(Robyn	and	et	al.,	2012)	 Burkina	Faso	 CBHI	 0	 3	 Moderate	(Robyn	et	al.,	2012)	 Burkina	Faso	 CBHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Levine,	Polimeni	and	Ramage,	2016)	 Cambodia	 CBHI	 +	 3	 Moderate	(Babiarz	et	al.,	2010)	 China	 SHI	 0	 2	 Low	(Lu,	Liu	and	Shen,	2012)	 China	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Chen,	Liu	and	Xu,	2014)	 China	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Hou	et	al.,	2014)	 China	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Liu	and	Zhao,	2014)	 China	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Cheng	et	al.,	2015)	 China	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Liao,	Gilmour	and	Shibuya,	2016)	 China	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Trujillo	et	al.,	2010)	 Colombia	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Hassan,	Jimenez	and	Montoya,	2013)	 Colombia	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Miller,	Pinto	and	Vera-Hernandez,	2013)	 Colombia	 SHI	 +	 3	 Low	(Hou	and	Chao,	2011)	 Georgia	 SHI	 +	 3	 Low	(Zoidze	et	al.,	2013)	 Georgia	 SHI	 0	 1	 Low	(Gotsadze	et	al.,	2015)	 Georgia	 SHI	 0	 1	 Low	(Blanchet,	Fink	and	Osei-Akoto,	2012)	 Ghana	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Yilma,	Van	Kempen	and	De	Hoop,	2012)	 Ghana	 SHI	 +	 3	 Low	(Abrokwah,	Moser	and	Norton,	2014)	 Ghana	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Brugiavini	and	Pace,	2015)	 Ghana	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Fenny	et	al.,	2015)	 Ghana	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Sheth,	2014)	 India	 CBHI	 -	 3	 Low	(Sood	et	al.,	2014)	 India	 SHI	 0	 2	 Low	(Raza	et	al.,	2016)	 India	 CBHI	 0	 3	 Moderate	(Sparrow	et	al.	2013)	 Indonesia	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Alkenbrack	and	Lindelow,	2015)	 Lao	PDR	 CBHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Rivera-Hernandez	et	al.,	2016)	 Mexico	 SHI	 0	 2	 Low	(Bernal,	Carpio	and	Klein,	2014)		 Peru	 SHI	 +	 3	 Low
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(Dhillon	et	al.,	2012)	 Rwanda	 CBHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Lu	et	al.,	2012)	 Rwanda	 CBHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Panpiemras	et	al.,	2011)	 Thailand	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Ghislandi,	Manachotphong	and	Perego,	2015)	 Thailand	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Limwattananon	et	al.,	2015)	 Thailand	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Makhloufi,	Ventelou	and	Abu-Zaineh,	2015)	 Tunisia	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Nguyen,	2012)	 Vietnam	 SHI	 +	 3	 Low	(Nguyen	and	Wang,	2013)	 Vietnam	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Guindon,	2014)	 Vietnam	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Nguyen,	2014)	 Vietnam	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Palmer	et	al.,	2015)	 Vietnam	 SHI	 +	 3	 Low	(Nguyen,	2016)	 Vietnam	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	
*	SHI	=	Social	Health	Insurance;	CBHI	=	Community-based	Health	Insurance;	**	Queens	score:	1	=	high	risk	of	bias;	2	=	
moderate	risk;	3	=	low	risk;	†	Grade	score:	Low	=	low	quality;	Moderate	=	moderate	quality;	High	=	high	quality		China	has	been	the	subject	of	a	long	health	reform	since	2003	and	many	studies	have	been	published	to	evaluate	the	success	of	this	health	reform.	Currently	there	are	four	big	health	insurance	schemes	covering	different	target	population:	NCMS	(for	rural	residents),	GMI	(for	the	government’s	employees),	UEBMI	(for	formal	workers	in	urban	area),	and	URBMI	(for	informal	workers	in	urban	area).	For	insurance	under	the	New	Cooperative	Medical	System	(NCMS),	Lu,	Liu,	and	Shen	(2012)	reported	a	positive	effect	on	probability	of	seeking	medical	care	and	an	increased	the	number	of	outpatient	visits.	Hou,	et	al.	(2009)	constructed	the	NCMS	generosity	index	based	on	the	reimbursement	rates	from	different	insurers	under	NCMS	contract.	They	found	that	a	40%	change	in	reimbursement	rates	(the	range	of	NCMS	index	from	the	data)	lead	to	an	increased	in	outpatient	admission	probability	of	16%.	It	also	increased	inpatient	admission,	but	this	was	not	statistically	significant.	Unsurprisingly,	they	also	found	that	enrolees	are	more	likely	to	choose	providers	with	more	generous	reimbursements.	Meanwhile,	Babiarz,	et	al.	(2010)	reported	that	NCMS	did	not	change	overall	medical	care	use,	but	it	might	have	redirected	patients	from	larger	and	more	specialised	facilities	towards	village	clinics	which	could	be	perceived	as	a	favourable	outcome.			For	a	more	recent	reform	that	took	place	in	2007,	Chen,	et	al.	(2014)	found	that	URBMI	marginally	increased	the	probability	of	seeking	medical	care	in	inpatient	and	outpatient	care	by	1.8%	and	1.7%	respectively.	A	similar	finding	was	also	reported	by	Liu	and	Zhao	(2014)	using	different	datasets	and	estimation	methods.	
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Furthermore,	Liu,	Wu,	and	Liu	(2014)	also	reported	positive	effect	of	three	schemes	(GMI,	UEBMI,	and	NCMS)	on	utilisation	rates,	but	they	admitted	that	their	method	(Structural	Equation	Modelling	[SEM])	is	not	appropriate	for	drawing	causal	effects.	Overall,	this	review	agrees	with	the	previous	review	(Acharya,	et	al.,	2012);	Health	insurance	reform	in	China	tends	to	deliver	positive	impact	on	utilisation	of	health	care	either	by	increasing	overall	medical	visits	or	substituting	specialised	visits	with	primary	care	visits.			Vietnam	is	also	one	of	the	countries	which	experiments	with	different	schemes	for	different	target	populations.	In	principal,	there	are	two	different	schemes:	the	compulsory	scheme,	which	covers	formal	workers	in	both	government	and	large	companies;	students	in	universities	and	colleges;	and	the	voluntary	scheme	which	covers	near	poor	people.	Children	under	the	age	of	6	and	the	poor	population	are	covered	with	the	compulsory	schemes,	but	their	premium	are	waived.	Nguyen	(2012)	evaluated	the	voluntary	scheme	with	propensity	score	matching	and	difference-in-difference-DID	and	compared	it	with	instrumental	variables	and	fixed	effect.	He	reported	that	the	voluntary	scheme	increased	annual	outpatient	visits	from	2.02	to	2.93	and	annual	inpatient	visits	from	0.11	to	0.18,	on	average.	In	addition,	Guindon,	et	al.	(2014)	evaluated	the	contributory	scheme	and	reported	different	patterns	by	target	population.	They	found	a	positive	effect	on	inpatient	visits,	but	not	on	outpatient	visits	for	poor	people	and	students;	and	vice	versa	for	children	under	the	age	of	6.	However,	Nguyen	and	Wang	(2013)	reported	increased	hospitalisations	in	secondary	facilities,	but	a	decreased	for	tertiary	facilities	for	children	under	the	age	of	6.	Meanwhile,	even	though	it	only	partially	solved	for	observables	selection	bias,	Nguyen	(2014)	reported	that	insured	people	in	compulsory	schemes	have	on	average	0.47	more	outpatient	visits	than	the	uninsured.	He	further	concluded	that	no	moral	hazard	or	adverse	effect	was	observed	for	hospital	visits.	Overall,	there	is	more	consensus	towards	the	positive	effect	of	health	insurance	reform	on	utilisation	of	overall	medical	care	in	Vietnam.			In	Colombia,	the	overall	picture	is	leaning	towards	positive	effect	of	health	insurance	on	utilisation	of	either	general	medical	care	or	maternal	health	services.	Camacho	
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and	Conover	(2013)	utilised	administrative	data	and	constructed	a	regression	discontinuity	model	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	the	health	reform	on	maternal	health	services.	They	found	that	the	reform	increases	the	probability	of	a	mother	to	deliver	in	formal	health	care	facilities.	In	addition,	Miller	et	al.	(2013)	also	constructed	the	fuzzy	regression	discontinuity	from	the	household	survey	and	reported	increased	outpatient	visits	and	preventive	visits	(such	as,	growth	monitoring	and	well-care	visits),	but	no	observed	effect	on	hospitalisation.	They	also	found	that	insured	mothers	were	no	more	likely	to	have	harmful	maternal	behaviours,	such	as	smoking	and	drinking,	than	the	uninsured.			There	is	a	big	interest	among	researchers	in	Colombia	to	evaluate	the	moral	hazard	effect	under	their	current	health	care	reform.	Trujillo,	et	al.	(2010)	reported	that	there	is	no	evidence	for	people	in	contributory	schemes	to	avoid	preventive	measures.	Meanwhile	Hassan,	et	al.	(2013)	evaluated	the	impact	of	health	insurance	by	using	the	two-stage	nonlinear	method	(similar	to	bi-probit	model,	but	with	more	relaxed	assumption	in	its	distribution)	and	they	found	that	people	in	the	subsidised	scheme	were	more	likely	to	use	inpatient	care	and	less	likely	to	use	preventive	care,	which	suggests	a	strong	moral	hazard	effect.			In	Georgia,	three	studies	reported	the	impact	of	health	insurance	for	poor	people	on	utilisation.	One	study	with	a	robust	method	found	that	the	insured	under	the	new	scheme	were	nine	times	more	likely	to	utilise	acute	surgeries	than	the	uninsured	(Hou	and	Chao,	2011).	However,	two	other	studies	with	weaker	methods	showed	smaller	effect	on	utilisation	though	the	overall	conclusion	seems	to	favour	a	positive	effect	(Gotsadze	et	al.,2015;	Zoidze	et	al.,	2013).	However,	it	is	worth	noting	that	Hou	and	Chao	(2011)	used	the	data	collected	just	6	months	after	reform	while	the	other	two	studies	used	more	recent	datasets	in	2010.	It	is	possible	the	strong	effect	observed	in	the	first	year	subsided	after	longer	periods.			All	included	studies	evaluating	health	insurance	in	Ghana	suffer	from	weaker	methods	to	overcome	selection	bias	issues.	Overall,	the	health	insurance	increased	utilisation	on	outpatient,	inpatient,	and	maternal	health	services	(Abrokowah,	et	al.,	
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2014;	Blanchet,	et	al.,	2012;	Dixon	et	al.,	2014;	Fenny	et	al.,	2015).	Meanwhile,	studies	evaluating	the	current	reform	in	Rwanda	showed	strong	positive	effect	on	utilisation	with	mixed	strength	of	evidence	(Lu	et	al.,	2012;	Dhillon,	et	al.,	2012).	The	similar	mixed	evidence	was	also	observed	in	Thailand	(Limwattananon,	et	al.	(2015);	Papiemras,	et	al.,	2011).			Robyn,	et	al.	(2012a)	used	cluster	randomisation	study	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	community-based	health	insurance	in	Burkina	Faso	and	they	found	that	the	insured	were	33%	more	likely	to	seek	treatment,	but	this	effect	was	not	significant.	They	argued	that	this	weak	evidence	could	be	caused	by	a	very	low	enrolment	rate	(10%),	compounded	by	the	misplaced	incentives	for	providers.	Also,	the	insurance	did	not	provide	comprehensive	medical	benefit	for	its	beneficiaries.	In	another	paper,	Robyn,	et	al.	(2012b)	reported	that	the	health	insurance	did	not	have	strong	role	in	reducing	self-treatment.	They	also	found	no	evidence	for	adverse	selection	in	terms	of	chronic	conditions.	This	could	also	mean	that	people	perceive	the	services	provided	under	the	new	reform	as	inferior	to	self-treatment	or	private	care	so	they	are	less	likely	to	join	the	scheme.			For	the	rest	of	the	studies,	one	country	is	represented	by	one	study	only.	Sood	et	al.	(2014)	utilised	the	phased	roll	out	of	the	community	based	insurance	in	India	and	they	found	positive	effect,	but	it	was	not	statistically	significant.	Sparrow,	et	al.	(2013)	reported	that	the	health	insurance	for	the	poor	in	Indonesia	increased	utilisation	rate	by	0.062	visits	per	person	per	month.	Alkenrack	and	Lindelow	(2015)	reported	increased	probability	of	having	inpatient	visits	among	the	insured	compared	with	the	uninsured	in	Lao,	but	their	method	did	not	consider	the	unobservable	selection	bias.	Chami,	et	al.	(2014)	evaluated	the	health	insurance	in	Tanzania	and	found	that	the	insured	are	more	likely	to	seek	care	and	less	likely	to	experience	a	delay	in	seeking	medical	treatment,	but	their	study	has	a	less	convincing	method	to	address	the	selection	bias.	Finally,	Makhloufi,	et	al.	(2015)	reported	a	positive	effect	on	utilisation	for	both	mandatory	and	subsidised	schemes	compared	to	the	uninsured	in	Tunisia.		
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 Financial	protection		Overall,	the	evidence	on	the	impact	of	health	insurance	on	financial	protection	is	less	clear-cut	than	that	for	utilisation	(see	Figure	5-3	and	Table	5-2).	Thirty	four	of	the	46	studies	reported	the	impact	on	the	level	of	out-of-pocket	health	expenditure.	Among	those	34	studies,	17	studies	found	a	positive	effect	(i.e.	a	reduction	in	out-of-pocket	expenditure),	15	studies	found	no	statistically	significant	effect,	and	two	studies	–	from	Indonesia	(Sparrow,	Suryahadi	and	Widyanti,	2013)	and	Peru	(Bernal,	Carpio	and	Klein,	2014)	–	reported	a	negative	effect	(i.e.	increase	in	out-of-pocket	expenditure).			The	second	most	popular	financial	protection	measure	is	the	probability	of	incurring	catastrophic	health	expenditure	defined	as	OOP	exceeding	a	certain	threshold	percentage	of	total	expenditure	or	income.	Of	the	14	studies	in	this	review,	nine	reported	reduction	in	the	risk	of	catastrophic	expenditure,	three	found	no	statistically	significant	difference,	and	two	found	a	negative	effect	of	health	insurance.	Only	four	studies	reported	sensitivity	analysis	to	changes	in	the	threshold	level	(Bernal,	Carpio	and	Klein,	2014;	Fink	et	al.,	2013;	Grogger	et	al.,	2015;	Sparrow,	Suryahadi	and	Widyanti,	2013),	though	this	did	not	affect	the	result	qualitatively.			Another	measure	of	financial	protection	has	been	the	probability	of	impoverishment	due	to	catastrophic	health	expenditure.	Two	studies	have	evaluated	this	outcome	with	different	conclusions	(Fan,	Karan	and	Mahal,	2012;	Aryeetey	et	al.,	2016).	Finally,	four	studies	evaluated	the	effect	on	financial	protection	by	assessing	the	impact	of	insurance	on	non-healthcare	consumption	or	saving	behaviour,	such	as	non-medical	related	consumption	(Bai	and	Wu,	2014),	probability	of	financing	medical	bills	via	asset	sales	or	borrowing	(Babiarz	et	al.,	2010),	and	household	saving	(Cheung	and	Padieu,	2013).	Unfortunately,	no	clear	pattern	can	be	observed	from	those	four	studies.				
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Figure	5-3	Summary	of	the	impact	of	health	insurance	on	financial	protection		
Table	5-2	Summary	of	studies	reporting	financial	protection	outcome	(N=46)	Study	 Country	 Insurance*	 Effect	 QUEENS**	 GRADE†	(Parmar	et	al.,	2012)	 Burkina	Faso	 CBHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Fink	et	al.,	2013)	 Burkina	Faso	 CBHI	 +	 3	 Moderate	(Levine,	Polimeni	and	Ramage,	2016)	 Cambodia	 CBHI	 +	 3	 Moderate	(Babiarz	et	al.,	2010)	 China	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Lu,	Liu	and	Shen,	2012)	 China	 SHI	 0	 2	 Low	(Cheung	and	Padieu,	2013)	 China	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Jing	et	al.,	2013)	 China	 SHI	 0	 1	 Low	(Bai	and	Wu,	2014)	 China	 SHI	 +	 3	 Low	(Hou	et	al.,	2014)	 China	 SHI	 0	 2	 Low	(Liu	and	Zhao,	2014)	 China	 SHI	 0	 2	 Low	(Liu,	Wu	and	Liu,	2014)	 China	 SHI	 0	 1	 Low	(Yuan	et	al.,	2014)	 China	 SHI	 0	 2	 Low	(Atella,	Brugiavini	and	Pace,	2015)	 China	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Li	et	al.,	2011)	 China	 SHI	 0	 2	 Low	(Jung	and	Streeter,	2015)	 China	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Yang	and	Wu,	2015)	 China	 SHI	 0	 2	 Low	
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(Camacho	and	Conover,	2013)	 Colombia	 SHI	 0	 3	 Low	(Miller,	Pinto	and	Vera-Hernandez,	2013)	 Colombia	 SHI	 0	 3	 Low	(Yilma	et	al.,	2015)	 Ethiopia	 CBHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Zoidze	et	al.,	2013)	 Georgia	 SHI	 -	 1	 Low	(Gotsadze	et	al.,	2015)	 Georgia	 SHI	 0	 1	 Low	(Abrokwah,	Moser	and	Norton,	2014)	 Ghana	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Brugiavini	and	Pace,	2015)	 Ghana	 SHI	 0	 2	 Low	(Aryeetey	et	al.,	2016)	 Ghana	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Fan,	Karan	and	Mahal,	2012)	 India	 SHI	 +	 3	 Low	(Sheth,	2014)	 India	 CBHI	 +	 3	 Low	(Sood	et	al.,	2014)	 India	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Raza	et	al.,	2016)	 India	 CBHI	 0	 3	 Moderate	(Aji	et	al.,	2013)	 Indonesia	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Sparrow,	Suryahadi	and	Widyanti,	2013)	 Indonesia	 SHI	 -	 2	 Low	(Alkenbrack	and	Lindelow,	2015)	 Lao	 CBHI	 0	 2	 Low	(Galarraga	et	al.,	2010)	 Mexico	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Sosa-Rubi,	Salinas-Rodriguez	and	Galarraga,	2011)	 Mexico	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Wirtz	et	al.,	2012)	 Mexico	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Avila-Burgos	et	al.,	2013)	 Mexico	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Grogger	et	al.,	2015)	 Mexico	 SHI	 +	 3	 Moderate	(Bernal,	Carpio	and	Klein,	2014)		 Peru	 SHI	 -	 3	 Low	(Lu	et	al.,	2012)	 Rwanda	 CBHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Koch	and	Alaba,	2010)	 South	Africa	 SHI	 -	 1	 Low	(Limwattananon	et	al.,	2015)	 Thailand	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Makhloufi,	Ventelou	and	Abu-Zaineh,	2015)	 Tunisia	 SHI	 0	 1	 Low	(Sepehri,	Sarma	and	Oguzoglu,	2011)	 Vietnam	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Nguyen,	2012)		 Vietnam	 SHI	 0	 3	 Low	(Nguyen	and	Wang,	2013)	 Vietnam	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Palmer	et	al.,	2015)	 Vietnam	 SHI	 0	 3	 Low	(Nguyen,	2016)	 Vietnam	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	
*	SHI	=	Social	Health	Insurance;	CBHI	=	Community-based	Health	Insurance	
**	Queens	score:	1	=	high	risk;	2	=	moderate	risk;	3	=	low	risk	
†	Grade	score:	Low	=	low	quality;	Moderate	=	moderate	quality;	High	=	high	quality		As	shown	in	previous	sub-section,	studies	in	China	have	the	biggest	share	among	the	included	studies.	There	are	eight	studies	evaluating	NCMS,	one	study	for	URBMI,	and	one	study	for	all	four	schemes.	Liu	and	Zhao	(2014)	found	that	the	insured	under	URBMI	scheme	were	more	likely	to	have	higher	out-of-pocket	(OOP)	health	
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expenditure,	but	this	effect	was	not	statistically	significant.	They	also	found	inequality	in	terms	of	OOP	health	inequality	disfavouring	the	poor	population.	Lu,	Liu,	and	Shen	(2012)	and	Cheng,	et	al.	(2015)	also	found	a	similar	pattern	when	they	evaluated	the	impact	of	NCMS	on	OOP	health	expenditure	using	different	datasets	and	estimation	methods.	Hou,	et	al.	(2014)	further	elaborated	the	pattern	by	breaking	down	the	OOP	into	outpatient	and	inpatient	expenditure.	They	found	that	a	1	percent	increase	in	NCMS	generosity	index	leads	to	an	increase	in	total	spending	and	OOP	for	inpatient	care,	but	not	for	outpatient	care	in	the	village	level.	However,	at	the	household	level	they	found	a	different	pattern	in	which	NCMS	increases	OOP	share	for	outpatient	care	but	had	no	effect	on	inpatient	care.	In	addition,	Yang,	et	al.	(2015)	compared	the	OOP	before	and	after	the	reimbursement	and	they	found	that	the	insured	are	associated	with	higher	OOP	total	health	spending	pre-and	post-reimbursement,	even	though	the	significant	coefficient	only	appears	in	pre-reimbursement.	Even	the	study	with	the	lowest	quality	score	among	the	studies	in	China	found	the	insignificant	increased	OOP	effect	for	NCMS	beneficiaries,	but	significantly	reduced	OOP	effect	for	UEBMI	and	URBMI	beneficiaries.			On	the	other	hand,	Lu,	Liu,	and	Shen	(2012)	reported	that	the	insured	are	associated	with	reduced	OOP	even	though	this	effect	was	not	significant,	which	also	in	agreement	with	a	study	by	Cheng	and	Padieu	(2013).	Meanwhile,	only	Babiarz,	et	al.	(2010)	reported	a	significant	reduced	OOP	health	expenditure	by	19%	among	the	insured	in	NCMS	scheme	compared	to	the	uninsured.		Other	measures	of	financial	protection	also	emerge	among	the	included	studies;	one	of	the	most	studied	is	the	probability	of	incurring	catastrophic	health	expenditure	(CHE).	Babiarz,	et	al.	(2010)	reported	that	the	insured	in	the	NCMS	scheme	is	associated	with	a	2%	point	reduced	the	likelihood	of	incurring	CHE.	Meanwhile,	Lu,	Liu,	and	Shen	(2012)	reported	no	conclusive	direction	and	no	significant	effect	of	NCMS	on	the	probability	of	incurring	CHE.			Another	different	method	is	the	probability	of	impoverishment	due	to	catastrophic	health	expenditure.	Even	though	the	effect	is	favourable,	the	study	suffers	from	a	low-
		 113	
quality	score	(Jing,	et	al.,	2013).	Finally,	some	studies	also	evaluated	the	financial	protection	through	the	impact	on	other	consumption	or	saving	behaviour.	Bai	and	Wu	(2014)	found	that	participation	in	NCMS	increase	the	nonmedical-related	consumption	by	more	than	5%	with	stronger	effect	among	people	reporting	worse	self-reported	health	status.	Babiarz,	et	al.	(2010)	reported	reduced	probability	of	financing	medical	bill	by	asset	sales	or	borrowing	by	2	percent	among	NCMS	beneficiaries.	Cheng	and	Padieu	(2013)	reported	that	NCMS	beneficiaries	in	third	quintiles	experience	reduced	household	saving,	but	this	effect	is	not	observed	among	the	poorest	nor	the	richest.			Overall,	there	is	more	evidence	to	conclude	that	NCMS	does	not	provide	adequate	financial	protection	through	the	reduction	in	OOP	health	expenditure.	The	conclusion	for	other	measures	is	less	convergent	thus	it	is	desirable	to	have	more	studies	with	stronger	methodology	in	the	future	as	the	use	of	OOP	reduction	measures	has	been	criticised	for	not	providing	a	comprehensive	picture	of	the	financial	protection	effect.			In	Burkina	Faso,	Gunther,	et	al.	(2013)	utilised	the	cluster	randomised	study	for	the	introduction	of	CBHI	in	one	rural	district.	They	found	that	the	insured	are	associated	with	30%	reduction	in	the	likelihood	of	incurring	CHE	compared	to	the	uninsured.	Furthermore,	Parmer,	et	al.	(2012)	reported	that	CBHI	increased	household	assets	among	the	insured	in	Burkina	Faso.			In	India,	the	favourable	effect	is	more	prominent	for	expenditure	in	inpatient	care	and	drug	spending.	Fan,	et	al.	(2012)	evaluated	the	impact	of	social	health	insurance	in	two	different	areas	and	different	times	and	they	found	that	the	insured	is	associated	with	reduced	OOP	spending,	but	the	pattern	was	varied	between	two	study	areas;	reduced	OOP	for	inpatient	but	not	for	outpatient	in	one	area	and	reduced	OOP	for	drug	spending	but	not	for	inpatient	in	another	area.	They	also	found	no	effect	on	any	measure	of	impoverishment	from	any	area.	Meanwhile,	Sood,	et	al.	(2014)	evaluated	a	different	insurance	scheme	for	poor	people	in	rural	areas	and	they	found	34%	reduction	in	OOP	for	inpatient	care	among	the	insured	population.		
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	In	Vietnam,	the	evidence	indicates	that	greater	protection	is	provided	from	the	subsidised	schemes	rather	than	the	voluntary	ones.	Nguyen	(2012)	reported	that	the	insured	among	voluntary	scheme	experience	reduced	OOP,	but	this	effect	was	not	statistically	significant.	Using	a	different	dataset	but	weaker	methodology,	Sepehri,	et	al.	(2011)	also	found	no	impact	of	voluntary	scheme	on	OOP	spending,	but	they	found	a	reduction	of	OOP	by	16%	among	poor	people	who	were	covered	by	the	subsidised	scheme.	In	addition,	Nguyen	and	Wang	(2013)	evaluated	the	impact	of	subsidised	compulsory	scheme	for	children	under	the	age	of	6	and	they	reported	reduced	probability	of	incurring	CHE	by	1.7%	point	compared	to	children	6-7	years	who	were	excluded	from	the	scheme	and	uninsured.			In	Mexico,	it	is	found	that	the	overall	favourable	effect	in	financial	protection	is	prominent,	especially	for	drug	expenditure.	Galarraga,	et	al.	(2010)	using	two	different	datasets	with	similar	methods	reported	that	the	insured	people	are	more	likely	to	have	reduced	OOP	spending	for	outpatient,	inpatient,	and	drug	expenditure	and	are	less	likely	to	incur	CHE	compared	to	the	uninsured	population	and	this	effect	still	held	when	they	repeated	the	analysis	using	another	dataset,	but	with	smaller	magnitude.	Meanwhile,	Wirtz,	et	al.	(2012)	found	a	significant	reduction	effect	for	drug	expenditure,	but	no	significant	effect	on	the	share	of	drug	expenditure	spent	from	household	available	expenditure	funds.	Finally,	Avilla-Burgos,	et	al.	(2013)	using	weaker	method	and	slightly	different	datasets	found	that	patients	with	chronic	conditions	and	insured	with	Seguro	Popular	are	less	likely	to	incur	health	expenditure	compared	to	uninsured	chronic	patients.			In	Indonesia,	the	evidence	is	more	inconclusive	as	two	studies	with	different	datasets	reach	opposite	conclusions.	Sparrow,	et	al.	(2013)	used	panel	datasets	from	a	national	socioeconomic	survey	and	found	that	the	insured	people	under	the	Askeskin	scheme	are	more	likely	to	have	larger	OOP	especially	in	urban	areas	compared	to	non-Askeskin	people.	Furthermore,	the	insured	people	have	a	higher	incidence	of	incurring	CHE	by	15%.	Meanwhile,	Aji,	et	al.	(2013)	used	a	different	panel	dataset	
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and	found	that	Askeskin	reduced	OOP	spending	among	its	beneficiaries	34%	lower	compared	to	non-Askeskin	people.			In	Georgia,	the	evidence	comes	from	two	low	quality	data,	thus	no	definite	conclusion	can	be	drawn.	Zoidze	et	al.	(2013)	found	that	poor	people	under	the	new	scheme	are	associated	with	reduced	OOP	spending	for	total	health	expenditure	and	inpatient	care	expenditure.	However,	they	also	found	an	increased	probability	to	incur	CHE	among	the	insured.	In	addition,	Gotzadze	(2015)	also	found	the	same	even	though	it	is	marginally	significant.			
 Health	status			Improving	health	is	one	of	key	aims	of	health	insurance,	yet	very	few	studies	have	thus	far	attempted	to	evaluate	this.	I	identified	12	studies,	with	considerable	variation	in	the	precise	health	measure	considered	(see	Table	5	and	6).	There	is	some	evidence	of	positive	impact	on	health	status:	nine	studies	found	positive	effect,	one	study	reported	negative	effect,	and	two	studies	reported	no	effect.			In	Burkina	Faso,	there	are	two	studies	which	took	place	in	the	same	district,	Nouna,	but	yield	different	conclusion.	Gunther,	et	al.	(2013)	used	the	rollout	of	insurance	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	CBHI	on	mortality	rates	and	they	found	that	the	scheme	is	associated	with	increased	general	mortality	rates.	After	stratifying	the	analysis	by	the	age,	they	found	that	the	insured	elderly	has	30%	higher	mortality	rate	compared	to	the	uninsured	in	the	same	age	group.	Meanwhile,	they	found	a	decreasing	trend	of	under-5	mortality	rates	from	170	deaths	per	1000	in	the	insured	group	to	103	deaths	per	1000	in	the	uninsured	group.	By	using	different	methods	and	datasets,	Schoeps,	et	al.	(2015)	reported	almost	similar	findings.	Among	33.500	children,	they	found	that	the	insurance	is	associated	with	decreased	mortality	rate	(Hazard	Ratio:	0.54,	95%CI	=	0.43	to	0.68).	However,	their	cox	regression	model	cannot	fully	consider	some	unobserved	bias	that	may	influence	the	insurance	status,	which	is	likely	to	happen	as	the	reported	enrolment	rate	was	very	low.	They	attempted	to	control	this	
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bias	by	using	vaccination	coverage	as	the	instrument	for	insurance	status,	but	no	assumption	checks	were	reported	in	their	paper.			
	
Figure	5-4	Summary	of	the	impact	of	health	insurance	on	health	status									
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Table	5-3	Summary	of	studies	reporting	health	status	(N=12)	Study	 Country	 Insurance	 Effect	 QUEENS	 GRADE	 Chosen	outcomes	(Fink	et	al.,	2013)	 Burkina	Faso	 CBHI	 -	 3	 Moderate	 Child	and	adult	mortality	(Levine,	Polimeni	and	Ramage,	2016)	 Cambodia	 CBHI	 +	 3	 Moderate	 Health	index	(Chen	and	Jin,	2012)	 China	 SHI	 0	 2	 Low	 Child	and	maternal	mortality	(Cheng	et	al.,	2015)	 China	 SHI	 0	 2	 Low	 Adult	mortality	(Peng	and	Conley,	2016)	 China	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	 Malnutrition	and	food	consumption	(Camacho	and	Conover,	2013)	 Colombia	 SHI	 +	 3	 Low	 Low	birth	weight	and	newborn	health	status	(Miller,	Pinto	and	Vera-Hernandez,	2013)	 Colombia	 SHI	 +	 3	 Low	 Acute	illness	(Sood	et	al.,	2014)	 India	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	 Adult	mortality	(Pfutze,	2014)	 Mexico	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	 Child	mortality	(Pfutze,	2015)	 Mexico	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	 Miscarriages	prevalence	(Hendriks	et	al.,	2014)	 Nigeria	 CBHI	 +	 1	 Low	 Blood	pressure	(Quimbo	et	al.,	2011)	 Philippines	 SHI	 +	 3	 Moderate	 CRP-positive	level	and	wasting	
*	SHI	=	Social	Health	Insurance;	CBHI	=	Community-based	Health	Insurance	
**	Queens	score:	1	=	high	risk;	2	=	moderate	risk;	3	=	low	risk	
†	Grade	score:	Low	=	low	quality;	Moderate	=	moderate	quality;	High	=	high	quality	
		In	China,	the	evidence	tends	to	show	no	improvement	in	mortality	rate,	especially	for	the	adult	population.	Cheng	et	al.	(2015)	used	panel	data	from	2005-2008	and	PSM-DID	method	and	found	that	there	is	no	significant	effect	of	NCMS	on	3-year	mortality	rates	among	elderly	enrolees.	They	also	found	a	positive	effect	on	elderly	enrolees’	activities	of	daily	living	and	cognitive	function,	but	this	has	not	led	to	better	self-assessed	general	health	status.	Furthermore,	Chen	and	Jin	(2012)	used	the	2006	China	Agriculture	Census	and	also	found	that	NCMS	had	no	effect	on	reducing	the	incidence	of	child	and	maternal	mortality	rate.	Finally,	Liang	and	Lu	(2014)	used	SF-36	variables	in	general,	psychological,	and	physical	health	and	reported	some	beneficial	effects	on	the	elderly	population,	but	they	did	not	control	for	selection	bias.			
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In	Colombia,	the	evidence	leads	to	an	improvement	of	child	health	after	the	introduction	of	subsidised	health	insurance.	By	using	the	regression	discontinuity	(RD)	method	to	analyse	registry	data,	Camacho	and	Conover	(2013)	reported	that	the	insurance	is	associated	with	lower	incidence	of	low	birth	weight	by	1.7-3.8	percentage	points.	Furthermore,	Miller,	et	al.	(2013)	used	fuzzy	RD	design	to	analyse	household	surveys	and	found	that	SR	enrolment	is	associated	with	1.4	fewer	child	days	absent	from	usual	activities	due	to	illness	in	the	past	month.			Other	studies	in	different	countries	also	tend	to	report	positive	effect	of	health	insurance	on	health	status.	Sood,	et	al.	(2014)	reported	lower	mortality	rate	for	conditions	covered	by	the	scheme	in	India.	Pfutze	(2014)	used	a	Weighted	Exogenous	Sampling	Maximum	Likelihood	approach	to	control	for	censored	selection	bias	in	birth	registry	in	which	births	of	surviving	children	are	more	likely	to	be	observed	than	births	of	non-surviving	ones.	He	found	that	the	subsidised	health	insurance	program	in	Mexico	is	associated	with	a	significant	large	negative	effect	on	infant	mortality.	The	mortality	reduction	is	expected	to	be	5	out	of	1,000	(or	0.5%)	for	the	population	at	large	and	by	around	7	out	of	1,000	(0.7%)	for	the	scheme’s	target	population.	In	the	Philippines,	Quimbo	et	al.	(2011)	used	a	DID	approach	to	analyse	data	from	a	randomised	policy	experiment	known	as	the	Quality	Improvement	Demonstration	Study	and	estimated	a	9–12	and	4–9	percentage	point	reduction	in	the	likelihood	of	wasting	and	having	an	infection,	respectively,	as	measured	by	a	common	biomarker	C-reactive	Protein.	Finally,	Hendriks,	et	al.	(2014)	used	DID	approach	and	intention	to	treat	analysis	to	analyse	household	surveys	in	Nigeria	and	found	that	CBHI	program	is	associated	with	a	significant	decrease	in	blood	pressure	in	a	hypertensive	population	in	rural	Nigeria.	
	
Section	5.4 Discussion		I	have	identified	a	total	of	68	eligible	studies	over	a	period	of	six	years	–	exactly	double	the	amount	of	the	studies	identified	by	the	previous	seminal	review	by	Acharya	et	al.	over	an	approximately	60-year	time	horizon	(1950	-	July	2010).	While	similar	search	strategy	and	inclusion	criteria	are	still	retained,	this	review	is	different	
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from	Acharya’s	review	by	the	use	of	different	approach	of	assessing	the	study	quality.	In	this	review,	two	quality	assessment	checklists	are	used	to	scrutinise	the	study	methodology	without	disregarding	the	heterogeneity	among	non-experimental	design.	While	GRADE	has	been	widely	used	to	grade	the	quality	of	evidence	from	a	randomised	study,	QuEENS	gives	a	more	detailed	approach	to	assess	the	strength	of	evidence	from	a	non-randomized	study.	
	
 Overall	effect	While	Acharya	et	al.	(2013)	found	weak	evidence	that	health	insurance	yields	higher	utilisation,	I	have	found	stronger	and	more	consistent	evidence	of	positive	effects	of	health	insurance	on	health	care	utilisation.	This	pattern	has	been	echoed	by	other	reviews	(Comfort	et	al.,	2013;	Giedion	et	al.,	2013;	Spaan	et	al,	2012;	Ekman	et	al.,	2004)	except	that	no	previous	reviews	have	reported	any	negative	effect	on	utilisation.	In	my	review,	I	found	one	study	in	India	which	evaluated	the	community-based	health	insurance	(CBHI)	in	one	part	of	India	(Sheth,	2014).	The	author	suggested	that	the	insurance	may	reduce	the	consumption	and	expenditure	of	health	care	which	may	be	an	indication	of	improved	health	status	of	the	insured.	However,	the	author	does	not	explore	the	possibility	of	low	quality	services	that	has	been	suggested	in	other	CBHI	evaluation	studies	(Robyn	et	al.,	2012;	Raza	et	al.,	2016).	It	is	at	least	conceivable	that	the	insured	decided	not	to	use	any	formal	health	care	services	and	turned	to	traditional	medicine	which	is	still	widely	used	in	India	(Payyappallimana,	2010).			I	also	have	found	that	there	is	less	clear	evidence	to	indicate	a	positive	effect	of	health	insurance	on	financial	protection,	echoing	the	findings	from	previous	reviews	(Acharya	et	al.,	2012;	Giedion	et	al.,	2012).	Restricting	the	evidence	base	to	the	small	subset	of	randomised	studies,	the	effects	on	financial	protection	appear	more	consistently	positive,	i.e.	three	cluster	randomised	studies	(Levine,	Polimeni	and	Ramage,	2016;	Grogger	et	al.,	2015;	Fink	et	al.,	2013)	showed	a	decline	in	OOP	expenditure	and	one	randomised	study	(Raza	et	al.,	2016)	found	no	significant	effect.			
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Besides	the	impact	on	utilisation	and	financial	protection,	this	review	identified	a	number	of	good	quality	studies	measuring	the	impact	of	health	insurance	on	health	outcomes.	Twelve	studies	were	identified	(i.e.	twice	as	many	as	Acharya’s	review),	nine	of	which	showed	a	beneficial	health	effect.	This	holds	for	the	subset	of	papers	with	stronger	methodology	for	tackling	selection	bias	(Levine,	Polimeni	and	Ramage,	2016;	Camacho	and	Conover,	2013;	Miller,	Pinto	and	Vera-Hernandez,	2013;	Quimbo	et	al.,	2011).	However,	Acharya	et	al.	(2012)	did	not	report	any	paper	showing	adverse	health	impacts,	I	identified	one	such	study	that	also	applied	a	particularly	strong	method	(i.e.	a	clustered	randomised	trial	of	the	rollout	of	the	CBHI	in	Burkina	Faso	(Fink	et	al.,	2013).	This	study	attributed	the	increased	mortality	among	the	elderly	in	the	insured	population	to	the	negative	incentives	embedded	in	the	capitation	payment	system,	arguing	that	it	may	have	upset	the	providers	by	taking	away	their	regular	income	from	user	charges	and	consequently	delivering	worse	quality	of	services.			In	cases	where	a	health	insurance	programme	does	not	have	a	positive	effect	on	either	utilisation,	financial	protection,	and	health	status,	it	is	particularly	important	to	understand	the	underlying	reasons	which	will	be	discussed	below.		
 Possible	explanation	of	heterogeneity		
1. Payment	system	Heterogeneity	of	the	impact	of	health	insurance	may	be	explained	by	differences	in	health	systems	and/or	health	insurance	programmes.	Robyn	et	al.	(2012)	and	Fink	et	al	(2013)	argued	that	the	lack	of	significant	effect	of	insurance	in	Burkina	Faso	may	have	been	partially	influenced	by	the	capitation	payment	system.	As	the	health	workers	relied	heavily	on	user	fees	for	their	income,	the	change	of	payment	system	from	fee-for-services	to	capitation	may	have	discouraged	provision	of	high	quality	services.	If	enrolees	perceive	the	quality	of	contracted	providers	as	bad,	they	might	delay	seeking	treatment,	which	in	turn	could	impact	negatively	on	health.			
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Several	studies	from	China	found	the	utilisation	of	expensive	treatment	and	higher-level	health	care	facilities	to	have	increased	following	the	introduction	of	the	insurance	scheme	(Cheng	et	al.,	2015;	Yang	and	Wu,	2015;	Liu	and	Zhao,	2014;	Lu,	Liu	and	Shen,	2012)	.	A	fee-for-service	payment	system	may	have	incentivised	providers	to	include	more	expensive	treatments	(	Yang	and	Wu,	2015;	Hou	et	al.,	2014;	Liu,	Wu	and	Liu,	2014).	Recent	systematic	reviews	suggested	that	payment	systems	might	play	a	key	role	in	determining	the	success	of	insurance	schemes	(Eijkenaar	et	al.,	2013;	Robyn	et	al.,	2013),	but	this	evidence	is	not	too	strong,	as	most	of	the	included	studies	were	observational	studies	not	controlling	for	selection	bias	sufficiently.				
2. Uncovered	essential	item	Sood	et	al.	(2014)	found	no	statistically	significant	effect	of	community-based	health	insurance	on	utilisation	in	India.	They	argued	that	this	could	be	caused	by	their	inability	to	specify	the	medical	conditions	covered	by	the	insurance,	causing	dilution	of	a	potential	true	effect.	In	other	countries,	transportation	costs	(Nguyen,	2012)	and	treatments	that	were	not	covered	by	the	insurance	(Alkenbrack	and	Lindelow,	2015;	Sparrow,	Suryahadi	and	Widyanti,	2013)	may	explain	the	absence	of	a	reduction	in	out-of-pocket	health	expenditures.		
3. Methodological	differences	Two	studies	in	Georgia	evaluated	the	same	programme	but	with	different	conclusions	(Zoidze	et	al.,	2013;	Hou	and	Chao,	2011).	This	discrepancy	may	be	explained	by	the	difference	in	the	estimated	treatment	effect:	one	used	average	treatment	effect	(ATE),	finding	no	effect,	and	another	used	average	treatment	effect	on	the	treated	(ATT),	reporting	a	positive	effect.	ATE	is	of	prime	interest	when	policymakers	are	interested	in	scaling	up	the	programme,	whereas	ATT	is	useful	to	measure	the	effect	on	people	who	were	actually	exposed	to	insurance	(Loi	and	Rodrigues,	2012).					
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4. Duration	of	health	insurance	I	also	found	that	the	longer	an	insurance	programme	has	been	in	place	prior	to	the	timing	of	the	evaluation,	the	higher	the	odds	of	improved	health	outcomes.	It	is	plausible	that	health	insurance	would	not	change	the	health	status	of	population	instantly	upon	implementation	(Giedion	et	al.,	2013).	While	there	may	be	an	appetite	among	policymakers	to	obtain	favourable	short	term	assessments,	it	will	be	important	to	compare	the	impact	over	time,	where	feasible.			
 Moral	hazard	Acharya	et	al	(2012)	raised	an	important	question	about	the	possibility	of	a	moral	hazard	effect	as	an	unintended	consequence	of	introducing	(or	expanding)	health	insurance	in	LMIC.	I	found	seven	studies	exploring	ex-ante	moral	hazard	by	estimating	the	effect	on	preventive	care.	If	uninsured	individuals	expect	to	be	covered	in	the	future,	they	may	reduce	the	consumption	of	preventive	care	or	put	less	investment	on	healthy	behaviours	(de	Preux,	2011;	Dave	and	Kaestner,	2009).	The	overall	evidence	cannot	suggest	a	definite	conclusion	considering	the	heterogeneity	in	chosen	outcomes.	One	study	found	that	the	use	of	a	self-treated	bed	nets	to	prevent	malaria	has	declined	among	the	insured	group	in	Ghana	(Yilma,	Van	Kempen	and	De	Hoop,	2012)	while	two	studies	reported	an	increase	in	vaccination	rate	(Bernal,	Carpio	and	Klein,	2014)	and	the	number	of	prenatal	care	visits	(Abrokwah,	Moser	and	Norton,	2014;	Bernal,	Carpio	and	Klein,	2014)	among	the	insured	group.	Meanwhile,	another	study	reported	no	evidence	that	health	insurance	encouraged	unhealthy	behaviour	or	reduction	of	preventive	efforts	in	Thailand	(Ghislandi,	Manachotphong	and	Perego,	2015).			Two	studies	from	Colombia	found	that	the	insured	group	is	more	likely	to	increase	their	demand	for	preventive	treatment	(Miller,	Pinto	and	Vera-Hernandez,	2013;	Trujillo	et	al.,	2010).	As	preventive	treatment	is	free	for	all,	both	authors	attributed	this	increased	demand	to	the	scheme’s	capitation	system,	incentivising	providers	to	promote	preventive	care	to	avoid	future	costly	treatments	(Peckham	and	Disclaimer,	2014).	Another	study	in	Colombia,	however,	found	an	opposite	effect	but	this	study	
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looked	into	a	different	health	insurance	programme	in	Colombia	(Hassan,	Jimenez	and	Montoya,	2013).			
 Type	of	insurance	In	my	inclusion	criteria,	I	distinguished	two	type	of	health	insurance	based	on	how	it	is	financed:	social	health	insurance	(SHI)	and	community	based	health	insurance	(CBHI).	Among	the	included	studies,	I	found	13	studies	about	CBHI	and	two	of	them	are	able	to	utilize	cluster	randomized	study.	Also,	there	are	40	studies	studying	SHI	but	only	one	study	using	cluster	randomized	study.	When	the	studies	are	grouped	based	on	CBHI	and	SHI,	there	is	only	slightly	different	pattern	seen	in	financial	protection	and	health	outcome.	Similar	pattern	of	overall	positive	effect	on	utilisation	can	be	observed	for	both	groups.	CBHI	tends	to	show	more	favourable	effect	on	financial	protection;	in	fact,	all	studies	reporting	unfavourable	effect	are	in	SHI	group	only.	However,	only	CBHI	group	that	has	one	study	reporting	negative	effect	on	health	outcome.	It	does	not	mean	that	one	system	is	better	than	the	other	one.	As	I	have	discussed	it	earlier,	the	choice	of	provider	payment	system	may	play	more	distinctive	role	in	determining	the	success	of	the	scheme	in	decreasing	out-of-pocket	health	expenditure.		
	
 Study	limitations	This	review	includes	a	large	variety	of	study	designs	and	indicators	for	assessing	the	multiple	potential	impacts	of	health	insurance,	making	it	hard	to	directly	compare	and	aggregate	findings.	For	those	studies	that	used	a	control	group,	the	use	of	self-selected	controls	in	many	cases	may	have	biased	the	results.	Second,	for	a	better	understanding	of	the	channels	between	health	insurance	and	relevant	outcomes,	there	is	a	need	to	go	beyond	quantitative	evidence	alone,	and	combine	the	quantitative	findings	with	qualitative	insights.	This	is	particularly	important	when	trying	to	interpret	some	of	the	counterintuitive	results	encountered	in	some	studies.			
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Section	5.5 	Conclusion		Despite	heterogeneity	of	the	studies	in	this	review,	the	impact	of	different	health	insurance	schemes	in	many	countries	on	utilisation	generally	shows	a	positive	effect.	This	is	aligned	with	the	supply-demand	theory	in	which	the	health	insurance	decreases	the	price	of	health	care	services	resulting	in	increased	demand.	Nevertheless,	given	the	differences	in	findings	between	studies,	it	is	difficult	to	draw	an	overall	conclusion	about	the	impact	of	health	insurance	on	financial	protection.	Furthermore,	the	impact	on	health	status	suggests	a	promising	positive	effect,	but	more	studies	from	different	countries	are	required.	In	the	next	chapter,	drawing	from	the	studies	identified	from	this	chapter	I	will	explore	the	impact	evaluation	methods	that	have	been	applied	to	estimate	the	causal	relationship	of	health	insurance.	This	method	review	is	important	as	a	guide	for	me	to	choose	the	most	appropriate	method	to	evaluate	the	JKN	programme	in	Indonesia.			 	
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Chapter	6 	Methods	for	evaluating	health	insurance	
programmes	
Section	6.1 	Introduction		This	chapter	reviews	the	methods	for	measuring	the	impact	of	health	insurance	programmes	on	access	to	health	care,	financial	protection	and	health	outcomes.	I	will	begin	by	discussing	common	regression	approaches	to	dealing	with	non-normally	distributed	outcomes	variables:	binary	outcomes	(for	example,	whether	a	person	had	any	outpatient	visits	in	the	past	4	weeks	or	the	proportion	of	hypertensive	people	who	had	their	blood	pressure	controlled),	count	data	(for	example,	number	of	doctor	visits)	and	expenditure	data.	Since	the	rollout	of	the	JKN	programme	was	not	randomised,	a	linear	regression	model	is	not	sufficient	to	estimate	the	treatment	effect	due	to	selection	bias.	I	will	briefly	discuss	the	concept	of	selection	bias	in	health	insurance	and	several	alternative	statistical	methods	for	controlling	selection	bias,	drawing	upon	the	evidence	from	existing	health	insurance	evaluation	studies	identified	in	Chapter	5.			
Section	6.2 	Regression	methods	for	non-normally	distributed	
variables	
 Binary	variables	The	linear	regression	model	can	be	extended	to	include	a	binary	variable	as	its	dependent	variable.	This	is	called	a	linear	probability	model	(LPM)	because	the	response	probability	is	still	linear	in	the	parameter	of	covariates.	Assuming	that	we	have	a	binary	dependent	variable	y	=	1	if	it	is	a	success	and	y	=	0	if	it	is	a	failure:	x	=	independent	variable	as	a	covariate;	a	=	the	intercept;	b	=	the	slope	of	the	covariate;	and	e	=	the	error	term,	we	can	write	a	simple	regression	model:	
Equation	6-1	 ! = 	$ + 	&' + (			
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Thus,	the	interpretation	of	b	in	Equation	6-1	is	the	predicted	change	in	the	probability	of	success	when	x	changes	by	one	unit.	However,	LPM	has	mainly	two	disadvantages:	the	predicted	probability	of	y	is	not	bounded	between	zero	and	one,	and	the	partial	effects	of	any	covariate	are	constant	(Wooldridge,	2013).	To	overcome	this	limitation,	we	can	use	the	binary	response	model.	In	a	binary	response	model,	it	is	assumed	that	the	value	of	y	is	motivated	by	a	latent	continuous	variable	(y*)	which	is	unobservable	(see	Eq.	6-2).	The	primary	objective	is	to	explain	the	effects	of	the	independent	variables	(x)	on	the	response	probability	P	(y	=	1|x),	which	can	be	estimated	by	specifying	a	distribution	function	bounded	between	zero	and	one,	such	as	normal	distribution	(i.e.	the	probit	model)	or	logistic	distribution	(i.e.	the	logit	model)	(Jones,	2007).			
Equation	6-2	 !∗ = 	$ + 	&' + (;	where	! = 	1	+,	!∗ > 0,	or	zero	otherwise	
Equation	6-3	 /	(! = 1|') = /(!∗ > 0|') = 	3($ + 	&')		Both	the	logit	and	probit	models	are	fairly	symmetrical	but	the	logit	model	is	more	sensitive	to	the	extreme	value	that	the	conditional	probability	approaches	0	or	1	at	a	slower	rate	in	logit	than	in	probit	(Gujarati,	2011).	In	their	application,	LPM,	logit	and	probit	models	often	lead	to	a	similar	conclusion	(Aldrich	and	Nelson,	1984).	However,	LPM	should	not	be	used	if	we	are	interested	in	obtaining	a	prediction	and	more	caution	is	warranted	if	we	wish	to	give	the	correct	interpretation	of	the	interaction	term	in	either	probit	or	logit	(Ai	and	Norton,	2003).			The	choice	between	logit	and	probit	has	been	discussed	elsewhere	(Eugene	and	Refik,	2005).	While	LPM	has	more	intuitive	and	easier	to	interpret,	the	interpretation	for	logit	and	probit	should	be	done	more	carefully	to	avoid	misleading	conclusions	(Hoetker,	2007).	Firstly,	the	slope’s	coefficient	no	longer	has	a	marginal	effect	interpretation.	It	is	advisable	to	calculate	the	partial	effect	at	the	average	(PEA)	which	is	the	marginal	effect	at	the	mean	of	covariates	(Wooldridge,	2013),	but	this	is	not	an	
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average	effect.	Other	alternatives	are	to	calculate	the	average	partial	effect	(APE)	which	is	defined	as	the	response	for	each	observation	and	the	average	of	those	responses	(Train,	1986;	Wooldridge,	2013)	or	to	calculate	the	effect	for	several	sets	of	relevant	values	of	the	variables	(Hoetker,	2007).	As	a	rough	guide	to	comparing	the	coefficient	in	probit,	logit	and	LPM,	we	can	multiply	the	probit	coefficients	by	1.6,	or	multiply	the	logit	estimates	by	0.625.	Secondly,	comparisons	of	logit	and	probit	across	groups	are	not	straightforward	because	the	residual	variances	differ	across	groups	(Allison,	1999).	It	is	advisable	to	correctly	adjust	the	slope	coefficients	to	consider	the	residual	differences	(Allison,	1999)	or	to	use	heterogeneous	choice	models	(Williams,	2009).	Lastly,	probit	and	logit	do	not	have	a	goodness	to	fit	property	directly	related	to	the	R-squared	as	the	LPM	does	(Hoetker,	2007).	In	conjunction,	there	are	many	choices	of	Pseudo-R-squared	which	have	been	developed	to	mimic	the	nice	property	of	R-squared	(Wooldridge,	2013).	To	summarise,	in	application	we	can	run	the	three	models	but	compare	the	findings	with	caution.	As	Aldrich	and	Nelson	(1984,	p.	79)	argued,	there	is	no	superior	choice	between	probit	and	logit:			
“The	assumptions	that	underlie	either	probit	or	logit,	beyond	that	specifying	the	
relation	between	the	mean	of	Y	and	X,	are	really	quite	similar	to,	and	no	more	
restrictive	than,	the	remaining	Gauss-Markov	assumptions	in	OLS	regression.	Thus,	the	
use	of	probit	or	logit	is	no	more	restrictive	than	is	OLS	in	the	general	linear	model.”		
 Count	data		As	is	often	the	case	in	public	health	research,	a	continuous	variable	may	not	always	follow	a	normal	distribution.	A	special	case	of	this	variable	is	called	count	data,	where	the	variable	contains	a	large	mass	of	zeros	and	a	right-skewed	distribution	(Jones,	2007).	For	example,	in	measuring	the	intensity	of	health	care	utilisation	we	can	use	the	number	of	outpatient	or	inpatient	visits	within	a	certain	period	of	time.	This	variable	may	contain	many	zero	values	indicating	no	use	of	care,	which	is	quite	prevalent	in	developing	countries,	and	have	a	few	very	high	values,	pulling	the	mean	to	the	right.	Problematically,	log	transformation,	which	is	a	common	approach	to	transforming	continuous	variables	to	get	as	close	to	normal	distribution	as	possible,	
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cannot	be	applied	to	this	variable	as	it	contains	many	zero	values.	Therefore,	it	is	necessary	to	model	the	expected	value	as	an	exponential	function	and	find	the	correct	distribution	(Wooldridge,	2013).	The	most	common	distribution	for	count	data	regression	is	Poisson	distribution.	Other	count	data	distributions	are	widely	available,	but	if	we	are	only	interested	in	estimating	the	mean	effects,	the	Poisson	model	is	often	adequate	(Wooldridge,	2013).	If	we	are	interested	in	estimating	the	probabilities,	the	excess	number	of	zeros	and	over-dispersion	issues	need	to	be	considered	when	choosing	the	most	appropriate	distribution	(Jones,	2007).		The	negative	binomial	model	can	be	used	to	relax	the	equal	dispersion	property	of	Poisson	distribution.	The	zero-inflated	model	adds	an	additional	probability	of	observing	zero	by	avoiding	the	assumption	of	the	same	mean	function	for	all	responses.	Alternatively,	it	is	possible	to	separate	the	probability	functions	into	the	decision	to	participate	and	the	positive	values	of	the	count	data	by	using	the	Hurdle	model.	An	effective	framework	for	selecting	econometric	techniques	for	modelling	the	relationships	between	health	insurance	and	count	data	variables	is	discussed	elsewhere	(Hidayat	and	Pokhrel,	2010;	Cameron	and	Trivedi,	2010),	but	generally	none	of	the	above	models	are	appropriate	in	the	presence	of	endogeneity.	The	Poisson	model	is	therefore	adequate	for	exploring	count	data	variables	(for	example,	the	number	of	outpatient	or	inpatient	visits	in	Chapter	7)	before	moving	to	a	more	sophisticated	analysis.			
 Health	expenditure			When	analysing	health	care	expenditure	with	a	large	proportion	of	zeros,	a	common	problem	is	the	difference	between	the	actual	outcome	and	the	potential	outcome.	The	actual	outcome	is	a	fully-observed	variable.	Zero	values	for	actual	health	expenditure	implies	that	zero	costs	were	spent.	These	actual	zero	values	can	be	seen	as	corner	solutions	because	individuals	cannot	have	negative	health	expenditures	(Cameron	and	Trivedi,	2010).	If	many	observations	have	zero	expenditures,	then	the	econometric	challenge	is	to	model	these	corner	solutions.		
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	In	contrast,	the	potential	outcome	is	a	latent	variable	that	is	only	partially	observed.	The	non-zero	values	are	assumed	to	be	true	observations	of	the	potential	outcome,	but	zero	values	indicate	observations	for	which	the	potential	outcome	is	missing	(latent).	The	zeros	do	not	represent	zero	values	for	the	potential	outcome.	One	possible	interpretation	of	potential	health	expenditure	is	that	for	a	person	with	zero	actual	expenditure,	there	is	a	latent	positive	expected	expenditure	that	would	have	been	incurred	if	the	person	had	sought	any	health	care	(Dow	and	Norton,	2003).	This	is	often	called	a	care-seeking	selection.	For	example,	if	a	person	with	zero	actual	expenditure	had	been	examined	by	a	doctor,	the	doctor’s	perception	of	unmet	health	care	needs	could	have	led	to	procedures	costing	a	sum	of	money.	In	this	case,	the	latent	potential	expenditure	would	be	positive,	instead	of	zero	as	in	the	actual	expenditure.			There	are	myriad	models	available	for	the	analysis	of	health	expenditure,	but	it	is	important	to	be	clear	about	whether	we	are	interested	in	actual	outcomes	or	potential	outcomes.	In	this	thesis,	health	expenditure	is	assumed	to	be	a	potential	outcome	because	access	to	health	care	is	not	universal,	and	financial	barriers	to	seeking	care	are	still	very	important	in	Indonesia,	compared	to	developed	countries	where	much	of	the	health	expenditure	literature	favours	actual	outcomes	(Dow	and	Norton,	2003).	It	is	more	plausible	in	Indonesia	to	state	that	once	people	seek	care,	they	are	more	likely	to	spend	money	to	pay	for	clinic	or	hospital	fees	and	prescription	fees.			A	two-part	model	(2PM)	can	be	used	to	analyse	health	expenditure	with	care-seeking	selection	by	assuming	that	the	care-seeking	mechanism	and	the	amount	of	money	spent	for	health	care	may	be	modelled	using	two	separate	processes	(Duan	et	al.,	1984).	In	other	words,	it	permits	the	zeros	and	non-zeros	to	be	generated	using	a	different	model.	The	zeros	are	typically	handled	using	a	model	for	the	probability	of	a	positive	outcome.	For	instance,	in	explaining	individual	OOP	health	expenses,	the	first	part	determines	the	probability	of	non-zero	expenditure,	while	the	second	part	models	the	positive	expenditures.	This	model,	therefore,	is	able	to	decompose	the	
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effect	into	the	part	attributable	to	individuals	starting	to	participate	(called	extensive	margin),	and	the	part	attributable	to	already	participating	individuals	(called	intensive	margin)	(Staub,	2014).			Estimating	the	parameters	of	the	two-part	model	is	straightforward.	The	first	part	representing	the	probability	of	observing	positive	outcomes	is	modelled	using	a	regression	model	for	binary	outcomes	such	as	probit	or	logit.	Next,	the	positive	outcomes	are	modelled	using	a	regression	framework	for	a	continuous	outcome;	for	example,	they	can	be	modelled	using	OLS	regression	or	a	generalized	linear	model	(GLM).	The	error	terms	in	the	two	equations	do	not	need	to	be	independent	to	get	consistent	estimates.	While	it	is	common	to	use	log	transformation	for	analysing	positive	health	care	expenditure	due	to	the	expenditure’s	highly-skewed	distribution,	this	specification	does	not	always	perform	well.	An	empirical	paper	studying	the	performance	of	the	various	specifications	for	health	care	costs	has	shown	that	the	regression	on	log	costs	and	the	generalised	linear	model	(GLM)	with	a	log	link	perform	poorly	according	to	the	link	test	and	the	Copas	test	(Jones,	2011).	The	poor	performance	of	regression	on	log	costs	has	been	echoed	by	other	authors	using	different	datasets	but	similar	performance	criteria	(Hill	and	Miller,	2010;	Deb	and	Burgess,	2003).	Furthermore,	using	log-transformed	costs	and	applying	Duan’s	smearing	estimator	is	susceptible	to	bias	if	the	error	term	on	the	log	scale	is	heteroscedastic	(Jones,	2011).			More	recently,	researchers	have	used	the	GLM	framework	to	model	positive	health	expenditure	using	a	nonlinear	transformation	of	a	linear	index	function	directly	(Jones,	2011).	Generalised	Linear	Models	(GLMs)	have	become	the	dominant	approach	to	modelling	health	care	costs	in	the	literature	when	there	are	unknown	forms	of	heteroscedasticity	(Jones,	2011;	Buntin	and	Zaslavsky,	2004;	Manning	and	Mullahy,	2001;	Mullahy,	1998).	These	models	specify	a	distribution	function	(for	example,	Gamma,	Poisson	or	Gaussian)	that	reflects	the	relationship	between	the	variance	and	the	raw-scale	mean	functions	and	a	link	function	that	relates	the	conditional	mean	of	medical	costs	to	the	covariates.	GLM	estimates	are	performed	on	the	raw	medical	cost	scale,	so	there	is	no	need	for	retransformation	as	is	the	case	
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with	log	transformation	in	OLS.	Another	advantage	is	that	this	approach	allows	for	heteroscedasticity	through	the	choice	of	the	distribution	function	(Mora,	Gil	and	Sicras-Mainar,	2015).	It	is	important	to	note	that	in	the	analysis	of	health	expenditure,	GLM	is	applied	to	model	non-zero	expenditure	excluding	the	zeros	because	GLM	is	used	to	model	the	second	part	of	the	two-part	model.		
Section	6.3 Selection	bias		Programme	evaluation	has	been	of	interest	to	many	researchers	for	reporting	on	the	effectiveness	of	a	public	policy	to	policymakers.	In	theory,	programme	evaluation	has	a	similar	motivation	to	medical	treatment	research.	The	fundamental	difference	between	those	two	lies	in	how	the	causal	relationship	can	be	inferred	from	the	evidence.	The	gold	standard	for	medical	research	is	the	randomised	control	trial,	in	which	the	treatment	is	randomly	assigned	to	the	participants.	For	example,	in	a	drug	trial,	patients	are	randomised	into	one	of	the	groups;	one	group	is	given	a	trial	treatment	and	another	group	is	assigned	to	receive	a	placebo	or	usual	treatment.	The	treatment	assignment	process	has	to	be	exogenous	to	ensure	that	any	observed	effect	between	the	treated	and	control	groups	can	only	be	caused	by	the	difference	in	the	treatment	assignment.	Unfortunately,	this	ideal	scenario	is	often	not	feasible	in	a	public	policy	setting.	According	to	the	updated	review	in	Chapter	5,	within	the	last	five	years	there	have	been	only	three	papers	which	have	been	able	to	conduct	a	randomised	study	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	health	insurance	programmes	in	developing	countries	(Quimbo	et	al.,	2011;	Robyn	et	al.,	2012;	Fink	et	al.,	2013;).	The	overview	in	Chapter	4	also	identified	a	limited	number	of	papers	as	well	(Gnawali	et	al.,	2009;	King	et	al.,	2009;	Kraft	et	al.,	2009;	Thornton	et	al.,	2010).	Policymakers	may	believe	in	the	value	of	an	intervention	regardless	of	its	actual	evidence	base,	or	they	may	believe	that	the	intervention	is	beneficial	and	that	no	one	in	need	should	be	denied	it.	In	addition,	policymakers	are	inclined	to	demonstrate	the	effectiveness	of	an	intervention	that	they	want	implemented	in	the	most	promising	contexts,	as	opposed	to	random	allocation	(Bonell	et	al.,	2011).				Consequently,	most	programme	evaluators	often	have	to	deal	with	a	non-randomised	treatment	assignment	which	may	result	in	a	selection	bias	problem.	Selection	bias	
		 132	
can	be	defined	as	the	spurious	relationship	between	the	treatment	and	the	outcome	of	interest	due	to	the	systematic	differences	between	the	treated	and	the	control	groups	(Wooldridge,	2013).	In	the	case	of	health	insurance,	an	individual	who	chooses	to	enrol	in	the	scheme	may	have	different	characteristics	to	an	individual	who	chooses	not	to	enrol.	For	example,	sicker	people	are	more	motivated	to	enrol	because	they	have	predicted	that	the	benefit	of	enrolling	outweighs	the	cost.	In	the	context	of	Indonesia,	the	JKN	programme	requires	the	potential	enrolees	to	pay	for	the	premium.	This	exhibits	the	classic	adverse	selection	issue	in	insurance	in	which	people	who	choose	to	enrol	are	more	likely	to	have	more	health	problems	and	use	more	medical	care.	Poor	people	are	eligible	to	receive	subsidies	and	their	eligibility	is	determined	by	the	proxy	means	test.	This	implies	that	the	beneficiary	of	the	subsidy	was	not	given	the	choice	to	enrol	or	not.	However,	selection	bias	can	still	exist	due	to	the	fact	that	the	list	of	eligible	individuals	may	be	contaminated;	non-poor	people	may	receive	the	subsidy.	Individuals	who	are	influential	in	the	community,	for	example,	the	relatives	of	a	local	community	leader,	could	persuade	the	local	officials	responsible	for	the	verification	of	the	eligibility	list	to	include	their	names	on	the	list.	Thus,	any	confounding	factors	that	are	able	to	affect	both	the	treatment	decision	and	the	outcome	of	interest	need	to	be	minimised	to	estimate	an	unbiased	treatment	effect.	In	general,	omitting	observable	factors	could	be	solved	by	identifying	such	factors	within	our	data	and	including	them	in	our	model.	However,	controlling	unobservable	factors	requires	more	advanced	techniques	and,	sometimes,	stronger	assumptions.	Based	on	the	updated	review	in	Chapter	6,	various	methods	are	quite	popular	among	the	health	insurance	evaluation	studies,	including	propensity	score	matching	(N	=	8),	difference-in-difference	(N	=10),	fixed	or	random	effects	of	panel	data	(N	=	6),	instrumental	variables	(N	=	12)	and	regression	discontinuity	(N	=	6).	In	addition,	some	papers	also	employ	a	combination	of	two	methods,	such	as	difference-in-difference	with	propensity	score	matching	(N	=	10)	and	fixed	effect	with	instrumental	variables	(N	=	8).			In	the	next	section,	statistical	methods	for	controlling	either	observable	or	unobservable	factors	are	explained	in	more	detail	and	their	applicability	in	the	Indonesian	context	will	also	be	discussed.	Since	there	are	many	possible	statistical	methods	in	the	literature,	this	section	will	limit	its	scope	to	the	range	of	common	
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methods	found	in	the	evaluation	of	health	insurance	programmes,	as	summarised	in	Table	6-1.		
Table	6-1	Summary	of	The	Included	Studies	from	the	Updated	Review	(N	=	68)	
Study	 Year	 Method†	 Type	of	Data	1.	Propensity	score	matching	(N	=	8)	Koch	and	Alaba	 2010	 Propensity	score	matching	 Cross-section	Blanchet	et	al	 2012	 Propensity	score	matching	 Cross-section	Robyn	et	al	 2012	 Propensity	score	matching	 Cross-section	Avilla-Burgos	et	al	 2013	 Propensity	score	matching	 Cross-section	Nguyen	 2014	 Propensity	score	matching	 Cross-section	Alkenrack	and	Lindelow	 2015	 Propensity	score	matching	 Cross-section	Makhloufi	et	al	 2015	 Propensity	score	matching	 Cross-section	Liao,	Gilmour	and	Shibuya		 2015	 Propensity	score	matching	 Cross-section	2.	Fixed	effect,	random	effect	or	difference-in-difference	(N	=	16)	Babiarz	et	al	 2010	 Difference-in-difference	 Repeated	cross-section		Quimbo	et	al	 2011	 Difference-in-difference	 Randomised	Sosa-Rubi,	Salinas-Rodriguez	and	Galarraga	 2011	 Difference-in-difference	 Panel	Data	Jing	et	al	 2013	 Difference-in-difference	 Repeated	cross-section		Nguyen	and	Wang	 2013	 Difference-in-difference	 Panel	Data	Zoidze	et	al	 2013	 Difference-in-difference	 Repeated	cross-section		Hendriks	et	al	 2014	 Difference-in-difference	 Panel	Data	Sheth	 2014	 Difference-in-difference	 Panel	Data	Yuan	et	al	 2014	 Difference-in-difference	 Panel	Data	Gotsadze	et	al	 2015	 Difference-in-difference	 Repeated	cross-section		Panpiemras	et	al	 2011	 Fixed	effect	 Panel	Data	Robyn	et	al	 2012	 Fixed	effect	 Randomised	Grogger	et	al	 2015	 Fixed	effect	 Panel	Data	Yilma	et	al.	 2015	 Fixed	effect	 Panel	Data	Nguyen	 2016	 Fixed	effect	 Panel	Data	Sepehri	et	al	 2011	 Random	effect	 Panel	Data	3.	Instrumental	variables	(N	=	12)	Trujillo	et	al	 2010	 Instrumental	variables	 Cross-section	Lu,	Liu	and	Shen	 2012	 Instrumental	variables	 Cross-section	Wirtz	et	al	 2012	 Instrumental	variables	 Cross-section	Cheung	and	Padieu	 2013	 Instrumental	variables	 Repeated	cross-section		Fink	et	al	 2013	 Instrumental	variables	 Randomised	Hassan	et	al	 2013	 Instrumental	variables	 Cross-section	Chen	et	al	 2014	 Instrumental	variables	 Repeated	cross-section		Brugiavini	and	Pace	 2015	 Instrumental	variables	 cross-section	Levine,	Polimeni	and	Ramage	 2016	 Instrumental	variables	 Cross-section	Raza	et	al.		 2016	 Instrumental	variables	 Cross-section	
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Galarraga	et	al	 2010	 Instrumental	variables	and	two	stage	residual	inclusion	 Panel	Data	Lu	et	al	 2012	 Instrumental	variables	and	two	stage	residual	inclusion	 Cross-section		4.	Regression	discontinuity	(N	=	6)	Hou	and	Chao	 2011	 Regression	discontinuity	 Administrative	Data	Camacho	and	Conover	 2013	 Regression	discontinuity	 Administrative	Data	Miller	et	al	 2013	 Regression	discontinuity	 Cross-section	Bernal	et	al.		 2014	 Regression	discontinuity	 Cross-section	Sood	et	al	 2014	 Regression	discontinuity	 Repeated	cross-section		Palmer	 2015	 Regression	discontinuity	 Cross-section				5.	Combination	(N	=	19)	Chen	and	Jin	 2012	 DID	-	PSM	 Repeated	cross-section		Fan	et	al	 2012	 DID	-	PSM	 Repeated	cross-section		Nguyen	 2012	 DID	-	PSM	 Panel	Data	Sparrow	et	al	 2013	 DID	-	PSM	 Panel	Data	Bai	and	Wu	 2014	 DID	-	PSM	 Panel	Data	Guindon	 2014	 DID	-	PSM	 Panel	Data	Cheng	et	al	 2015	 DID	-	PSM	 Panel	Data	Ghislandi,	Manachotphong	and	Perego	 2015	 DID	-	PSM	 Repeated	cross-section		Yang	and	Wu	 2015	 DID	-	PSM	 Panel	Data	Yilma	et	al	 2015	 DID	-	PSM	 Panel	Data	Limwattananon	et	al	 2015	 DID	and	quintile	regression	 Repeated	cross-section		Peng	and	Conley		 2015	 FE	and	IV	 Panel	Data	Dhillon	et	al	 2012	 FE	with	IV		 Panel	Data	Parmar	et	al	 2012	 FE	with	IV		 Panel	Data	Aji	et	al	 2013	 FE	with	IV		 Panel	Data	Liu	and	Zhao	 2014	 FE	with	IV		 Panel	Data	Jung	and	Streeter	 2015	 FE	with	IV		 Panel	Data	Aryeetey	et	al.	 2016	 FE	with	IV		 Repeated	cross-section		Rivera-Hernandez		 2016	 FE	with	IV		 Panel	Data	6.	Other	methods	(N	=	7)	Atella,	Brugiavini	and	Pace	 2015	 Finite	Mixture	Model		 Repeated	cross-section		Fenny	et	al	 2015	 Multinomial	Logit	 Cross-section	Liu,	Wu,	and	Liu	 2014	 Structural	equation	modelling	 Cross-section	Hou	et	al	 2014	 Two-part	model	 Repeated	cross-section		Abrokwah	et	al	 2014	 Two-part	model		 Cross-section	Pfutze	 2014	 Weighted	Exogenous	Sampling	Max	Likelihood	 Cross-section	Pfutze	 2014	 Weighted	Exogenous	Sampling	Max	Likelihood	 Repeated	cross-section				
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Section	6.4 	Methods	for	controlling	selection	on	observables	
 Linear	regression			The	linear	regression	model	can	produce	estimates	that	can	have	a	causal	interpretation	if	the	treatment	variable	is	randomly	assigned	(Angrist	and	Pischke,	2008)	.	In	observational	data,	it	is	also	possible	to	obtain	a	causal	effect	if	the	selection	into	treatment	is	based	only	on	observable	factors	(Jones	and	Rice,	2011).	The	core	assumption	of	this	approach	is	that	while	the	selection	into	treatment	is	not	randomly	assigned,	it	should	be	assumed	that	the	selection	happens	independently	from	the	outcome	of	the	interest	conditional	on	observable	factors.	More	specifically,	whilst	conditional	on	the	observable	factors,	the	selection	into	treatment	should	be	independent	of	the	counterfactual	outcome,	which	is	defined	as	the	outcome	for	a	group	had	it	been	assigned	to	a	different	group.	This	is	often	called	the	conditional	independence	assumption	(CIA).	Coupled	with	the	additional	assumption	that	the	conditional	mean	of	the	counterfactual	outcome	is	a	linear	function	of	the	observable	factors,	the	standard	linear	regression	model	becomes	the	simplest	method	to	estimate	the	average	treatment	effect	on	the	treated	(ATT)	(Jones	and	Rice,	2011).	When	applied	to	health	care,	this	linearity	assumption	is	found	to	be	too	restrictive	due	to	many	of	the	outcome	variables	being	of	a	binary	variable	nature.	Even	when	the	outcome	variable	is	a	continuous	variable,	it	often	features	as	a	non-normal,	skewed	distribution,	as	in	the	case	of	health	expenditure	data	and	number	of	doctor	visits.	While	it	is	possible	to	transform	the	data,	the	resulting	estimate	does	not	come	with	the	original	scale	which	then	needs	to	be	rescaled	into	its	original	value.	This	is	complicated	by	the	difference	of	error	term	distribution	between	the	original	and	scaled	variables	(Duan,	1983).	To	avoid	this	retransformation	problem,	it	is	recommended	that	an	alternative	method	is	used,	such	as	the	generalised	linear	model	(GLM)	with	quasi-likelihood	estimation	or	propensity	score	matching	(PSM).	In	the	next	sub-section,	I	will	further	consider	the	role	of	PSM	as	an	alternative	non-linear	approach	to	dealing	with	non-normally	distributed	variables.			
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 Propensity	score	matching	(PSM)		Matching	can	solve	the	selection	on	the	observable	problem	by	ensuring	that	the	control	groups	have	similar	observable	characteristics,	except	for	the	different	treatment,	with	the	treated	group.	Exact	matching,	in	which	individuals	are	paired	directly	on	key	variables	of	interest,	is	possible	when	the	number	of	matched	variables	are	not	too	many.	Adding	more	matching	variables	can	increase	the	precision	of	exact	matching,	but	it	also	increases	the	possibility	of	excluding	patients	who	do	not	match,	further	reducing	sample	size	and	the	variability	of	the	patient	population	(Stuart,	2010).	Propensity	score	matching	is	a	technique	that	matches	the	control	and	treated	groups	on	the	basis	of	their	propensity	score,	the	probability	of	receiving	treatment.	Propensity	score	matching	can	help	to	reduce	the	dimensionality	problem	of	the	general	matching	technique	if	a	high	number	of	variables	needs	to	be	controlled	(Caliendo	and	Kopeinig,	2008).	In	the	context	of	this	thesis,	the	propensity	score	for	being	insured	can	be	constructed	as	a	function	of	observable	confounding	factors	using	non-linear	models,	such	as	probit	or	logit.	Thus,	insured	individuals	will	be	matched	with	the	control	individuals	who	have	a	similar	propensity	score	or	are	within	the	acceptable	range	of	scoring.			PSM	is	also	often	used	as	an	alternative	to	standard	regression	analysis	in	the	presence	of	a	transformed	outcome	variable.	It	is	also	more	straightforward	to	perform	a	robustness	check	of	PSM	compared	with	regression	adjustment.	Finally,	PSM	has	more	intuitive	appeal	in	relation	to	creating	groups	of	similar	treatment	and	control,	ultimately	making	it	easier	to	produce	an	explanation	for	non-technical	people	(Zanutto,	2006).		In	order	to	derive	a	treatment	effect	from	the	PSM	method,	there	are	two	important	assumptions	that	need	to	be	justified.	Firstly,	this	method	relies	on	the	conditional	independence	assumption	(CIA)	in	which	the	potential	outcomes	are	independent	of	the	treatment	status,	conditional	on	the	observed	characteristics	(Heinrich,	Maffioli	and	Vázquez,	2010).	It	means	that	the	counterfactual	effect	for	the	treated	can	be	inferred,	as	in	the	case	of	the	randomised	trial,	so	that	the	observed	change	in	
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outcome	between	the	treated	and	the	control	groups	can	be	attributed	to	the	effect	of	the	programme.	The	second	assumption	is	the	overlap	assumption,	in	which	the	individuals	have	a	chance	of	being	selected	for	either	the	treated	or	control	groups;	there	is	no	individual	who	is	impossible	to	be	in	any	group	(Heinrich	et	al.,	2010).	If	under	selected	observable	characteristics,	an	individual	can	only	be	in	one	group	and	not	in	another,	this	assumption	can	fail.	Both	assumptions	are	needed	to	identify	the	Average	Treatment	Effect	(ATE).	It	is	possible	to	use	a	weaker	version	of	both	assumptions,	but	this	will	only	allow	us	to	identify	the	Average	Treatment	on	Treated	(ATT).		Under	the	weaker	assumptions,	the	mean	of	the	distribution	of	the	potential	outcome	is	independent	of	the	treatment	status,	and	only	treated	individuals	are	required	to	have	a	chance	to	be	selected	into	either	the	treated	or	control	groups	(Faria	et	al.,	2015).	The	latter	implies	that	it	is	possible	to	select	control	groups	from	a	different	area	in	which	the	treatment	is	applied,	as	long	as	they	have	similar	observable	characteristics	with	the	treated	group.			In	the	application	of	PSM	in	an	empirical	study,	Dehejia	and	Wahba	(	2002)	identify	three	issues:	the	decision	to	match	with	or	without	replacement,	the	number	of	control	units	to	be	matched	with	the	treated	units,	and	the	matching	algorithm.	For	the	first	issue,	the	decision	depends	on	the	balance	between	reducing	bias	and	increasing	efficiency.	Matching	with	replacement	can	reduce	bias	by	ensuring	that	the	matched	control	group	has	a	similar	or	close	propensity	score	with	the	treated	group,	but	this	may	decrease	efficiency	since	the	matched	controls	are	no	longer	independent.	Meanwhile,	matching	without	replacement	may	increase	our	precision	by	ensuring	independence	among	matched	controls,	but	it	may	also	increase	bias	in	terms	of	the	low-quality	of	the	match	between	the	treated	and	control	units.		In	deciding	on	the	number	of	matches,	the	trade-off	between	bias	and	efficiency	should	also	be	considered.	By	choosing	one	single	unit,	we	can	reduce	the	bias,	but	choosing	multiple	units	may	increase	our	precision	of	the	estimates.	The	next	step	is	choosing	the	matching	algorithm.	The	simplest	method	is	nearest	neighbour	matching	with	a	ratio	of	1:1,	which	means	that	each	individual	in	the	treated	group	will	be	matched	with	an	individual	from	the	control	group	who	has	the	smallest	
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distance	of	propensity	score	from	the	treated	individual.	However,	this	method	can	create	a	bad	match	if	the	closest	neighbour	is	too	far	away.	We	can	impose	an	acceptable	range	(caliper)	on	the	propensity	score	for	a	control	group	that	is	allowed	to	be	selected	as	a	match;	this	method	is	called	caliper	matching.	It	implies	that	an	individual	from	the	control	group	is	chosen	as	a	matching	partner	for	a	treated	individual	who	lies	within	the	caliper	and	is	closest	in	terms	of	the	propensity	score,	but	the	decision	regarding	what	distance	is	appropriate	is	somewhat	arbitrary	(Caliendo,	2005).	Another	alternative	method	is	kernel	matching,	in	which	a	non-parametric	method	is	employed	to	determine	the	weighted	average	of	the	outcomes	of	all	of	the	untreated	individuals,	which	would	then	be	compared	with	the	treated	individuals.	Propensity	score	can	also	be	used	to	create	intervals	and	we	can	ensure	the	same	propensity	score	on	average	between	the	treated	and	control	groups.			One	final	note	should	be	made	about	the	selection	of	variables	to	create	a	propensity	score.	We	should	ensure	that	the	selected	variables	are	unaffected	by	the	treatment	status	because	failing	to	do	so	will	cause	the	CIA	assumption	to	fail.	It	is	best	to	include	variables	that	are	collected	before	the	treatment	begins.	Also,	the	instrumental	variable	should	not	be	included	as	it	will	increase	the	bias	in	the	treatment	effect	estimate	(Wooldridge,	2010).		In	application,	the	CIA	assumption	is	an	untestable	assumption.	We	should	therefore	justify	our	analysis	with	reference	to	the	expert	literature.	The	most	common	check	in	empirical	work	is	the	overlap	assumption	and	this	needs	to	be	assessed	thoroughly	despite	the	choice	of	matching	algorithm.			Based	on	the	preceding	review,	it	has	been	shown	that	PSM	is	one	of	the	most	common	methods	used	to	estimate	the	causal	effects	of	a	health	insurance	programme	on	utilisation	and	financial	protection,	whether	in	combination	with	another	technique	or	on	its	own.	The	common	support	assumption	is	often	reported	properly.	From	eight	studies	using	PSM	as	their	main	estimation	method,	only	two	studies	perform	sensitivity	analysis	in	terms	of	the	different	choices	of	the	matching	algorithms	(Alkenbrack	and	Lindelow,	2015;	Makhloufi	et	al.,	2015).	Moreover,	there	
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are	three	studies	which	do	not	discuss	important	the	assumptions	made	to	justify	the	validity	of	the	propensity	score	(Avilla-Burgos	et	al.,	2013;	Blanchet	et	al.,	2012;	Robyn	et	al.,	2012).	Overall,	these	eight	studies	are	judged	to	have	a	high	risk	of	bias	because	PSM	is	unable	to	control	for	unobserved	confounding	factors.	High-quality	papers	tend	to	combine	PSM	with	another	method	that	is	capable	of	controlling	for	unobserved	factors,	such	as	PSM	and	DID	or	PSM	and	IV	(Cheng	et	al.,	2015;	Nguyen,	2012;	Lu	et	al.,	2012;).				
Section	6.5 	Methods	for	controlling	selection	on	unobservables	
 Instrumental	variables	(IV)		The	idea	behind	IV	estimation	is	to	find	a	variable	(also	commonly	called	an	“instrument”)	which	is	correlated	with	the	treatment	but	only	within	the	outcome	through	its	effect	on	the	treatment.	This	is	known	as	the	exclusion	restriction	or	instrument	exogeneity,	as	the	IV	is	excluded	from	the	original	model	and	restricted	to	appearing	in	the	treatment	choice	equation	only.	The	variation	in	the	instrument	is	then	utilised	to	identify	the	causal	treatment	effect.	Intuitively,	since	the	instrument	is	a	source	of	variation	correlated	with	the	treatment	decision,	it	gives	some	exogenous	variation	to	approximate	randomisation	(Faria	et	al.,	2015).	However,	this	assumption	cannot	be	tested	in	a	simple	IV	estimator;	it	must	be	justified	based	on	knowledge	from	the	literature	or	expert	opinion.	Nevertheless,	when	we	have	more	than	one	instrument	per	endogenous	variable,	it	is	possible	to	test	whether	some	of	the	instruments	are	uncorrelated	within	the	structural	error	term.	The	procedure	of	comparing	different	IV	estimates	of	the	same	parameter	is	called	the	over-identifying	restrictions	test	(Wooldridge,	2013).			The	second	assumption	is	called	instrument	relevance,	which	means	that	the	instruments	have	to	be	correlated,	positively	or	negatively,	with	the	endogenous	explanatory	variable	(Wooldridge,	2013).	Unlike	the	first	assumption,	the	second	one	can	be	tested	easily.	An	instrument	with	low	correlation	between	the	endogenous	regressors	is	called	a	weak	instrument.	In	this	case,	the	model	is	said	to	be	weakly	
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identified,	leading	to	a	loss	of	precision	in	the	estimate	of	the	treatment	effect.	Consequently,	the	usual	statistical	inference,	based	on	t-statistics	and	the	standard	normal	distribution,	could	be	misleading.	There	is	some	evidence	that	IV	estimation	with	weak	instruments	may	perform	badly	and	even	more	poorly	than	OLS	(Imbens	and	Wooldridge,	2009).	The	asymptotic	bias	in	the	IV	estimator	is	less	than	that	for	OLS,	only	if	the	ratio	of	correlation	between	the	instrument	and	the	endogenous	variable	is	less	than	the	correlation	between	the	endogenous	variable	and	the	error	term	of	the	original	model	(Wooldridge,	2013).			For	a	model	with	an	endogenous	variable,	the	standard	first-stage	F-statistic	can	be	used	to	test	for	identifying	a	weak	instrument,	in	which	weakness	is	identified	in	terms	of	the	size	of	the	bias	of	the	IV	estimator	relative	to	that	of	the	OLS	estimator.	For	multiple	endogenous	variables,	one	should	use	the	Cragg-Donald	statistic	method	to	evaluate	the	overall	strength	of	the	instruments	(Stock	and	Yogo,	2005).		Another	key	assumption	in	standard	IV	estimation	is	that	the	treatment	effect	is	homogeneous	(the	treatment	effects	are	the	same	for	everybody	in	the	population).	Alternatively,	the	treatment	effect	can	be	assumed	to	be	heterogeneous	but	requires	the	assumption	that	selection	into	treatment	is	not	influenced	by	the	unobserved	heterogeneity	(individual	specific	effect)	in	the	outcome	(Faria	et	al.,	2015).		Despite	the	difficulty	of	finding	a	good	instrument,	IV	is	one	of	the	most	common	methods	used	to	estimate	the	impact	of	health	insurance	in	developing	countries.	There	are	12	studies	that	utilise	IV	as	the	main	method	to	determine	a	causal	effect	of	health	insurance.	Some	of	the	common	instruments	are:		1. Randomisation	of	eligibility:	true	randomisation	(Fink	et	al.,	2013;	Parmar	et	
al.,	2012)	or	a	natural	experiment	on	the	gradual	roll	out	of	the	insurance	(Wirtz	et	al.,	2012;	Galarraga	et	al.,	2010)	2. The	community	rate	of	enrolment	in	which	the	denominator	is	the	number	of	eligible	households	in	a	particular	area	minus	the	observed	households	
		 141	
(Cheung	and	Padieu,	2013;	Nguyen,	2012;	Lu	et	al.,	2012;	Lu,	Liu	and	Shen,	2012;	Trujillo	et	al.,	2010)		3. Eligibility	for	other	government	social	protection	(Aji	et	al.,	2013)	4. Drinking	behaviour	as	a	proxy	for	risk	attitude	(Chen	et	al.,	2014)	5. Lagged	dependent	variable	(Dhillon	et	al.,	2012)	6. Self-employment	status	(Trujillo	et	al.,	2010)	7. Participation	in	a	community	meeting	or	community	organization	(Aji	et	al.,	2013)	8. The	type	of	housing	area	per	household	member	as	the	instrument	for	health	spending	(Lu,	Liu,	and	Shen,	2012;	Lu	et	al.,	2012)	9. Simulated	eligibility	score	to	instrument	the	“real”	yet	manipulated	eligibility	score	(Miller	et	al.,	2013)		The	two	important	assumptions	are	often	justified	in	the	study,	but	there	is	no	discussion	about	the	tests	in	the	results	sections.	However,	this	could	be	partly	explained	by	the	word	count	limitation	imposed	by	the	journals	so	that	the	authors	must	select	the	most	important	tables	to	be	displayed	in	their	paper.	Stronger	IV	studies	tend	to	either	combine	their	method	with	other	strategies,	such	as	fixed	effect	(Liu	and	Zhao,	2014;	Dhillon	et	al.,	2012;	Parmar	et	al.,	2012)	and	PSM	(Lu	et	al.,	2012;	Lu,	Liu,	and	Shen,	2012;	Wirtz	et	al.,	2012).	Furthermore,	Fink	et	al.	(2013)	used	the	insurance	rollout	assignment,	which	was	a	random	assignment	from	33	available	districts,	as	an	instrument	for	insurance	enrolment.	In	addition,	bivariate	probit	is	also	used	as	an	alternative	to	the	IV	method	when	the	outcome	variables	are	also	binary	variables,	such	as	in	the	probability	of	incurring	catastrophic	health	expenditure	(Galarraga	et	al.,	2010)	or	the	probability	of	using	outpatient/inpatient	care	(Chen	et	al.,	2014).						
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 Panel	data	methods		Panel	data	offers	the	advantage	of	using	the	individual	as	their	own	control	since	each	individual	is	observed	at	different	time	periods.	The	assumption	that	is	required	to	be	able	to	identify	a	treatment	effect	is	that	the	individual’s	unobserved	heterogeneity	in	the	outcome	model	is	time	invariant.	There	are	two	separate	models,	depending	on	which	approach	is	taken	to	eliminate	the	unobserved	term.	If	the	individual’s	unobserved	effect	is	suspected	to	be	correlated	with	the	covariates	in	the	model	(including	treatment),	a	fixed	effects	model	or	a	first	difference	model	can	be	used.	These	models	do	not	use	the	cross-sectional	variation	across	individuals	and	might,	therefore,	be	less	efficient	than	the	random	effects	estimator	(Wooldridge,	2013).	Alternatively,	if	it	is	assumed	that	the	individual’s	unobserved	effect	is	random,	and	thus	not	correlated	with	covariates	in	the	model,	a	random	model	should	be	used.	This	estimator,	however,	assumes	that	the	unobserved	determinants	of	heterogeneity	in	the	outcomes	do	not	have	an	effect	on	selection.	The	Hausman	test	of	fixed	versus	random	effects	is	routinely	reported	by	standard	software	when	using	these	models.	It	is	worth	noting	that	rejection	of	the	null	hypothesis	of	this	test	could	also	be	due	to	a	misspecification	of	the	model	(Cameron	and	Trivedi,	2005).		There	are	not	many	papers	that	utilise	panel	data	because	this	type	of	data	collection	requires	more	effort	and	takes	a	longer	period	of	time.	In	the	context	of	a	developing	country,	due	to	resource	constraints,	the	data	collection	process	is	completed	over	a	longer	period	of	time,	but	the	authority	often	demands	quicker	results	to	evaluate	the	policy.		
Section	6.6 	Natural	experiment		Natural	experiment	approaches	make	use	of	exogenous	events.	Exogenous	events	are	those	that	produce	a	random	assignment	of	individuals	to	treatment	or	to	eligibility	for	treatment.		
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 Difference-in-difference	(DID)		DID	has	been	used	widely	in	many	policy	evaluations	(Angrist	and	Pischke,	2009).	DID	compares	the	changes	in	outcomes	over	time	between	a	population	that	is	enrolled	in	a	programme	(the	treatment	group)	and	a	population	that	is	not	(the	comparison	group).	The	difference	in	the	before-and-after	outcomes	for	the	treatment	group	–	the	first	difference	–	controls	for	confounders	that	are	constant	over	time	in	that	group,	since	we	are	comparing	the	same	group	to	itself.	The	second	difference	involves	measuring	the	before-and-after	change	in	outcomes	for	a	group	that	did	not	enrol	in	the	programme	but	was	exposed	to	the	same	set	of	environmental	conditions	to	capture	time-varying	confounders.	By	subtracting	the	second	difference	from	the	first	difference,	we	will	be	able	to	eliminate	the	selection	bias	between	those	who	choose	to	enrol	and	those	who	choose	not	to	enrol	to	produce	a	better	estimate	of	the	counterfactual	(Gertler	et	al.,	2011).			The	difference	in	difference	estimator	is	defined	as	the	difference	in	average	outcome	of	the	treatment	group	before	and	after	treatment,	minus	the	difference	in	average	outcome	in	the	control	group	before	and	after	treatment	(Lechner,	2011).	To	identify	a	treatment	effect,	this	method	uses	either	longitudinal	data	for	the	same	individuals	or	repeated	cross-sections	drawn	from	the	same	population,	before	and	after	the	treatment.	By	comparing	the	changes	over	time	in	the	means	of	the	treatment	and	control	groups,	the	DID	estimator	allows	for	both	group-specific	and	time-specific	effects.	In	general,	the	DID	approach	will	identify	the	ATT	(Faria	et	al.,	2015).		One	of	the	most	common	problems	with	the	difference	in	difference	estimates	is	the	failure	of	the	parallel	trend	assumption	which	assumes	common	trends	across	the	treatment	and	control	groups	(Imbens	and	Wooldridge,	2009).	If	outcome	trends	are	different	for	the	treatment	and	control	groups,	then	the	estimated	treatment	effect	obtained	by	difference-in-difference	methods	would	be	biased.	The	reason	is	that	the	trend	for	the	control	group	is	not	a	valid	estimate	of	the	counterfactual	trend	that	would	have	been	observed	for	the	treatment	group	in	the	absence	of	the	treatment.	A	good	validity	check	is	to	compare	changes	in	outcomes	for	the	treatment	and	
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comparison	groups	before	the	programme	is	implemented	(Gertler	et	al.,	2011).	One	way	to	solve	this	problem	is	to	obtain	more	data	on	other	time	periods	before	and	after	treatment	to	see	if	there	are	any	other	pre-existing	differences	in	trends.	To	check	for	equality	of	pre-intervention	trends,	we	need	at	least	two	serial	observations	on	the	treatment	and	comparison	groups	before	the	start	of	the	programme.	It	may	also	be	possible	to	find	other	control	groups	which	will	provide	additional	underlying	trends.	If	both	the	original	and	additional	groups	are	valid	control	groups,	we	would	find	that	the	estimated	impact	is	approximately	the	same	in	both	calculations.			Another	way	to	test	the	assumption	of	equal	trends	would	be	to	perform	what	is	known	as	a	“placebo”	test.	For	this	test,	it	is	necessary	to	conduct	an	additional	difference-in-differences	estimation	using	a	group	that	was	not	affected	by	the	treatment	as	the	“fake”	treatment	group.	If	we	perform	DID	estimation	between	the	“fake”	treatment	group	and	the	control	group,	we	should	find	no	impact	at	all.	Otherwise,	there	must	be	some	underlying	trend	between	those	two	which	would	also	cast	doubt	on	the	assumption	of	a	parallel	trend	between	our	original	treatment	group	and	the	control	group	(Gertler	et	al.,	2011)		When	using	repeated	cross-sections	of	individuals	instead	of	longitudinal	data,	we	also	need	to	add	one	more	assumption	in	addition	to	common	trend	assumptions.	There	should	be	no	systematic	changes	in	the	composition	of	the	groups	so	that	the	average	individual	fixed	effect	can	be	eliminated	(Lechner,	2011).		Difference-in-difference	has	become	more	popular	in	an	evaluation	study	of	the	impact	of	health	insurance	in	developing	countries	due	to	its	flexible	design	in	either	repeated	cross	sectional	or	longitudinal	data.	However,	only	a	few	good	studies	have	justified	the	parallel	trend	assumptions	which	may	cast	doubt	on	the	validity	of	the	reported	causal	effect.	In	addition,	it	is	increasingly	common	to	combine	DID	and	PSM	to	tackle	selection	bias	on	both	observable	and	unobservable	characteristics	(Cheng	et	al.,	2015;	Yang	and	Wu,	2015;	Guindon,	2014;	Sparrow,	Suryahadi	and	Widyanti,	2013;	Chen	and	Jin,	2012;	Nguyen,	2012).	
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 Regression	discontinuity	(RD)		The	basic	idea	behind	the	RD	design	is	that	assignment	to	the	treatment	is	determined	by	the	value	of	a	predictor,	or	the	forcing	variable,	being	on	either	side	of	a	common	threshold.	The	RD	estimator	uses	the	discontinuity	to	identify	a	treatment	effect	by	assuming	that	the	individuals	on	different	sides	of	the	discontinuity	are	the	same	in	terms	of	the	unobservable	that	affects	the	outcome,	and	that	treatment	differs	simply	because	of	the	discontinuity	in	the	eligibility	rule	(Imbens	and	Wooldridge,	2009).	The	design	often	arises	from	government	decisions	whereby	the	decision	for	individuals	to	participate	in	a	programme	is	restricted	by	budgetary	constraints	and	is	determined	by	clear	transparent	rules,	not	an	indiscretion.			There	are	two	general	settings	for	RD	design:	sharp	and	fuzzy.	In	the	sharp	design,	the	treatment	assignment	is	a	deterministic	function	of	the	forcing	variable,	for	example,	when	all	individuals	above	a	certain	income	threshold	are	treated	but	those	below	the	threshold	are	not.	Alternatively,	in	the	fuzzy	design	the	probability	of	treatment	need	not	change	from	zero	to	one	at	the	threshold;	it	only	requires	a	discontinuity	in	the	probability	of	assignment	to	treatment	at	the	threshold,	for	example,	if	other	variables	(including	unobserved	variables)	apart	from	income	determine	treatment.	In	this	case,	treated	as	well	as	untreated	individuals	are	found	on	both	sides	of	the	threshold.	Both	designs	depend	on	the	assumption	that	the	conditional	mean	of	the	outcome	functions	for	the	treated	and	control	groups	are	continuous	at	the	discontinuity	point	(Faria	et	al.,	2015).		After	applying	the	RD	design,	we	should	perform	two	specification	checks.	Firstly,	we	may	look	for	discontinuities	in	the	average	value	of	the	covariates	around	the	threshold.	Finding	a	discontinuity	in	other	covariates	typically	casts	doubt	on	the	assumptions	underlying	the	RD	design	(Imbens	and	Wooldridge,	2009).	Secondly,	to	check	the	possibility	of	manipulation	by	the	individuals,	we	should	check	the	density	of	the	covariate	that	underlies	the	assignment	at	the	threshold	(McCrary,	2008).	A	jump	in	the	density	at	the	threshold	is	probably	the	most	direct	evidence	of	some	
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degree	of	sorting	around	the	threshold,	and	should	provoke	serious	scepticism	about	the	appropriateness	of	the	RD	design	(Lee	and	Lemieux,	2010).			Because	the	RD	design	estimates	the	impact	of	the	treatment	around	the	threshold,	we	can	only	estimate	the	Local	Average	Treatment	Effect	or	LATE	(Gertler	et	al.,	2011).	Consequently,	the	estimate	cannot	be	generalised	to	observations	further	away	from	the	threshold	where	eligible	and	ineligible	individuals	may	not	be	as	similar.	It	also	raises	challenges	in	terms	of	the	statistical	power	of	the	analysis.	Since	effects	are	estimated	only	around	the	threshold,	fewer	observations	can	be	used	than	in	other	methods	that	would	include	all	observations.	Relatively	large	evaluation	samples	are	required	to	obtain	sufficient	statistical	power	when	applying	RD	design.	According	to	Table	6-1,	there	are	six	papers	that	utilised	RD	design	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	health	insurance	programmes	in	developing	countries	(Palmer	et	al.,	2015;	Bernal,	Carpio	and	Klein,	2014;	Sood	et	al.,	2014;	Camacho	and	Conover,	2013;	Miller,	Pinto	and	Vera-Hernandez,	2013;	Hou	and	Chao,	2011).	All	of	them	are	considered	to	be	high	quality	with	a	low	risk	of	selection	bias,	based	on	the	quality	assessment	done	in	Chapter	5.	The	similarity	among	them	is	the	ability	to	gather	data	necessary	to	determine	the	threshold,	which	may	prove	quite	challenging	in	the	Indonesian	context.	This	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section.			
Section	6.7 	Applicable	methods			Following	the	description	above	of	potential	methods,	there	are	several	methods	that	could	be	used	for	my	empirical	study.	The	method	that	is	chosen	needs	to	account	for	both	observable	and	unobservable	factors	that	influence	health	insurance	status.	The	first	possible	method	is	the	instrumental	variable,	but	it	is	moderately	difficult	to	obtain	a	strong	instrument.	I	attempted	to	use	several	potential	instruments,	such	as	the	local	JKN	advertisement	effort	by	the	local	government,	participation	in	community	organisation,	and	individual	risk	preference,	but	all	of	them	are	proven	to	be	weak	instruments	based	on	the	first-stage	F-statistic.	Weak	instruments	may	introduce	more	bias	than	OLS	estimation	(Wooldridge,	2014).	Furthermore,	most	of	
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my	outcome	variables	are	non-normally	distributed	which	complicates	the	weak	instrument	testing.			Another	possible	method	is	regression	discontinuity	as	this	method	most	closely	resembles	true	randomization	allocation.	However,	RD	design	has	been	proven	to	be	challenging	to	implement	in	Indonesia.	Most	poverty	alleviation	programmes,	including	the	JKN	programme,	are	targeted	based	on	a	proxy	means-testing	technique	with	14	indicators	including	housing	characteristics,	frequency	of	food	consumption,	educational	and	occupational	levels	of	household	heads,	and	asset	possession.	In	2010,	the	central	government	updated	the	database	of	40%	poorest	population	to	be	used	for	poverty	alleviation	programs,	including	public	health	insurance.	However,	the	local	governments	were	still	able	to	modify	the	list	based	on	their	own	criteria.	This	was	confirmed	from	my	visit	to	BPS	(Badan	Pusat	Statistik/Indonesian	Statistics)	in	Jakarta.	Thus,	it	is	quite	difficult	to	reproduce	the	list	in	order	to	justify	a	regression	discontinuity	(RD)	analysis.	One	paper	has	tried	to	evaluate	the	unconditional	cash	transfer	programme	in	Indonesia	and	they	report	that	it	is	almost	impossible	to	reconstruct	the	proxy	means	test	scores,	even	to	justify	fuzzy	RD	(Bazzi,	Sumarto	and	Suryahadi,	2012).			An	alternative	and	feasible	method	is	to	combine	propensity	score	matching	and	the	difference	in	difference	method	which	has	been	used	to	estimate	the	causal	effect	of	health	insurance	in	several	developing	countries	(Yang	and	Wu,	2015;	Cheng	et	al.,	2015;	Guindon,	2014;	Sparrow,	Suryahadi	and	Widyanti,	2013;	Chen	and	Jin,	2012;	Nguyen,	2012).	There	is	also	an	increasing	trend	towards	employing	DID	in	combination	with	PSM	(10	studies).	There	are	several	reasons	for	combining	PSM	and	DID.	Firstly,	PSM	and	DID	allow	the	researcher	to	control	both	observable	and	unobservable	selection	bias	(Cheng	et	al.,	2015;	Yang	and	Wu,	2015;	Guindon,	2014;	Nguyen,	2012).	Secondly,	PSM	does	not	impose	any	functional	form	on	outcome	variables	(Sparrow	et	al.,	2013).	Thirdly,	PSM	and	DID	avoids	the	unobserved	selection	of	insurance	take-up	by	comparing	the	populations	in	the	targeted	and	non-targeted	areas,	regardless	of	the	actual	household	decision	(Chen	and	Jin,	2012).	Fourthly,	the	time	trend	assumption	could	be	tested	by	conducting	a	falsification	test:	
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defining	treatment	and	the	control	group	for	both	before	and	after	the	treatment,	based	on	the	information	available	after	the	treatment	(Cheng	et	al.,	2015)		Considering	the	availability	of	panel	data	from	the	IFLS	dataset,	with	its	rich	information	about	individuals	and	household	characteristics,	and	the	method’s	flexibility	in	terms	of	handling	non-normally	distributed	variables,	I	decided	to	use	a	combination	of	PSM	and	DID	as	my	primary	method	for	estimating	the	impact	of	the	JKN	programme.	The	next	three	chapters	will	present	the	empirical	findings	of	the	effects	of	the	JKN	programme	on	access	to	care	(Chapter	7),	financial	protection	(Chapter	8)	and	health	status	(Chapter	9).						 	
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Chapter	7 	The	JKN	programme	and	its	impact	on	access	to	
care	
Section	7.1 	Introduction		In	the	previous	chapters,	it	has	been	suggested	that	health	insurance	can	be	effective	in	increasing	access	to	care,	usually	measured	in	terms	of	utilisation	of	formal	care	facilities,	but	that	the	evidence	is	mixed.	In	chapter	4,	I	found	several	systematic	reviews	that	favour	the	positive	effect	of	health	insurance	in	improving	access	to	health	care	services	(Comfort	et	al.,	2013;	Giedion	et	al.,	2013;	Spaan	et	al.,	2012;	Ekman,	2004).	In	chapter	5,	I	updated	the	systematic	review	by	searching	for	more	recent	evidence	from	2012	to	2016	and	found	that	30	out	of	38	studies	reported	the	positive	effect	of	health	insurance	in	increasing	utilisation	of	curative	care.	Restricting	the	evidence	by	choosing	studies	with	stronger	methodological	techniques	revealed	that	seven	studies	found	a	positive	effect	(Levine,	Polimeni	and	Ramage,	2016;	Palmer	et	al.,	2015;	Bernal,	Carpio	and	Klein,	2014;	Miller,	Pinto	and	Vera-Hernandez,	2013;	Nguyen,	2012;	Yilma,	Van	Kempen	and	De	Hoop,	2012;	Hou	and	Chao,	2011),	one	study	found	no	statistically	significant	effect	(Raza	et	al.,	2016),	and	one	study	found	negative	effect	on	utiilsation	(Sheth,	2014).	In	this	chapter,	I	examine	whether	the	implementation	of	Indonesia’s	JKN	programme	has	improved	access	to	health	care	for	its	enrolees.	The	specific	objectives	are:		a. To	evaluate	whether	the	JKN	programme	has,	on	average,	increased	the	probability	of	utilisation	for	both	outpatient	and	inpatient	care;	b. To	evaluate	whether	the	JKN	programme	has,	on	average,	increased	the	frequency	of	utilisation	for	both	outpatient	and	inpatient	care;	and,	c. To	assess	the	heterogeneity	of	the	JKN	programme	effect	in	relation	to	living	in	an	urban	or	rural	area,	socioeconomic	status	and	the	availability	of	health	care	facilities	in	the	area.		In	my	effort	to	estimate	the	treatment	effect	of	the	JKN	programme,	I	need	to	control	for	self-selection	bias	in	the	insurance	status;	individuals	who	expect	to	consume	more	medical	treatment	are	more	likely	to	purchase	health	insurance	(Waters,	1999).	To	address	this	in	estimating	the	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	access	to	care,	the	
		 150	
combination	of	propensity	score	matching	and	difference-in-difference	was	chosen	based	on	the	methodological	review	in	chapter	6.	In	this	chapter	(and	the	next	two	chapters),	the	data	come	from	the	Indonesian	Family	Life	Survey	(IFLS),	a	longitudinal	survey	in	Indonesia	that	follows	the	same	cohort	over	time	from	2007	to	2014.		
Section	7.2 	Conceptual	framework	of	access	to	health	care		A	number	of	frameworks	have	been	proposed	in	the	literature	to	define	access	to	health	care.	Andersen	(1968)	first	provided	a	simple	framework	to	model	families’	use	of	health	services	in	the	USA	(see	Figure	7-1)	and	this	model	has	been	used	extensively	in	studies	which	investigate	the	use	of	health	services	(Babitsch,	Gohl	and	von	Lengerke,	2012;	Titaley,	Dibley	and	Roberts,	2010;	Chakraborty	et	al.,	2003;	Becker	et	al.,	1993).	Andersen	suggests	that	use	of	health	services	is	the	consequence	of	need,	whilst	the	need	itself	is	influenced	by	two	main	factors:	predisposing	characteristics	and	enabling	resources.			
	
Figure	7-1	Andersen’s	behavioural	model	of	access	to	care,	early	version	(Andersen,	1968).		Predisposing	characteristics	can	be	understood	as	the	innate	factors	within	an	individual	and	these	are	relatively	unchangeable.	There	are	three	different	categories	of	predisposing	characteristics:	demographic,	social	structure	and	health	beliefs.		
Predisposing 
characteristics 
•Demographic
•Social structure
•Health beliefs
Enabling resources
•Personal/family
•Community
Need
•Perceived need
•Evaluated need
Use of health 
services
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1. Demographic	represents	the	biological	factors	that	drive	people	to	use	health	services,	such	as	age	and	gender.	Children	may	demand	more	use	of	health	services,	for	example,	immunisation,	whereas	older	people	are	more	likely	to	suffer	from	chronic	diseases	which	result	in	a	higher	need	for	regular	visits	to	the	general	practitioner	(Collins	and	Klein,	1980).		2. Social	structure	represents	the	social	status	and	the	ability	of	an	individual	to	cope	with	any	given	problem.	Social	status	can	be	measured	by	occupation,	education	and	ethnicity,	while	culture	and	social	networks	may	contribute	to	coping	mechanisms	(Andersen,	1995).		3. Health	beliefs	represent	people’s	values	and	knowledge	which	are	reflected	in	their	attitudes	towards	the	need	for	health	services.	Institutional	trust	towards	modern	health	care	facilities	can	influence	a	patient’s	beliefs	about	health	(Mohseni	and	Lindstrom,	2007).	Furthermore,	trust	facilitates	communication	and	patient	disclosure	which	encourages	people	to	utilise	health	services	(Gilson,	2003).	Health	beliefs	also	include	cultural	norms	and	prevailing	political	perspectives	on	how	health	services	should	be	organised	and	financed	(Andersen	and	Davidson,	2007).			Enabling	resources	must	be	present	in	order	for	the	use	of	health	services	to	be	realised.	Enabling	resources	can	be	divided	into	two	factors:	personal/family	and	community.	Income	or	health	insurance	acts	as	a	personal	factor	that	supports	the	fulfilment	of	health	care	utilisation	(Andersen,	1968).	Virtually	all	supply-side	factors,	such	as	the	availability	of	adequate	health	facilities	in	the	nearby	area	and	a	good	medicine	procurement	system,	are	included	in	the	community	factor.	The	means	of	transportation	to	reach	the	health	facilities	(Arcury	et	al.,	2005)	and	reasonable	waiting	times	(Gulliford	et	al.,	2002)	are	also	considered	to	be	enabling	factors	in	health	service	use.				Both	predisposing	characteristics	and	enabling	factors	can	contribute	to	the	presence	of	perceived	need	that	reflects	the	role	of	social	aspects	explaining	an	individual’s	care-seeking	behaviour	(Andersen,	1995).	Based	on	perceived	need,	an	individual	may	decide	to	seek	help	from	the	health	care	professionals	who	have	the	capacity	to	
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evaluate	the	need	for	medical	treatment.	This	evaluated	need	reflects	more	of	the	medical	aspects	of	access	to	health	care	and	it	is	easily	observed	in	the	data,	for	example	by	looking	at	the	reported	number	of	acute	or	chronic	medical	conditions	from	patients.	While	perceived	need	can	explain	individual	care-seeking	behaviour	and	adherence	to	a	medical	treatment,	evaluated	need	will	be	more	closely	related	to	the	type	and	amount	of	treatment	that	will	be	provided	after	an	individual	has	consulted	with	a	medical	care	provider.		
	
Figure	7-2	The	behavioural	framework	of	access	to	care	(a	more	recent	model)		In	its	more	recent	model	(see	Figure	7-2),	Andersen	includes	more	factors	that	contribute	to	the	realisation	of	access	to	health	care.	Firstly,	he	distinguishes	between	two	types	of	access:	potential	access	which	reflects	the	presence	of	enabling	resources	and	realised	access	representing	the	actual	use	of	services.	He	further	introduces	the	role	of	a	health	care	system	and	external	conditions	(physical,	political,	economic)	as	environmental	factors	which	influence	the	presence	of	population	characteristics.	Next,	the	use	of	health	services	is	perceived	as	an	
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individual’s	behaviour	to	promote	his/her	health	outcomes.	Another	health	behaviour	aspect	is	personal	health	practice,	such	as	diet,	exercise	and	self-care,	which	acts	as	a	complemental	factor	in	the	utilisation	of	formal	health	services	to	influence	health	outcomes.			Andersen	includes	health	outcomes	as	a	feedback	loop	affecting	the	predisposing	characteristics	of	perceived	need	and	health	behaviour.	Health	status	is	often	evaluated	by	medical	professionals	and	it	offers	a	more	objective	measure	rather	than	health	status	perceived	by	patients.	However,	perceived	health	status	may	play	an	important	factor	in	explaining	a	patient’s	decision	to	seek	care.	Andersen	also	considers	consumer	satisfaction	as	another	important	outcome	which	complements	both	perceived	and	evaluated	health	status.	The	inclusion	of	these	three	outcomes	implies	that	the	health	outcomes	after	the	first	use	of	health	services	may	reinforce	the	subsequent	use	of	health	services	in	the	future.	If	an	individual	has	been	diagnosed	with	a	chronic	illness	(for	example,	diabetes	or	hypertension),	this	illness	may	alter	his/her	attitude	to	his/her	condition	that	previously	might	not	have	been	perceived	as	a	serious	complaint.			Andersen’s	model	provides	a	simple	and	applicable	model	to	evaluate	the	treatment	effect	of	policies	which	aim	to	improve	access	to	health	care	while	controlling	for	other	factors	that	may	influence	the	actual	use	of	care.	In	this	model,	health	insurance	can	be	seen	as	an	enabling	factor	that	reinforces	the	patient’s	decision	to	use	formal	care.	I	focus	on	the	use	of	formal	health	care	because	traditional	care	is	not	covered	by	the	JKN	programme.	Control	variables	may	include	predisposing	characteristics	(for	example,	age	and	gender,	urban/rural	location,	educational	status	and	socioeconomic	status),	enabling	factors	(for	example,	the	availability	of	health	services)	and	health	outcomes.	One	issue	with	this	model	is	the	inclusion	of	health	outcomes	as	a	control	variable	which	may	pose	a	reverse	causality	problem	in	a	regression	model	of	utilisation	as	the	dependent	variable.	The	inclusion	of	past	health	status	may	be	included	in	the	model	instead,	assuming	future	use	of	care	does	not	influence	the	previous	health	outcome,	which	is	quite	a	reasonable	assumption	to	be	made.		
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Section	7.3 Methodology	
 Survey	methodology		The	main	data	were	obtained	from	the	Indonesia	Family	Life	Survey	(IFLS)	waves	4	(2007)	and	5	(2014).	The	IFLS	is	a	national	longitudinal	survey	of	socioeconomic	characteristics	and	population	health;	the	survey	is	based	on	a	sample	of	households	living	in	13	of	the	country’s	27	Provinces,	identified	in	1993.	Although	only	half	of	the	provinces	were	chosen,	those	13	provinces	represented	83	percent	of	the	Indonesian	population.	The	selected	provinces	were	chosen	to	maximise	the	representativeness	of	the	population	and	for	cost	effectiveness	reasons,	given	the	vast	area	and	difficult	terrain	of	the	country	(Strauss,	Witoelar	and	Sikoki,	2016).	The	IFLS	is	designed	to	provide	data	for	studying	behaviours	and	outcomes.	The	survey	contains	a	wealth	of	information	collected	at	individual	and	household	levels,	including	multiple	indicators	on	economic	and	non-economic	well-being:	consumption,	assets,	education,	migration,	labour	market	outcomes,	marriage,	fertility,	contraceptive	use,	health	status,	use	of	health	care	and	health	insurance,	relationships	among	co-resident	and	non-resident	family	members,	processes	underlying	household	decision-making,	transfers	among	family	members	and	participation	in	community	activities.			The	main	sample	in	this	study	consists	of	adult	respondents	who	completed	individual	questionnaires	in	both	the	2007	and	2014	IFLS	surveys.	The	JKN	programme	began	in	January	2014	and	was	implemented	nationally.	IFLS	2014	was	conducted	in	September	2014,	which	means	that	IFLS	2007	data	can	be	treated	as	the	baseline	and	2014	data	as	the	follow-up,	thereby	allowing	for	panel	data	analysis.	There	were	29,014	individuals	who	completed	individual	questionnaires	in	2007,	but	only	22,711	individuals	completed	the	same	questionnaires	in	2014,	yielding	an	attrition	rate	of	21.73%.	The	reasons	for	non-completion	among	the	6,303	individuals	are	depicted	in	Figure	7-4.			
		 155	
	
Figure	7-3	Map	of	Indonesia	showing	IFLS	provinces	and	population	density		 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		
Figure	7-4	Summary	of	main	sample	from	IFLS	2007	and	2014		
 	Treatment	variables		In	order	to	estimate	a	causal	effect	from	a	before	and	after	study,	it	is	important	to	ensure	that	both	the	treated	and	control	groups	have	similar	characteristics	in	the	baseline.	In	the	context	of	health	insurance	evaluation,	this	means	that	both	groups	must	be	uninsured	in	2007.	Furthermore,	to	limit	the	spillover	effect	from	other	types	of	health	insurance,	the	treatment	group	must	have	no	other	type	of	insurance	
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other	than	the	JKN	programme.	Figure	7-4	provides	the	summary	of	the	main	sample	in	this	analysis.	Out	of	the	22,711	individuals	who	were	followed	from	2007	to	2014,	10,650	individuals	were	excluded	from	this	analysis	for	two	reasons:	firstly,	they	were	uninsured	in	2007	but	insured	through	non-JKN	insurance	in	2014;	and	secondly,	they	were	insured	by	any	type	of	insurance	in	2007,	regardless	of	their	insurance	status	in	2014.				As	previously	explained	in	Chapter	3,	the	JKN	programme	targets	many	different	groups	depending	on	their	ability	to	pay	and	employment	status.	Some	JKN	enrolees	were	previously	insured	by	ASKES	(for	civil	servants),	JAMSOSTEK	(for	formal	sector	employees),	or	private	insurance	(through	their	employers	or	a	private	decision).	Following	the	baseline	criteria	of	being	uninsured,	the	above	three	groups	were	therefore	excluded.	Thus,	the	following	treatment	and	control	groups	were	defined	for	this	analysis:			 (1)	JKN	contributory	group:	individuals	who	were	uninsured	in	2007	but	then	enrolled	voluntarily	in	2014	–	there	is	potential	for	self-selection	because	individuals	who	expect	to	gain	more	health	benefits	are	more	likely	to	purchase	health	insurance.	This	group	may	represent	self-employed	individuals	or	people	who	work	in	the	informal	sector	that	are	not	categorised	as	poor.		(2)	JKN	subsidised	group:	individuals	who	were	uninsured	in	2007	but	qualified	for	subsidised	JKN	premiums	in	2014	due	to	their	socioeconomic	status.	This	group	is	qualified	for	subsidised	premiums	based	on	a	proxy	means	test	defined	by	the	government.		(3)	Uninsured	group:	individuals	who	were	uninsured	in	2007	and	remained	uninsured	in	2014.			Both	the	contributory	and	subsidised	groups	received	almost	similar	medical	benefits	from	the	JKN	programme	but	the	contributory	group	could	choose	to	pay	a	higher	premium	in	exchange	for	better	non-medical	hospital	services.	To	eliminate	the	
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spillover	effect	from	other	health	insurance,	individuals	who	reported	having	more	than	one	health	insurance	membership,	including	private	insurance,	were	excluded.	Based	on	this	classification,	my	analysis	included	12,061	individuals	of	which	982	individuals	were	in	the	contributory	group,	2,503	were	in	the	subsidised	group,	and	8,576	were	still	uninsured	in	2014.			
 Outcome	and	control	variables		IFLS	data	provides	two	types	of	utilisation	information:	outpatient	and	inpatient	care.	For	both	outpatient	and	inpatient,	two	types	of	utilisation	data	were	recorded:	the	probability	of	visits	and	the	unconditional	number	of	visits.	These	two	datasets	were	aggregated	into	three	groups	based	on	type	of	health	facility:	public	and	private.	All	utilisation	data	were	recorded	between	September	2014	–	March	2015,	at	least	8	months	after	the	introduction	of	the	JKN	programme	on	1	January	2014.	Outpatient	data	were	recorded	based	on	four	weeks	period	prior	to	the	survey	and	inpatient	data	were	based	on	twelve	months	period.	It	might	be	an	issue	if	the	inpatient	visit	happened	before	1	January	2014.	Fortunately,	IFLS	data	provided	information	on	the	time	of	survey	allowing	me	to	split	the	sample	between	observations	made	in	2014	and	2015	and	establish	whether	the	effects	of	the	JKN	programme	are	any	different	across	the	two	groups.	It	will	be	shown	in	the	robustness	check	sub-section.			The	next	step	was	to	choose	control	variables	that	could	be	associated	with	the	insurance	decision	and	outcome	variables	(i.e.	health	care	utilisation);	and,	if	these	were	not	included	in	the	model,	they	would	confound	the	causal	relationship	between	the	insurance	and	the	outcome	variables.	Based	on	Andersen’s	model,	it	is	necessary	to	include	predisposing	characteristics	and	enabling	factors	as	control	variables.	To	capture	predisposing	characteristics,	I	included	gender,	age,	marital	status,	and	locality	of	residence.	Educational	status	and	socioeconomic	status	are	chosen	to	represent	enabling	factors.			
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Socioeconomic	status	is	considered	to	be	the	most	important	enabling	factor.	While	income	and	employment	status	have	been	the	standard	variables	for	measuring	socioeconomic	status	in	high-income	countries,	these	two	variables	rely	on	the	availability	of	rich	dataset	which	may	be	hard	to	find	in	low-middle	income	countries.	The	asset	index	has	been	used	as	a	proxy	measure	of	living	standards	when	neither	income	nor	expenditure	data	are	available	(Moser	and	Felton,	2009;	Booysen	et	al.,	2008;	Sahn	and	Stifel,	2003;	Filmer	and	Pritchett,	2001).	Compared	with	consumption	expenditure	(which	may	also	be	used	as	a	proxy	for	socioeconomic	status),	an	asset	index	may	act	as	a	more	reliable	predictor	with	less	measurement	error	in	several	settings	(for	example,	education	[Filmer	and	Pritchett,	2001]	and	health	[Sahn	and	Stifel,	2003]).	Information	on	the	asset	index	is	based	on	data	collected	in	the	IFLS	household	questionnaire.	The	questionnaire	includes	questions	about	household	possession	of	durable	assets	such	as	a	refrigerator,	television	and	electricity;	and	dwelling	characteristics	such	as	number	of	rooms,	house	size	in	square	metres,	flooring	material,	outer	walls	material,	roof	material,	main	drinking	source,	type	of	toilet,	type	of	sewage	drain	and	main	energy	source	for	cooking.			Principal	components	analysis	(PCA)	is	employed	in	creating	the	asset	index,	and	a	similar	method	is	used	to	create	a	wealth	index	in	the	Demographic	Health	Survey	(DHS)	(Vyas	and	Kumaranayake,	2006).	PCA	considers	the	variation	within	each	input	variable	and	selects	the	best	model	to	explain	the	underlying	structure	of	the	data.	Values	generated	by	PCA	will	normally	have	mean	zero	and	standard	deviation	close	to	one,	therefore	it	allows	negative	numbers.	The	input	variables	should	have	internal	consistency	or	a	strong	correlation	among	themselves	to	ensure	that	all	of	them	measure	the	same	thing.	To	determine	this	internal	consistency,	it	is	advisable	to	calculate	the	Cronbach’s	Alpha	from	all	of	the	input	variables	(Bland	and	Altman,	2002).	When	it	is	used	as	a	research	tool	for	comparing	groups,	Alpha	values	of	0.7	to	0.8	are	regarded	as	satisfactory	(Bland	and	Altman,	1997).	The	Alpha	for	the	assets	index	in	this	analysis	is	0.78	which	lies	within	this	acceptable	range.			Following	Andersen’s	model,	the	use	of	health	services	is	also	influenced	by	both	perceived	need	and	evaluated	need.	Perceived	need	reflects	the	role	of	social	aspects	
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in	explaining	an	individual’s	care-seeking	behaviour	and	it	has	been	captured	by	both	predisposing	characteristics	and	enabling	factors.	Evaluated	need	reflects	the	medical	condition	that	prompts	the	care	seeking.	In	this	study,	I	used	three	health	variables:	number	of	acute	conditions,	number	of	chronic	conditions	and	the	presence	of	physical	disability.			To	control	for	supply-side	factors	which	act	as	an	important	aspect	of	enabling	factors,	I	also	included	the	availability	of	health	care	facilities	in	the	community	area	as	a	density	variable.	Density	variables	were	derived	from	the	number	of	facilities	divided	by	the	village/township	size	in	hectares	(1	hectare	=	10,000	m2),	separated	into	primary	care	facilities	for	outpatient	care	and	hospitals	for	inpatient	care.	Binary	variables	for	each	IFLS	province	are	also	included	to	capture	unobserved	time-fixed	effect	that	may	correlate	with	the	demand	and	supply	of	care	in	the	area	(Gravelle	et	al.,	2003).	To	capture	the	supply-side	factor	more	reliably,	it	is	desirable	to	include	distance	in	km	to	the	nearest	health	care	facility.	Even	though	IFLS	provides	such	measure,	only	less	than	50%	of	the	observation	has	no	missing	data	hence	its	exclusion	from	my	analysis.	Lastly,	I	also	included	dummy	variables	for	each	enumeration	area	to	capture	time-varied	variables	which	are	common	within	the	same	area	(e.g.	local	policy	change	or	local	economic	shock).		
	
 	Estimation	model			A	key	empirical	problem	that	hinders	our	efforts	to	estimate	the	impact	of	health	insurance	is	the	correlation	between	insurance	enrolment	and	demand	for	health	care.	Since	both	voluntary	and	subsidised	schemes	were	not	distributed	randomly,	any	observed	and	unobserved	factors	influencing	the	participation	decision	can	potentially	introduce	bias	into	our	estimation	model.	To	solve	this	problem,	I	utilised	the	panel	structure	of	IFLS	data	by	combining	a	difference-in-differences	(DID)	approach	with	propensity	score	matching	(PSM).	I	accounted	for	potential	bias	due	to	observable	factors	(or	simply	observables)	using	PSM	which	matches	the	treated	with	the	untreated	based	on	observables.	Next,	I	used	DID	to	account	for	any	unobservable	factors	(or	simply	unobservables)	that	may	be	associated	with	
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insurance	decision-making	as	well	as	utilisation	(Wagstaff,	2010a).	Below,	I	discuss	the	intuition	of	obtaining	the	treatment	effect	from	the	combination	of	these	two	approaches	and	I	will	discuss	some	important	assumptions	which	ensure	the	validity	of	this	analysis.			If	we	observe	two	sets	of	outcomes	–	!456 ,	the	outcome	among	the	JKN	enrolees;	!4576 ,	the	outcome	for	the	uninsured	–	we	can	assume:	
Equation	7-1	 !456 = ,(845) +	345 + 956 +	:456 	where	,(845)	is	a	function	of	observable	variables,	845;	345	is	the	expected	benefit	from	the	JKN	accruing	to	those	received	it;	956is	a	time-specific	unobservable	common	to	all	participants;	and	:456 is	an	idiosyncratic	error	term.	For	the	uninsured,	we	have:	
Equation	7-2	 !4576 = ;(845) + 9576 +	:4576	345	does	not	appear	in	this	second	equation	because	the	benefits	of	the	scheme	are	assumed	to	be	gained	by	JKN	enrolees	only.	This	implies	the	non-existence	of	the	spillover	effect.	The	changes	before	and	after	the	introduction	of	JKN	(which	I	labelled	0	and	1,	respectively)	for	each	of	these	groups	can	be	written	as:		
Equation	7-3	 ∆!456 = ,(∆845) +	34= + ∆956 +	∆:456 	
Equation	7-4	 ∆!4576 = ;(∆845) + ∆9576 +	∆:4576	The	expected	difference	between	the	changes	among	the	insured	(i.e.	Equation	7-3)	and	the	uninsured	(i.e.	Equation	7-4)	is	therefore	equal	to:		
Equation	7-5	 >>6,76 = @(∆!456) − @(∆!4576)																	= @B,(∆845)C − @B;(∆845)C + @(34=) + ∆956 − ∆9576 + 	@(∆:456) − @(:4576)	
	The	treatment	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	its	enrolees	is	reflected	by	the	@(345	).		
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 Propensity	score	matching		The	first	difference	in	Equation	7-5,	i.e.	@B,(∆845)C − @B;(∆845)C,	represents	the	differences	of	changes	in	outcomes	due	to	the	difference	in	observables.	This	first	difference	can	be	eliminated	through	matching	each	treated	individual	with	one	or	more	untreated	individuals	who	are	similar	in	terms	of	observable	variables	(845).	In	the	context	of	JKN,	there	are	many	control	variables	that	may	influence	both	the	uptake	of	JKN	insurance	and	health	care	utilisation,	such	as	age,	gender,	socioeconomic	status,	dwelling	area,	education	and	health	condition.	Performing	exact	matching	on	too	many	variables	leads	to	an	insurmountable	number	of	possible	combinations,	a	condition	called	the	“curse	of	dimensionality”	(Dehejia	and	Wahba,	1999).	To	overcome	this	challenge,	I	matched	the	insured	with	the	uninsured	based	on	the	conditional	propensity	score,	defined	as	the	probability	of	the	uptake	of	the	treatment	conditional	on	all	the	covariates	X.	This	method	is	called	Propensity	Score	Matching	[PSM]	(Rosenbaum	and	Rubin,	1983).	PSM	works	by	summarising	information	given	by	the	observable	factors	into	a	one-dimensional	metric,	the	propensity	score.			 	Another	attractive	feature	of	PSM	compared	with	regression	type	estimators	is	its	nonparametric	nature	because	PSM	assumes	a	flexible	functional	form	to	estimate	the	outcome	model	(Rosenbaum	and	Rubin,	1983).	A	better	statistical	balance	between	treatment	and	control	group	after	matching	based	on	the	estimated	propensity	score	is	more	important	than	finding	the	appropriate	model	for	the	outcome	variables	(Wagstaff,	2010a).	To	ensure	the	validity	of	the	estimated	treatment	effect,	it	is	important	to	ensure	the	exogeneity	of	the	observables	in	estimating	the	propensity	score	by	choosing	pre-treatment	characteristics	(Caliendo	and	Kopeinig,	2008).			To	implement	PSM,	a	logit	model	was	estimated	for	the	log-odds	of	enrolment	in	the	JKN	programme	in	2014	using	control	variables	in	2007.	Based	on	this	model,	the	propensity	score	was	predicted	for	each	individual	for	both	voluntary	and	subsidised	groups	separately.	The	use	of	covariates	from	2007,	instead	of	2014,	was	chosen	to	
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ensure	the	exogeneity	of	the	observables.	In	this	application,	the	model	is	not	a	behavioural	one,	but	simply	a	statistical	device	that	enables	me	to	weight	the	differences	in	observable	variables	between	the	treated	and	untreated	groups	(Imbens	and	Rubin,	2015).	In	addition,	I	included	the	sampling	weight	into	the	propensity	score	calculation	to	achieve	unbiased	treatment	effect	estimates	that	are	generalisable	to	the	target	population	of	the	original	survey	(Dugoff,	Schuler	and	Stuart,	2014).			Another	important	step	in	estimating	the	propensity	score	is	to	choose	the	matching	algorithm.	In	this	study,	I	used	several	indicators	that	can	test	the	algorithm’s	performance	in	bias	reduction.	The	choice	of	the	most	appropriate	algorithm	was	determined	after	taking	into	account	the	value	of	all	indicators.	The	first	indicator	is	the	Likelihood	Ratio	test	(LR-test)	of	the	joint	significance	of	all	the	control	(matching)	variables	in	the	logit	model	using	the	propensity	score	as	the	weight.	In	other	words,	we	need	to	re-run	the	propensity	score	model	but	use	the	estimated	propensity	score	as	the	weight.	Intuitively,	once	the	sample	has	been	properly	weighted	by	its	propensity	score,	all	of	the	control	variables	should	have	no	power	in	explaining	the	variation	in	treatment	allocation	(Wagstaff	et	al.,	2009;	Caliendo	and	Kopeinig,	2008).	A	significant	LR-test	means	our	matching	method	has	not	been	adequately	performed	to	achieve	the	balance	between	the	treated	and	non-treated	groups.			Other	important	indicators	that	are	considered	in	this	study	include	the	following	(Leuven	and	Sianesi,	2018):		
• To	quantify	the	bias,	I	calculated	the	mean	bias,	defined	as	the	difference	between	the	sample	means	in	the	matched	treated	and	control	subsamples	as	a	percentage	of	the	square	root	of	the	average	of	the	sample	variances	in	the	treated	and	control	groups.	The	median	of	bias	is	also	calculated	to	account	for	outliers.		
• B	is	the	Rubin’s	B	test	which	shows	the	absolute	standardised	difference	of	means	of	propensity	score	in	the	treated	and	matched	non-treated	groups.	Good	matching	should	have	B	<	25.		
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• R	is	the	Rubin’s	R	ratio	of	treated	to	matched	non-treated	variances	of	the	propensity	score	index.	It	should	be	less	than	2	and	more	than	0.5.		
• I	also	calculated	the	ratio	of	the	variance	of	the	residuals	orthogonal	to	the	linear	index	of	the	propensity	score	in	the	treated	group	over	the	non-treated	group	for	each	covariate.	Variables	that	have	a	ratio	in	the	range	of	(0.5,	0.8)	or	(1.25,	2)	are	labelled	as	“Concern”	whereas	variables	that	have	a	ratio	of	<0.5	or	>2	are	labelled	as	“Bad”	(Rubin,	2001).			The	standard	errors	for	the	coefficients	estimated	from	the	propensity	score	matching	need	to	be	adjusted	to	reflect	the	sampling	variance	in	the	estimates	of	the	propensity	score	(Caliendo	and	Kopeinig,	2008).	One	of	the	most	common	practices	in	dealing	with	this	issue	is	the	use	of	bootstrapping,	as	suggested	by	Lechner	(2002).	Bootstrapping	is	a	common	re-sampling	method	that	allows	for	the	estimation	of	the	sampling	variance	of	estimated	parameters	(Austin	and	Small,	2014).	Bootstrapping	involves	re-estimating	the	propensity	score	and	treatment	effect	calculation	several	times,	often	hundreds	of	times.	Repeating	the	bootstrapping	M	times	results	in	M	estimated	treatment	effect.	The	distribution	of	the	treatment	effect	from	M	bootstrap	samples	approximates	to	the	sampling	distribution	of	the	population	mean.	In	this	chapter,	standard	errors	for	all	PSM	estimates	were	calculated	using	bootstrapping.		
 	Difference-in-difference		While	PSM	is	able	to	eliminate	bias	due	to	the	observables,	it	is	not	sufficient	for	uncovering	the	programme’s	impact,	34=,	in	Equation	7-5.	To	uncover	the	true	treatment	effect,	the	second	and	third	differences,	i.e.	∆956 − ∆9576 + 	@(∆:456) −@(:4576)	need	to	disappear.	Difference-in-difference	(DID)	is	able	to	eliminate	these	unobservable	biases	using	two	important	assumptions:		(a) The	time-specific	unobservable	factor	exhibits	the	same	trend	between	the	treated	and	the	untreated	(i.e.	the	9′s	change	at	the	same	speed).	This	will	eliminate	the	first	difference	in	unobservables,	i.e.	∆956 − ∆9576 .	
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(b) The	expectation	of	the	change	in	the	idiosyncratic	errors	is	zero	among	both	the	treated	and	untreated.	It	refers	to	the	second	difference	in	the	unobservables,	i.e.	∆956 − ∆9576 .	If	these	two	assumptions	can	be	justified,	DID	may	allow	us	to	estimate	the	impact	of	a	programme.	Below	I	will	explain	the	DID	assumptions	in	more	detail.		The	first	key	assumption	of	the	DID	estimator	is	that	the	outcome	trends	would	have	been	the	same	in	both	groups	in	the	absence	of	the	treatment.	In	an	ideal	experimental	situation,	we	are	usually	interested	in	estimating	the	treatment	effect	for	all	participants	(both	treated	and	non-treated	groups)	and	this	is	called	the	average	treatment	effect	(ATE).	However,	in	a	non-experiment	setting,	ATE	estimation	requires	strongly	ignorable	treatment	assignment	assumptions,	namely	unconfoundedness	and	overlap,	and	they	are	often	violated	in	most	applications	(Imbens	and	Rubin,	2015).	Another	alternative	is	to	calculate	the	treatment	effect	only	for	the	treated	group,	which	is	called	the	average	treatment	effect	on	treated	(ATT)	and	it	requires	weaker	assumptions	than	ATE	(Wooldridge,	2010).	It	follows	from	this	that	ATT	can	be	calculated	by	taking	the	difference	between	the	difference	of	outcome	in	the	treatment	group	(Y1,2014-	Y1,2007)	and	the	difference	of	outcome	in	the	control	group	(Y0,2014-	Y0,2007),	if	the	counterfactual	outcome	trend	in	the	treatment	group	(i.e.	if	the	treated	remained	untreated)	was	assumed	to	follow	a	similar	slope	as	the	control	group.	This	assumption	is	often	called	the	“parallel	trend	assumption”.	Depending	on	the	context,	there	may	be	several	forms	of	this	assumption	and	different	approaches	for	testing	it.	We	can	test	this	assumption	by	calculating	the	effect	of	the	treatment	on	the	outcome	before	the	programme	was	implemented	(Angrist	and	Pischke,	2008).	To	test	the	parallel	trend	assumption	in	this	analysis,	I	performed	a	placebo	test	by	estimating	the	impact	of	JKN	on	the	difference-in-difference	estimates	from	IFLS	2000	and	IFLS	2007.	If	the	parallel	trend	assumption	was	valid,	then	the	treatment	variable	should	not	have	any	effect	on	past	outcomes.	This	assumption	is	violated	if	the	obtained	effects	are	statistically	significant	different	at	a	5	percent	level.			
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The	second	type	of	unobservable	bias	due	to	time-varying	unobservable	factors	cannot	be	eliminated	by	DID.	To	assess	the	scope	of	this	hidden	bias,	I	calculated	the	Rosenbaum	bounds	for	the	treatment	effects.	This	test	gives	an	indication	of	the	extent	of	hidden	bias	that	is	required	to	undermine	interpretation	of	the	propensity	score	estimates	(Rosenbaum,	2002).	The	bounding	approach	does	not	test	the	unconfoundedness	assumption,	because	this	would	amount	to	testing	that	there	are	no	(unobserved)	variables	that	influence	the	selection	into	treatment.	Instead,	Rosenbaum	bounds	provide	evidence	on	the	degree	to	which	any	significance	results	hinge	on	this	untestable	assumption	(Becker	and	Caliendo,	2007).		Only	a	single	pre-intervention	time	point	was	chosen	due	to	sample	size	consideration.	Considering	my	strict	inclusion	criteria	to	identify	the	treated	group,	the	inclusion	of	more	than	one	pre-intervention	period	would	likely	to	reduce	the	number	of	the	treated	group	and	reduce	the	statistical	power	of	my	analysis.	Nevertheless,	I	utilised	an	additional	pre-intervention	period	to	test	parallel	trend	assumption	to	check	the	robustness	of	my	findings.				
Section	7.4 	Findings			
 	Descriptive	statistics	Table	7-1	presents	a	descriptive	(unadjusted)	table	of	the	proportions	of	outpatient	and	inpatient	use,	whereas	Figure	7-5	shows	descriptive	figures	for	the	frequency	of	outpatient	and	inpatient	visits.	Compared	with	the	uninsured,	both	the	contributory	and	subsidised	groups	had	a	higher	proportion	and	level	of	utilisation	of	outpatient	and	inpatient	care	in	public	and	private	facilities.	This	increase	was	observed	at	both	the	pre-reform	(i.e.	2007)	and	post-reform	(i.e.	2014)	stages.	The	only	exception	was	that	the	subsidised	group	had	a	slightly	lower	frequency	of	inpatient	visits	compared	with	the	uninsured	group	in	2007	(see	Figure	7-5.B).	These	results	indicate	a	higher	possibility	of	insurance	selection	bias	for	the	contributory	group,	as	they	already	had	higher	probability	and	frequency	of	utilisation	before	the	JKN	programme	was	introduced.	Failing	to	tackle	this	insurance	bias	will	lead	to	a	misleading	causal	effect.			
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Table	7-1	Summary	of	utilisation	profiles,	by	year	and	insurance	status	Variables	 Uninsured		(N	=	8,576)	 JKN	Contributory	(N	=9,82)	 JKN	Subsidised	(N	=	2,503)	2007*	 	 	 	Probability	of	outpatient	visits		 12.0%	 14.4%	 13.2%	Probability	of	inpatient	visits		 2.0%	 3.3%	 1.7%	2014	 	 	 	Probability	of	outpatient	visits		 14.5%	 23.4%	 17.4%	Probability	of	inpatient	visits		 2.6%	 11.2%	 4.2%	
*Since	the	JKN	programme	was	introduced	in	2014,	the	figures	for	JKN	enrolees	in	2007	represented	their	utilisation	
when	they	were	still	uninsured	in	2007.		
(A)	Outpatient	 	 	 	
	 	(B)	Inpatient	
		 Figure	7-5	Number	of	visits	by	type	of	care,	year	and	insurance	status	
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Table	7-2	shows	the	characteristics	of	survey	respondents	by	insurance	status	and	year.	Individuals	belong	to	the	JKN	contributory	group	were	younger,	more	likely	to	live	in	an	urban	area,	wealthier,	more	likely	to	have	completed	higher	education,	and	more	likely	to	live	in	an	area	with	more	health	facilities	compared	with	the	uninsured.	Meanwhile,	individuals	belong	to	the	JKN	subsidised	group	were	poorer,	less	likely	to	finish	higher	education,	and	more	likely	to	live	in	an	area	with	fewer	health	facilities	compared	to	the	uninsured.			
Table	7-2	Descriptive	statistics	for	control	variables,	by	year	and	insurance	status	Variables	 2007	 	 	 2014	
Uninsured	
(N=8,564)	
JKN	
Contributory	
(N=975)	
JKN	
Subsidised	
(N=2,495)	
	
	
Uninsured	
(N=8,564)	
JKN	
Contributory	
(N=975)	
JKN	
Subsidised	
(N=2,495)	Age	(year)	 37.18	 33.8	 37.33	 	 	 43.7	 40.33	 43.8	Male	(%)	 45.7	 42	 45	 	 	 46	 42	 45	Marital	status	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Single	(%)	 18.9	 24	 15	 	 	 8.7	 9.5	 6.3	Married	(%)	 72.5	 72	 77	 	 	 78.5	 82.2	 81.2	Divorced/widowed	(%)	 8.6	 4.2	 8.4	 	 	 12.8	 8.5	 12.5	Urban	(%)	 41.2	 71.2	 43.8	 	 	 41.2	 71.2	 43.8	Highest	education	level	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Primary	education	(%)	 41.1	 22	 51	 	 	 40.5	 21	 49	Secondary	education	(%)	 44.8	 61	 38	 	 	 43.3	 59.2	 38	College	(%)	 1.8	 6	 1	 	 	 2	 4.9	 1.1	Higher	education	(%)	 3	 8	 1	 	 	 5.5	 12.6	 2.1	No	education	(%)	 8.6	 3	 9	 	 	 8	 2.2	 9.1	Poorest	–	lowest	quintile*	(%)	 20.1	 9.2	 32.6	 	 	 20.4	 7.1	 32.2	Richest	–	highest	quintile*	(%)	 16	 35.2	 5	 	 	 17.2	 39.6	 7	No.	of	acute	conditions	 2.11	 2.34	 2.12	 	 	 3.33	 3.54	 3.63	No.	of	chronic	conditions	 0.16	 0.15	 0.14	 	 	 0.32	 0.38	 0.31	Any	disability	(%)	 0.9	 1.4	 0.3	 	 	 8.2	 12	 7.6	Density	of	outpatient	health	facilities	**	 0.2	 0.549	 0.11	 	 	 0.242	 0.631	 0.135	Density	of	inpatient	health	facilities	**	 0.036	 0.098	 0.018	 	 	 0.053	 0.177	 0.027	Recipient	of	unconditional	cash	transfer	(%)	 15.9	 12.9	 35	 	 	 1	 11.2	 53	
*The	asset	index	is	calculated	by	combining	variables	reflecting	the	possession	of	certain	durable	assets	and	the	
characteristics	of	the	dwellings	via	principal	component	analysis.	A	lower	asset	index	represents	lower	socioeconomic	
status	and	vice	versa.	
**Density	variables	were	derived	from	the	number	of	facilities	divided	by	the	village/township	size	in	hectares	(1	
hectare	=	10,000	m2)		
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From	these	descriptive	statistics,	it	is	clear	that	both	the	contributory	and	subsidised	groups	have	different	characteristics	that	may	influence	both	utilisation	variables	and	the	uptake	of	insurance,	hence	the	decision	to	separate	these	two	groups.	With	regards	to	medical	need	measured	by	number	of	acute	conditions,	number	of	chronic	conditions,	and	the	presence	of	any	disability,	the	contributory	group	is	likely	to	have	a	greater	need	compared	with	the	uninsured.	The	subsidised	group,	however,	does	not	always	show	a	higher	medical	need	compared	to	the	uninsured,	either	at	a	similar	level	or	lower.	This	may	be	an	indication	that	the	insurance	selection	bias	for	the	subsidised	group	is	not	large.	Furthermore,	the	supply-side	variables,	measured	by	the	density	of	health	care	facilities,	may	influence	the	insurance	selection	bias	within	the	contributory	group.	Contributory	group	members	are	more	likely	to	live	in	an	area	which	has	a	higher	density	of	health	care	facilities	than	the	uninsured.	This	finding	may	be	explained	by	a	higher	probability	of	living	in	an	urban	area,	which	tends	to	have	more	clinics	and	hospitals,	within	the	contributory	group.	Interestingly,	although	both	the	subsidised	and	the	uninsured	groups	tend	to	live	in	rural	areas,	the	subsidised	group	is	more	likely	to	live	in	an	area	with	a	lower	density	of	health	care	facilities.		
 Naïve	estimator	In	this	sub-section,	I	will	show	the	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	without	taking	into	account	insurance	selection	bias	explicitly	as	a	comparator	to	findings	based	on	PSM-DID	later	in	the	next	sub-section.	Logit	model	and	negative	binomial	regression	model	are	used	to	model	binary	outcome	variable	and	count	data	outcome	variable,	respectively.	The	logit	model	follows	
Equation	7-6	FG	 H IJ=KIJL = 	$ + M4N4 +	∑ &484PQR= + S4	,	with:	Pr(V4 = 1	|	84) = 	W4 	V4 	refers	to	my	binary	outcome	variable,	i.e.	the	proportion	of	utilising	care;	84Q 	includes	all	control	variables	described	in	sub-section	7.33	and	&4Q 	is	the	coefficient	for	each	84Q;	α	 is	 the	 model	 intercept,	 and	 S4 	 captures	 random	 error	 term.	 N4 	 represents	 the	insurance	status	with	T	=	1	as	being	insured	and	T	=0	as	being	uninsured.	Thus,	M4 	can	be	 interpreted	 as	 the	 log	 odds	 ratio	 of	 the	 JKN	 programme	 impact	 comparing	 the	
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insured	group	to	the	uninsured.	Given	the	slope’s	coefficient	in	logit	model	no	longer	has	a	marginal	effect	interpretation,	I	calculated	the	partial	effect	at	the	average	(PEA)	referring	 to	 the	 marginal	 effect	 at	 the	 mean	 of	 covariates	 (Wooldridge,	 2013).	 In	addition,	 the	 count	 data	 variable,	 i.e.	 the	 number	 of	 visits,	 is	modelled	 by	 negative	binomial	 regression	model,	which	 is	 similar	 to	 Poisson	model	 but	 allows	 for	 over-dispersion	issue	by	assuming	that	there	will	be	random	variability	among	individuals	who	have	the	same	predicted	value	(Cameron	and	Trivedi,	2010).				
1Table	7-3	Naive	estimator	for	utilisation	of	health	care	
Variables	 Contributory		 Subsidised	
Outpatient	care	 	 	Probability	of	utilising	any	outpatient	visit	in	the	past	month	 6.95***	 2.35***	(%)	 (1.11)	 (0.95)	Number	of	total	visits	(all)	 0.17***	 0.04***		 (0.02)	 (0.02)	Number	of	total	visits	(public)	 0.09***	 0.06***		 (0.01)	 (0.01)	Number	of	total	visits	(private)	 0.08***	 -0.02		 (0.02)	 (0.02)	
Inpatient	care	 	 	Probability	of	utilising	any	inpatient	visit	in	the	past	year	 4.6***	 0.96**	(%)	 (0.45)	 (0.23	Number	of	total	visits	(all)	 0.07***	 0.02***		 (0.01)	 (0.01)	Number	of	total	visits	(public)	 0.05***	 0.02***		 (0.01)	 (0.37)	Number	of	total	visits	(private)	 0.02***	 -0.001		 (0.004)	 (0.02)	
Note:	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	have	been	adjusted	for	complex	survey	design.	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01		1Table	7-3	shows	the	results	of	the	logit	model	for	the	binary	outcome	of	outpatient	and	inpatient	visits	and	the	negative	binomial	regression	model	for	the	number	of	visits	to	public	and	private	facilities.	All	coefficients	show	the	marginal	effect	of	the	JKN	programme.	Overall,	both	the	contributory	and	subsidised	groups	showed	significantly	higher	probability	and	frequency	of	utilisation	for	both	outpatient	and	inpatient	care,	especially	in	public	facilities.	The	subsidised	group	showed	no	increased	visits	to	private	facilities,	but	the	contributory	group,	on	average,	made	0.08	more	outpatient	visits	and	0.02	more	inpatient	visits	compared	with	the	
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uninsured.	Naïve	estimators	are	not	able	to	estimate	the	true	causal	effect	because	of	their	failure	to	tackle	insurance	selection	bias.	In	the	next	sub-section,	I	will	begin	by	presenting	the	results	of	the	PSM-DID	analysis,	which	is	argued	to	be	more	robust	than	the	naïve	estimator.			
 Diagnostic	tests	of	matching	algorithms		Firstly,	I	provided	a	comparison	of	the	different	matching	algorithms	to	select	the	best	one	for	my	PSM-DID	analysis.	Based	on	the	quality	indicators	in	judging	the	extent	of	bias	reduction	from	each	matching	algorithm	in		 	
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Table	7-4,	radius	matching	and	kernel	matching	perform	better	than	the	others.	I	decided	to	choose	Kernel	matching	–	its	validity	in	terms	of	using	bootstrapping	to	obtain	the	corrected	standard	errors	is	well	established	(Heckman,	Ichimura,	and	Todd,	1998;	Abadie	and	Imbens,	2008).			Figure	7-6	(a)	and	(b)	show	the	histograms	for	the	propensity	scores	after	matching	using	the	kernel	matching.	Despite	its	skewed	distribution,	there	are	ample	overlaps	between	the	treated	and	the	control	group.	This	implies	that	the	matching	has	successfully	retained	adequate	samples	to	avoid	attrition	bias	from	the	cases	of	off-support.	Figure	7-6	(c)	and	(d)	show	the	extent	to	which	matching	has	reduced	the	bias	in	our	analysis.	Both	graphs	show	that	after	matching,	the	standardised	percentage	of	bias	across	covariates	has	been	reduced	to	near	zero.					 	
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Table	7-4	Comparison	of	the	bias	across	different	matching	techniques	(command	=	psmatch2	and	pstest)	
Matching	technique	 LR	chi2	 p-value	 Mean	
Bias	
B	 R	 %	
concern	
%	
bad	
Off	
support	
Contributory	group	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Unmatched	 743.34	 <0.01	 16.20	 97.7*	 0.72	 30	 18	 -	1	to	1	matching	 11.87	 1.00	 1.90	 15.50	 1.01	 6	 0	 0	1	to	1	no	replacement	 11.70	 1.00	 2.20	 15.40	 1.05	 3	 0	 0	Nearest	neighbour	matching	(n=5)	caliper	0.01	
4.10	 1.00	 1.20	 9.10	 1.05	 3	 0	 1	
Radius	caliper	0.01	 1.63	 1.00	 0.70	 5.80	 1.03	 0	 0	 1	Kernel	(bandwidth=0.01)	 1.68	 1.00	 0.70	 5.80	 1.04	 0	 0	 1	Kernel	normal	(bandwidth=0.01)	 11.87	 1.00	 1.90	 15.50	 1.01	 6	 0	 0	Mahalanobis		 23.65	 0.89	 1.80	 22.00	 1.35	 6	 0	 0		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Subsidised	group	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Unmatched	 862	 <0.01	 12.7	 115.6*	 1.81	 34	 12	 -	1	to	1	matching	 13.26	 0.998	 2.7	 19.1	 1.11	 12	 3	 0	1	to	1	no	replacement	 14.03	 0.998	 3.1	 19.7	 1.15	 25	 0	 0	Nearest	neighbour	matching	(n=5)	caliper	0.01	
4.30	 1.00	 1.50	 10.90	 1.14	 6	 0	 1	
Radius	caliper	0.01	 2.90	 1.00	 1.20	 8.90	 0.95	 0	 0	 1	Kernel	(bandwidth=0.01)	 2.93	 1.00	 1.20	 9.00	 0.95	 0	 0	 1	Kernel	normal	(bandwidth=0.01)	 13.26	 1.00	 2.70	 19.10	 1.11	 12	 3	 0	Mahalanobis		 32.74	 0.43	 3.10	 30.2*	 1.30	 3	 0	 0	
*	if	B>25%,	R	outside	[0.5;	2]			
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		 	 	 (a)	 	 	 	 	 	 (b)	
		 	 	 (c)	 	 	 	 	 	 (d)	
Figure	7-6	Support	and	balance	after	kernel	matching		(a)	shows	support	between	treated	and	untreated	for	the	contributory	group	whereas	(b)	is	for	the	subsidised	group.		(c)	and	(d)	show	the	reduced	bias	before	and	after	matching	for	the	contributory	group	and	subsidised	group	respectively.						
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 Impact	estimates	from	PSM-DID		Table	7-5	reports	the	results	of	the	adjusted	analysis	of	outpatient	and	inpatient	visits	based	on	PSM	with	kernel	matching	and	DID	following	Equation	7-5.	This	was	implemented	by	(1)	calculating	the	first	difference,	that	is,	the	difference	in	the	mean	outcomes	between	2007	and	2014	for	each	group;	and	then	(2)	taking	the	difference	of	the	first	differences	between	the	treated	and	untreated	groups	to	estimate	the	average	treatment	effect	on	the	treated	(ATT).	The	first	column	shows	the	ATT	for	the	contributory	group.	The	contributory	group	had	7.9	percent	(95%	CI:	4.3%	-	11.4%)	and	8.2	percent	(95%	CI:	5.9%	-	10.5%)	higher	probabilities	of	using	outpatient	and	inpatient	care,	respectively,	compared	with	the	uninsured.	Furthermore,	the	contributory	group	had	0.16	(95%	CI:	0.05	–	0.27)	more	outpatient	visits	per	person	per	month	and	0.1	(95%	CI:	0.08	–	0.14)	more	inpatient	visits	per	person	per	year	compared	to	the	uninsured.	This	higher	number	of	total	visits	was	likely	to	occur	in	public	facilities.	While	the	number	of	outpatient	visits	to	private	facilities	was	not	significantly	affected,	the	number	of	inpatient	visits	to	private	facilities	increased	significantly.			The	fourth	column	shows	the	ATT	for	the	subsidised	group.	It	appears	that	the	JKN	programme	increased	the	probability	of	seeking	care	at	outpatient	facilities	among	the	subsidised	group	by	2	percent	(95%	CI:	-0.4%	-	4.3%),	but	this	effect	is	not	significant	at	10	percent	level.	Meanwhile,	the	subsidised	group	also	increased	their	probability	of	having	any	inpatient	visit	by	1.8	percent	(95%	CI:	0.7%	-	2.8%)	compared	with	the	uninsured.	In	addition,	the	JKN	subsidised	group	spent	more	number	of	visits	to	public	facilities	for	both	outpatient	and	inpatient	care	compared	to	the	uninsured.	Overall,	the	estimates	obtained	from	the	subsidised	group	were	smaller	in	magnitude	than	the	estimates	from	the	contributory	group.						
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Table	7-5	Average	treatment	effects	on	treated	(ATT)	estimates	for	both	contributory	and	subsidised	groups	relative	
to	the	uninsured		 Contributory	 	 	 Subsidised	Outcomes	 ATT	 95%	CI	 	 	 ATT	 95%	CI		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 	 	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Outpatient	care	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Probability	of	having	outpatient	visits	 7.87%***	 4.32%	 11.43%	 	 	 1.96%	 -0.36%	 4.27%	Number	of	visits	(all)	 0.158***	 0.046	 0.269	 	 	 0.063***	 0.016	 0.110	Number	of	visits	(public)	 0.115***	 0.072	 0.158	 	 	 0.059***	 0.024	 0.094	Number	of	visits	(private)	 0.043	 -0.050	 0.135	 	 	 0.004	 -0.028	 0.036		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Inpatient	care	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Probability	of	having	inpatient	visits	 8.18%***	 5.89%	 10.46%	 	 	 1.76%***	 0.70%	 2.82%	Number	of	visits	(all)	 0.109***	 0.079	 0.138	 	 	 0.023***	 0.006	 0.040	Number	of	visits	(public)	 0.073***	 0.054	 0.091	 	 	 0.018***	 0.004	 0.033	Number	of	visits	(private)	 0.036***	 0.010	 0.062	 	 	 0.005	 -0.005	 0.014	
Note:	ATT	is	calculated	by	simply	taking	the	difference	between	the	treated	(either	contributory	or	subsidised)	and	the	control	
(uninsured)	groups.	The	treated	group	was	matched	with	the	control	group	through	kernel	Epanechnikov	matching	with	
bandwidth	=	0.01.	The	standard	errors	were	calculated	by	bootstrapping	with	200	replications.					*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01		
 
	 Probability	of	having	outpatient	visits	(%)	
Number	of	outpatient	visits	(all)	 Number	of	outpatient	visits	(public)	
Number	of	outpatient	visits	(private)	
Probability	of	having	inpatient	visits	(%)	
Number	of	inpatient	visits	(all)	 Number	of	inpatient	visits	(public)	
Number	of	inpatient	visits	(private)	Subsidised	Group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Q1	 -1.1	 0.013	 0.009	 0.004	 0.015	 0.010	 0.012	 -0.002	(N	=	2547)	 (2.1)	 (0.046)	 (0.039)	 (0.023)	 (0.010)	 (0.012)	 (0.009)	 (0.006)	Q2	 6.9***	 0.126**	 0.112***	 0.015	 -0.004	 -0.001	 0.010	 -0.011	(N	=	2525)	 (2.7)	 (0.060)	 (0.037)	 (0.034)	 (0.013)	 (0.014)	 (0.014)	 (0.006)	Q3	 0.6	 0.056	 0.087*	 -0.031	 0.032***	 0.042**	 0.033*	 0.009	(N	=	2324)	 (2.1)	 (0.047)	 (0.045)	 (0.033)	 (0.011)	 (0.021)	 (0.019)	 (0.008)	Q4	 1.3	 0.047	 0.066*	 -0.020	 0.030**	 0.049*	 0.039	 0.010	(N=	2011)	 (2.4)	 (0.044)	 (0.034)	 (0.033)	 (0.014)	 (0.028)	 (0.027)	 (0.007)	Q5	 9.3*	 0.180*	 0.044	 0.136*	 0.017	 0.043	 0.009	 0.034	(N=	1653)	 (5.4)	 (0.101)	 (0.060)	 (0.081)	 (0.023)	 (0.049)	 (0.029)	 (0.047)	Urban	 3.2	 0.112***	 0.114***	 -0.002	 0.016*	 0.026*	 0.019	 0.007	(N	=	4545)	 (2.1)	 (0.038)	 (0.028)	 (0.027)	 (0.009)	 (0.016)	 (0.015)	 (0.008)	Rural	 1.1	 0.025	 0.019	 0.006	 0.017**	 0.019*	 0.018**	 0.001	(N	=	6525)	 (0.013)	 (0.037)	 (0.024)	 (0.029)	 (0.007)	 (0.011)	 (0.009)	 (0.005)	Contributory	Group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Q1		 -2.4	 -0.018	 0.052	 -0.070	 0.041	 0.046	 0.006	 0.040	(N	=	1814)	 (6.3)	 (0.112)	 (0.056)	 (0.091)	 (0.047)	 (0.056)	 (0.035)	 (0.029)	Q2	 11.3**	 0.312	 0.173*	 0.139	 0.081**	 0.184***	 0.117**	 0.067	(N	=	1950)	 (5.6)	 (0.194)	 (0.099)	 (0.142)	 (0.029)	 (0.061)	 (0.048)	 (0.048)	
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Table	7-6	
demonstrates	the	impact	of	the	JKN	programme	on	the	contributory	group	and	the	subsidised	group	stratified	by	asset	index	quintiles.	The	impact	on	the	contributory	group	was	observed	across	all	quintiles,	except	the	poorest	(1st	quintile).	A	higher	impact	among	the	wealthiest	was	expected	because	they	were	more	likely	to	afford	the	premium.	Meanwhile,	the	effects	on	the	subsidised	group	showed	a	different	pattern:	increased	outpatient	utilisation	was	higher	in	the	second	quintile	but	the	effect	on	inpatient	utilisation	was	stronger	among	the	third	and	fourth	quintiles.	No	effect	was	observed	among	the	poorest	quintile.	In	addition,	the	positive	impact	among	more	affluent	individuals	may	confirm	the	suspicion	that	some	of	the	subsidies	were	misdirected.	The	premium	subsidy	within	the	JKN	programme	was	targeted	to	reach	the	40-percent	poorest	population	only.			The	impact	estimates	were	also	stratified	by	urban	and	rural	area	(see	 
Q3	 10.6***	 0.172	 0.176***	 -0.005	 0.099***	 0.113**	 0.083**	 0.030	(N	=	1979)	 (3.1)	 (0.279)	 (0.065)	 (0.279)	 (0.034)	 (0.050)	 (0.038)	 (0.025)	Q4	 8.8**	 0.081	 0.060*	 0.021	 0.095***	 0.126***	 0.090**	 0.036**	(N	=	1933)	 (3.9)	 (0.073)	 (0.033)	 (0.066)	 (0.029)	 (0.041)	 (0.036)	 (0.015)	Q5	 8.3**	 0.207**	 0.126***	 0.081	 0.071***	 0.080***	 0.054***	 0.026	(N	=	1866)	 (3.8)	 (0.081)	 (0.037)	 (0.066)	 (0.019)	 (0.025)	 (0.012)	 (0.023)	Urban	 8.5***	 0.146**	 0.119***	 0.026	 0.097***	 0.128***	 0.082***	 0.046***	(N	=	4224)	 (2.1)	 (0.066)	 (0.025)	 (0.060)	 (0.015)	 (0.021)	 (0.016)	 (0.015)	Rural	 6.8**	 0.199*	 0.109***	 0.090	 0.044**	 0.063**	 0.051***	 0.013	(N	=	5327)	 (3.2)	 (0.111)	 (0.031)	 (0.093)	 (0.018)	 (0.031)	 (0.015)	 (0.020)	
	 Probability	of	having	outpatient	visits	(%)	
Number	of	outpatient	visits	(all)	 Number	of	outpatient	visits	(public)	
Number	of	outpatient	visits	(private)	
Probability	of	having	inpatient	visits	(%)	
Number	of	inpatient	visits	(all)	 Number	of	inpatient	visits	(public)	
Number	of	inpatient	visits	(private)	Subsidised	Group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Q1	 -1.1	 0.013	 0.009	 0.004	 0.015	 0.010	 0.012	 -0.002	(N	=	2547)	 (2.1)	 (0.046)	 (0.039)	 (0.023)	 (0.010)	 (0.012)	 (0.009)	 (0.006)	Q2	 6.9***	 0.126**	 0.112***	 0.015	 -0.004	 -0.001	 0.010	 -0.011	(N	=	2525)	 (2.7)	 (0.060)	 (0.037)	 (0.034)	 (0.013)	 (0.014)	 (0.014)	 (0.006)	Q3	 0.6	 0.056	 0.087*	 -0.031	 0.032***	 0.042**	 0.033*	 0.009	(N	=	2324)	 (2.1)	 (0.047)	 (0.045)	 (0.033)	 (0.011)	 (0.021)	 (0.019)	 (0.008)	Q4	 1.3	 0.047	 0.066*	 -0.020	 0.030**	 0.049*	 0.039	 0.010	(N=	2011)	 (2.4)	 (0.044)	 (0.034)	 (0.033)	 (0.014)	 (0.028)	 (0.027)	 (0.007)	Q5	 9.3*	 0.180*	 0.044	 0.136*	 0.017	 0.043	 0.009	 0.034	(N=	1653)	 (5.4)	 (0.101)	 (0.060)	 (0.081)	 (0.023)	 (0.049)	 (0.029)	 (0.047)	Urban	 3.2	 0.112***	 0.114***	 -0.002	 0.016*	 0.026*	 0.019	 0.007	(N	=	4545)	 (2.1)	 (0.038)	 (0.028)	 (0.027)	 (0.009)	 (0.016)	 (0.015)	 (0.008)	Rural	 1.1	 0.025	 0.019	 0.006	 0.017**	 0.019*	 0.018**	 0.001	(N	=	6525)	 (0.013)	 (0.037)	 (0.024)	 (0.029)	 (0.007)	 (0.011)	 (0.009)	 (0.005)	Contributory	Group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Q1		 -2.4	 -0.018	 0.052	 -0.070	 0.041	 0.046	 0.006	 0.040	
		 177	
Table	7-6).	Among	the	contributory	group,	enrolees	from	both	rural	and	urban	areas	showed	a	similar	pattern	of	positive	and	significant	effects	on	both	outpatient	and	inpatient	utilisation.	Subsidised	individuals	living	in	rural	areas	showed	a	positive	impact	on	inpatient	utilisation,	whereas	those	living	in	urban	areas	showed	a	positive	impact	only	on	the	frequency	of	outpatient	utilisation	in	public	facilities.			
(N	=	1814)	 (6.3)	 (0.112)	 (0.056)	 (0.091)	 (0.047)	 (0.056)	 (0.035)	 (0.029)	Q2	 11.3**	 0.312	 0.173*	 0.139	 0.081**	 0.184***	 0.117**	 0.067	(N	=	1950)	 (5.6)	 (0.194)	 (0.099)	 (0.142)	 (0.029)	 (0.061)	 (0.048)	 (0.048)	Q3	 10.6***	 0.172	 0.176***	 -0.005	 0.099***	 0.113**	 0.083**	 0.030	(N	=	1979)	 (3.1)	 (0.279)	 (0.065)	 (0.279)	 (0.034)	 (0.050)	 (0.038)	 (0.025)	Q4	 8.8**	 0.081	 0.060*	 0.021	 0.095***	 0.126***	 0.090**	 0.036**	(N	=	1933)	 (3.9)	 (0.073)	 (0.033)	 (0.066)	 (0.029)	 (0.041)	 (0.036)	 (0.015)	Q5	 8.3**	 0.207**	 0.126***	 0.081	 0.071***	 0.080***	 0.054***	 0.026	(N	=	1866)	 (3.8)	 (0.081)	 (0.037)	 (0.066)	 (0.019)	 (0.025)	 (0.012)	 (0.023)	Urban	 8.5***	 0.146**	 0.119***	 0.026	 0.097***	 0.128***	 0.082***	 0.046***	(N	=	4224)	 (2.1)	 (0.066)	 (0.025)	 (0.060)	 (0.015)	 (0.021)	 (0.016)	 (0.015)	Rural	 6.8**	 0.199*	 0.109***	 0.090	 0.044**	 0.063**	 0.051***	 0.013	(N	=	5327)	 (3.2)	 (0.111)	 (0.031)	 (0.093)	 (0.018)	 (0.031)	 (0.015)	 (0.020)	
	 Probability	of	having	outpatient	visits	(%)	
Number	of	outpatient	visits	(all)	 Number	of	outpatient	visits	(public)	
Number	of	outpatient	visits	(private)	
Probability	of	having	inpatient	visits	(%)	
Number	of	inpatient	visits	(all)	 Number	of	inpatient	visits	(public)	
Number	of	inpatient	visits	(private)	Subsidised	Group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Q1	 -1.1	 0.013	 0.009	 0.004	 0.015	 0.010	 0.012	 -0.002	(N	=	2547)	 (2.1)	 (0.046)	 (0.039)	 (0.023)	 (0.010)	 (0.012)	 (0.009)	 (0.006)	Q2	 6.9***	 0.126**	 0.112***	 0.015	 -0.004	 -0.001	 0.010	 -0.011	(N	=	2525)	 (2.7)	 (0.060)	 (0.037)	 (0.034)	 (0.013)	 (0.014)	 (0.014)	 (0.006)	Q3	 0.6	 0.056	 0.087*	 -0.031	 0.032***	 0.042**	 0.033*	 0.009	(N	=	2324)	 (2.1)	 (0.047)	 (0.045)	 (0.033)	 (0.011)	 (0.021)	 (0.019)	 (0.008)	Q4	 1.3	 0.047	 0.066*	 -0.020	 0.030**	 0.049*	 0.039	 0.010	(N=	2011)	 (2.4)	 (0.044)	 (0.034)	 (0.033)	 (0.014)	 (0.028)	 (0.027)	 (0.007)	Q5	 9.3*	 0.180*	 0.044	 0.136*	 0.017	 0.043	 0.009	 0.034	(N=	1653)	 (5.4)	 (0.101)	 (0.060)	 (0.081)	 (0.023)	 (0.049)	 (0.029)	 (0.047)	Urban	 3.2	 0.112***	 0.114***	 -0.002	 0.016*	 0.026*	 0.019	 0.007	(N	=	4545)	 (2.1)	 (0.038)	 (0.028)	 (0.027)	 (0.009)	 (0.016)	 (0.015)	 (0.008)	Rural	 1.1	 0.025	 0.019	 0.006	 0.017**	 0.019*	 0.018**	 0.001	(N	=	6525)	 (0.013)	 (0.037)	 (0.024)	 (0.029)	 (0.007)	 (0.011)	 (0.009)	 (0.005)	Contributory	Group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Q1		 -2.4	 -0.018	 0.052	 -0.070	 0.041	 0.046	 0.006	 0.040	(N	=	1814)	 (6.3)	 (0.112)	 (0.056)	 (0.091)	 (0.047)	 (0.056)	 (0.035)	 (0.029)	Q2	 11.3**	 0.312	 0.173*	 0.139	 0.081**	 0.184***	 0.117**	 0.067	(N	=	1950)	 (5.6)	 (0.194)	 (0.099)	 (0.142)	 (0.029)	 (0.061)	 (0.048)	 (0.048)	Q3	 10.6***	 0.172	 0.176***	 -0.005	 0.099***	 0.113**	 0.083**	 0.030	(N	=	1979)	 (3.1)	 (0.279)	 (0.065)	 (0.279)	 (0.034)	 (0.050)	 (0.038)	 (0.025)	Q4	 8.8**	 0.081	 0.060*	 0.021	 0.095***	 0.126***	 0.090**	 0.036**	(N	=	1933)	 (3.9)	 (0.073)	 (0.033)	 (0.066)	 (0.029)	 (0.041)	 (0.036)	 (0.015)	Q5	 8.3**	 0.207**	 0.126***	 0.081	 0.071***	 0.080***	 0.054***	 0.026	
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Table	
7-6	
PSM-
DID	
findings	
on	the	
impact	
of	health	insurance	on	both	the	subsidised	and	contributory	groups,	by	socioeconomic	status	quintiles	and	
urban/rural	location	
ATT	is	calculated	by	simply	taking	the	difference	between	the	treated	(either	contributory	or	subsidised)	and	the	control	
(uninsured)	group.	The	treated	group	was	matched	with	the	control	group	through	kernel	Epanechnikov	matching	with	bandwidth	
=	0.01.	The	reported	standard	errors	were	calculated	by	bootstrapping	with	200	replications.	Quintiles	are	based	on	the	asset	index	
in	2007.	Standard	errors	are	in	parentheses.	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01		Table	7-7	demonstrates	the	heterogeneity	of	the	JKN	effect	by	supply-side	factors,	measured	by	the	density	of	health	care	facilities.	The	calculation	of	density	variables	was	done	separately	for	outpatient	and	inpatient	care.	After	this,	I	sorted	the	samples	from	the	lowest	to	the	highest	based	on	the	density	variables	and	divided	the	samples	into	four	equal	group	(quartiles).	Almost	no	significant	effect	was	observed	in	the	area	with	a	low	density	of	health	care	facilities.	In	the	high-density	area,	however,	the	effect	on	inpatient	visits	was	large	and	significant	for	both	the	contributory	and	subsidised	groups.	This	further	confirms	the	suggestion	that	the	effect	of	health	insurance	can	only	be	realised	given	the	availability	of	nearby	health	care	facilities.			
Table	7-7	Heterogeneity	of	the	JKN	impact,	by	density	of	health	care	facilities		 Probability	of	any	outpatient	care	(%)	
Number	of	outpatient	visits	(total)	
Number	of	outpatient	visits	(public)	
Number	of	outpatient	visits	private	
Probability	of	any	inpatient	care	(%)	
Number	of	inpatient	visits	(total)	
Number	of	inpatient	visits	(public)	
Number	of	inpatient	visits	private	Contributory	group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Q1	 1.6		 0.097		 0.046		 0.051		 2.5		 0.050		 0.038		 0.013		(Lowest)	 (3.9)	 (0.130)	 (0.048)	 (0.136)	 (2.1)	 (0.038)	 (0.025)	 (0.022)	Q2	 11.1***	 0.2**	 0.098***	 0.102		 10.2***	 0.093**	 0.088***	 0.002			 (3.9)	 (0.082)	 (0.036)	 (0.066)	 (2.5)	 (0.037)	 (0.026)	 (0.026)	Q3	 12.9***	 0.243**	 0.143***	 0.099		 8.3***	 0.084***	 0.046**	 0.039			 (4.1)	 (0.108)	 (0.054)	 (0.098)	 (2.3)	 (0.027)	 (0.019)	 (0.020)	Q4	 3.5		 0.067		 0.148***	 -0.081	 10.3***	 0.176***	 0.105***	 0.076***	(Highest)	 (3.1)	 (0.107)	 (0.049)	 (0.101)	 (2.6)	 (0.046)	 (0.027)	 (0.025)	Subsidised	group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(N	=	1866)	 (3.8)	 (0.081)	 (0.037)	 (0.066)	 (0.019)	 (0.025)	 (0.012)	 (0.023)	Urban	 8.5***	 0.146**	 0.119***	 0.026	 0.097***	 0.128***	 0.082***	 0.046***	(N	=	4224)	 (2.1)	 (0.066)	 (0.025)	 (0.060)	 (0.015)	 (0.021)	 (0.016)	 (0.015)	Rural	 6.8**	 0.199*	 0.109***	 0.090	 0.044**	 0.063**	 0.051***	 0.013	(N	=	5327)	 (3.2)	 (0.111)	 (0.031)	 (0.093)	 (0.018)	 (0.031)	 (0.015)	 (0.020)	
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Q1	 1.7		 0.068		 0.017		 0.051		 1.6		 0.012		 -0.001	 0.008		(Lowest)	 (2.2)	 (0.057)	 (0.041)	 (0.033)	 (1.1)	 (0.014)	 (0.011)	 (0.009)	Q2	 1.4		 0.016		 0.053**	 -0.037	 0.8		 0.005		 0.023		 -0.013		 (2.1)	 (0.042)	 (0.024)	 (0.027)	 (1.1)	 (0.022)	 (0.019)	 (0.009)	Q3	 0.2		 0.029		 0.030		 -0.001	 1.3		 0.024*	 0.021*	 0.003			 (2.3)	 (0.041)	 (0.028)	 (0.027)	 (1.2)	 (0.014)	 (0.013)	 (0.005)	Q4	 4.8		 0.155**	 0.133***	 0.021		 3.1***	 0.046***	 0.029**	 0.021		(Highest)	 (3.7)	 (0.060)	 (0.045)	 (0.043)	 (1.1)	 (0.017)	 (0.011)	 (0.015)	
The	reported	standard	errors	were	calculated	by	bootstrapping	with	200	replications.	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01				
 Robustness	check		In	the	first	instance,	I	checked	the	robustness	of	the	impact	estimates	using	different	caliper	of	kernel	matching.	Table	7-8	shows	that	overall,	the	impact	estimates	for	the	contributory	group	are	not	sensitive	to	the	size	of	the	bandwidth	for	calculating	the	distance	in	kernel	matching.	The	magnitude	and	the	significance	of	the	estimates	seemed	stable	even	at	bandwidth	0.001.	Meanwhile,	standard	errors	for	the	subsidised	group	were	quite	sensitive	to	a	smaller	bandwidth.	Most	of	the	impact	estimates	were	no	longer	significant	at	a	level	of	5	percent	but	they	were	still	significant	at	10	percent.	Overall,	it	seems	that	the	expansion	of	public	health	insurance	to	the	previously	uninsured	has	had	a	profound	effect	on	increasing	the	utilisation	of	inpatient	care.			Secondly,	I	checked	the	potential	influence	of	the	unobserved	non-fixed	confounders	on	the	estimates	by	calculating	Rosenbaum	bounds	(detailed	results	can	be	seen	in	Table	A-3	and	A-4	in	the	appendices).	It	appears	that	the	effect	on	the	probability	of	utilising	inpatient	care	is	more	stable	than	the	effect	on	the	probability	of	using	outpatient	services	for	the	contributory	group.	However,	the	impact	on	the	
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subsidised	group	is	more	sensitive	to	the	unobserved	non-fixed	confounders	for	the	probability	of	using	both	outpatient	and	inpatient	services.	The	impacts	on	total	visits	for	both	groups	are	very	sensitive	to	this	unobserved	bias.			Thirdly,	I	also	ran	a	placebo	regression	to	test	the	parallel	trend	assumption	by	using	data	from	IFLS	2000	and	IFLS	2007.	The	same	PSM-DID	model	was	estimated	using	the	mean	difference	of	utilisation	variables	from	IFLS	2000	and	2007.	Parallel	trend	assumption	is	valid	if	none	of	the	outcomes	in	this	placebo	test	are	significant.	From	
Error!	Reference	source	not	found.,	it	appears	that	none	of	the	outcome	variables	show	any	significant	effect,	taken	as	a	p-value	equal	to	or	less	than	0.05.	The	PSM-DID	model	therefore	passed	the	parallel	trend	assumption.				
Table	7-8	Sensitivity	analysis	to	different	matching	bandwidths	for	Kernel	Epanechnikov	Choice	of	bandwidth	 Probability	of	any	outpatient	care	
Number	of	outpatient	visits	(total)	
Number	of	outpatient	visits	(public)	
Number	of	outpatient	visits	(private)	
Probability	of	any	inpatient	care	
Number	of	inpatient	visits	(total)	
Number	of	inpatient	visits	(public)	
Number	of	inpatient	visits	(private)	
JKN	Subsidised	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	0.05	 0.030	 0.097**	 0.070**	 0.032	 0.028***	 0.038**	 0.030**	 0.013		 (0.021)	 (0.045)	 (0.032)	 (0.025)	 (0.010)	 (0.016)	 (0.013)	 (0.010)	0.005	 0.030	 0.104**	 0.072**	 0.034	 0.028**	 0.039**	 0.030**	 0.014		 (0.024)	 (0.048)	 (0.035)	 (0.028)	 (0.012)	 (0.018)	 (0.014)	 (0.011)	0.001	 0.031	 0.111**	 0.069*	 0.040	 0.029***	 0.039*	 0.032*	 0.011		 (0.025)	 (0.056)	 (0.040)	 (0.033)	 (0.011)	 (0.021)	 (0.017)	 (0.010)	
JKN	Contributory	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	0.05	 0.075***	 0.127	 0.115***	 0.040	 0.084***	 0.108***	 0.073***	 0.036***		 (0.018)	 (0.067)	 (0.026)	 (0.053)	 (0.012)	 (0.018)	 (0.012)	 (0.012)	0.005	 0.077***	 0.128**	 0.115***	 0.043	 0.085***	 0.109***	 0.072***	 0.037***		 (0.019)	 (0.058)	 (0.022)	 (0.051)	 (0.013)	 (0.019)	 (0.013)	 (0.011)	0.001	 0.080***	 0.140	 0.119***	 0.050	 0.087***	 0.112***	 0.072***	 0.040***		 (0.020)	 (0.074)	 (0.028)	 (0.064)	 (0.013)	 (0.019)	 (0.014)	 (0.011)	
The	reported	standard	errors	were	calculated	by	bootstrapping	with	200	replications.	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01		
Table	7-9	Placebo	test	from	IFLS	2000		 ATT	 p-value	
JKN	Subsidised	 	 	
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Prob.	of	any	outpatient	care	 0.76%	 0.59	Number	of	outpatient	visits	(total)	 0.018	 0.45	Number	of	outpatient	visits	(public)	 0.021	 0.17	Number	of	outpatient	visits	(private)	 -0.003	 0.87	Prob.	of	any	inpatient	care	 -0.95%	 0.08	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(total)	 -0.010	 0.11	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(public)	 -0.003	 0.40	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(private)	 -0.007	 0.06		 	 	
JKN	Contributory	 	 	Prob.	of	any	outpatient	care	 -0.62%	 0.62	Number	of	outpatient	visits	(total)	 -0.007	 0.73	Number	of	outpatient	visits	(public)	 0.010	 0.50	Number	of	outpatient	visits	(private)	 -0.017	 0.28	Prob.	of	any	inpatient	care	 -0.64%	 0.17	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(total)	 -0.007	 0.20	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(public)	 -0.002	 0.44	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(private)	 -0.003	 0.41	
All	outcome	variables	are	taken	from	IFLS	2000.	ATT	is	calculated	by	simply	taking	the	difference	between	the	treated	(either	
contributory	or	subsidised)	and	the	control	(uninsured)	groups.	Standard	error	is	calculated	via	bootstrap	200	replications.	The	
treated	group	was	matched	with	the	control	group	through	kernel	Epanechnikov	with	bandwidth	=	0.01.	The	parallel	trend	
assumption	can	be	upheld	if	the	ATT	from	IFLS	2000	shows	no	significant	effect	with	an	assumed	type-1	error	taken	at	a	level	of	5%.			Fourth,	considering	some	of	the	respondents	were	interviewed	in	the	period	of	September	–	December	2014,	those	people	might	have	reported	inpatient	visits	that	happened	before	2014.	Thus,	I	also	repeated	the	PSM-DID	analysis	for	the	inpatient	outcomes	for	individuals	interviewed	in	2015	only.	Based	on	Table	7-10,	focusing	on	respondents	interviewed	in	2015	the	JKN	still	has	a	positive	impact	on	probability	of	seeking	outpatient	and	inpatient	care,	for	both	contributory	and	subsidised	groups	with	similar	magnitude	compared	to	overall	sample	in	 
	 Probability	of	having	outpatient	visits	(%)	
Number	of	outpatient	visits	(all)	 Number	of	outpatient	visits	(public)	
Number	of	outpatient	visits	(private)	
Probability	of	having	inpatient	visits	(%)	
Number	of	inpatient	visits	(all)	 Number	of	inpatient	visits	(public)	
Number	of	inpatient	visits	(private)	Subsidised	Group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Q1	 -1.1	 0.013	 0.009	 0.004	 0.015	 0.010	 0.012	 -0.002	(N	=	2547)	 (2.1)	 (0.046)	 (0.039)	 (0.023)	 (0.010)	 (0.012)	 (0.009)	 (0.006)	Q2	 6.9***	 0.126**	 0.112***	 0.015	 -0.004	 -0.001	 0.010	 -0.011	(N	=	2525)	 (2.7)	 (0.060)	 (0.037)	 (0.034)	 (0.013)	 (0.014)	 (0.014)	 (0.006)	Q3	 0.6	 0.056	 0.087*	 -0.031	 0.032***	 0.042**	 0.033*	 0.009	(N	=	2324)	 (2.1)	 (0.047)	 (0.045)	 (0.033)	 (0.011)	 (0.021)	 (0.019)	 (0.008)	Q4	 1.3	 0.047	 0.066*	 -0.020	 0.030**	 0.049*	 0.039	 0.010	(N=	2011)	 (2.4)	 (0.044)	 (0.034)	 (0.033)	 (0.014)	 (0.028)	 (0.027)	 (0.007)	Q5	 9.3*	 0.180*	 0.044	 0.136*	 0.017	 0.043	 0.009	 0.034	(N=	1653)	 (5.4)	 (0.101)	 (0.060)	 (0.081)	 (0.023)	 (0.049)	 (0.029)	 (0.047)	
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Table	7-6.		
Table	
7-10	
Sensitivity	analysis	of	the	JKN	effect	on	inpatient	utilisation,	by	the	year	of	interview	(2015	only)			 Treatment	effect	 P-value	 95%	CI	(Lower	-	Upper)			
Contributory	group	 	 	Probability	of	having	inpatient	visits	(%)	 7.03%	 <0.001	 4.01%	 10.05%	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(all)	 0.09	 <0.001	 0.05	 0.12	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(public)	 0.06	 <0.001	 0.04	 0.08	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(private)	 0.03	 0.01	 0.01	 0.06	
Subsidised	group	
	 	 	 		Probability	of	having	inpatient	visits	(%)	 2.31%	 0.01	 0.00%	 4.00%	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(all)	 0.03	 0.04	 0.00	 0.05	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(public)	 0.01	 0.13	 0.00	 0.03	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(private)	 0.01	 0.11	 0.00	 0.03	
		 	
Urban	 3.2	 0.112***	 0.114***	 -0.002	 0.016*	 0.026*	 0.019	 0.007	(N	=	4545)	 (2.1)	 (0.038)	 (0.028)	 (0.027)	 (0.009)	 (0.016)	 (0.015)	 (0.008)	Rural	 1.1	 0.025	 0.019	 0.006	 0.017**	 0.019*	 0.018**	 0.001	(N	=	6525)	 (0.013)	 (0.037)	 (0.024)	 (0.029)	 (0.007)	 (0.011)	 (0.009)	 (0.005)	Contributory	Group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Q1		 -2.4	 -0.018	 0.052	 -0.070	 0.041	 0.046	 0.006	 0.040	(N	=	1814)	 (6.3)	 (0.112)	 (0.056)	 (0.091)	 (0.047)	 (0.056)	 (0.035)	 (0.029)	Q2	 11.3**	 0.312	 0.173*	 0.139	 0.081**	 0.184***	 0.117**	 0.067	(N	=	1950)	 (5.6)	 (0.194)	 (0.099)	 (0.142)	 (0.029)	 (0.061)	 (0.048)	 (0.048)	Q3	 10.6***	 0.172	 0.176***	 -0.005	 0.099***	 0.113**	 0.083**	 0.030	(N	=	1979)	 (3.1)	 (0.279)	 (0.065)	 (0.279)	 (0.034)	 (0.050)	 (0.038)	 (0.025)	Q4	 8.8**	 0.081	 0.060*	 0.021	 0.095***	 0.126***	 0.090**	 0.036**	(N	=	1933)	 (3.9)	 (0.073)	 (0.033)	 (0.066)	 (0.029)	 (0.041)	 (0.036)	 (0.015)	Q5	 8.3**	 0.207**	 0.126***	 0.081	 0.071***	 0.080***	 0.054***	 0.026	(N	=	1866)	 (3.8)	 (0.081)	 (0.037)	 (0.066)	 (0.019)	 (0.025)	 (0.012)	 (0.023)	Urban	 8.5***	 0.146**	 0.119***	 0.026	 0.097***	 0.128***	 0.082***	 0.046***	(N	=	4224)	 (2.1)	 (0.066)	 (0.025)	 (0.060)	 (0.015)	 (0.021)	 (0.016)	 (0.015)	Rural	 6.8**	 0.199*	 0.109***	 0.090	 0.044**	 0.063**	 0.051***	 0.013	(N	=	5327)	 (3.2)	 (0.111)	 (0.031)	 (0.093)	 (0.018)	 (0.031)	 (0.015)	 (0.020)	
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Section	7.5 	Discussion		This	chapter	has	analysed	the	impact	of	the	JKN	programme	on	access	to	care	measured	by	individual’s	health	care	utilisation.	Two	treatment	groups	were	identified	based	on	their	ability	to	pay	the	premium:	a	contributory	group	and	a	subsidised	group.	Each	treatment	group	was	compared	to	the	uninsured	group	separately.	This	study’s	findings	suggest	that	the	JKN	programme	has	improved	access	to	both	inpatient	and	outpatient	care.	It	has	increased	the	probability	of	individuals	seeking	outpatient	and	inpatient	care	as	well	as	the	volume	of	care	provided.	This	impact	is	stronger	among	the	contributory	group,	which	likely	comes	from	the	wealthier	and	more	educated	population.	This	finding	is	consistent	with	the	relevant	theory,	as	well	as	evidence	from	other	countries	(Bernal,	Carpio	and	Klein,	2014;	Miller,	Pinto	and	Vera-Hernandez,	2013;	Nguyen,	2012;	Robyn	et	al.,	2012).	The	contributory	group	represents	self-selected	participation	in	JKN	while	the	subsidised	group	had	limited	power	to	determine	their	eligibility.	People	are	more	likely	to	enrol	into	health	insurance	schemes	if	they	are	more	likely	to	use	them	(referred	to	as	adverse	selection	in	economics	literature).	This	contributory	group	may	also	be	more	proactive	in	seeking	information	and	treatment,	and	may	also	be	more	aware	of	the	benefits	of	JKN	due	to	having	a	higher	level	of	education.	Individuals	themselves	have	the	best	knowledge	of	whether	the	benefit	of	insurance	exceeds	the	cost,	which	then	determines	whether	or	not	people	decide	to	get	insured	(Schneider,	2004;	Kahneman,	Knetsch	and	Thaler,	1991).	Studies	in	other	settings	have	also	found	that	knowledge	of	and	trust	in	the	insurance	scheme	are	important	factors	in	predicting	enrolment	(Kusi	et	al.,	2015;	Ozawa	and	Walker,	2009).	Recent	evidence	from	Indonesia	reveals	that	insurance	premiums	are	not	the	major	deterrent,	but	that	patients	are	more	likely	to	be	influenced	by	the	availability	of	health	services	and	a	lack	of	insurance	literacy	(Dartanto	et	al.,	2016)			In	the	case	of	Indonesia,	previous	studies	have	evaluated	earlier	forms	of	health	insurance	using	different	datasets	and	techniques,	with	mixed	findings.	Johar	(2009)	evaluated	the	health	cards	programme	introduced	in	2000	and	found	that	it	did	not	increase	outpatient	utilisation	due	to	the	inelastic	demand	among	the	recipients.	
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Hidayat	and	Pokhrel	(2010)	analysed	the	impact	of	the	health	insurance	programme	for	civil	servants	and	formal-sector	employees	and	found	a	positive	outpatient	utilisation	effect	especially	on	private	facilities	possibly	due	to	supplier-induced	demand.	Furthermore,	Sparrow,	Suryahadi	and	Widyanti	(2013)	evaluated	the	health	insurance	programme	for	poor	people	(Askeskin)	and	found	positive	utilisation	effects	on	outpatient	care.	Finally,	Vidyattama,	Miranti	and	Resosudarmo	(2014)	evaluated	Askeskin	using	different	datasets	and	found	a	positive	effect	on	the	likelihood	of	utilising	outpatient	care	for	both	conditional	and	unconditional	medical	needs.			It	appears	that	most	health	insurance	studies	in	Indonesia	seem	to	avoid	analysing	the	impact	on	inpatient	care	due	to	the	fear	of	low	statistical	power	associated	with	inpatient	care.	In	this	study,	this	low	power	concern	does	not	hinder	finding	a	significant	effect.	Rather,	I	show	that	the	impact	of	JKN	was	relatively	larger	on	inpatient	care	compared	with	outpatient	care.	Following	the	Rosenbaum	bounds	analysis	to	check	the	sensitivity	of	the	JKN	effect	to	the	dynamic	unobserved	factors,	it	also	appears	that	the	effect	on	inpatient	care	is	relatively	less	sensitive.	Since	inpatient	care	is	generally	more	expensive	and	JKN	offers	comprehensive	benefits,	including	hospitalisation	in	both	public	and	contracted	private	hospitals,	an	individual	is	more	likely	to	enrol,	particularly	if	they	consider	themselves	to	be	a	high-risk	individual.	It	can	be	argued	that	small	sample	size	may	also	reduce	the	likelihood	that	a	statistically	significant	result	reflects	a	true	effect	(Button	et	al.,	2013).	However,	in	this	study,	1,064	out	of	22,708	individuals	reported	any	inpatient	visit	in	any	formal	health	care	facilities,	thus	minimising	the	concern	that	the	study	has	too	low	power	in	detecting	the	true	treatment	effect.					 	
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Chapter	8 	Financial	protection	effect	of	the	JKN	programme		
Section	8.1 	Introduction		From	the	general	empirical	literature	discussed	in	Chapters	4	and	5,	I	have	shown	that	health	insurance	in	developing	countries	might	be	effective	in	providing	adequate	financial	protection	by	reducing	out-of-pocket	(OOP)	health	expenditure,	although	the	evidence	is	somewhat	mixed.	Several	systematic	reviews	have	reported	a	general	trend	concerning	the	favourable	effects	of	health	insurance	on	financial	protection	(Acharya	et	al.,	2013;	Giedion	et	al.,	2013;	Spaan	et	al.,	2012;	Ekman,	2004)	but	some	notable,	robust	studies	showed	no	statistically	significant	effect	(Raza	et	al.,	2016;	Palmer	et	al.,	2015;	Camacho	and	Conover,	2013;	Miller,	Pinto	and	Vera-Hernandez,	2013;	Nguyen,	2012;	Thornton	et	al.,	2010)	or	even	a	negative	effect,	that	is,	increased	OOP	health	expenditure	(Bernal,	Carpio	and	Klein,	2014;	Sparrow,	Suryahadi	and	Widyanti,	2013;	Wagstaff	et	al.,	2009;	Wagstaff	and	Lindelow,	2008).	While	health	insurance	might	be	expected	to	increase	utilisation	of	health	care	services,	it	may	also	lead	to	higher	OOP	expenditure	as	well	if	the	insurance	does	not	cover	the	whole	cost	of	seeking	medical	treatment,	such	as	transportation	costs,	drug	costs	and	laboratory	costs	(Thornton	et	al.,	2010).	Insurance	that	introduces	a	cost	sharing	mechanism,	such	as	co-payment	and	co-insurance	has	generally	offer	worse	protection	than	insurance	that	has	no	cost	sharing.	The	JKN	programme	does	not	have	any	cost	sharing	mechanisms	and	covers	quite	a	comprehensive	list	of	benefits	packages.	Thus,	it	is	expected	to	observe	reduced	OOP	health	expenditure	among	its	enrolees.			In	this	chapter,	I	examine	whether	the	implementation	of	Indonesia’s	JKN	programme	has	provided	financial	protection	to	its	enrolees.	The	specific	objectives	are:		a. To	evaluate	whether	the	JKN	programme,	on	average,	has	any	impact	on	out-of-pocket	(OOP)	health	expenditure	at	an	individual	level;	
		 187	
b. To	evaluate	whether	the	JKN	programme,	on	average,	has	any	impact	on	OOP	health	expenditure	at	household	level;	c. To	evaluate	whether	the	JKN	programme,	on	average,	has	any	impact	on	catastrophic	health	expenditure	events	at	household	level;	and,	d. To	assess	the	heterogeneity	of	the	JKN	programme	effect	in	terms	of	locality	of	residence	and	by	socioeconomic	status.	
Section	8.2 	Methodology		
 Outcome	variables	(health	expenditure)		Out-of-pocket	(OOP)	health	expenditure	data	are	available	for	individual	and	household	levels	from	the	IFLS	data.	The	individual	level	data	provide	more	detailed	information	on	whether	the	cost	was	spent	on	outpatient	or	inpatient	care.	All	individuals	aged	15	years	or	older	were	asked	whether	they	had	sought	any	outpatient	care	in	the	past	4	weeks	and,	if	they	had,	the	amount	of	money	they	had	to	spend	out-of-pocket	to	pay	for	medical	care.	The	same	questions	are	available	for	inpatient	care	but	the	time	period	is	longer,	12	months.	Furthermore,	IFLS	data	include	information	on	whether	the	respondent	sought	self-treatment	in	the	past	4	weeks	and	the	costs	incurred,	regardless	of	whether	or	not	they	sought	care	in	formal	health	facilities.	This	amount	of	detailed	information	allows	for	a	more	in-depth	analysis	of	the	impact	of	the	JKN	programme	on	health	expenditure,	but	it	is	only	available	in	two	waves	–	2007	and	2014.	To	remove	the	effect	of	inflation,	I	adjusted	all	expenditure	values	in	2014	using	the	Indonesian	Consumer	Price	Index	(CPI)	to	2007	values.		Meanwhile,	the	household	data	provide	information	on	medical	expenditure	for	the	household	over	the	past	12	months.	The	respondent	for	the	household	survey	is	the	wife	of	the	head	of	the	household,	or	the	female	head	of	the	household,	or	another	household	member	aged	18	years	or	older	who	is	able	to	answer	the	questions.	Unlike	the	expenditure	data	at	individual	level,	the	household	data	only	provide	the	overall	household	health	expenditure	that	includes	hospitalisation	costs,	clinic	
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charges,	physician	fees,	traditional	healer	fees	and	medicines.	Household	data	on	OOP	health	expenditure	may	be	useful	to	control	for	any	intra-household	spillover	effects	(Sparrow,	Suryahadi	and	Widyanti,	2013).	Providing	one	household	member	with	health	insurance	may	relax	the	budgetary	constraint	for	the	entire	household,	especially	if	the	insured	household	member	is	an	elderly	person	or	has	a	history	of	health	problems.		Household	data	also	enables	an	analysis	of	catastrophic	health	expenditure	(CHE)	which	classifies	OOP	health	expenditure	as	catastrophic	if	it	exceeds	a	pre-specified	fraction	of	total	household	consumption	(or	expenditure).	This	measure	is	the	official	indicator	for	monitoring	UHC	financial	protection	in	the	Sustainable	Development	Goals	(SDGs	indicator	3.8.2),	where	it	is	suggested	that	catastrophic	expenditure	is	defined	as	10	percent	or	25	percent	of	total	household	expenditure.	The	lower	threshold	of	10	percent	is	more	relevant	for	the	poor	who	empirically	rarely	spend	as	much	as	25	percent	of	their	budget	on	health	care	given	the	need	to	spend	on	food	and	other	necessities	(Wagstaff	et	al.,	2018).		An	alternative	definition	of	CHE	is	the	incidence	of	health	care	expenditure	equal	to	or	exceeding	40	percent	of	the	household’s	capacity	to	pay	(Xu	et	al.,	2003).	The	household’s	capacity	to	pay	is	defined	as	a	household’s	non-subsistence	spending,	i.e.	a	household’s	consumption	expenditure	minus	subsistence	spending.	Subsistence	spending	is	the	minimum	requirement	of	a	household	in	order	to	guarantee	the	most	basic	standard	of	living.	The	average	food	expenditure	of	households	is	used	to	estimate	subsistence	spending.	To	complement	the	main	analysis	on	individual	OOP	health	expenditure,	I	also	estimate	the	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	household	OOP	health	expenditure	and	the	incidence	of	catastrophic	health	expenditure.			
 Treatment	and	control	variables	As	mentioned	in	the	previous	chapter,	I	am	interested	in	the	impact	of	the	JKN	programme	on	newly-insured	individuals,	who	were	previously	uninsured	in	2007	but	enrolled	in	the	JKN	programme	in	2014.	Two	groups	of	JKN	enrolees	are	
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maintained	in	this	analysis:	the	contributory	group	who	pay	the	full	premium	and	the	subsidised	group	who	get	their	premium	subsidised	by	the	government.	Each	group	is	compared	to	the	uninsured	group	who	stayed	uninsured	in	both	2007	and	2014.			I	selected	independent	variables	that	are	likely	to	modify	individual	or	household	health	expenditure.	They	have	been	chosen	to	allow	estimation	the	treatment	effect	of	insurance,	after	controlling	for	potential	confounders	that	may	be	related	to	health	expenditure.		
• Age		An	ageing	population	is	positively	related	to	health	care	expenditure	(Di	Matteo,	2005),	especially	in	relation	to	the	elderly	population	aged	65	years	and	older	who	are	more	likely	to	utilise	long-term	care	(Mendelson	and	Schwartz,	1993).	However,	the	effect	of	age	on	health	expenditure	was	reported	to	vary	across	countries	depending	on	the	delivery	and	financing	of	health	care	(O’Connell,	1996).	While	it	is	still	an	open	debate	as	to	whether	an	ageing	population	contributes	to	overall	per	capita	health	care	expenditure,	the	effect	of	age	on	increased	individual	health	care	expenditure	remains	consistent	(Zweifel,	Felder	and	Meiers,	1999).	
• Gender	Pregnant	women	are	more	likely	to	spend	more	on	health	care	(for	example,	prenatal	care),	but	often	in	developing	countries,	the	decision	about	seeking	care	lies	with	the	head	of	the	household	(Chirowa,	Atwood	and	Van	der	Putten,	2013).	It	is	likely	that	the	effect	of	gender	on	care	seeking	behaviour	is	confounded	by	women’s	educational	status	(Beegle,	Frankenberg	and	Thomas,	2001),	where	more	educated	women	are	likely	to	have	greater	independence	over	their	decision	to	seek	care	and	are,	therefore,	more	likely	to	spend	extra	money	on	health	care.	
• Education	Health	literacy	is	found	to	affect	medical	spending	and	patients	with	low	health	literacy	tend	to	consume	an	inefficient	mix	of	health	care	services	(Howard,	Gazmararian	and	Parker,	2005;	MacLeod	et	al.,	2017).	Low	general	education	is	one	of	the	strongest	predictors	associated	with	inadequate	health	literacy,	regardless	of	one’s	health	status	(Martin	et	al.,	2009).		
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• Locality	of	residence	(urban/rural)		The	split	between	urban	and	rural	areas	reflects	differences	in	economic	development,	the	availability	of	health	care	facilities	and	culture.	Since	urban	areas	tend	to	receive	more	attention	from	the	government,	people	living	in	urban	areas	can	enjoy	easier	access	and	a	greater	choice	of	medical	providers	compared	with	those	living	in	rural	areas.	Thus,	they	are	more	likely	to	spend	greater	amounts	money	on	health	care.	Binary	variables	for	each	IFLS	province	are	also	included	to	capture	unobserved	time-fixed	effect	that	may	correlate	with	the	demand	and	supply	of	care	in	the	area	(Gravelle	et	al.,	2003).	
• Wealth	index	It	is	predicted	that	people	with	low	socioeconomic	status	will	spend	more	on	health	care	through	the	utilisation	of	more	expensive	health	services	(Fitzpatrick	et	al.,	2015).	In	this	chapter,	I	use	the	asset	index	to	construct	wealth	quantiles,	as	previously	carried	out	in	chapter	7.	
• Medical	condition	Individuals	suffering	from	multiple	medical	conditions	are	likely	to	spend	more	on	health	expenditure	(Vogeli	et	al.,	2007).	In	this	analysis,	I	used	three	variables	to	capture	medical	condition:	the	number	of	acute	conditions,	the	number	of	chronic	conditions	and	the	presence	of	disability.			
 Estimation	model		As	previously	discussed	in	Chapter	6,	health	expenditure	can	be	modelled	using	a	two-part	model	(2PM)	by	separating	the	model	into	two:	the	probability	of	having	non-zero	health	expenditure	and	the	amount	spent	on	health	care.	However,	the	2PM	model	does	not	control	for	any	endogenous	explanatory	variable	as	it	was	originally	devised	to	deal	with	the	corner	selection	problem	in	health	care	expenditure.	To	estimate	the	causal	effect	of	the	JKN	programme,	I	still	need	to	consider	the	confounding	effect	of	insurance	selection	bias.	This	occurs	when	selection	to	receive	a	treatment	is	correlated	with	the	outcome	variables,	i.e.	OOP	health	expenditure	due	to	observable	or	unobservable	factors.	One	of	the	main	arguments	of	selection	bias	
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usually	arises	from	an	individual’s	health	status.	An	individual	with	a	higher	probability	of	seeking	medical	treatment	in	the	future	will	be	more	likely	to	enrol	in	health	insurance.	In	other	words,	individuals	who	expect	higher	health	care	costs	may	be	more	likely	to	be	insured.	This	phenomenon	is	widely	known	in	economics	literature	as	adverse	selection	in	health	insurance	(Cutler	and	Zeckhauser,	1998),	which	has	been	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	Healthy	people	are	expected	to	consume	less	health	care,	hence	their	decision	to	stay	uninsured.		In	the	case	of	JKN,	the	contributory	group	are	more	likely	to	be	subjected	to	the	adverse	selection	problem	because	they	chose	to	enrol	voluntarily.	The	subsidised	group	is	arguably	less	sensitive	to	the	adverse	selection	issue	because	they	did	not	have	to	pay	the	premium	and	the	decision	to	enrol	did	not	mainly	depend	on	them	but	on	the	eligibility,	criteria	set	by	the	government.	However,	evidence	suggests	that	the	leakages	to	non-eligible	beneficiaries	are	a	significant	problem	for	public	health	insurance	in	Indonesia.	In	2010,	only	34.6	percent	of	the	poor	and	near-poor	populations	reported	having	subsidised	health	insurance,	whereas	only	47.6	percent	of	the	beneficiaries	were	poor	or	near-poor	(Harimurti	et	al.,	2013).	This	problem	is	likely	to	be	driven	by	the	subjectivity	of	the	enrolment	process	at	district	level.	The	selection	process	can	be	summarised	into	two	stages:	national	and	district.	The	first	stage	is	carried	out	by	central	government,	whereby	a	quota	list	of	eligible	individuals	is	issued,	based	on	a	mixture	of	geographic	and	proxy	means	testing	methods.	This	first	stage	is	arguably	exogenous	to	health	care	expenditure.	The	second	stage	is	largely	conducted	by	district-level	health	staff	who	identify	and	enrol	eligible	households.	The	decision	to	enrol	eligible	households	at	district	level	is	varied	and	deploys	different	methods	depending	on	district-level	preferences	(Rokx	et	al.,	2009).	It	is	likely	that	health	staff	at	the	district	level	determine	the	eligibility	criteria	based	on	characteristics	other	than	those	prescribed	by	central	government.	Nepotism	is	still	a	common	practice	in	Indonesia,	which	implies	that	individuals	who	have	more	connections	to	health	staff	at	district	level	are	more	likely	to	receive	subsidised	health	insurance/other	poverty	alleviation	programmes.			
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Because	the	subsidised	public	health	insurance	system,	i.e.	Jamkesmas,	has	been	integrated	into	the	JKN	programme	since	2014,	it	is	very	likely	that	its	selection	problem	continues	to	present	bias	in	terms	of	the	eligibility	criteria	for	receiving	the	premium	subsidy	under	the	JKN	programme.	To	control	for	the	insurance	selection	bias,	I	employed	the	combination	of	difference-in-difference	(DID)	and	propensity	score	matching	(PSM).	Since	it	is	non-parametric	by	nature,	PSM	is	able	to	deal	with	health	expenditure	data	which	has	a	large	proportion	of	zeros.			
Equation	8-1	 >>6,76 = @(∆!456) − @(∆!4576)																	= @B,(∆845)C − @B;(∆845)C + @(34=) + ∆956 − ∆9576 + 	@(∆:456) − @(:4576)	
	If	we	observe	two	sets	of	outcomes	–	!456 ,	the	outcome	among	the	JKN	enrolees;	!4576 ,	the	outcome	for	the	uninsured,	the	difference-in-difference	treatment	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	can	be	obtained	by	taking	the	expected	difference	between	the	changes	among	the	insured	[@(∆!456)	]	and	the	uninsured	[@(∆!4576)].	This	equation	can	be	solved	by	functions	of	observables	and	unobservables	as	shown	in	the	second	line	of	Equation	8-1.	The	first	difference	in	the	second	line	of	Equation	8-1,	i.e.	@B,(∆845)C − @B;(∆845)C,	represents	the	differences	of	changes	in	outcomes	due	to	the	difference	in	observables.	This	first	difference	can	be	eliminated	through	matching	each	treated	individual	with	one	or	more	untreated	individuals	who	are	similar	in	terms	of	observable	variables	(845).	The	treatment	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	its	enrolees	is	reflected	by	the	@(345	).	The	second	difference,	i.e.	∆956 − ∆9576 ,	represents	the	difference	of	time-specific	unobservable	factor,	common	to	all	individuals	in	each	group,	between	the	treated	and	the	untreated.	For	example,	it	can	represent	the	change	in	economic	shock	or	new	legislation	that	occurs	in	national	level.	To	eliminate	this,	we	need	to	assume	that	the	time-fixed	unobservable	factor	for	both	insured	and	uninsured	change	at	the	same	trend.			The	propensity	score	was	predicted	based	on	logit	regression	estimates	of	the	probability	of	an	individual	enrolling	in	the	JKN	programme	in	2014	as	a	function	of	
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the	control	variables	in	2007.	The	propensity	score	for	the	contributory	and	subsidised	groups	was	estimated	separately.	For	individual	data,	the	control	variables	include	age,	gender,	marital	status,	educational	status,	asset	index	as	a	proxy	for	socioeconomic	status,	number	of	acute	conditions,	number	of	chronic	conditions,	the	presence	of	disability,	dummy	variables	for	each	province	included	in	IFLS,	and	sample	weights.	Kernel	matching	was	chosen	as	the	matching	algorithm	with	a	choice	of	caliper	of	bandwidth	equal	to	0.2	of	the	standard	deviation	of	the	logit	of	the	propensity	score	(Austin,	2011).	Standard	errors	were	calculated	by	bootstrapping	to	allow	for	an	estimation	of	the	sampling	variance	of	estimated	propensity	score	parameters.	DID	estimation	was	calculated	by	taking	the	difference	between	individual	health	expenditure	in	2014	and	2007	and	calculating	the	mean	of	these	differences	for	each	insured	and	matched	uninsured	group.	These	mean	differences	between	the	insured	and	the	matched	uninsured	were	tested	using	a	t-test	with	bootstrapped	standard	errors.			In	this	chapter,	I	also	used	household	data	to	estimate	the	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	household	OOP	expenditure.	The	treatment	variable	for	household	analysis	is	different	to	the	individual	analysis.	I	constructed	a	binary	variable	indicating	the	presence	of	a	household	member	insured	with	the	JKN	programme.	Households	that	were	previously	covered	by	any	insurance	type,	including	Askes	(health	insurance	for	civil	servants),	Jamsostek	(for	formal	sector	employees)	and	private	health	insurance,	were	excluded.	Since	the	treatment	variable	for	household	analysis	is	slightly	different	to	the	one	used	in	the	individual	analysis,	i.e.	no	separate	groups	between	enrolees	who	paid	the	premium	(the	contributory	group)	and	enrolees	who	received	subsidised	premiums	(the	subsidised	group),	the	research	question	for	the	household	analysis	is	to	establish	the	effectiveness	of	the	JKN	programme	on	providing	financial	protection,	regardless	of	the	enrolees’	ability	to	pay.	Control	variables	include	gender,	age,	educational	status	of	the	head	of	the	household,	locality	of	residence,	household	size,	number	of	acute	conditions	affecting	daily	activities,	number	of	chronic	conditions,	the	presence	of	any	household	member	who	has	a	disability,	a	dummy	variable	indicating	utilisation	of	any	type	of	formal	care	in	the	past	year,	and	the	dummy	variables	for	each	IFLS	province.		
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The	fundamental	assumption	of	the	DID	estimator	is	that	the	outcome	trends	would	have	been	the	same	in	both	groups	in	the	absence	of	the	treatment.	Depending	on	the	context,	there	may	be	several	forms	of	this	assumption	and	different	approaches	to	testing	it	(Angrist	and	Pischke,	2009).	One	way	to	test	this	assumption	is	by	calculating	the	placebo	effect	of	the	treatment	on	the	outcome	before	the	programme	was	implemented.	However,	the	individual	OOP	health	expenditure	was	not	available	prior	to	the	IFLS	2007.	As	the	individual	data	do	not	permit	placebo	effect	calculation,	I	used	household	expenditure	data	instead	to	check	the	parallel	trend	assumption	at	household	level.	It	is	not	unreasonable	to	assume	that	the	expenditure	trend	of	individuals	follows	the	same	pattern	as	the	household	health	expenditure	trend.	The	parallel	trend	assumption	is	likely	to	be	valid	if	the	trend	for	OOP	health	expenditure	is	similar	between	the	insured	and	the	uninsured.		
Section	8.3 Findings	
 Individual	data	
8.3.1.1 Descriptive summary 	
	Table	8-1	presents	descriptive	statistics	for	OOP	health	expenditure	in	2007	and	2014,	comparing	the	contributory	and	subsidised	groups	separately	to	the	uninsured	group.	All	expenditure	values	in	2014	have	been	adjusted	to	2007	using	the	Indonesian	Consumer	Price	Index	(CPI).	All	three	groups	show	a	general	trend	of	increased	expenditure	for	all	three	categories,	i.e.	inpatient,	outpatient	and	self-treatment.	This	increasing	trend	is	particularly	high	in	inpatient	care,	especially	among	the	contributory	group.	This	finding	is	surprising	considering	that	the	insured	should	have	been	protected	from	incurring	the	costs	of	seeking	care.	The	increasing	trend	in	self-treatment	expenditure	is	also	surprising	given	the	insured	was	expected	to	rely	more	on	formal	health	care.		
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Table	8-1	Descriptive	statistics	for	OOP	Health	Expenditure	in	2007	and	2014,	in	Indonesian	Rupiah	(IDR)	Health	expenditure	by	type	of	care		 Uninsured	(N	=	8,576)	 Contributory	(N	=	982)	 Contributory	–	Uninsured†	
Subsidised	
(N	=	2,503)	
Subsidised	–	Uninsured†	
2007	
	     Inpatient	 62,885	 90,148	 27,263	 27,613	 -35,272*	Outpatient	 8,507	 11,386	 2,879	 9,612	 1,105	Self-treatment	 6,447	 12,589	 6,142***	 4,424	 -2,022		 	 	 	 	 	
2014	
	     Inpatient	 111,551	 254,271	 142,720	 50,264	 -61,287	Outpatient	 15,987	 18,376	 2,389	 7,696	 -8,291	Self-treatment	 20,306	 25,737	 5,431	 14,579	 -5,726	†	=	The	mean	differences.	Significance	level:	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01		In	addition,	the	contributory	group	had	already	spent	more	OOP	health	expenditure	in	formal	care	(both	outpatient	and	inpatient)	and	self-treatment	in	2007	compared	to	the	other	groups,	and	this	group	continued	to	spend	more	in	2014.	The	contributory	group	spent	IDR	255,000	out-of-pocket	for	paying	inpatient	care,	a	180%	increase	from	the	spending	in	2007.	It	suggests	the	presence	of	selection	bias	for	this	group;	people	who	choose	to	get	insured	under	the	JKN	programme	are	likely	to	demand	more	health	care	and	spend	higher	OOP	health	expenditure	than	the	uninsured	people.			Meanwhile,	the	subsidised	group	generally	spent	less	than	the	uninsured	group,	except	for	outpatient	care	in	2007,	although	the	difference	is	not	significant	at	the	10	percent	level.	Despite	the	indication	of	higher	spending	among	the	contributory	group	and	lower	spending	among	the	subsidised	group	compared	with	the	uninsured,	the	mean	difference	in	health	expenditure	between	the	insured	and	the	uninsured	is	mostly	not	significant,	even	at	the	10	percent	level.	This	non-significant	finding	may	be	explained	by	a	wide	confidence	interval	given	the	skewed	distribution	of	health	care	expenditure	with	a	large	mass	of	zero	values.		
		 196	
	
8.3.1.2 Naïve estimator for individual health expenditure 	Table	8-2	shows	the	marginal	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	untransformed	OOP	health	expenditure	in	2014	without	any	other	control	variables.	It	follows	OLS	regression	with	the	following	equation:		
Equation	8-2	 V4 = 	$ + M4N4 + S4		V4 	refers	to	OOP	health	expenditure;	α	is	the	model	intercept,	and	S4 	captures	random	error	term.	N4 	represents	the	insurance	status	with	T	=	1	as	being	insured	and	T	=0	as	being	uninsured.	Thus,	M4 	can	be	interpreted	as	the	difference	of	incurred	OOP	heath	expenditure	for	the	insured	group	compared	to	the	uninsured.	The	first	column	for	each	expenditure	category,	i.e.	outpatient,	inpatient	and	self-treatment,	presents	the	OLS	model	that	includes	all	samples,	whereas	the	second	column	only	includes	individuals	with	positive	expenditure.	This	table	does	not	demonstrate	the	causal	effect	of	the	JKN	programme;	it	only	serves	as	a	comparison	with	other	findings	in	the	following	section	that	utilise	a	more	robust	method.		
Table	8-2	Regression	table	of	raw/untransformed	OOP	health	expenditure	in	2014	OLS	 Outpatient	[All]	 Outpatient	[Positive]	 Inpatient	[All]	 Inpatient	[Positive]	 Self-treatment	[All]	 Self-treatment	[Positive]		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Panel	A:	Treatment	variable:	JKN	Contributory	Marginal	Effect	 5,207	 75,827	 247,326	 -2,303,019	 2,047	 3,386	SE	 (10,998)	 (84,408)	 (208,709)	 (5,065,580)	 (3,268)	 (4,505)	Observations	 9,547	 1,146	 9,549	 237	 9,549	 6,791	
Panel	B:	Treatment	variable:	JKN	Subsidised	Marginal	Effect	 -14,899	 -100,034	 -62,732*	 -3,815,540*	 -6,662	 -9,434	SE	 (10,098)	 (88,064)	 (36,747)	 (2,200,130)	 (6,789)	 (9,159)	Observations	 11,067	 1,290	 11,069	 241	 11,069	 7,913	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01		As	expected,	the	JKN	contributory	group	spent	higher	levels	of	OOP	in	outpatient	care	and	self-treatment	compared	with	the	uninsured	but	this	increase	is	not	significant.	The	subsidised	group	shows	lower	OOP	expenditure	for	all	categories	compared	with	the	uninsured.	Only	the	effect	on	inpatient	care	is	significant	at	the	10	percent	level.	
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On	average,	people	in	the	subsidised	group	spend	IDR	15,000,	IDR	62,000	and	IDR	6,600	less	on	outpatient,	inpatient	and	self-treatment	costs	respectively,	compared	with	the	uninsured.			Table	8-3	presents	the	marginal	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	three	categories	of	OOP	health	expenditure	costs	according	to	a	two-part	model	(2PM)	approach.	The	first	part	models	zeros	in	OOP	health	expenditure,	which	is	typically	handled	using	a	model	for	the	probability	of	a	positive	outcome:		
Equation	8-3	 φ(Y	 > 	0) 	= 	Pr(Y	 > 	0|X) 	= 	F(Xδ)		Where	X	is	a	vector	of	control	variables,	δ	is	the	corresponding	vector	of	parameters	to	be	estimated,	and	F	is	the	cumulative	distribution	function	of	an	independent	identically	distributed	error	term,	typically	solved	by	either	logit	or	probit	model	(Belotti	et	al.,	2015).	The	second	part	handles	positive	OOP	expenditures,	which	is	usually	represented	as:	
Equation	8-4	 φ(Y|Y	 > 	0, X) 	= 	G(Xγ)		Where	X	is	a	vector	of	control	variables,	γ	is	the	corresponding	vector	of	parameters	to	be	estimated,	and	G	is	an	appropriate	density	function	for	Y|Y	>	0.	In	this	analysis,	the	first	part	used	a	probit	model	to	estimate	the	probability	of	incurring	positive	OOP	expenditure,	while	the	second	part	used	GLM	regression	based	on	a	Gamma	distribution	with	the	log	link	function	to	model	the	positive	OOP	expenditure.			According	to	Table	8-3,	there	is	no	significant	effect	on	outpatient	OOP	expenditure	for	the	contributory	group.	Meanwhile,	the	contributory	group	is	2	percent	more	likely	to	have	positive	expenditure,	and	out	of	those	who	spend	positive	expenditure,	the	contributory	group	spend	IDR	168,000	more	than	the	uninsured	group.	However,	only	the	first	part	is	significant	at	the	1	percent	level.	Finally,	the	JKN	programme	decreases	the	probability	of	incurring	positive	self-treatment	costs	among	the	contributory	group	but	does	not	have	much	effect	on	the	actual	self-treatment	cost.		
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Table	8-3	Regression	table	of	the	two-part	model	analysis	on	OOP	health	expenditure	in	2014			 Outpatient	OOP	 Inpatient	OOP	 Self-treatment			 First	part	 Second	part	 First	part	 Second	part	 First	part	 Second	part		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Panel	A:	Treatment	variable:	JKN	Contributory	Marginal	Effect	 0.00	 7,569	 0.02***	 167,658	 -0.03*	 1,380	SE	 (0.01)	 (6,536.00)	 (0.00)	 (69,404.32)	 (0.02)	 (1,962.36)	
Panel	B:	Treatment	variable:	JKN	Subsidised	Marginal	Effect	 -0.02**	 -5,288	 0.00	 -53,799	 0.01	 -3,987	SE	 (0.01)	 (5,055.42)	 (0.00)	 (41,161.55)	 (0.01)	 (2,840.71)	Significance	level	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01		According	to	panel	B	in	Table	8-3,	the	subsidised	group	is	two	percent	less	likely	to	incur	OOP	expenditure	for	outpatient	care	but	there	is	no	significant	effect	on	the	actual	cost.	The	JKN	programme	also	decreases	the	actual	cost	of	inpatient	care	and	self-treatment	for	the	subsidised	group,	but	neither	of	these	is	significant	at	even	the	10	percent	level.			Overall,	it	is	suggested	that	the	JKN	programme	increases	the	OOP	expenditure	for	the	contributory	group	but	decreases	the	OOP	expenditure	for	the	subsidised	group.	However,	none	of	these	effects	on	the	positive	expenditure	are	significant	at	the	10	percent	level.	The	two-part	model	can	solve	the	skewed	distribution	of	health	expenditure	data,	but	it	is	unable	to	control	for	the	insurance	selection	bias.	Next,	I	will	present	the	findings	from	the	PSM-DID	analysis,	which	is	more	robust	in	controlling	for	insurance	selection	bias.				 	
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8.3.1.3 PSM-DID analysis 	
		 	 	 (a)	 	 	 	 	 (b)	
	 		 	 	 (c)	 	 	 	 	 (d)	(a)	shows	support	between	the	treated	and	untreated	for	the	contributory	group,	whereas	(b)	shows	this	for	the	subsidised	group.		(c)	and	(d)	show	the	reduced	bias	before	and	after	matching	for	the	contributory	and	subsidised	groups	respectively.	
Figure	8-1	Support	and	balance	after	propensity	score	matching		Figure	8-1a	and	8-1b	show	histograms	of	the	propensity	scores	after	matching	using	kernel	matching.	Despite	its	left-skewed	distribution,	there	are	ample	overlaps	between	the	treated	and	the	control	group.	This	suggests	that	the	matching	process	has	successfully	retained	adequate	samples	to	avoid	attrition	bias	from	the	cases	of	off-support.	Figures	8-1c	and	8-1d	show	the	extent	to	which	matching	has	reduced	
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the	bias	in	this	analysis.	Both	graphs	demonstrate	that	after	matching,	the	standardised	percentage	of	bias	across	covariates	has	been	reduced	to	near	zero.		
	The	estimated	treatment	effect,	based	on	Equation	8-1,	are	presented	in	Table	8-4,	with	the	contributory	group	results	in	panel	A	and	the	subsidised	group	in	panel	B.	Column	(1)	reports	the	estimates	from	a	PSM	analysis	for	outpatient	OOP	expenditure.	PSM	enables	us	to	estimate	the	average	treatment	effect	on	treated	(ATT)	on	the	assumption	that	the	control	variables	have	no	explanatory	power	over	outcome	variables	after	matching.	Overall,	the	result	shows	that	there	is	no	significant	effect	for	both	the	contributory	and	subsidised	groups,	a	pattern	similar	to	the	findings	in	the	two-part	model	in	Table	8-3.		
	
Table	8-4	Results	of	the	PSM-DID	analysis	of	the	impact	of	the	JKN	programme	on	OOP	health	expenditure			 Outpatient	OOP	 Inpatient	OOP	 Self-treatment		 PSM	 PSM-DID	 PSM	 PSM-DID	 PSM	 PSM-DID		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Panel	A:	Treatment	variable:	JKN	Contributory	ATT	 6,818	 8,417	 240,365	 154,914	 6,714	 -1,583	SE	 (13,497)	 (9,819)	 (176,500)	 (124,647)	 (6,715)	 (6,274)	
	
Panel	B:	Treatment	variable:	JKN	Subsidised	ATT	 -10,395	 -11,082	 -14,198	 2,202	 -5,464	 -1,697	SE	 (8,803)	 (9,214)	 (77,273)	 (55,876)	 (5,933)	 (3,405)	
The	treated	group	was	matched	with	the	control	group	through	kernel	Epanechnikov	with	bandwidth	0.01.	The	reported	standard	
errors	in	parentheses	were	calculated	by	bootstrapping	with	200	replications.	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01	
	
While	PSM	only	controls	for	observable	selection	bias,	PSM-DID	can	further	control	for	fixed	unobservable	selection	
bias.	Based	on	Table	8-4,	no	estimate	of	PSM-DID	reports	a	significant	effect,	even	at	10%	level.	The	expansion	of	JKN	
to	the	previously	uninsured	population	has	no	statistically	significant	effect	on	reducing	or	increasing	OOP	health	
expenditure.	Stratifying	the	DID-PSM	estimates	by	asset	index	quintiles	and	urban/rural	area	still	results	in	no	
significant	impact	for	both	the	contributory	and	subsidised	groups	(see		Table	8-5).			
	
Table	8-5	Impact	of	JKN	on	health	care	spending,	by	asset	index	quintiles	(Q1	=	poorest;	Q5	=	richest)	and	
urban/rural	area		 Inpatient	OOP	 Outpatient	OOP	 Self-treatment	JKN	Contributory	 	  Q1	 63,710	 -10,549	 -2,141		 (59,011)	 (8,281)	 (12,519)	
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Q2	 25,845	 3,803	 1,495		 (68,540)	 (25,901)	 (7,740)	Q3	 66,901	 33,451	 -2,408		 (120,311)	 (41,285)	 (2,374)	Q4	 352,129	 -679	 1,780		 (328,393)	 (15,235)	 (2,448)	Q5	 168,895	 3,011	 -3,037		 (303,598)	 (7,728)	 (14,485)	Urban	 222,083	 14,206	 -1,438		 (186,934)	 (11,605)	 (8,113)	Rural	 -9,442	 -2,464	 -1,854		 (50,927)	 (9,763)	 (4,587)	JKN	Subsidised	 	  Q1	 17,763	 -1,859	 -5,708		 (56,258)	 (7,930)	 (10,437)	Q2	 -31,166	 -23,406	 -5,113		 (29,168)	 (26,080)	 (7,580)	Q3	 -23,912	 -31,639	 -1,962		 (85,775)	 (32,825)	 (1,516)	Q4	 53,842	 433	 11,751		 (44,288)	 (9,678)	 (13,713)	Q5	 -14,045	 11,916	 1,903		 (264,320)	 (8,932)	 (3,196)	Urban	 -29,175	 -12,660	 95		 (126,450)	 (17,127)	 (1,990)	Rural	 21,411	 -10,029	 -3,110		 (43,192)	 (9,843)	 (5,335)	
*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01		
 Household	data	In	this	sub-section,	I	present	the	analysis	of	the	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	at	household	level.	I	only	have	one	treatment	group	because	it	is	possible	to	have	two	individuals	belonging	to	different	types	of	JKN	membership,	i.e.	the	contributory	and	subsidised	schemes.	This	happens	because	the	JKN	membership	for	non-salaried	individuals	is	not	at	the	household	level	and	one	household	can	have	more	than	one	family	(either	related	or	unrelated),	especially	in	rural	areas	or	the	slums.	Nevertheless,	this	is	still	an	important	policy	question	because	even	when	only	one	member	of	the	household	is	enrolled	in	the	insurance	scheme,	this	can	ease	the	burden	on	the	household’s	overall	expenditure.	The	interpretation	of	the	treatment	effect	therefore	needs	to	be	understood	as	a	joint	effect	of	JKN	programme.	From	this	
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point,	an	insured	household	is	defined	as	a	household	which	has	at	least	one	member	enrolled	in	the	JKN	programme.			
8.3.2.1 Descriptive summary 	Table	8-6	presents	the	descriptive	statistics	for	both	the	outcome	and	the	control	variables.	On	average,	the	insured	households	were	more	likely	to	live	in	an	urban	area,	have	the	head	of	household	who	only	finished	primary	education,	have	bigger	household	size,	report	more	acute	conditions	affecting	daily	activities,	utilise	more	health	care,	and	come	from	lower	socioeconomic	status	compared	to	the	uninsured	households.			Looking	at	the	amount	of	OOP	health	expenditure,	the	insured	household	spent,	on	average,	IDR	9,600	less	than	the	uninsured	household	in	the	baseline	year	and	this	difference	is	significant	at	the	1	percent	level.	However,	the	insured	increased	their	spending	in	2014	to	almost	the	same	level	as	the	uninsured,	thereby	closing	the	gap	between	the	insured	and	the	uninsured.			Turning	to	the	catastrophic	health	expenditure	(CHE)	measures,	the	insured	households	had	a	lower	incidence	of	CHE	in	2007	compared	with	the	uninsured	and	these	differences	are	significant	at	a	5	percent	level	for	two	out	of	three	CHE	indicators.	Aligned	with	my	observation	on	the	amount	of	OOP	health	expenditure	spent,	the	differences	between	the	CHE	indicators	are	no	longer	significant	in	2014.						
Table	8-6	Descriptive	statistics	of	IFLS	household	data,	2007–2014			 2007	 		 2014	
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Variables	 Uninsured	(N=3,720)	 JKN	insured	(N=2,027)	 Mean	difference	
	 Uninsured	(N=3,720)	 JKN	insured	(N=2,027)	 Mean	difference	
Outcome	variables	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		OOP	health	expenditure†	 42,073	 32,426	 -9,646***	 	 54,826	 55,070	 243	OOP/total	expenditure	>	10%	 4.20%	 3.40%	 -0.80%	 	 4.70%	 5.10%	 0.50%	OOP/total	expenditure	>	25%	 1.30%	 0.70%	 -0.6%**	 	 1.00%	 1.10%	 0.10%	OOP/non-food	expenditure	>	40%	 3.90%	 2.80%	 -1.1%**	 	 3.80%	 4.00%	 0.20%	
Control	variables	
	       Gender	of	the	head	of	household	 68.40%	 69.70%	 1.30%	 	 68.40%	 69.70%	 1.30%	Urban/Rural	 44.30%	 49.90%	 5.6%***	 	 44.30%	 49.90%	 5.6%***	Age	of	the	head	of	household	 41.17	 40.78	 -0.39	 	 47.68	 47.28	 -0.40	Educational	level	of	the	head	of	household	 	       Primary	 45.70%	 49.50%	 3.8%***	 	 44.50%	 48.90%	 4.4%***	Secondary	 40.80%	 38.80%	 -2.00%	 	 41.20%	 38.80%	 -2.4%*	University	 5.60%	 4.70%	 -0.90%	 	 6.90%	 5.60%	 -1.3%*	Household	size	 3.81	 4.09	 0.27***	 	 3.78	 4.13	 0.35***	Number	of	acute	conditions	affecting	daily	activities	 2.12	 2.20	 0.08*	 	 3.36	 3.64	 0.28***	Number	of	chronic	conditions	 0.17	 0.15	 -0.02*	 	 0.34	 0.34	 0.00	Any	disability	 1.60%	 2.30%	 0.7%*	 	 15.60%	 16.40%	 0.80%	Any	utilisation	(outpatient	or	inpatient	in	the	past	year)	 25.10%	 27.50%	 2.4**	 	 29.60%	 38.20%	 8.6***	Total	household	expenditure†	 	1,800,000		 	1,653,000		 	-147,112***		 		 	2,497,000		 	2,326,000		 	-170,610***		
Significance	level	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01		
8.3.2.2 Impact estimates 	Table	8-7	displays	the	estimated	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	the	actual	health	expenditure	for	households.	The	first	column	presents	the	cross-sectional	regression	on	untransformed	health	expenditure	in	2014,	controlling	for	demographic	characteristics,	educational	status,	total	household	expenditure,	the	presence	of	medical	conditions	and	the	use	of	any	type	of	formal	health	care.	The	OLS	model	is	based	on:		
Equation	8-5	
V4 = 	$ + M4N4 +	_&484PQR= + S4 	
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Where	Y	refers	to	OOP	health	expenditure;	84Q 	includes	all	control	variables	described	above	and	&4Q 	is	the	coefficient	for	each	84Q;	α	is	the	model	intercept,	and	S4 	captures	random	error	term.	I	found	that	JKN	insured	households	on	average	spend	IDR	2,600	more	than	uninsured	households,	a	relatively	small	difference,	but	this	effect	is	not	significant	at	10	percent	level.	In	the	second	column,	the	log	of	health	expenditure	is	used	instead,	which	is	then	re-transformed	to	the	actual	cost	again	by	applying	the	Duan	smearing	approach.	The	effect	becomes	smaller,	but	it	is	still	not	significant.			
Table	8-7	The	estimated	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	household	OOP	health	expenditure		 OLS	untransformed	 OLS	with	Log	and	Duan	smearing	 Two-part	model	 PSM	 DID-PSM		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	OOP	Health	Expenditure		 2,648		 909		 3,513		 2,375		 9,207*		 (6,606)	 (2,941)	 (5,740)	 (6,728)	 (5,467)	
Significance	level	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01		The	third	column	presents	the	findings	from	the	two-part	model	that	considers	the	skewed	distribution	of	health	expenditure,	following	similar	approach	to	Equation	8-3	and	Equation	8-4.	The	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	is	still	not	significant,	with	only	a	slightly	bigger	magnitude	compared	to	the	first	and	second	columns.	The	fourth	column	shows	a	PSM	analysis	on	cross-sectional	data	(2014)	and	demonstrates	a	similar	effect	to	the	first	column,	though	still	not	significant.	Finally,	the	fifth	column	shows	the	mean	differences	between	OOP	in	2014	and	2007	after	matching,	following	similar	approach	to	Equation	8-1.	While	the	magnitude	of	the	JKN	effect	is	larger	than	in	the	first	column,	this	finding	is	only	significant	at	the	10	percent	level.	The	finding	from	the	PSM-DID	model	agrees	with	my	observation	on	the	descriptive	statistics.	Despite	having	lower	health	expenditure	compared	to	the	uninsured	in	2007,	the	insured	households	increased	their	health	expenditure	to	the	same	level	of	the	uninsured	in	2014.	Cross-sectional	analysis	in	column	1-4	may	not	be	able	to	detect	this	increased	expenditure	over	time.			
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Table	8-8	shows	the	estimated	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	CHE	indicators.	The	first	row	demonstrates	the	proportion	of	households	which	have	OOP	health	expenditure	at	more	than	10	percent	of	total	household	expenditure,	whereas	the	second	row	shows	the	same	proportion	with	a	higher	threshold,	25	percent.	The	first	column	shows	the	calculation	of	the	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	CHE	indicators	using	the	OLS	model,	whereas	the	second	column	uses	probit	modelling	as	all	CHE	indicators	are	binary	outcomes.	Nevertheless,	both	models	display	very	similar	findings.	The	third	column	shows	the	findings	from	the	PSM-DID	analysis,	representing	a	much	larger	effect	compared	with	the	OLS	and	probit	models.	The	insured	households	are	1.26	percent	more	likely	to	experience	CHE	if	the	threshold	is	set	to	10	percent,	but	this	effect	is	not	significant	at	10	percent	level.	Changing	the	threshold	to	25	percent	reduces	the	magnitude	but	the	effect	is	still	not	statistically	significant.	Using	the	ratio	of	OOP	expenditure	and	non-food	expenditure	with	40%	threshold	(see	the	third	row),	the	effect	is	rather	similar	to	the	first	row.	Overall,	there	is	not	enough	evidence	to	claim	that	the	JKN	programme	affects	the	incidence	of	CHE.			
Table	8-8	The	estimated	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	catastrophic	health	expenditure	(CHE)	incidence	(in	%)		 CHE	 OLS	 Probit		(Marginal	Effect)	 PSM-DID	OOP/HH>10%	 0.25	 0.25	 1.26		 (0.68)	 (0.68)	 (0.82)	OOP/HH>25%	 -0.02	 -0.02	 0.65		 (0.30)	 (0.30)	 (0.40)	OOP/NFOOD>40%	 0.12	 0.12	 1.19		 (0.64)	 (0.64)	 (0.75)	
HH	=	total	household	expenditure;	NFOOD	=	Non-food	household	expenditure	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01		Table	8-9	presents	the	estimated	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	OOP	health	expenditure	and	CHE	indicators	stratified	by	socioeconomic	quintiles	and	locality	of	residence	area.	While	no	apparent	increasing	or	decreasing	trend	from	the	lowest	to	the	highest	quintile	can	be	observed,	the	effect	of	JKN	becomes	significant	for	those	in	
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the	third	and	fourth	quintiles,	showing	the	opposite	signs.	While	the	insured	households	in	the	third	quintile	spent	IDR	17,000	less	compared	to	the	uninsured	households,	the	insured	households	in	the	fourth	quintile	spent	IDR	37,000	more	than	the	uninsured	households.	This	pattern	is	also	evident	for	all	three	incidences	of	CHE,	but	the	effect	is	more	significant	for	the	fourth	quintile.	The	insured	households	in	the	fourth	quintile	are	6.2	percent	more	likely	to	have	health	expenditure	exceeding	10	percent	of	total	household	expenditure,	and	5.6	percent	more	likely	to	have	health	expenditure	exceeding	40	percent	of	non-food	expenditure	compared	with	the	uninsured	in	the	same	quintile.		
Table	8-9	The	impact	of	JKN	on	OOP	health	expenditure	(in	IDR)	and	CHE	incidence	(in	%)	stratified	by	
socioeconomic	status	quintile	and	urban/rural	area			 OOP	(in	IDR)		 OOP/HH>10%	 OOP/HH>25%	 OOP/NFOOD>40%	Q1	 -3,062	 0.165	 -0.533	 0.836		 (6,919)	 (1.916)	 (0.008)	 (0.019)	Q2	 6,553	 0.659	 1.083	 1.444		 (6,935)	 (1.662)	 (0.008)	 (0.016)	Q3	 -17,422**	 -3.489*	 -0.144	 -3.092*		 (8,727)	 (1.826)	 (0.010)	 (0.017)	Q4	 37,109***	 6.242***	 2.706***	 5.598***		 (12,571)	 (1.965)	 (0.010)	 (0.017)	Q5	 21,179	 3.374	 0.027	 1.860		 (21,273)	 (2.092)	 (0.010)	 (0.019)		 	 	 	 	Urban	 19,471**	 2.361*	 1.873***	 2.520**		 (9,722)	 (1.236)	 (0.006)	 (0.011)	Rural	 -2,732	 -0.189	 -0.379	 -0.119		 (6,186)	 (1.120)	 (0.005)	 (0.011)	
HH	=	total	household	expenditure;	NFOOD	=	Non-food	household	expenditure	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01		In	addition,	the	JKN	effect	on	OOP	health	expenditure	and	three	CHE	indicators	is	more	prominent	in	urban	areas	compared	with	rural	ones.	The	insured	households	living	in	urban	area	spent	IDR	19,500	more	than	the	uninsured	households	in	urban	area.	The	insured	households	are	also	more	likely	to	experience	catastrophic	health	expenditure	compared	to	the	uninsured	households.		
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To	check	the	parallel	trend	assumption,	I	plotted	the	OOP	health	expenditure	from	2000	to	2014	with	price	adjustment	to	2007	level.	It	is	assumed	that	the	trend	of	OOP	health	expenditure	in	both	the	insured	and	uninsured	groups	is	similar	before	the	introduction	of	the	JKN	programme	in	2014,	which	will	be	reflected	in	the	2000	and	2007	data.	According	to	Figure	8-2,	it	is	likely	that	the	parallel	trend	assumption	can	be	upheld.				
	
Figure	8-2	Parallel	trend	for	OOP	health	expenditure	(in	IDR),	2000–2014	
	
 Positive	expenditures		Even	though	it	is	not	significant,	the	positive	coefficients	on	the	OOP	health	expenditure	is	unexpected	given	the	generosity	of	JKN	programme.	If	people	spent	more	OOP	health	spending,	the	purpose	of	the	spent	costs	is	still	not	clear	considering	JKN	did	not	collect	any	co-insurance	or	deductible	costs	at	the	point	of	treatment.			Without	the	intention	to	draw	causal	effect,	descriptive	information	from	patients	who	sought	care	in	IFLS	2014	data	might	shed	some	light	in	explaining	limited	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	OOP	health	expenditure.	This	data	was	not	utilised	into	my	empirical	model	as	it	is	only	available	for	2014.	From	a	more	detail	questionnaire	
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regarding	medical	expenditure	from	the	last	visit	to	outpatient	facilities,	5,695	people	sought	outpatient	care	in	2014.	It	is	found	that	642	out	of	1873	(34	percent)	individuals	who	were	insured	under	the	JKN	programme,	excluding	civil	servants	and	formal	sector	employees,	used	JKN	benefits	to	pay	for	the	outpatient	care.	Among	642	individuals	who	used	JKN	benefits	to	seek	care,	607	paid	nothing	for	prescription	and	35	people	paid	on	average	IDR	340,000	(GBP	17.5)	for	prescription.	Furthermore,	581	people	out	of	642	patients	paid	nothing	for	treatment	care	and	the	other	61	people	paid	on	average	IDR	270,000	(GBP	14).			Data	on	OOP	expenditure	on	the	last	visits	for	inpatient	care	showed	almost	similar	pattern.	From	1480	individuals	who	sought	inpatient	care	in	2014,	607	reported	to	be	enrolled	in	JKN	programme.	Out	of	607,	419	patients	(69	percent)	used	JKN	benefit	to	seek	care,	a	much	higher	rate	compared	to	the	utilisation	of	JKN	benefit	to	outpatient	care.	Among	those	419	patients,	332	paid	zero	expenditure	for	prescription	and	96	paid	on	average	IDR	1	million	(GBP	51).	In	addition,	271	out	of	419	patients	paid	zero	for	treatment	care	and	148	paid	on	average	IDR	2,3	million	(GBP	117).	These	numbers	have	considered	the	amount	of	OOP	expenditure	that	were	reimbursed	by	the	insurance.	This	descriptive	finding	agrees	with	findings	from	a	qualitative	survey	in	Indonesia,	albeit	a	much	lower	rate,	which	reported	that	31	percent	of	422	individuals	who	were	insured	by	the	JKN	programme	still	had	to	spend	out-of-pocket	when	they	sought	care	in	hospitals	and	10	percent	paid	out-of-pocket	in	primary	care	clinics	(Thabrany	and	Abidin,	2017).		It	can	also	be	observed	that	some	patients	still	had	to	spend	money	even	though	they	received	care	under	the	JKN	programme.	Not	only	for	prescription	costs	which	has	been	documented	as	the	common	source	of	extra	payment	for	the	insured	(Thornton	et	al.,	2010),	but	also	treatment	costs	that	are	meant	to	be	covered	completely	under	JKN	programme.	The	amount	of	average	OOP	prescription	and	treatment	costs	are	also	substantial	as	the	average	minimum	national	wages	in	2014	was	only	IDR	1,6	million	(Range:	IDR	910,000	–	IDR	2,2	million)	(BPS	Indonesia,	2017a).	It	means,	on	average,	JKN	insured	patients	may	spend	20%	of	their	income	to	pay	for	prescription	after	using	outpatient	care	or	62.5%	for	inpatient	care.	In	addition	to	OOP	
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prescription	costs,	JKN	insured	patients	may	have	to	spend	another	17%	of	their	income	for	treatment	fees	in	outpatient	clinics	or	143%	for	hospitals	fee.			 	
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Section	8.4 	Discussion		In	this	chapter,	I	have	found	that	individuals	in	the	JKN	contributory	group	increased	their	OOP	health	spending,	even	though	this	finding	was	not	significant	at	even	the	10	percent	level	after	controlling	for	time-invariant	unobservable	selection	bias.	Meanwhile,	the	JKN	subsidised	group	also	increased	their	OOP	health	spending	but	to	a	lesser	magnitude	compared	with	the	impact	on	the	contributory	group;	this	finding	was	also	not	significant	at	the	10	percent	level.	Furthermore,	I	found	that	there	is	no	significant	effect	on	OOP	health	expenditure	and	catastrophic	health	expenditure	events	among	the	insured	households,	on	average.	However,	there	is	an	indication	that	the	increased	spending	due	to	JKN	is	only	limited	to	insured	households	in	quintile	4,	who	are	also	more	likely	to	live	in	an	urban	area.	The	seemingly	stronger	evidence	at	household	level	compared	to	the	individual	level	might	be	due	to	the	larger	sample	size	at	household	level;	the	treatment	indicator	for	the	household	analysis	combines	the	presence	of	both	the	contributory	and	the	subsidised	groups.			This	limited	finding	may	be	correlated	with	the	finding	in	the	previous	chapter	about	the	JKN	effect	on	increased	utilisation	among	the	contributory	and	subsidised	groups.	No	reduction	in	OOP	health	spending	may	still	be	considered	an	improvement	in	the	sense	that	JKN	did	not	increase	OOP	spending	despite	an	increase	in	utilisation.	If	people	could	not	access	care	and	had	zero	expenditure	before	the	introduction	of	JKN,	then	having	increased	utilisation	but	no	increase	in	OOP	health	expenditure	after	enrolling	in	the	insurance	means	that	JKN	still	has	a	protective	effect.	Another	scenario	for	no	JKN	effect	relates	to	when	people	did	not	seek	care	before	the	treatment	period,	and	still	had	not	sought	care	after	the	treatment	period,	hence	their	zero	spending.			In	this	study,	I	have	found	that	the	expansion	of	the	JKN	programme	has	not	reduced	the	level	of	OOP	health	expenditure	for	the	enrolees	who	sought	medical	care.	Further	research	is	needed	to	understand	the	reasons	for	the	increased	expenditure.	Considering	the	benefits	of	the	programme,	another	empirical	question	relates	to	whether	this	increased	expenditure	results	in	improved	health	status.	The	next	
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chapter	discusses	my	attempt	to	find	evidence	about	the	effects	of	health	insurance	on	improving	health	status.		 	
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Chapter	9 	The	impact	on	blood	pressure	and	hypertension	
rate	
Section	9.1 	Introduction		In	the	previous	two	chapters,	I	have	estimated	the	impact	of	the	Indonesian	public	health	insurance	(Jaminan	Kesehatan	Nasional	–	JKN)	programme	on	the	level	of	utilisation	of	health	care	and	the	out-of-pocket	(OOP)	health	expenditures	at	the	individual	level.	While	the	JKN	programme	appears	to	encourage	use	of	health	care	services,	it	has	also	increased	OOP	health	expenditures.	In	this	chapter,	I	evaluate	the	impact	of	JKN	programme	on	health	status.	The	health	insurance	effect	on	blood	pressure	was	chosen	for	this	study	because	hypertension	is	the	leading	risk	factor	for	adult	mortality	in	many	developing	countries	(Lim	et	al.,	2013),	including	Indonesia.	Hypertension	is	the	primary	risk	factor	for	the	top	two	causes	of	death	in	Indonesia:	stroke	(21%	of	all	deaths)	and	ischaemic	heart	disease	(9%	of	all	deaths)	(World	Health	Organization,	2010).	IFLS	survey	has	collected	blood	pressure	measurement	since	2000	and	history	of	chronic	diseases,	including	hypertension,	since	2007.	Another	reason	for	choosing	this	outcome	is	that	blood	pressure	management	may	be	modified	by	health	care	utilisation	which	can	be	influenced	by	insurance.	Health	insurance	reduces	the	cost	of	access	to	medical	providers	which	may	encourage	the	enrolees	to	initiate	blood	pressure	management	with	regular	anti-hypertensive	medication.	The	enrolees	are	also	more	likely	to	maintain	good	adherence	to	treatment	which	is	an	important	factor	for	adequate	blood	pressure	control	(Menanga	et	al.,	2016).		In	this	chapter,	the	specific	objectives	are:		e. Evaluate	whether	JKN	programme,	on	average,	has	reduced	blood	pressure	level	among	its	enrolees	compared	to	the	uninsured	f. Evaluate	whether	JKN	programme	decreases	the	prevalence	of	hypertension	among	its	enrolees	compared	to	the	uninsured	g. Evaluate	whether	JKN	programme	has	improved	the	management	of	hypertension	by	measuring	the	rate	of	patient	awareness	of	the	condition,	treatment,	and	control	of	hypertension.	
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h. Assess	the	potential	effect	of	rurality	and	socioeconomic	status	on	the	effect	of	JKN	programme	effect	on	hypertension	outcome.		
Section	9.2 	Conceptual	framework					 						
Source:	(Ross	and	Mirowsky,	2000;	Grossman,	2000)		Figure	9-1	provides	a	conceptual	model	to	predict	the	relationship	between	health	insurance	and	health	status.	The	model	predicts	three	paths	on	how	health	insurance	can	improve	individual’s	health.	The	top	path	suggests	that	health	insurance	influences	the	quantity	of	health	care	services.	Through	changes	in	medical	care	consumption,	an	individual	may	stay	healthy	and	free	from	illness	and	avoid	deterioration	in	health	(Grossman,	1972).	The	model	explicitly	suggests	changes	in	medical	care	should	happen	first	before	the	effect	of	health	insurance	on	health	can	be	realised.	Health	insurance	can	act	as	a	subsidy	on	health	care	prices	and	based	on	economic	theory	reduced	price	should	increase	demand	of	medical	care	(Folland,	Goodman	and	Stano,	2014).	Based	on	this	first	theory,	use	of	medical	care	is	an	act	of	investment	to	sustain	the	health	stock	from	both	natural	(i.e.,	aging)	and	external	deteriorations	(i.e.,	illness)	(Grossman,	2000).		
Figure	9-1	Conceptual	model	of	the	relationships	between	health	insurance	and	health	status	
Health	Insurance	
Financial	protection	
Utilisation	
Health	status		
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Based	on	early	evidence	from	the	US	experience	(Ross	and	Mirowsky,	2000),	it	is	argued	that	increased	access	to	medical	care	due	to	health	insurance	may	not	necessarily	contribute	to	better	health	outcomes.	They	found	that	private	insurance	had	no	association	with	better	outcomes	and	public	insurance	led	to	worse	outcome	even	after	adjusting	for	socioeconomic	status.	However,	having	medical	insurance	greatly	reduced	both	the	likelihood	of	not	having	the	money	to	purchase	necessary	medical	services	and	the	likelihood	of	not	having	money	to	pay	bills	and	buy	necessities,	or	commonly	called	catastrophic	financial	effect.	This	suggestion	translates	to	a	second	path	of	how	health	insurance	influences	health	outcomes.	While	health	insurance	may	or	may	not	increase	utilisation	of	health	care,	the	effect	of	health	insurance	on	health	outcomes	can	come	indirectly	through	its	financial	protection	effect	(Ross	and	Mirowsky,	2000).	Health	insurance	enables	an	individual	to	sustain	their	optimum	living	condition	by	protecting	their	wealth	from	any	excessive	medical	bills.	With	sustained	living	conditions,	that	individual	is	protecting	their	health	stock	from	any	deterioration	that	may	come	from	non-optimum	living	conditions.	For	example,	an	insured	individual	can	potentially	avoid	large	bills	for	private	health	care	which	would	in	turn	reduce	the	catastrophic	impact	of	health	financing,	thus	reducing	the	impact	on	food	consumption	and	other	necessary	expenses.	Reduced	food	consumption	may	mean	choosing	less-healthy	food	consumption	or	sub-optimal	food	consumption	and	both	may	affect	physical	health.			In	addition,	living	with	huge	medical	debt	may	reduce	one’s	well-being	by	impaired	mental	health,	such	as	depression	or	anxiety	(Hojman,	Miranda,	and	Ruiz-Tagle,	2016;	Keese	and	Schmitz,	2014)	and	even	physical	health,	such	as	diastolic	blood	pressure	(Sweet	et	al.	2013).	A	cross-country	evidence	from	17	European	countries	suggests	that	long-term	debt	can	be	associated	with	poorer	health	outcome	(Clayton,	Liñares-Zegana,	and	Wilson,	2015).	The	consequence	of	financial	debt	on	psychological	well-being	may	also	depends	on	different	coping	mechanisms	used	by	individuals	which	further	suggests	a	wide	range	of	heterogeneity	of	the	debt	effect	(Bridges	and	Disney,	2010).	Nevertheless,	the	evidence	suggests	that	financial	protection	from	health	insurance	may	contribute	to	improved	individual’s	health	status.			
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Section	9.3 	Methodology	
 Outcome	variables	The	outcome	variables	in	this	chapter	are	mainly	derived	from	blood	pressure	measurement	and	history	of	diagnosed	hypertension	(HT)	which	are	available	in	IFLS	2007	and	2014.	An	Omron	meter,	HEM-7203	was	used	for	taking	blood	pressure	of	all	household	members	age	15	or	older.	Respondents	were	measured	three	times	on	alternate	arms	for	blood	pressure	and	the	average	of	systolic	and	diastolic	from	three	measurements	were	taken	and	then	dichotomised	using	the	WHO	definition	of	hypertension,	i.e.	Systolic	>140	mmHg	and/or	Diastolic	>90	mmHg	(Whitworth	and	World	Health	Organization,	International	Society	of	Hypertension	Writing	Group,	2003).	The	blood	pressure	measurements	were	taken	on	the	same	respondents	allowing	a	panel	data	analysis.	A	scatterplot	of	measured	blood	pressure	over	the	years	suggests	an	increasing	trend	(Figure	9-2).	Judging	by	the	histogram	of	measured	blood	pressure	in	Figure	9-3,	both	systolic	and	diastolic	are	normally	distributed	with	slight	skew	to	the	right.		
	
Figure 9-2 Scatterplot of measured systolic and diastolic 
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		The	next	step	is	to	determine	the	proportion	of	individuals	who	had	hypertension.	In	many	studies,	individuals	were	called	being	hypertensive	if	their	blood	pressure	(BP)	measurement	was	either	>	140mmHg	Systolic	Blood	Pressure	(SBP)	or	>	90mmHg	Diastolic	Blood	Pressure	(DBP)	OR	if	they	were	taking	medication	to	lower	blood	pressure	(Burt	et	al.,	1995;	Morenoff	et	al.,	2007;	Pereira	et	al.,	2009;	Joffres	et	al.,	2013;	Hertz	et	al.,	2005;	Falaschetti	et	al.,	2014;	Lloyd-Sherlock	et	al.,	2014).	Another	definition	of	being	hypertensive	is	any	individual	who	had	>	140mmHg	SBP	or	>	90mmHg	DBP	OR	self-reported	of	hypertension	diagnosis	by	any	health	professional	(Duru	et	al.,	2007;	Witoelar,	Strauss	and	Sikoki,	2012;	Strauss	et	al.,	2010).	This	identification	process	is	commonly	used	in	health	and	retirement	study	(HRS)-type	data	to	calculate	levels	of	hypertension	because	only	individuals	who	self-reported	to	have	hypertension	were	given	the	follow	up	question	on	hypertension	treatment.	This	implies	that	no	individual	took	anti-hypertensive	medication	without	being	aware	of	having	HT,	which	is	a	reasonable	assumption.	Because	IFLS	questionnaires	
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Figure	9-3	Histogram	of	systolic	and	diastolic,	by	year	
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were	developed	closely	similar	to	HRS	type	data	(Strauss,	Witoelar	and	Sikoki,	2016),	I	chose	the	second	approach	to	calculate	the	prevalence	of	HT.				Awareness,	treatment,	and	control	of	hypertension	were	defined	using	commonly	recognised	standards	(Joffres	et	al.,	2013).	Awareness	of	hypertension	was	self-reported	and	was	based	on	previous	diagnosis	of	hypertension	by	a	medical	professional.	In	the	survey	questionnaire,	this	information	was	recorded	using	the	following	question:	Has	a	doctor/paramedic/nurse	/midwife	ever	told	you	that	you	
had	hypertension?”	Those	answering	‘yes’	were	subsequently	asked:	“In	order	to	
manage	your	hypertension	are	you	currently	taking	prescribed	medication	on	a	weekly	
basis?”	Those	answering	yes	to	this	question	were	considered	to	be	on	treatment.	In	those	reporting	to	be	on	antihypertensive	medication,	control	of	hypertension	was	defined	as	having	a	mean	SBP<140	and	DBP	<90	mmHg.		Using	three	criteria	related	to	hypertension	(i.e.	blood	pressure	measurement,	self-reported	hypertension	diagnosis,	and	an	indicator	for	taking	anti-hypertensive	medication),	six	groups	of	individuals	can	be	identified	from	our	sample.	Figure	3a	–	3c	depicts	the	detail	of	those	six	groups	in	both	years.	The	first	is	a	group	of	individuals	who	had	elevated	blood	pressure	but	was	unaware	of	their	situation.	Their	number	increased	from	3,598	to	4,049	individuals.	The	second	group	is	a	group	of	individuals	who	was	aware	of	their	hypertensive	condition,	still	had	elevated	blood	pressure,	and	were	not	taking	anti-hypertensive	medication	at	the	time	of	the	survey,	whereas	the	third	group	is	almost	similar	to	the	second	group,	but	these	respondents	took	anti-hypertensive	medication.	Both	groups	increased	in	size	over	time,	but	the	second	group	increased	more	significantly	from	352	in	2007	to	1,429	in	2014.		Meanwhile,	the	fourth	group	consists	of	individuals	who	were	aware	of	their	hypertensive	condition	but	had	normal	blood	pressure	and	took	anti-hypertensive	medication	(i.e.	their	hypertension	was	under	control	due	to	medication).	The	fifth	group	was	similar	to	the	fourth	group	(i.e.	they	were	aware	of	their	hypertension	because	of	diagnosis	in	the	past)	but	did	not	take	anti-hypertensive	medication	(i.e.	their	blood	pressure	was	under	control	without	medication).	While	the	fourth	group	did	not	change	much	(257	in	2007	and	229	in	2014),	the	fifth	group	increased	from	
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226	to	901	in	2014.	This	may	have	happened	because	of	lifestyle	changes,	such	as	weight	loss,	that	may	have	helped	reduce	blood	pressure.	Finally,	the	sixth	group,	which	is	the	largest	among	the	others,	consists	of	non-hypertensive	people.			Based	on	those	six	groups	in	Figure	3,	we	could	construct	the	formula	to	calculate	the	prevalence	of	hypertension,	awareness,	treatment,	and	controlled.		Hypertension	=	#=a#ba#ca#da#e5f5gh	igjIhk 	 Treatment	=	 #ca#d#=a#ba#ca#da#e	Awareness	=	 #ba#ca#da#e#=a#ba#ca#da#e												Controlled	=	 #d#ca#d		Prevalence	is	calculated	as	the	sum	of	all	groups	who	had	hypertension,	either	through	elevated	blood	pressure	or	self-reported	hypertension	diagnosis,	divided	by	the	total	sample.	For	the	purpose	of	this	analysis,	the	numerator	of	the	prevalence	can	be	named	as	hypertensive	individuals.	Awareness	is	calculated	as	the	total	number	of	hypertensive	individuals	who	were	aware	of	their	condition	divided	by	the	total	number	of	hypertensive	individuals.	Treatment	is	calculated	as	the	sum	of	hypertensive	individuals	receiving	anti-hypertensive	medication	divided	by	the	total	number	of	hypertensive	individuals.	Controlled	is	calculated	as	the	number	of	individuals	who	had	anti-hypertensive	medication	and	had	normal	blood	pressure	divided	by	the	total	number	of	individuals	who	received	anti-hypertensive	medication.						
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	(a)	
	(b)	
	(c)	
Figure	9-4	Summary	of	hypertension	measurement	in	IFLS	2007	and	2014	
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 Independent	variables	I	selected	independent	variables	that	are	likely	to	modify	blood	pressure	or	known	to	be	risk	factors	of	cardiovascular	disease	(CVD).	They	are	chosen	to	allow	estimation	the	treatment	effect	of	insurance	after	controlling	for	potential	confounders	that	may	be	related	to	hypertension-based	outcome.	For	instance,	if	age	is	correlated	with	HT	and	is	unequally	distributed	in	the	insured	and	uninsured	groups,	then	the	estimate	of	treatment	effect	of	insurance	will	be	biased.	These	variables	can	be	categorised	into	two	groups:	biomedical	characteristics	(age,	gender,	body	mass	index,	smoking	status,	physical	activities,	and	history	of	diabetes	mellitus)	and	socioeconomic	status	(living	in	urban/rural	area,	education	status,	and	wealth	index).	I	also	included	dummies	for	each	IFLS	provinces	that	will	capture	province-specific	factors	such	as	culture,	geography	and	local	policy.		
Biomedical	characteristics	
• Age		Prevalence	of	hypertension	increases	with	age	(Sun,	2015).	One	mechanism	by	which	the	prevalence	of	hypertension	is	increased	in	relation	to	aging	may	be	advancing	endothelial	dysfunction	associated	with	aging	through	an	increase	in	oxidative	stress.	In	addition,	endothelial	cell	deterioration	is	also	involved	in	aging-related	endothelial	dysfunction	(AlGhatrif	et	al.,	2013).	Population	studies	also	demonstrated	the	increased	prevalence	of	hypertension	among	older	population	in	Indonesia	(Hussain	et	al.,	2016).			
• Gender	In	general,	women	have	higher	prevalence,	awareness,	treatment,	and	control	of	HT	across	all	races	in	the	USA	(Cutler	et	al.,	2008).	By	contrast,	in	Indonesia,	men	are	more	likely	to	have	higher	prevalence	but	still	higher	awareness	and	control	of	HT	(Hussain	et	al.	2016).	Indonesian	women	were	more	likely	to	have	hypertension	when	they	are	older	but	men	had	higher	prevalence	when	they	were	younger	(<45	years)	(Christiani	et	al.,	2016).	
		 221	
	
• Body	mass	index	 	Body	mass	index	(BMI)	is	defined	as	weight	(in	kg)	divided	by	height	(in	meter)	squared.	Height	was	measured	with	Shorr	measuring	boards	and	weight	was	measured	using	Seca	floor-model	scales	developed	in	collaboration	with	UNICEF.		We	used	World	Health	Organization	(WHO)	standards	which	defines	adults	whose	BMI	is	under	18.5	are	considered	underweight,	those	whose	BMI	is	under	16	are	considered	severe	underweight,	those	whose	BMI	is	25	or	greater	are	overweight,	and	those	whose	BMI	is	30	or	greater	are	considered	obese.	Obesity	has	been	associated	with	elevated	hypertension,	diabetes,	and	other	cardiovascular	disease	(Gaal,	Mertens	and	Block,	2006;	Mokdad	et	al.,	2003;	Rahmouni	et	al.,	2005).				
• Smoking	status	Cigarette	smoking	has	been	shown	to	cause	damage	on	human’s	vascular	system	and	modulate	contributing	to	increased	risk	of	fatal	cardiovascular	outcomes	(Messner	and	Bernhard,	2014).	In	a	global	study	of	smoking	prevalence	and	cigarette	consumption	1980-2012,	Indonesia	has	seen	a	slight	increase	in	smoking	prevalence	from	29.2	%	(95%CI:	27.3	–	29.8)	in	1980	to	30.1%	(95%	CI:	28.9	–	31.4),	and	a	bigger	increase	in	mean	daily	consumption	per	smoker	from	8.9	(95%	CI:	7.8	–	10.1)	to	11	(95%	CI:	10.1	–	11.9)	(Ng	et	al.,	2014).			
• Physical	activity	Physical	activity	was	assessed	through	a	set	of	questions	[modified	short	form	of	International	Physical	Activity	Questionnaire	(IPAQ)]	on	the	types	and	times	of	physical	activities	engaged	in,	in	all	parts	of	life:	work,	home	and	exercise.	The	total	duration	of	activities	was	transformed	to	Metabolic	Equivalent	of	Tasks	(METs)-minutes	and	summed	to	gain	an	overall	estimate	of	physical	activity	in	a	week	and	further	classified	as	low,	moderate	and	high	level	of	physical	activity	(Di	Blasio,	Di	Donato	and	Mazzocco,	2016).	
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• History	of	Diabetes	Insulin	resistance	causes	diabetes	mellitus	and	hypertension.	People	with	diabetes	mellitus	are	more	likely	to	have	hypertension	and	uncontrolled	blood	pressure	(DeFronzo	and	Ferrannini,	1991).	However,	a	population	study	in	Indonesia	did	not	find	a	strong	relationship	between	diabetes	and	hypertension	(Rahajeng	and	Tuminah,	2009).		
Socioeconomic	status	
• Locality	of	residence		The	split	between	urban	and	rural	area	reflects	the	difference	in	the	economic	development,	the	availability	of	health	care	facilities,	and	cultural	practices.	As	urban	area	tends	to	receive	more	attention	from	the	government,	people	living	in	urban	area	can	enjoy	easier	access	and	more	choices	of	medical	provider	compared	to	in	rural	area.	It	is	expected	to	see	higher	rate	of	awareness	and	treatment	in	the	urban	area.	However,	people	living	in	rural	area	may	have	healthier	diet	as	fast	food	chains	are	less	available	in	the	village,	which	in	turn	may	contribute	to	lower	prevalence	rate	of	hypertension.	In	Indonesia,	the	prevalence	of	hypertension	was	significantly	higher	in	urban	(49.8%)	compared	with	rural	(46.4%)	areas	(Hussain	et	al.	2016).		
• Education	Education	may	play	an	indirect	role	in	hypertension	by	the	means	of	health	behaviour.	More	educated	people	are	more	likely	to	adopt	healthy	behaviours,	such	as	eating	healthier	diet.	On	the	other	hand,	a	person	with	lower	education	is	more	likely	to	work	in	an	occupation	requiring	manual	labour,	which	may	increase	their	physical	activity,	while	a	person	with	higher	education	is	more	likely	to	work	in	an	office,	leading	to	a	more	sedentary	lifestyle.	In	Indonesia,	education	was	a	significant	factor	in	women	(p<0.05)	to	be	associated	with	lower	odds	of	uncontrolled	hypertension	among	those	who	were	under	45	years	old	(Christiani	et	al.,	2016).	One	epidemiology	study	of	hypertension	in	Indonesia	found	that	people	who	did	not	finish	elementary	school	had	higher	odds	of	being	hypertensive	than	those	who	finished	elementary	school	(Rahajeng	and	Tuminah,	2009).	Among	Indonesian	male	
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adults	age	40	or	higher,	the	prevalence	of	hypertension	progressively	rose	across	levels	of	education.	However,	after	adjusting	for	sociodemographic	variables,	including	current	smoking	and	level	of	physical	activity,	the	odds	of	hypertension	did	not	vary	significantly	across	level	of	education	or	wealth	index	in	either	men	or	women	(Hussain	et	al.,	2016).	While	in	theory	education	may	affect	the	level	of	blood	pressure,	but	education	may	also	be	influential	in	modifying	healthy	behaviour	which	has	more	direct	impact	on	blood	pressure.			
• Wealth	index	Socioeconomic	status	may	affect	the	level	of	blood	pressure,	but	its	mechanism	is	not	clear.	Poor	people	may	have	less	access	to	healthier	diet,	but	rich	people	are	more	likely	to	live	a	more	sedentary	lifestyle.	However,	it	is	thought	socioeconomic	status	may	play	a	bigger	role	in	the	access	to	medical	providers	and	to	preventative	care.	Based	on	an	epidemiology	study	in	Indonesia,	socioeconomic	status	has	no	association	with	prevalence	of	HT,	but	this	may	be	related	to	awareness,	treatment,	and	control	(Rahajeng	and	Tuminah,	2009).	Hypertension	can	often	be	asymptomatic	which	leads	to	the	detection/preventive	care	issue.	A	poor	person	with	no	health	insurance	is	less	likely	to	undergo	blood	pressure	screening,	whereas	an	insured	poor	person	with	asymptomatic	hypertension	is	likely	to	go	for	preventive	care	visits,	get	diagnosed	early,	initiate	the	hypertensive	treatment,	and	maintain	a	good	treatment	compliance.	In	this	chapter,	I	used	the	asset	index	to	construct	wealth	quantiles	as	I	had	done	in	the	previous	two	chapters.		
 Estimation	model	
Difference-in-Differences (DID) with regression I	begin	by	estimating	conventional	parametric	DID	models	for	the	outcomes.	Consider	the	following	equation:	
Equation	9-1	 V45 = 	&l + &=N5 +	&b>45 +	&cN5 × >45 +	8459 +	ni + :45			
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where		V45	stands	for	the	outcome	variables	for	individual	+	in	year	o.	The	year	dummy	N5	captures	aggregate	factors	that	would	cause	changes	in	outcome	variables	even	in	the	 absence	 of	 a	 policy	 change.	 >45	is	 the	 treatment	 group	 dummy	 that	 captures	possible	 differences	 between	 the	 treatment	 and	 control	 groups	 prior	 to	 the	introduction	of	JKN	programme	in	2014.	N5 × >45	is	the	interaction	between	the	year	and	 the	 treatment	dummy	which	 is	 the	 regressor	 of	 interest:	 it	 gives	us	 the	 causal	reform	effect,	provided	the	assumptions	required	in	the	DID	approach	are	satisfied.	State	 dummies,	 ni	 ,	 account	 for	 permanent	 differences	 across	 the	 13	 Indonesian	provinces.	845	contains	1	x	K	column	vector	of	control	variables.	As	usual,	:45	stands	for	unobserved	heterogeneity	and	is	assumed	to	be	normally	distributed	with	zero	mean.			DID	is	usually	estimated	by	ordinary	least	squares	and	the	treatment	effect	is	easily	identifiable	 from	 the	 sign	 and	 statistical	 significance	 of	 &c	 in	 Equation	 1.	 Binary	outcomes	can	also	be	estimated	with	DID	using	nonlinear	model,	such	as	probit	or	logit	model.	However,	the	treatment	effect,	unlike	in	the	linear	model,	 is	not	equal	to	the	interaction	term	and	it	cannot	be	constant	across	the	treated	population	because	the	expectation	of	the	outcome	variables	is	bounded	between	zero	and	one.	It	has	been	shown	 that	 the	 treatment	 effect	 in	 nonlinear	 DID	 is	 the	 cross	 difference	 of	 the	conditional	 expectation	 of	 the	observed	outcome	minus	 the	 cross	 difference	 of	 the	conditional	expectation	of	the	counterfactual	outcome	(Puhani,	2012).	The	sign	of	the	treatment	effect	in	any	strictly	monotonic	transformation	model,	such	as	logit,	probit,	and	 tobit,	 is	 the	 same	as	 the	 sign	of	 the	coefficient	of	 the	 interaction	 term	(Puhani,	2012;	Karaca-Mandic,	Norton	and	Dowd,	2012).	Since	all	outcomes	in	this	analysis	are	binary,	 I	 estimated	 all	 regression	models	 using	 both	OLS	 and	 logit	 to	 compare	 the	consistency	of	any	observed	findings.			Because	 of	 serial	 correlation	 in	 panel	 data,	 conventional	 DID	 standard	 errors	may	understate	 the	 standard	 deviation	 of	 the	 estimated	 treatment	 effects,	 leading	 to	serious	 overestimation	 of	 t-statistics	 and	 significance	 levels	 (Bertrand,	 Duflo	 and	Mullainathan,	 2004).	 A	 simple	method	 to	 correct	 this	 serial	 correlation	 issue	 is	 by	clustering	over	the	individuals	to	obtain	cluster-robust	standard	errors.			
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Difference-in-differences	assumes	that	outcome	trends	are	similar	between	the	insured	and	uninsured	groups	before	the	intervention	and	that	the	only	factors	explaining	changes	in	outcomes	between	the	two	groups	are	constant	over	time.	It	implies	that	the	outcomes	would	have	moved	in	parallel	trend	between	the	insured	and	uninsured	groups	in	the	absence	of	the	programme.	A	falsification	test	requiring	two	rounds	of	data	available	before	the	start	of	the	programme	can	verify	whether	any	difference	in	trends	appears	between	the	two	groups	before	the	implementation	of	the	programme.	By	plotting	the	mean	of	outcome	variables	for	each	year	between	the	insured	and	uninsured,	we	can	physically	observe	any	trend	difference	prior	to	the	reform.	I	run	placebo	regression	assuming	counterfactually	that	the	JKN	programme	took	place	in	a	different	year.	Should	the	coefficient	of	interest	be	significant	in	a	non-reform	year,	the	common	time	trend	assumption	would	be	seriously	challenged	(Lechner,	2010;	Ziebarth	and	Karlsson,	2014).			
PSM and DID approach As	in	Chapter	7	and	8,	I	also	estimated	the	treatment	effect	of	JKN	programme	using	the	combination	of	propensity	score	matching	(PSM)	and	difference-in-difference	(DID).	The	most	attractive	feature	of	propensity	score	matching	compared	to	regression	type	estimators	is	its	nonparametric	nature	as	PSM	assumes	a	flexible	functional	form	to	estimate	the	outcome	model	(Rosenbaum	and	Rubin,	1983).	While	PSM	controls	for	any	observed	confounders,	DID	removes	the	time	constant	confounders.		The	PSM-DID	approach	follows	the	following	equation:		
Equation	9-2	 >>6,76 = @(∆!456) − @(∆!4576)																	= @B,(∆845)C − @B;(∆845)C + @(34=) + ∆956 − ∆9576 + 	@(∆:456) − @(:4576)		If	we	observe	two	sets	of	outcomes	–	!456 ,	the	outcome	among	the	JKN	enrolees;	!4576 ,	the	outcome	for	the	uninsured,	the	difference-in-difference	treatment	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	can	be	obtained	by	taking	the	expected	difference	between	the	changes	among	the	insured	[@(∆!456)	]	and	the	uninsured	[@(∆!4576)].	This	equation	can	be	solved	by	functions	of	observables	and	unobservables	as	shown	in	the	second	
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line	of	Equation	8-1.	The	first	difference	in	the	second	line	of	Equation	9-2,	i.e.	@B,(∆845)C − @B;(∆845)C,	represents	the	differences	of	changes	in	outcomes	due	to	the	difference	in	observables.	This	first	difference	can	be	eliminated	through	matching	each	treated	individual	with	one	or	more	untreated	individuals	who	are	similar	in	terms	of	observable	variables	(845).	The	treatment	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	its	enrolees	is	reflected	by	the	@(345	).	The	second	difference,	i.e.	∆956 − ∆9576 ,	represents	the	difference	of	time-specific	unobservable	factor,	common	to	all	individuals	in	each	group,	between	the	treated	and	the	untreated.	For	example,	it	can	represent	the	change	in	economic	shock	or	new	legislation	that	occurs	in	national	level.	To	eliminate	this,	we	need	to	assume	that	the	time-fixed	unobservable	factor	for	both	insured	and	uninsured	change	at	the	same	trend.			The	 propensity	 score	 was	 predicted	 based	 on	 logit	 regression	 estimates	 of	 the	probability	of	an	individual	enrolling	in	the	JKN	programme	in	2014	as	a	function	of	the	control	variables	in	2007.	The	propensity	score	for	each	voluntary	and	subsidised	group	were	 estimated	 separately.	 The	use	of	 covariates	 from	2007	 instead	of	 from	2014	was	 chosen	 to	minimise	 a	 reverse	 causality	 issue.	 In	 addition,	 I	 included	 the	sample	 weight	 accounting	 both	 complex	 survey	 design	 and	 attrition	 rate	 into	 our	propensity	 score	 estimation	 (DuGoff,	 Schuler,	 and	 Stuart,	 2014).	 Based	 on	 the	coefficient	 estimates	 from	 the	 logit	 model,	 I	 constructed	 a	 propensity	 score	 that	allowed	us	to	quantify	the	distance	between	each	of	the	treated	and	untreated	cases	in	the	sample.	This	propensity	score	is	essentially	the	predicted	probability	of	being	in	the	 treated	 (insured)	 group.	 I	 applied	 the	 common	 support	 rule	 that	 observations	whose	 propensity	 score	 is	 higher	 than	 the	 maximum	 or	 less	 than	 the	 minimum	propensity	 score	of	 the	 controls	 are	 excluded.	 I	 also	 excluded	 the	 treated	 cases	 for	which	a	sufficiently	close	match	could	not	be	 found	among	 the	controls,	and	 it	was	determined	by	choice	of	bandwidth	or	caliper,	as	described	below.			In	this	analysis,	I	used	nearest	neighbour	matching	in	which	we	matched	each	treated	case	with	the	five	‘nearest’	untreated	cases.	In	addition	to	matching	each	treated	case	with	the	five	nearest	untreated	cases,	I	also	set	the	maximum	distance	of	propensity	score	between	 the	 treated	and	non-treated	case	with	a	pre-defined	caliper	0.01.	As	
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robustness	check,	I	also	used	kernel	matching	as	an	alternative	matching	technique.	In	kernel	 matching,	 each	 insured	 individual	 is	 given	 a	 weight	 of	 one.	 A	 weighted	composite	 of	 comparison	 observations	 is	 used	 to	 create	 a	 match	 for	 each	 insured	individual,	where	uninsured	individuals	are	weighted	by	their	distance	in	propensity	score	from	insured	individuals	within	a	range,	or	bandwidth,	of	the	propensity	score.	Only	 observations	 outside	 the	 range	 of	 common	 support	 are	 discarded.	 Kernel	matching	maximizes	precision	(by	retaining	sample	size)	without	worsening	bias	(by	giving	greater	weight	to	better	matches)	(Garrido	et	al.,	2014).		
Section	9.4 Findings		This	section	presents	the	result	of	the	impact	evaluation	of	JKN	programme	on	hypertension.	Before	presenting	the	regression	results,	the	descriptive	results	are	presented	first.			
 Descriptive	statistics	Table	9-1	shows	the	summary	of	hypertension-related	variables	in	percentages.	Both	SBP	and	DBP	shows	an	increasing	trend	from	2007	to	2014	for	all	groups.	Consequently,	the	prevalence	also	shows	an	increasing	trend.	The	contributory	group	has	the	lowest	prevalence	in	both	years	compared	to	the	other	groups	but	its	growth	rate	is	almost	50%	higher	in	2014	compared	to	the	2007	figure.			Over	time,	people	with	elevated	BP	were	more	likely	to	be	aware	of	their	hypertensive	condition	and	this	is	true	for	all	groups.	Although	the	uninsured	showed	the	highest	awareness	in	2007,	it	became	the	lowest	rate	in	2014.	Meanwhile,	the	awareness	for	the	contributory	group	increased	almost	twofold	in	2014.	However,	the	treatment	rates	show	a	mixed	pattern.	While	the	contributory	group	shows	an	increasing	trend,	the	rates	for	both	subsidised	and	uninsured	groups	show	a	decreasing	pattern,	substantially	more	for	the	latter	group.	While	the	uninsured	showed	decreased	treatment	rate	followed	by	decreased	control	rate	of	hypertension	
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as	well,	the	subsidised	group	had	higher	control	rate	despite	its	decreased	treatment	rate.	Overall,	the	contributory	group	showed	a	more	positive	pattern	such	that	more	people	were	aware	of	their	hypertension,	received	treatment,	and	had	better	control	of	hypertension	in	2014	compared	to	2007		
Table	9-1	Descriptive	table	of	hypertension	rates,	by	year	and	insurance	status			 Uninsured	 Contributory	 Subsidised		 2007	 2014	 2007	 2014	 2007	 2014	SBP	(in	mmHg)	 127.045	 131.817	 124.573	 128.814	 127.015	 131.807	DBP	(in	mmHg)	 79.081	 80.364	 78.829	 79.851	 78.891	 80.184	Prevalence*	(in	%)	 24.4	 34.4	 21.3	 30.6	 24	 34.5	Awareness^	(in	%)	 28.8	 41.2	 27.6	 51.8	 25.6	 41.4	Treatment†	(in	%)	 17.5	 10.8	 15.1	 18.1	 15.8	 8.5	Controlled††	(in	%)	 29.1	 21.2	 27.6	 30	 26.4	 31	*Prevalence:	The	union	of	elevated	blood	pressure	(Systolic/Diastolic	>	140/90	mmHg)	and	self-reported	of	hypertension	diagnosis/total	sample.	^Awareness:	Hypertensive	individuals	who	were	aware	of	their	condition/hypertensive	individuals	†Treatment:	Hypertensive	individuals	who	took	medication	to	lower	their	blood	pressure/hypertensive	individuals	††Control:	Hypertensive	individuals	with	normal	BP	and	taking	medication/hypertensive	individuals	who	took	medication		Table	9	2	presents	a	summary	of	the	descriptive	statistics	for	control	variables	used	in	the	analysis.	The	contributory	group	is	more	likely	to	be	female	and	younger,	have	higher	BMI,	live	in	urban	area,	come	from	the	richest	population,	be	highly	educated,	be	a	non-smoker,	and	have	been	diagnosed	diabetes	mellitus	by	a	health	professional.	On	the	other	hand,	the	subsidised	group	is	more	likely	to	be	older,	come	from	the	poorest	population	and	have	no	education.	Both	the	subsidised	and	uninsured	are	more	likely	to	be	a	smoker	than	the	contributory	group.	Table	9-3	shows	that	this	prediction	is	correct	that	the	richest	has	the	highest	awareness	and	treatment	rate	while	the	poorest	has	the	lowest	one.	This	pattern	also	persists	from	2007	to	2014	suggesting	that	this	inequality	has	already	existed	prior	to	the	introduction	of	JKN	programme	in	2014.	However,	the	controlled	rate	which	presents	the	success	of	blood	pressure	management	shows	a	pro-poor	pattern	in	2007,	i.e.	the	first	and	second	quintiles	had	higher	controlled	rate	than	richer	quintiles;	however,	the	poorest	quintile	had	a	large	drop	in	controlled	level	in	2014	making	it	similar	to	the	richest	quintile.			
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Table	9-3	presents	the	distribution	of	systolic	and	diastolic	across	year,	wealth	quintiles,	and	rural/urban	area.	Systolic	and	diastolic	in	all	quintiles	show	an	increasing	trend	and	the	difference	between	the	poorest	and	the	richest	appears	small	clinically.	Awareness	and	treatment	rate	imply	access	to	health	care	facilities.	Based	on	the	finding	of	the	JKN	programme	effect	on	utilisation	of	health	care	in	the	previous	chapter,	it	is	predicted	to	observe	higher	awareness	and	treatment	rate	among	the	richest	quintile.			
Table	9-2	Descriptive	table	of	control	variables,	by	year	and	insurance	status			 Uninsured	 Contributory	 Subsidised	Control	variables	 2007	 2014	 2007	 2014	 2007	 2014	
Age	(years)	 37.19	 43.71	 33.8	 40.33	 37.34	 43.82	18-29	year	 37.50%	 18.40%	 44.60%	 22.10%	 35.10%	 16.10%	30-39	year	 22.80%	 27.70%	 25.90%	 32.50%	 26.30%	 28.80%	40-49	year	 18.50%	 20.60%	 16.50%	 21.80%	 18.40%	 23.20%	50-59	year	 12.30%	 17.20%	 7.90%	 13.60%	 10.70%	 16.10%	60-69	year	 6.40%	 9.40%	 3.90%	 6.80%	 7.10%	 9.10%	>	70	year	 2.50%	 6.70%	 1.20%	 3.20%	 2.40%	 6.70%	
Marital	status	
	      Single	 18.90%	 8.70%	 24.40%	 9.50%	 14.70%	 6.10%	Married	 72.50%	 78.50%	 71.90%	 82.20%	 77.30%	 81.70%	Previously-married	 8.60%	 12.80%	 3.70%	 8.40%	 8.00%	 12.30%	
Male	 45.70%	 45.70%	 42.10%	 42.10%	 44.90%	 44.90%	
Urban		 41.20%	 47.30%	 71.20%	 73.90%	 40.80%	 51.90%	
Wealth	quintiles	
	      Quintile	1	(the	poorest)	 18.40%	 19.10%	 7.30%	 9.00%	 30.70%	 28.60%	Q2	 20.40%	 20.20%	 13.10%	 15.80%	 27.60%	 25.70%	Q3	 21.20%	 21.50%	 22.40%	 22.70%	 20.40%	 20.40%	Q4	 21.50%	 21.70%	 27.20%	 22.00%	 13.70%	 16.40%	Quintile	5	(the	richest)	 18.40%	 17.50%	 29.90%	 30.50%	 7.60%	 8.80%	
Education	status	
	      No	education	 9.30%	 8.50%	 3.10%	 2.30%	 9.90%	 9.30%	Primary	education	 41.10%	 40.50%	 21.60%	 21.00%	 50.10%	 49.40%	Secondary		 44.80%	 43.30%	 61.40%	 59.20%	 38.40%	 38.00%	Higher		 4.80%	 7.50%	 14.00%	 17.50%	 1.60%	 3.20%	
BMI	(kg/m2)	 22.33	 23.57	 22.95	 24.39	 21.89	 22.99	Underweight	 14.70%	 10.30%	 12.50%	 8.90%	 16.40%	 12.40%	Normal	BMI	 63.40%	 55.60%	 59.10%	 48.00%	 64.40%	 58.20%	Overweight	 21.90%	 33.40%	 28.40%	 42.80%	 19.10%	 28.60%	Obese	 4.40%	 8.00%	 6.20%	 11.40%	 2.80%	 6.10%	
History	of	Diabetes		 0.70%	 2.30%	 1.30%	 4.10%	 0.20%	 2.00%	
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Smoking	status	
	      Non-smoker	 64.50%	 60.80%	 70.70%	 67.60%	 63.60%	 60.20%	Ex-smoker	 2.10%	 5.20%	 2.00%	 5.30%	 1.80%	 4.80%	Light	(1-10	cig/day)	 10.40%	 10.20%	 10.90%	 9.00%	 11.80%	 10.30%	Medium	(11-20)	 19.10%	 18.20%	 13.10%	 14.90%	 19.70%	 20.10%	Heavy	(>20)	 3.80%	 5.70%	 3.30%	 3.30%	 3.20%	 4.50%	
Physical	activity	
	      Low	 22.00%	 40.50%	 30.30%	 47.90%	 20.20%	 36.50%	Moderate	 33.20%	 24.50%	 32.40%	 24.50%	 30.40%	 24.20%	High	 44.80%	 30.40%	 37.40%	 23.80%	 49.40%	 35.00%	Table	9-3	shows	that	this	prediction	is	correct	that	the	richest	has	the	highest	awareness	and	treatment	rate	while	the	poorest	has	the	lowest	one.	This	pattern	also	persists	from	2007	to	2014	suggesting	that	this	inequality	has	already	existed	prior	to	the	introduction	of	JKN	programme	in	2014.	However,	the	controlled	rate	which	presents	the	success	of	blood	pressure	management	shows	a	pro-poor	pattern	in	2007,	i.e.	the	first	and	second	quintiles	had	higher	controlled	rate	than	richer	quintiles;	however,	the	poorest	quintile	had	a	large	drop	in	controlled	level	in	2014	making	it	similar	to	the	richest	quintile.		
	
Table	9-3	Blood	pressure	and	hypertension	rate	in	2007	and	2014	across	wealth	quintiles	and	urban/rural	area,	all	
three	groups	(contributory,	subsidised,	and	uninsured)			 Systolic	(mmHg)	 		 Diastolic	(mmHg)	 		 Prevalence*	 	 Awareness^	 	 Treatment†	 	 Controlled††			 2007	 2014	 		 2007	 2014	 		 2007	 2014	 		 2007	 2014	 		 2007	 2014	 		 2007	 2014	Q1	(Poorest)	 127.7	 133.5	 	 78.5	 79.9	 	 23.8%	 35.2%	 	 23.5%	 38.2%	 	 14.8%	 8.6%	 	 34.0%	 26.0%	Q2	 127.1	 131.6	 	 78.6	 80.0	 	 23.6%	 33.9%	 	 28.6%	 42.2%	 	 17.5%	 11.0%	 	 32.2%	 32.9%	Q3	 125.7	 131.0	 	 78.9	 80.4	 	 22.1%	 34.3%	 	 29.7%	 44.7%	 	 17.5%	 11.6%	 	 28.8%	 23.2%	Q4	 125.9	 130.2	 	 79.2	 80.5	 	 23.3%	 32.7%	 	 30.5%	 48.2%	 	 19.3%	 15.2%	 	 20.5%	 17.7%	Q5	 126.0	 129.5	 	 80.2	 80.6	 	 25.0%	 33.1%	 	 33.5%	 49.4%	 	 20.5%	 16.5%	 	 27.9%	 26.5%	(Richest)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Rural	 127.0	 131.4	 	 78.8	 79.9	 	 23.6%	 33.2%	 	 26.5%	 42.4%	 	 16.3%	 10.7%	 	 28.6%	 26.0%	Urban	 126.0	 130.8	 	 79.4	 80.6	 	 23.5%	 34.3%	 	 31.9%	 46.1%	 	 19.7%	 13.9%	 	 27.9%	 24.4%		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Total	 127.2	 131.1	 	 79.1	 80.3	 	 23.6%	 33.8%	 	 29.2%	 44.5%	 	 18.0%	 12.6%	 	 28.3%	 24.9%	*Prevalence:	The	union	of	elevated	blood	pressure	(Systolic/Diastolic	>	140/90	mmHg)	and	self-reported	of	hypertension	diagnosis/total	sample	^Awareness:	Hypertensive	individuals	who	were	aware	of	their	condition/hypertensive	individuals	†Treatment:	Hypertensive	individuals	who	took	medication	to	lower	their	blood	pressure/hypertensive	individuals	††Control:	Hypertensive	individuals	with	normal	BP	and	taking	medication/hypertensive	individuals	who	took	medication		
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 Results	from	the	difference-in-differences	(DID)	estimator	
	
	
	
	Table	9-4	presents	the	DID	estimates	of	the	JKN	programme	effect	on	blood	pressure,	both	systolic	and	diastolic,	with	or	without	controlling	for	potential	confounders.	Columns	(1)	–	(6)	represent	the	comparison	between	the	contributory	group	and	the	uninsured	whereas	columns	(7)	–	(12)	present	the	model	comparing	the	subsidised	and	the	uninsured	group.	Columns	(1),	(4),	(7),	and	(10)	show	the	DID	estimation	without	adjusting	for	control	variables.	Enrolling	in	JKN	programme	does	not	show	any	significant	effect	in	both	systolic	and	diastolic	among	the	contributory	group,	nor	the	subsidised	group.	While	it	is	discouraging	to	observe	no	direct	impact	on	blood	pressure,	it	is	not	surprising	considering	the	JKN	programme	had	only	been	running	for	a	maximum	of	9	months.	Columns	(2),	(5),	(8),	and	(11)	present	the	DID	estimation	for	systolic	and	diastolic	with	the	addition	of	control	variables	which	should	improve	the	precision	of	any	observed	impact.	As	expected,	no	significant	change	was	observed	after	controlling	for	control	variables.	We	did	not	observe	changes	in	any	estimates	after	adding	physical	activity	as	a	control.			
	
	
	
	Table	9-5	presents	the	adjusted	and	unadjusted	estimation	of	JKN	on	prevalence,	awareness,	treatment,	and	control	of	hypertension.	Panel	1	shows	the	effect	on	the	contributory	group	while	the	subsidised	group	is	represented	in	panel	2.	Column	(1),	(4),	(7),	and	(10)	show	the	unadjusted	estimates.	The	JKN	programme	seems	to	have	significant	effect	in	increasing	awareness,	treatment,	and	control	of	hypertension	among	the	contributory	group.	Among	the	contributory	enrolees	who	were	diagnosed	hypertension	by	medical	providers	or	had	elevated	blood	pressure,	12%	(95%	CI:	2.2%	-	21.8%)	were	more	likely	to	be	aware	of	their	hypertension	compared	to	the	uninsured.	Those	contributory	enrolees	were	also	10%	(95%	CI:	
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4.12%	-	15.9%)	more	likely	to	receive	anti-hypertensive	medication	compared	to	the	uninsured.			The	evidence	of	JKN	programme	effect	among	the	subsidised	group	is	very	limited.	Compared	to	the	uninsured,	the	subsidised	group	who	had	elevated	blood	pressure	were	3%	(95%	CI:	-2.9%	-	8.8%)	more	likely	to	be	diagnosed	for	their	hypertensive	condition,	and	those	who	received	anti-hypertensive	treatment	were	13%	(95%	CI:	-2.7%	-	28.7%)	more	likely	to	have	controlled	blood	pressure,	but	neither	of	those	effects	are	significant	even	at	10%	level.	Columns	(2),	(5),	(8),	and	(11)	presents	the	adjusted	prevalence,	awareness,	treatment,	and	control	of	hypertension,	taking	into	account	the	control	variables	and	dummies	for	provinces.	The	effect	of	JKN	on	prevalence	of	hypertension	was	not	statistically	significant	for	either	the	contributory	or	subsidised	groups.	After	adjusting	for	the	control	variables,	the	effect	of	JKN	on	the	awareness	among	the	contributory	group	decreased	to	9%	(95%	CI:	1.2%	-	16.8%)	from	12%,	but	the	effect	on	treatment	increased	to	11%	(95%	CI:	3.2%	-	18.8%)	from	10%	in	the	unadjusted	estimates.	Even	after	adjusting	for	both	biological	and	socioeconomic	factors,	the	effect	of	JKN	on	controlled	hypertension	was	still	not	statistically	significant.	Meanwhile	no	changes	in	outcome	variables	were	observed	among	the	subsidised	group	in	panel	2,	with	the	exception	of	hypertension	control,	which	increased	to	14%	(95%	CI:	6.8%	-	20.8%)	and	was	significant	at	the	5%	level.			Columns	(3),	(6),	(9),	and	(11)	presents	DID	estimation	with	one	additional	control	variable:	physical	activity.	While	the	addition	of	physical	activity	did	not	change	the	estimation	of	JKN	effect	on	both	systolic	and	diastolic,	it	seems	to	have	modified	the	JKN	effect	on	control	rate	of	hypertension	among	the	contributory	group.	It	is	estimated	that	the	contributory	enrolees	who	received	anti-hypertension	treatment	were	19%	(95%	CI:	-0.6%	-	38.6%)	more	likely	to	have	controlled	blood	pressure	compared	to	the	uninsured,	but	that	effect	was	significant	only	at	the	10%	level.			
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	Table	9-6	shows	a	similar	analysis	compared	to	Table	5,	but	uses	a	logit	model	to	estimate	the	JKN	effect	on	prevalence,	awareness,	treatment,	and	control	of	hypertension.	Overall,	there	was	no	marked	difference	between	results	from	the	OLS	and	logit	models.	It	is	encouraging	to	see	the	consistency	of	the	findings	from	both	the	OLS	and	logit	models.			
 Results	from	the	difference-in-differences	(DID)	estimator	with	
propensity	score	matching	(PSM)		
Next,	I	re-analysed	the	JKN	effect	on	hypertension	by	combining	propensity	score	
matching	and	DID.	First,	I	estimated	the	propensity	score	of	the	likelihood	for	an	
individual	to	enrol	in	the	JKN	programme.	To	do	this,	I	ran	a	logit	model	of	treatment	
indicator	on	all	control	variables	including	physical	activities	and	sampling	weight.	
Only	control	variables	from	pre-programme	period	(i.e.	2007)	were	used	in	the	
propensity	score	model.		
	
	
	
Table	9-7	presents	the	treatment	effect	of	JKN	using	PSM-DID	approach.	I	compared	the	results	from	two	different	
matching	techniques:	Nearest	neighbour	matching	and	kernel	matching.	Both	techniques	were	able	to	reduce	the	
bias	based	on	pre-treatment	baseline	to	almost	zero	as	shown	in	Figure	4.	Overall	results	from	Table	7	showed	
similar	pattern	with	the	findings	from	DID	alone.	JKN	had	no	significant	effect	on	reducing	blood	pressure	or	the	
prevalence	of	hypertension,	but	JKN	may	have	some	positive	effect	on	increasing	awareness	and	treatment	rate	
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significantly	among	the	contributory	group	compared	to	the	uninsured.	The	main	difference	between	findings	from	
the	PSM-DID	(	
	
	
	
Table	9-7)	and	DID-only	(	
	
	
	
Table	9-5	and		
	
	
	Table	9-6)	estimators	was	that	the	JKN	effect	on	hypertension	control	was	much	bigger	and	statistically	significant	at	5%	level	using	PSM-DID.	Using	this	method,	the	contributory	group	showed	42%	higher	control	rate	of	hypertension	compared	to	the	uninsured.			
 Heterogeneity	of	the	JKN	effect	The	next	step	is	to	investigate	whether	the	JKN	effect	varied	by	wealth.	Findings	from	the	chapter	7	suggest	that	the	JKN	effect	on	increased	utilisation	for	the	contributory	group	was	stronger	among	the	richest	and	the	JKN	effect	for	the	subsidised	group	was	more	prominent	among	the	poorest.	One	way	to	explore	this	is	to	interact	the	treatment	variable,	year	fixed	effect,	and	the	wealth	dummy	variables,	which	would	enable	us	to	calculate	the	difference	between	the	JKN	effect	on	the	poorest	and	the	richest.	I	created	a	new	variable	which	equals	to	one	if	an	individual	was	in	the	poorest	quintiles	(quantiles	1	and	2)	and	zero	otherwise.	I	also	checked	the	heterogeneity	of	JKN	effect	based	on	urban/rural	locality	to	check	whether	the	JKN	effect	favours	individuals	living	in	more	developed	region	(i.e.,	urban	areas)	using	OLS.		These	results	are	presented	in	Table	9-8.	Panel	A	shows	results	comparing	urban	and	rural	areas,	whereas	Panel	B	shows	comparison	between	the	poorest	and	the	richest	groups.			
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Panel	A:	Urban	vs	rural	comparison	
From	Table	9-8,	panel	A,	the	data	suggest	that	JKN	contributory	has	stronger	effect	of	reducing	systolic	in	rural	areas	
compared	to	the	JKN	contributory	enrolees	in	urban	areas,	despite	no	overall	effect	of	JKN	shown	previously	in		
	
	
	Table	9-7.	No	differences	were	observed	on	diastolic	blood	pressure	or	prevalence	of	hypertension,	consistent	with	the	overall	no	effect	previously	shown.	At	the	same	time,	the	JKN	effect	on	increasing	awareness	of	hypertension	was	21%	higher	in	urban	areas	compared	to	rural	areas.	While	the	JKN	effect	on	treatment	and	control	rate	of	hypertension	were	also	stronger	in	urban	area,	these	differences	were	not	significant	at	the	10%	level.			The	heterogeneity	of	JKN	effect	among	the	subsidised	group	showed	a	more	favourable	picture	than	the	overall	effect.	The	JKN	effect	on	awareness	of	hypertension	in	rural	areas	was	positive	and	statistically	significant	at	the	1%	level.	By	contrast,	the	effect	of	JKN	on	awareness	was	negative	in	urban	areas.	Similarly,	the	JKN	effect	on	control	of	hypertension	was	also	positive	and	significant	in	rural	areas,	but	negative	in	urban	areas.	Subsidised	enrolees	living	in	rural	areas	were	29%	more	likely	to	have	better	control	of	their	hypertension	compared	to	the	uninsured	living	in	rural	area	after	JKN.	Since	people	living	in	poverty	were	the	target	group	for	the	subsidies,	and	a	high	proportion	of	poor	people	live	in	rural	areas,	this	finding	suggests	that	the	subsidies	reached	the	target	population.			
Panal	B:	Richest	vs.	poorest	comparison	Similar	to	the	urban/rural	comparison,	the	finding	from	Table	9-8,	panel	B	suggests	a	heterogeneity	of	JKN	effects	between	the	poorest	and	the	richest.	In	this	comparison,	the	JKN	effects	were	positive	and	statistically	significant	on	increased	awareness,	treatment,	and	control	among	the	richest	enrolled	in	the	contributory	group.	Meanwhile,	poor	people	enrolled	in	the	JKN	subsidised	scheme	seems	to	have	1.86	mmHg	(p-value	<	0.01)	higher	diastolic	compared	to	rich	people	in	the	subsidised	
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group.	No	differences	were	observed	for	blood	pressure	and	prevalence	of	hypertension.	
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Table	9-4	Effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	blood	pressure	(Outcome	variables:	Systolic	and	Diastolic	in	mmHg)			 Contributory	vs	Uninsured	 		 Subsidised	vs	Uninsured		 Systolic	 		Diastolic	 	 Systolic	 		Diastolic		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 	 (10)	 (11)	 (12)	DID	effect		 -0.57	 0.38	 0.56	 		-0.07	 0.14	 0.28	 		 -0.14	 -0.53	 -0.18	 		0.12	 0.01	 0.21		 (0.60)	 (0.61)	 (0.60)	 	 (0.38)	 (0.40)	 (0.39)	 	 (0.42)	 (0.44)	 (0.43)	 	 (0.25)	 (0.26)	 (0.26)	Control	variables	 NO	 YES	 YES	 	 NO	 YES	 YES	 	 NO	 YES	 YES	 	 NO	 YES	 YES	Health	behaviour	 NO	 NO	 YES	 	 NO	 NO	 YES	 	 NO	 NO	 YES	 	 NO	 NO	 YES	Observations	 18102	 18099	 18031	 		18102	 18078	 18031	 		 21112	 21109	 21023	 		21112	 21109	 21023	
	*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01;	standard	errors	are	in	parentheses.	Standard	error	is	clustered	at	the	individual	level.	All	models	are	estimated	by	OLS.	Number	of	observations	reduce	
slightly	for	every	model	that	controls	for	physical	activities	because	4%	individuals	in	2014	did	not	report	physical	activities	questionnaires.	Control	variables	include	age	groups,	
marital	status,	gender,	education,	wealth	index	in	quintiles,	rural/urban,	regional	dummies,	and	history	of	diabetes.	Health	behaviour	includes	BMI,	smoking	status,	and	physical	
activities.	All	estimates	are	adjusted	by	sampling	weight	taking	into	account	both	attrition	rate	and	survey	sampling	design.	The	first	column	for	each	systolic	and	diastolic	sub-group	
(i.e.	column	1,	4,	7,	and	10)	shows	the	treatment	effect	without	any	control	variables.	The	second	column	(i.e.	2,	5,	8,	and	11)	includes	control	variables	as	stated	previously	and	the	
third	column	(i.e.	3,	6,	9,	and	12)	includes	physical	activities	as	an	additional	control	variable.				  
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Table	9-5	Effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	prevalence,	awareness,	treatment,	and	control	of	hypertension	(OLS	estimation)	OLS	 Prevalence#	 		 Awareness^	 		 Treatment†	 		 Controlled††		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 		 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 		 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 		 (10)	 (11)	 (12)	Panel	1	JKN	Contributory	 	 		 	   		 	   		 	   		 	DID	effect		 -0.01	 -0.01	 -0.01	 	 0.12**	 0.09**	 0.10**	 	 0.10***	 0.11***	 0.09***	 	 0.10	 0.13	 0.18*		 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 	 (0.05)	 (0.04)	 (0.04)	 	 (0.03)	 (0.04)	 (0.03)	 	 (0.11)	 (0.10)	 (0.11)	Observations	 18,102	 18,100	 18,030	 	 5,260	 5,260	 5,218	 	 5,260	 5,260	 5,218	 	 726	 726	 717		                Panel	2	JKN	Subsidised	 	               DID	effect		 0.01	 -0.00	 -0.00	 	 0.03	 0.03	 0.02	 	 -0.01	 -0.03	 -0.03	 	 0.13	 0.14**	 0.13*		 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 	 (0.03)	 (0.03)	 (0.03)	 	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 	 (0.08)	 (0.07)	 (0.07)	Observations	 21,110	 21,110	 21,022	 	 6,200	 6,200	 6,148	 	 6,200	 6,200	 6,148	 	 810	 810	 800		                Control	variables	 NO	 YES	 YES	 	 NO	 YES	 YES	 	 NO	 YES	 YES	 	 NO	 YES	 YES	Physical	activities	 NO	 NO	 YES	 		 NO	 NO	 YES	 		 NO	 NO	 YES	 		 NO	 NO	 YES	
#Prevalence:	The	union	of	elevated	blood	pressure	(Systolic/Diastolic	>	140/90	mmHg)	and	self-reported	of	hypertension	diagnosis/total	sample	
^Awareness:	Hypertensive	individuals	who	were	aware	of	their	condition/hypertensive	individuals	
†Treatment:	Hypertensive	individuals	who	took	medication	to	lower	their	blood	pressure/hypertensive	individuals	
††Control:	Hypertensive	individuals	with	normal	BP	and	taking	medication/hypertensive	individuals	who	took	medication	
	*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01;	standard	errors	are	in	parentheses.	Standard	error	is	clustered	at	the	individual	level.	All	models	are	estimated	by	OLS.	All	estimates	can	be	seen	as	a	
percentage	change.	Control	group	for	both	panels	are	the	uninsured	group.	Number	of	observations	reduce	slightly	for	every	model	that	controls	for	physical	activities	because	4%	
individuals	in	2014	did	not	report	physical	activities	questionnaires.	Control	variables	include	age	groups,	marital	status,	gender,	education,	wealth	index	in	quintiles,	rural/urban,	
regional	dummies,	and	history	of	diabetes.	Health	behaviour	includes	BMI,	smoking	status,	and	physical	activities.	All	estimates	are	adjusted	by	sampling	weight	taking	into	account	
both	attrition	rate	and	survey	sampling	design.	The	first	column	for	each	systolic	and	diastolic	sub-group	(i.e.	column	1,	4,	7,	and	10)	shows	the	treatment	effect	without	any	control	
variables.	The	second	column	(i.e.	2,	5,	8,	and	11)	includes	control	variables	as	stated	previously	and	the	third	column	(i.e.	3,	6,	9,	and	12)	includes	physical	activities	as	an	additional	
control	variable.	Awareness	and	treatment	columns	show	lower	observations	than	prevalence	columns	because	by	construction	the	denominator	for	both	awareness	and	treatment	
rate	is	the	hypertensive	individuals	only.	Number	of	observations	for	the	control	rate	is	even	lower	because	its	denominator	is	hypertensive	individuals	who	received	treatment	only.			
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Table	9-6	Effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	prevalence,	awareness,	treatment,	and	control	of	hypertension	(Logit	estimation)	OLS	 Prevalence#	 		 Awareness^	 		 Treatment†	 		 Controlled††		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 		 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 		 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 		 (10)	 (11)	 (12)	Panel	1	JKN	Contributory	 	 		 	   		 	   		 	   		 	DID	effect		 -0.01	 -0.01	 -0.01	 	 0.12**	 0.08*	 0.07*	 	 0.10***	 0.11***	 0.10***	 	 0.10	 0.07	 0.11		 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 	 (0.05)	 (0.04)	 (0.04)	 	 (0.03)	 (0.04)	 (0.04)	 	 (0.11)	 (0.10)	 (0.09)	Observations	 18,102	 18,100	 18,030	 	 5,260	 5,260	 5,218	 	 5,260	 5,260	 5,218	 	 726	 726	 717		                Panel	2	JKN	Subsidised	 	               DID	effect		 0.01	 -0.01	 -0.01	 	 0.03	 0.03	 0.03	 	 -0.01	 -0.03	 -0.02	 	 0.13	 0.14**	 0.13*		 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 	 (0.03)	 (0.03)	 (0.03)	 	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 	 (0.08)	 (0.07)	 (0.07)	Observations	 21,110	 21,110	 21,022	 	 6,200	 6,200	 6,148	 	 6,200	 6,200	 6,148	 	 810	 810	 800		                Control	variables	 NO	 YES	 YES	 	 NO	 YES	 YES	 	 NO	 YES	 YES	 	 NO	 YES	 YES	Health	behaviour	 NO	 NO	 YES	 		 NO	 NO	 YES	 		 NO	 NO	 YES	 		 NO	 NO	 YES	
	
#Prevalence:	The	union	of	elevated	blood	pressure	(Systolic/Diastolic	>	140/90	mmHg)	and	self-reported	of	hypertension	diagnosis/total	sample	
^Awareness:	Hypertensive	individuals	who	were	aware	of	their	condition/hypertensive	individuals	
†Treatment:	Hypertensive	individuals	who	took	medication	to	lower	their	blood	pressure/hypertensive	individuals	
††Control:	Hypertensive	individuals	with	normal	BP	and	taking	medication/hypertensive	individuals	who	took	medication		
	*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01;	standard	errors	are	in	parentheses.	Standard	error	is	clustered	at	the	individual	level.	All	models	are	estimated	by	logit	model.	All	estimates	are	calculated	
as	a	marginal	effect	following	calculation	by	Puhani	(2012)	therefore	they	can	be	interpreted	as	a	percentage	change.	Control	group	for	both	panels	are	the	uninsured	group.	The	first	
column	for	each	systolic	and	diastolic	sub-group	(i.e.	column	1,	4,	7,	and	10)	shows	the	treatment	effect	without	any	control	variables.	The	second	column	(i.e.	2,	5,	8,	and	11)	includes	
control	variables	as	stated	previously	and	the	third	column	(i.e.	3,	6,	9,	and	12)	includes	physical	activities	as	an	additional	control	variable.		
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Note:	NNM	=	nearest	neighbour	matching	Points	represent	the	control	variables	used	in	propensity	score	estimation.	X-variable:	standardised	percentage	bias	à	closer	to	zero,	the	better.		Y	variable:	variance	ratio	of	residuals	à	closer	to	zero,	the	better.	Therefore,	matching	techniques	are	successful	if	all	points	are	closer	to	centre	point	of	origin	(0,0)		
Figure	9-5	Bias	reduction	from	propensity	score	matching	
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Table	9-7	The	effect	of	JKN	programme	estimated	by	PSM-DID		 Systolic	 	 Diastolic	 	 Prevalence	 	 Awareness	 	 Treatment	 	 Controlled		 NNM	 Kernel	 	 NNM	 Kernel	 	 NNM	 Kernel	 	 NNM	 Kernel	 	 NNM	 Kernel	 	 NNM	 Kernel		 (1)	 (2)	 	 (3)	 (4)	 	 (5)	 (6)	 	 (7)	 (8)	 	 (9)	 (10)	 	 (11)	 (12)	JKN	Contributory	 	                PSM	 0.878	 0.255	 	 0.395	 0.028	 	 0.010	 -0.002	 	 0.110**	 0.141***	 	 0.071*	 0.071*	 	 0.290*	 0.159*		 (0.883)	 (0.824)	 	 (0.486)	 (0.451)	 	 (0.018)	 (0.017)	 	 (0.110)	 (0.046)	 	 (0.041)	 (0.039)	 	 (0.170)	 (0.051)	DID	 0.688	 0.158	 	 0.389	 0.002	 	 -0.001	 -0.007	 	 0.135**	 0.100***	 	 0.090	 0.292**	 	 0.450**	 0.427**		 -0.603	 -0.561	 	 -0.397	 -0.370	 	 -0.017	 -0.016	 	 -0.053	 -0.045	 	 -0.048	 -0.163	 	 -0.180	 -0.175	JKN	Subsidised	 	                PSM	 0.289	 0.388	 	 0.275	 0.170	 	 0.021	 0.020	 	 0.040	 0.047	 	 -0.041	 -0.031	 	 0.041	 0.050***		 (0.608)	 (0.562)	 	 (0.318)	 (0.296)	 	 (0.013)	 (0.012)	 	 (0.033)	 (0.030)	 	 (0.022)	 (0.020)	 	 (0.035)	 (0.031)	DID	 0.023	 0.019	 	 0.044	 0.001	 	 0.011	 0.011	 	 -0.050	 -0.041	 	 -0.500	 -0.485	 	 0.000	 0.052		 (0.427)	 (0.396)	 	 (0.263)	 (0.245)	 	 (0.012)	 (0.011)	 	 (0.031)	 (0.028)	 	 (0.500)	 (0.181)	 	 0.000	 (0.116)	
*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01;	standard	errors	are	in	parentheses.	Calculations	based	on	902	observations	of	JKN	contributory,	2403	observations	of	JKN	subsidised,	and	8137	
observations	of	uninsured	group	that	fulfil	common	support	condition.						 	
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Table	9-8	Heterogeneity	of	the	JKN	effect,	by	urban/rural	area	and	socioeconomic	status	(OLS	estimation)		 JKN	Contributory	 	 JKN	Subsidised	VARIABLES	 Systolic	 Diastolic	 Prevalence	 Awareness	 Treatment	 Controlled	 	 Systolic	 Diastolic	 Prevalence	 Awareness	 Treatment	 Controlled			 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 (10)	 (11)	 (12)	Panel	A	-	Urban	vs	Rural	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		Effect	on	rural	 -2.35*	 -0.04	 -0.05	 -0.04	 0.03	 -0.07	 	 -0.43	 -0.06	 -0.00	 0.10***	 -0.01	 0.29***		 (1.25)	 (0.77)	 (0.03)	 (0.08)	 (0.08)	 (0.20)	 	 (0.66)	 (0.39)	 (0.02)	 (0.04)	 (0.03)	 (0.10)	Additional	effect	on	urban	relative	to	rural	 3.21**	 -0.13	 0.06	 0.21**	 0.12	 0.37	 	 0.68	 0.38	 0.01	 -0.13**	 -0.01	 -0.37***		 (1.63)	 (1.00)	 (0.04)	 (0.10)	 (0.09)	 (0.23)	 (1.08)	 (0.63)	 (0.03)	 (0.06)	 (0.05)	 (0.14)	Observations	 18,078	 18,078	 18,078	 5,251	 5,251	 726	 	 21,083	 21,083	 21,083	 6,188	 6,188	 809		              Panel	B	-	Poor	vs	Rich	 	             Effect	on	the	Rich	 -0.12	 -0.68	 -0.00	 0.12**	 0.14***	 0.19*	 	 -1.18	 -0.89*	 -0.02	 0.04	 -0.03	 0.08		 (0.73)	 (0.47)	 (0.02)	 (0.05)	 (0.04)	 (0.10)	 	 (0.79)	 (0.46)	 (0.02)	 (0.04)	 (0.04)	 (0.10)	Additional	effect	on	the	poor	relative	to	the	Rich	 -0.31	 2.37	 -0.04	 -0.10	 -0.15*	 -0.26	 	 1.57	 1.76***	 0.03	 -0.02	 0.01	 0.12		 (1.94)	 (1.23)	 (0.05)	 (0.11)	 (0.08)	 (0.24)	 (1.16)	 (0.67)	 (0.03)	 (0.06)	 (0.05)	 (0.14)	Observations	 18,087	 18,087	 18,087	 5,253	 5,253	 726	 	 21,095	 21,095	 21,095	 6,191	 6,191	 809	
*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01;	standard	errors	are	in	parentheses.	Poor	is	defined	as	an	individual	who	belongs	to	wealth	quintile	1	and	2	based	on	asset	index.	Rich	is	defined	as	an	
individual	who	belongs	to	wealth	quintile	3-5.	All	models	are	estimated	by	OLS.	All	estimates	can	be	seen	as	a	percentage	change.	 	
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 Test	of	the	parallel	trends	assumption		The	most	important	assumption	in	DID	is	the	parallel	trends	assumption	that	both	insured	and	uninsured	groups	followed	the	same	outcome	trajectory	prior	to	the	introduction	of	JKN	programme.	As	previously	described,	one	of	the	ways	to	test	this	assumption	is	to	run	a	placebo	regression	in	which	the	treatment	variable	is	applied	to	past	outcomes.	If	the	assumption	was	not	violated,	we	would	expect	zero	effect	of	the	treatment	variable	on	these	outcomes.	Table	9-9	presents	the	result	of	the	placebo	regression	on	systolic	and	diastolic	blood	pressure	levels	in	2000.	None	of	coefficients	were	statistically	significant,	which	suggests	the	assumption	was	not	violated,	and	the	estimation	results	are	reliable.			
Table	9-9	Placebo	test	of	the	JKN	effect	on	systolic	and	diastolic		 JKN	Contributory	 JKN	Subsidised	Systolic	(mmHg)	 1.34	 0.13		 (1.03)	 (0.67)	Diastolic	(mmHg)	 0.85	 -0.44		 (0.58)	 (0.37)	Observation	 15,463	 18,097	
*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01;	standard	errors	are	in	parentheses.		
Section	9.5 Discussion		In	this	chapter,	I	used	DID	and	PSM	combined	with	DID	to	evaluate	the	effect	of	JKN	on	blood	pressure	(SBP	and	DBP)	as	well	as	the	level	of	prevalence,	awareness,	treatment	and	control	of	hypertension.	Overall,	the	effect	of	JKN	varied	between	the	contributory	and	the	subsidised	groups	compared	to	those	who	were	uninsured.	Sub-group	analyses	by	locality	of	residence	and	household	wealth	also	revealed	further	heterogeneity	of	effects	on	some,	but	not	all,	outcomes.		While	the	JKN	programme	had	no	significant	effect	on	systolic	and	diastolic	blood	pressure,	the	data	suggest	a	positive	effect	on	increasing	awareness,	treatment,	and	control	of	hypertension	
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among	the	contributory	group,	although	the	latter	finding	was	not	always	consistent.	In	addition,	the	JKN	programme	appeared	to	have	only	limited	effect	on	improving	control	of	hypertension	among	the	subsidised	group.	The	overall	finding	on	control	rate	of	hypertension	needs	to	be	interpreted	carefully	because	of	the	inconsistency	of	the	findings	across	different	estimation	strategies.	It	is	possible	that	the	insufficient	sample	size	may	dampen	our	effort	in	estimating	the	true	treatment	effect	on	control	rate	of	hypertension.	For	example,	the	sample	for	control	of	hypertension	was	taken	from	number	of	people	who	received	anti-hypertensive	treatment.	Based	on	Figure	3,	only	918	individuals	reported	taking	anti-hypertensive	medication	from	medical	providers	in	2014.			The	increased	effects	on	increasing	awareness	and	treatment	among	the	contributory	group	were	expected	based	on	my	finding	in	Chapter	7.	I	have	shown	that	the	contributory	group	has	increased	utilisation	on	outpatient	and	inpatient	services.	As	awareness	and	treatment	can	be	used	as	proxies	for	access	to	diagnosis	of	hypertension	and	hypertension	medication,	my	findings	in	this	chapter	suggest	that	the	JKN	programme	improved	access	to	medical	care	among	the	contributory	group.			In	this	analysis,	I	found	no	overall	effect	of	JKN	on	reducing	systolic	and	diastolic	blood	pressure	among	the	insured.	This	finding	is	consistent	with	several	evaluation	studies	in	other	countries	that	also	reported	no	insurance	effect	on	health	status.		One	explanation	is	the	short	time	period	between	the	introduction	of	the	insurance	programme	and	the	start	of	its	evaluation	(King	et	al.,	2009;	Chen	and	Jin,	2012;	Cheng	et	al.,	2015),	meaning	sufficient	time	has	not	passed	for	the	programme’s	effect	on	health	status	to	be	reflected	in	the	data.	Indeed,	JKN	was	introduced	in	January	of	2014,	and	the	data	were	collected	in	September	2014.	The	effect	on	health	status	may	only	be	realised	if	either	utilisation	or	financial	protection	were	affected	by	the	insurance	programme.	By	contrast,	health	insurance	arguably	impacts	utilisation	of	health	care	and	OOP	health	expenditure	more	directly	as	depicted	in	the	conceptual	framework	in	Figure	9-1n	Figure	9-1.	Therefore,	the	findings	in	this	analysis	are	consistent	with	the	theorised	pathway	between	health	insurance	and	utilisation.		
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Very	few	studies	evaluating	the	impact	of	introducing	health	insurance	programmes	in	LMIC	examine	population	health	outcomes,	with	most	studies	focusing	on	utilisation	or	financial	protection	as	outcomes	of	interest	(Acharya	et	al.	2013,	Giedion	et	al.	2012).	To	illustrate,	in	the	review	I	conducted	in	chapter	4,	I	found	only	12	studies	evaluating	health	status	as	the	outcome,	compared	to	40	studies	on	utilisation	and	46	studies	on	financial	protection.	Of	these	12	studies,	two	evaluated	the	impact	of	health	insurance	on	hypertension.	One	of	these	studies	evaluated	the	effect	of	the	Seguro	Popular	insurance	programme	in	Mexico	on	hypertension	treatment	and	control	(Bleich	et	al.	2007).	The	authors	found	that	being	insured	was	associated	with	greater	use	of	antihypertensive	treatment	and	better	blood	pressure	control.	However,	cross-sectional	data	from	a	single	survey	were	used	to	compare	the	insured	with	the	uninsured	populations.	Selection	bias	was	also	likely	in	the	voluntarily	insured	group,	which	limits	the	value	of	a	comparison	of	insured	with	uninsured	groups.	That	is,	patients	with	better	health	literacy,	more	health-seeking	behaviour,	and	more	severe	hypertension	may	be	more	likely	to	enrol	in	an	insurance	programme	and	may	be	more	likely	to	start	and	adhere	to	an	antihypertensive	treatment	regimen,	independent	of	their	insurance	status.	Findings	from	my	study	support	this	notion	because	treatment	coverage	for	hypertension	in	the	uninsured	population	in	the	programme	area	was	lower	compared	with	treatment	coverage	in	the	(equally	uninsured)	control	area,	and	patients	with	more	severe	hypertension	were	more	likely	to	enrol	in	the	programme.			The	strength	of	my	study	is	the	elimination	of	selection	bias	by	using	analysis	with	longitudinal	data	from	longitudinal	surveys.	The	other	study	evaluating	the	effect	of	health	insurance	on	hypertension	came	from	Nigeria.	In	contrast	to	my	findings,	the	authors	evaluated	the	effect	of	community-based	health	insurance	and	found	that	the	insurance	programme	was	associated	with	a	significant	decrease	in	blood	pressure	among	the	hypertensive	people	(systolic:	-5.24	[95%	CI:	−9.46	to	−1.02]	and	diastolic:	2.16	[95%	CI:	−4.27	to	−0.05])	(Hendriks	et	al.,	2014).	While	the	authors	used	a	similar	technique	to	what	I	used	in	this	thesis,	they	limited	their	sample	to	only	hypertensive	individuals	identified	in	baseline	survey.	In	my	analysis,	I	pooled	all	individuals	despite	their	hypertensive	status	in	baseline	and	estimated	the	overall	effect	of	JKN	programme	on	both	systolic	and	diastolic.	However,	restricting	the	
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analysis	to	only	hypertensive	individuals	(either	systolic	>	140	mmHg	or	diastolic	>	90	mmHg)	identified	in	the	2007	(baseline)	survey,	the	findings	did	not	differ	substantially	(result	not	shown);	the	effect	of	JKN	on	either	systolic	or	diastolic	was	still	not	statistically	significant.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	the	follow-up	survey	in	Nigeria	was	conducted	two	years	after	the	introduction	of	the	insurance	programme,	which	further	strengthens	the	suggestion	that	sufficient	time	should	be	allowed	to	pass	before	the	impact	on	health	status	can	be	observed.			Evidence	from	developed	countries,	point	to	a	protective	effect	of	health	against	hypertension	among	its	enrolees.	One	of	the	most	famous	health	insurance	experiments	in	the	U.S.,	the	RAND	Health	Insurance	Study,	collected	cross-sectional	data	from	3,958	people	between	the	ages	of	14	and	61	and	had	been	randomly	assigned	to	a	set	of	insurance	plans	for	three	or	five	years.	One	plan	provided	free	care;	the	others	required	enrolees	to	pay	a	share	of	their	medical	bills.	The	study	showed	that	diastolic	blood	pressure	among	the	insured	was	3	mmHg	lower	than	the	uninsured.	They	further	explained	that	this	reduction	could	be	explained	by	better	case	finding	of	hypertension	resulting	from	reduced	barriers	to	accessing	primary	care	and	not	by	altering	health	habits	associated	with	cardiovascular,	such	as	smoking	(Brook	et	al.,	1983).	My	finding	that	the	JKN	programme	was	associated	with	increased	awareness	rate	of	hypertension	among	the	enrolees	in	the	contributory	group	is	consistent	with	the	findings	from	the	RAND	study.			Similar	findings	were	observed	from	the	Oregon	Health	Insurance	Experiment,	an	experimental	study	of	health	insurance	expansion	for	low-income	adults	through	a	lottery	drawing.	Adults	randomly	selected	in	the	lottery	were	given	the	option	to	apply	for	health	insurance,	but	not	all	lottery	winners	enrolled	in	the	health	insurance.	In	that	study,	health	insurance	was	associated	with	7.16	percentage	point	reduction	in	the	prevalence	of	hypertension	(p-value:	0.39)	(Baicker	et	al.,	2013).	The	authors	argued	that	the	sample	size	of	their	study	might	not	strong	enough	to	detect	any	treatment	effects	among	people	with	hypertension.	Nevertheless,	they	also	found	a	decrease	of	more	than	20%	in	the	predicted	10-year	cardiovascular	risk	or	a	
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decrease	of	more	than	10%	in	predicted	cardiovascular	risk	among	the	participants	with	high-risk	of	cardiovascular	diagnoses	before	the	lottery.			In	this	chapter,	I	evaluated	the	impact	of	JKN	on	health	status,	specifically	looking	at	hypertension	in	the	study	population.		The	data	suggest	the	JKN	effect	on	health	status	is	limited	although	there	is	an	indication	that	JKN	programme	encourages	better	blood	pressure	management	through	increased	awareness,	treatment,	and	control.	I	also	found	that	the	benefit	of	the	JKN	programme	was	stronger	among	the	richest	group,	as	reflected	in	a	stronger	effect	in	the	contributory	group	and	limited	effect	in	the	subsidised	group.						 	
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Chapter	10 Discussion	
Section	10.1 	Introduction			The	research	carried	out	for	this	thesis	explores	the	expansion	of	the	public	health	insurance	programme	in	Indonesia,	focusing	on	the	most	recent	insurance	scheme	–	the	JKN	programme	–	introduced	in	2014.	Within	the	thesis,	I	have	critically	reviewed	the	evidence	gathered	from	low-	and	middle-income	countries	(LMICs)	on	the	effectiveness	of	public	health	insurance	in	improving	access	to	care,	financial	protection	and	health	status.	I	have	also	emphasised	the	importance	of	controlling	for	selection	bias	in	health	insurance	evaluation	studies	and	reviewed	the	methods	that	were	used	in	the	research	in	LMIC	settings.	Finally,	the	main	aim	of	this	thesis	was	to	measure	the	impact	of	the	JKN	programme	on	health	care	utilisation,	financial	protection	and	health	status.	More	specifically,	the	study’s	objectives	were	to	measure:	i. The	impact	of	the	JKN	programme	on	utilisation	of	health	care	measured	by	both	the	probability	and	frequency	of	outpatient	and	inpatient	visits;	ii. The	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	average	individual	out-of-pocket	(OOP)	health	expenditure	and	the	incidence	of	catastrophic	health	expenditure	at	household	level;	iii. The	effects	of	the	JKN	programme	on	reducing	blood	pressure	and	hypertension	prevalence	rates	and	increasing	hypertension	awareness,	treatment	and	control.				In	this	chapter,	I	will	synthesise	and	explore	the	findings	taking	into	account	the	Indonesian	context,	the	body	of	evidence	available	on	the	effectiveness	of	public	health	insurance	in	LMIC	settings,	and	the	health	insurance	theories	explored	in	previous	chapters.	Additionally,	I	will	provide	a	reflection	on	the	strengths	and	limitations	of	the	methods.	Several	suggestions	based	on	the	evidence	gathered	in	this	thesis	are	offered	for	researchers	and	policymakers	regarding	potential	strategies	for	improving	the	effectiveness	of	the	health	insurance	programme	in	Indonesia.	
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Section	10.2 	Discussion	of	findings	
 The	health	insurance	system		No	country	relies	on	a	single	source	of	funding	for	health	care.	Countries	typically	use	one	of	the	four	main	funding	models	as	the	principal	way	of	paying	for	health	care,	alongside	elements	of	the	others.	However,	there	is	lack	of	evidence	to	suggest	that	one	funding	model	or	particular	mix	of	funding	mechanisms	is	inherently	better	in	delivering	cost-effective	health	care	(OECD/EU,	2016).	The	precise	combination	of	funding	sources	in	use	develops	over	time,	based	on	a	country’s	context,	history	and	social	values.	Nevertheless,	there	are	several	patterns	that	can	be	observed	from	various	successful	schemes	in	LMICs.			First,	I	found	that	community-based	health	insurance	(CBHI)	is	commonly	adopted	by	low-income	countries	that	have	limited	monetary	and	human	resources	in	establishing	either	social	health	insurance	or	a	tax-based	insurance	system.	CBHI	may	act	as	the	first	step	towards	introducing	the	concept	of	insurance	to	the	general	population.	If	the	CBHI	scheme	is	successful,	the	government	may	scale	it	up	nationally	by	retaining	the	multiple	payer	structure	(for	example,	Rwanda)	or	forming	a	single	payer	system	(for	example,	Ghana	and	The	Philippines).			Second,	social	health	insurance	is	usually	popular	among	middle-income	countries	which	have	sizeable	formal	employment	sectors	(for	example,	Mexico,	Colombia	and	The	Philippines)	while	tax-based	insurance	is	uncommon	in	LMICs.	In	the	case	of	the	latter,	it	is	argued	that	establishing	such	a	system	requires	a	strong	political	movement	focused	on	providing	access	to	health	care	for	everyone	(Savedoff,	2004).	For	example,	Malaysia,	an	upper	middle-income	country,	has	a	national	public	health	system	primarily	funded	by	general	tax	payments	and	this	has	existed	since	its	independence	in	1957	(Yu,	Whynes	and	Sach,	2008).	Another	example	is	Ghana	which	has	established	a	national	health	insurance	system	primarily	funded	(approximately	70	percent)	by	value-added	tax,	but	it	still	requires	premium	contributions	from	its	enrolees	(Agyepong	et	al.,	2016).		
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	Third,	regardless	of	the	difference	in	its	implementation,	LMICs	adopting	either	SHI	or	CBHI	systems	have	encountered	issues	in	enrolling	new	members	and	retaining	current	members,	particularly	among	informal	sector	employees.	If	the	insurance	scheme	fails	to	recruit	more	members	when	the	demand	for	health	care	increases,	the	effectiveness	of	its	risk	pooling	will	deteriorate	which	will	further	deter	people	from	joining.	For	example,	CBHI	schemes	in	Rwanda	and	Uganda	showed	weak	financial	sustainability	because	of	low	renewal	rates,	high	claims-to-revenue	ratios	and	high	operational	costs	(Spaan	et	al.,	2012).	While	SHI	is	usually	characterised	by	its	mandated	contribution,	many	LMICs	have	yet	to	develop	a	reliable	method	to	enforce	it,	particularly	among	informal	sector	employees.			Fourth,	LMICs	which	claim	to	have	achieved	universal	health	coverage	often	do	not	rely	on	a	single	public	insurance	scheme;	a	separate	scheme	for	civil	servants	or	employees	in	the	formal	sector	usually	exists	and	offers	more	comprehensive	medical	benefits.	In	Thailand,	formal	public	and	private	sector	employees	were	covered	by	the	Civil	Servant	Medical	Benefit	Scheme	(CSMBS)	and	Social	Health	Insurance	(SHI),	both	of	which	existed	prior	to	the	introduction	of	the	Universal	Coverage	Scheme	(UCS)	for	informal	sector	employees	and	the	poor	population.	The	Rwandaise	
d’assurance	maladie	(RAMA)	is	a	mandatory	scheme	for	Rwandan	government	employees	and	their	dependants	and	covered	2.3	percent	of	the	population	in	2007	(Saksena	et	al.,	2010).	RAMA	is	considered	to	have	superior	medical	benefits	compared	with	the	national	CBHI	scheme	offered	to	the	general	population.	In	Mexico,	the	Instituto	Mexicano	del	Seguro	Social	(the	Mexican	Institute	of	Social	Security,	or	IMSS)	serves	formal	workers	in	the	private	sector	and	covers	approximately	40	percent	of	the	Mexican	population	(Lakin,	2010).	This	separation	is	often	caused	by	the	resistance	from	stakeholders	within	the	existing	scheme.	For	example,	Thailand	is	still	struggling	to	unify	CSMBS	into	UCS	due	to	heavy	resistance	from	the	union	of	health	care	providers	who	favour	the	fee-for-service	payment	structure	employed	by	the	CSMBS	(Tangcharoensathien	et	al.,	2018).	In	Mexico,	the	IMSS	union	of	health	providers	also	opposed	the	integration	of	the	IMSS	into	a	unified	public	insurance	scheme	because	the	proposed	unified	scheme	would	have	weakened	the	labour	relations	within	the	IMSS	(Lakin,	2010).			
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 Access	to	care	
10.2.2.1 Defining access to care 	Measuring	access	to	care	is	key	to	understanding	and	developing	health	policy,	but	there	is	a	lack	of	agreement	on	the	definition	of	access	in	the	literature.	The	most	commonly	cited	framework	of	access	to	care	is	Andersen’s	access	to	care	model	which	was	developed	in	late	1960s	to	explain	factors	affecting	access	to	medical	care	in	the	United	States	of	America	(Andersen,	1968).	Andersen	argued	that	access	can	be	broken	down	further	into	two	distinct	components,	potential	access	and	realised	access.	Potential	access	is	measured	by	enabling	factors	that	give	patients	the	opportunity	to	access	care.	For	example,	health	insurance	is	assumed	to	provide	greater	access	to	care	for	patients.	Therefore,	health	insurance	coverage	indicates	potential	access	that	may	or	may	not	be	realised	by	the	patients	(Andersen,	2008).	Another	example	is	the	availability	of	health	care	facilities.	Individuals	who	live	in	an	area	with	a	greater	choice	of	health	care	providers	are	considered	to	have	better	potential	access	to	care	(Gulliford	et	al.,	2002).	Potential	access	may	help	to	explain	how	patients	are	able	to	access	the	care	but	it	does	not	explain	whether	patients	actually	use	the	care	–	this	is	measured	by	realised	access.	Realised	access	is	commonly	measured	by	utilisation	indicators,	including	outpatient,	inpatient,	dental,	maternal	and	emergency	care.	Andersen’s	model	is	therefore	useful	as	a	conceptual	framework	for	exploring	the	relationship	between	potential	access	(for	example,	health	insurance	or	other	financial	incentives)	and	realised	access.			Measuring	utilisation	can	be	seen	as	an	objective	indicator	of	access	and	this	explains	its	popularity	in	studies	of	access	to	care	(for	example,	Bernal,	Carpio	and	Klein,	2014;	Sparrow,	Suryahadi	and	Widyanti,	2013;	Sommers,	Baicker	and	Epstein,	2012;	Kisa	and	MZ,	2007).	Findings	from	the	reviews	in	Chapters	4	and	5	have	indicated	that	access	to	care	is	uniformly	defined	as	utilisation	of	health	care	which	may	vary	from	visits	to	primary	care	clinics	to	hospitalisation.	However,	solely	measuring	utilisation	may	prove	inadequate	for	exploring	the	reasons	why	access	is	not	realised.	Another	alternative	model	has	been	proposed	by	Penchansky	and	Thomas	(1981)	as	a	critique	of	the	initial	1960s	Andersen	model.	They	assert	that	access	is	a	
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multidimensional	term	which	makes	it	impossible	to	measure	using	one	factor	alone.	They	suggest	that	access	has	five	interrelated	dimensions,	including	availability	(for	example,	the	supply-side	of	health	services),	accessibility	(for	example,	transportation),	accommodation	(for	example,	quality	and	support	systems	in	health	care	facilities),	affordability	(for	example,	the	price)	and	acceptability	(for	example,	trust	between	patient	and	doctor).	This	model	can	be	seen	as	an	extension	of	the	potential	access	concept,	as	all	five	dimensions	are	closely	related	to	the	predisposing	characteristics	and	enabling	factors	found	in	Andersen’s	model	(Andersen,	1995).	However,	Penchansky	and	Thomas’	model	regards	all	five	dimensions	as	equal	which	means	improving	access	to	care	cannot	be	reached	successfully	without	considering	all	five	dimensions.	Providing	health	insurance	may	increase	the	affordability	dimension,	but	it	may	not	be	enough	to	build	trust	between	patient	and	provider	(acceptability)	or	cover	the	transportation	costs	required	to	reach	the	clinic	or	hospital	(accessibility).			
10.2.2.2 A stronger positive impact among the contributory group 	From	my	empirical	study	discussed	in	Chapter	7,	I	found	that	the	JKN	programme	has	a	positive	effect	in	increasing	utilisation	for	its	enrolees	and	this	effect	is	stronger	among	the	contributory	group.	Approximately,	In	addition,	the	insured	in	the	contributory	group	are	more	likely	to	initiate	the	seeking	of	care	in	formal	health	care	facilities,	such	as	clinics,	private	GPs	and	hospitals,	as	well	as	increase	the	frequency	of	the	visits.			This	increased	utilisation	may	be	associated	with	the	concept	of	‘moral	hazard’,	found	in	the	economic	literature.	Moral	hazard	dictates	that	the	increased	consumption	of	care	is	unnecessary	and	welfare	decreasing	because	the	insured	take	advantage	of	the	price	reduction	offered	by	the	insurance	and	utilise	the	care	more	than	they	should	(Zweifel	and	Manning,	2000;	Pauly,	1974).	The	potential	for	moral	hazard	may	be	strong	in	the	context	of	the	JKN	programme	because	it	offers	very	generous	medical	benefits	with	almost	no	cost-sharing.	However,	this	moral	hazard	arguably	should	not	be	always	seen	as	welfare-decreasing.	According	to	Nyman	(2003),	the	
		 253	
insured	would	only	gain	benefits	from	the	insurance	when	they	are	ill.	The	insurance	offers	an	income	transfer	from	the	healthy	to	the	sick,	which	allows	the	sick	to	access	medical	care	that	would	be	otherwise	unaffordable.	This	is	especially	true	for	inpatient	care	because	it	often	involves	more	complicated	medical	treatments	and	it	is	more	expensive	than	outpatient	care.	In	addition,	it	is	quite	implausible	to	assume	that	being	hospitalised	is	desirable	for	many	healthy	individuals.	Under	this	condition,	this	‘moral	hazard’	can	be	considered	an	efficient	behaviour	because	the	resulting	use	of	care	is	justified	by	the	medical	need	for	care.			An	important	condition	in	regarding	increased	utilisation	as	an	inefficient	moral	hazard	is	the	trade-off	between	personal	health	practice	and	use	of	curative	medical	treatment	(de	Preux,	2011).	The	insured	may	engage	in	more	risky	health	behaviour	and	use	less	preventive	care,	which	may	lead	to	increased	use	of	curative	care	that	could	have	been	avoided	if	the	patients	were	still	uninsured	(Qin	and	Lu,	2014).	This	is	often	known	as	‘ex-ante	moral	hazard’	(Zweifel	and	Manning,	2000).	However,	it	does	not	always	mean	that	the	insured	are	more	likely	to	start	engaging	in	risky	behaviour,	for	example,	conversion	from	a	non-smoker	or	a	non-alcoholic	to	a	smoker	or	an	alcoholic.	Dong	(2013)	investigated	the	differences	in	moral	hazard	in	the	extensive	and	intensive	margins	of	risky	behaviour.	He	found	that	while	health	insurance	was	not	significantly	associated	with	the	probability	of	participating	in	unhealthy	behaviours,	among	those	who	participate	in	unhealthy	behaviours,	health	insurance	may	increase	the	quantity	of	unhealthy	behaviour.	Thus,	the	insurance	may	incentivise	a	smoker	to	smoke	more	cigarettes	but	does	not	influence	a	non-smoker	to	try	a	cigarette	for	the	first	time.			The	evidence	for	ex-ante	moral	hazard	in	the	context	of	the	JKN	programme	has	not	been	documented	elsewhere	as	yet.	The	evidence	from	my	study	(see	Table	9–2)	shows	a	general	trend	of	an	increase	in	the	number	of	people	initiating	cigarette	smoking	but	equally	an	increase	in	the	number	of	people	stopping	smoking.	For	example,	in	the	contributory	group,	the	percentage	of	people	participating	in	medium-level	smoking	(11–20	cigarettes/day)	increased	between	2007	and	2014,	and	both	the	uninsured	and	subsidised	groups	demonstrated	an	increased	
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percentage	of	heavy	smoking	(>20	cigarettes/day)	between	the	two	waves.	Another	example	can	be	taken	from	looking	at	physical	status	which	measures	the	type	and	frequency	of	physical	activity	at	work,	at	home	and	during	exercise.	All	three	groups	show	a	similar,	increased	trend	of	living	a	more	sedentary	life.	While	Indonesian	people	are	engaging	in	less	healthy	behaviours,	it	is	unlikely	that	JKN	insurance	can	explain	this	phenomenon	because	the	uninsured	group	and	both	JKN	insured	groups	exhibit	a	similar	trend	of	increased	levels	of	smoking	and	lower	levels	of	physical	activity.	Therefore,	there	is	not	enough	evidence	to	claim	that	the	JKN	programme	affects	the	health	behaviour	of	its	enrolees.		In	addition	to	moral	hazard,	a	more	serious	possible	explanation	for	increased	medical	care	usage	among	the	contributory	group	is	‘adverse	selection’.	My	analysis	found	that	the	contributory	group	(those	who	self-selected	to	participate	in	the	JKN	programme)	increased	their	consumption	of	medical	care	at	a	higher	rate	than	the	subsidised	group.	If	their	decision	to	enrol	in	the	JKN	programme	can	be	explained	by	their	health	status,	the	case	for	adverse	selection	is	likely	to	be	true.	From	the	logit	regression	of	participation	in	the	JKN	programme	on	baseline	characteristics	in	2007,	the	number	of	acute	conditions	and	the	presence	of	disability	were	significantly	associated	with	the	decision	to	participate	in	the	JKN	contributory	group	(see	Table	A–5	in	the	appendices).	Meanwhile,	none	of	the	health	status	variables	were	significant	in	the	JKN	subsidised	participation	logit	model	(see	Table	A–6	in	the	appendices).	This	evidence	suggests	the	presence	of	adverse	selection	among	the	JKN	contributory	group	but	not	the	subsidised	group.		
10.2.2.3 A limited effect among the subsidised group 	In	the	review	in	Chapter	4,	it	was	predicted	that	health	insurance	would	be	most	beneficial	in	increasing	access	to	formal	health	care	facilities	and	that	poor	people	may	gain	greater	benefits	from	health	insurance	(Acharya	et	al.,	2013;	Giedion	et	al.,	2013).	In	my	empirical	analysis	in	Chapter	7,	I	found	that	the	subsidised	group	was	more	likely	to	utilise	both	outpatient	and	inpatient	care	but	only	marginally	compared	with	the	increased	utilisation	rate	of	the	contributory	group.	My	finding,	
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therefore,	does	not	support	the	suggestion	made	in	Chapter	4	that	low-income	individuals	may	reap	more	benefits	from	public	health	insurance.			When	the	estimation	model	was	stratified	by	density	of	health	facilities	in	a	given	area,	the	effect	was	larger	and	more	statistically	significant	for	the	subsidised	group	living	in	an	area	with	high	availability	of	health	facilities.	This	finding	agrees	with	the	conceptual	framework	of	access	to	care:	that	the	need	for	health	care	can	only	be	realised	with	the	fulfilment	of	adequate	enabling	factors,	including	health	insurance	and	proximity	to	the	nearest	health	facilities.	In	itself,	health	insurance	acts	as	a	demand-side	incentive	that	may	help	patients	to	pay	for	the	cost	of	medical	treatment,	boosting	the	affordability	of	seeking	care.	However,	improving	access	to	care	requires	the	fulfilment	of	the	other	four	dimensions	of	access,	which	is	accessibility,	accommodation,	availability	and	acceptability	(Penchansky	and	Thomas,	1981).	The	JKN	programme	is	unlikely	to	increase	the	availability	of	health	facilities	for	several	reasons.	First,	Indonesia	has	a	decentralised	health	system,	as	described	in	Chapter	3,	which	provides	greater	autonomy	to	local	areas	in	running	general	health	care	activities,	including	building	new	facilities	and	their	maintenance.	Thus,	increasing	the	availability	of	public	health	facilities	is	unlikely	to	happen	in	the	short	term	because	it	requires	extensive	discussion	between	the	central	and	local	governments	in	order	to	reach	an	agreement.	Second,	the	JKN	programme	adopts	a	capitation	payment	system	for	primary	care	and	a	diagnosis-related	group	(DRG)	system	for	hospital	care,	both	of	which	are	unpopular	among	private	providers.	Private	practices	in	rural	and	remote	areas	are	often	staffed	by	doctors	who	work	in	public	health	centres	in	the	daytime	and	open	their	own	practices,	often	in	their	own	homes,	at	night	time.	They	tend	to	favour	a	fee-for-service	system	to	boost	their	income	and	it	is	unlikely	that	they	would	also	accept	JKN	patients.		Other	poverty	alleviation	programmes,	for	example	unconditional	or	conditional	cash	transfer,	could	also	potentially	increase	health	care	utilisation	because	the	recipients	of	such	programmes	may	receive	extra	income	to	spend	on	health	care,	but	this	is	likely	to	be	a	relatively	small	impact.	Examples	of	other	poverty	alleviation	programmes	are	Unconditional	Cash	Transfer	(UCT)	and	Conditional	Cash	Transfer	
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(CCT).	It	is	likely	that	individuals	in	the	JKN	subsidised	group	are	also	recipients	of	UCT	and	CCT	because	the	selection	criteria	for	both	programmes	may	overlap.	In	fact,	51	percent	of	individuals	in	the	subsidised	group	also	reported	receiving	UCT	in	2014,	compared	with	one	percent	in	the	uninsured	group.	Meanwhile,	the	number	of	CCT	recipients	is	far	lower	in	both	the	subsidised	and	uninsured	groups,	nine	percent	and	one	percent	respectively,	because	CCT	is	only	available	in	several	urban	areas.	In	my	analysis,	both	UCT	and	CCT	status	have	been	controlled	for	by	adding	those	variables	into	the	PSM-DID	estimation	model.	However,	I	cannot	fully	account	for	all	of	the	other	poverty	alleviation	programmes	that	may	influence	both	the	decision	to	seek	care	and	insurance	selection.	To	establish	the	likelihood	of	other	confounding	factors	that	were	not	controlled	for	by	the	PSM-DID	strategy,	and	which	may	change	the	findings,	a	sensitivity	analysis	based	on	the	Rosenbaum	bounds	approach	was	also	conducted	(see	Tables	A–3	and	A–4	in	the	appendices).	The	effect	of	an	unobserved	bias	would	need	to	be	1.3	times	the	effect	of	having	JKN	insurance	on	inpatient	care	to	undermine	this	study’s	findings.	As	the	UCT	and	CCT	programmes	have	been	controlled	for	in	my	analysis,	other	smaller	poverty	alleviation	programmes	that	are	not	specifically	targeted	to	health	are	unlikely	to	influence	the	decision	to	seek	formal	health	care.			A	local	government	in	the	province	or	district	area	may	also	provide	an	additional	health	insurance	programme	(collectively	called	Jamkesda)	which	aims	to	close	the	coverage	gap,	but	this	policy	is	not	implemented	across	all	local	authorities.	In	this	study,	individuals	who	reported	having	Jamkesda	are	excluded	because	I	am	interested	in	the	effect	of	the	national	health	insurance	programme,	not	the	local	setting.	Furthermore,	Jamkesda	has	too	much	variation	in	terms	of	coverage	and	benefit	structures,	making	it	difficult	to	identify	a	causal	relationship	between	the	insurance	and	the	outcome.	Nevertheless,	an	evaluation	study	of	Jamkesda	discovered	that	it	only	marginally	increased	outpatient	utilisation,	while	providing	little	to	no	financial	protection	(Sparrow	et	al.,	2017)	This	finding	is	consistent	with	my	result	that	the	subsidised	health	insurance	programme	has	a	rather	limited	effect	on	utilisation.			
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It	is	worth	noting	that	the	contributory	group	is	not	the	major	contributor	to	the	JKN	programme,	representing	only	16.4	percent	of	total	JKN	membership.	The	majority	of	JKN	members	are	in	the	subsidised	group	(60	percent)	followed	by	salaried	private	workers	and	civil	servants	(23.6	percent).	Given	the	fact	that	the	subsidised	group	accounts	for	the	largest	proportion	of	the	JKN	insured	population,	the	subsidies	paid	for	by	the	government	are	likely	to	contribute	more	to	the	overall	JKN	budget.	This	implies	a	potential	inequity	in	how	government	subsidies	are	being	targeted	in	the	sense	that	the	poor	do	not	receive	the	benefit	from	the	subsidy.	This	inequity	issue	is	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	the	JKN	effect	is	much	stronger	in	areas	with	a	higher	density	of	health	care	facilities.	Since	subsidised	group	members	are	more	likely	to	live	in	rural	areas	with	limited	health	care	facilities,	we	can	expect	to	see	that	the	insurance	has	a	limited	effect	in	removing	barriers	to	accessing	care.	Insurance	may	ease	the	financial	barriers	associated	with	the	fees	for	medical	treatment	(i.e.	affordability)	but	may	not	be	adequate	for	removing	other	barriers	to	access,	such	as	the	cost	of	transportation	(accessibility)	or	the	availability	of	primary	clinics	and	hospitals.		Improving	access	to	care	among	individuals	in	rural	and	remote	areas	remains	a	significant	challenge	for	the	Indonesian	government:	a	problem	that	cannot	be	solved	solely	by	the	introduction	of	public	health	insurance	for	all.			
 Financial	protection	
10.2.3.1 The limited effect of the JKN programme on OOP health expenditure 	Financial	protection	is	commonly	measured	by	identifying	the	medical	costs	that	patients	have	to	spend	‘out-of-pocket’,	often	called	out-of-pocket	(OOP)	health	expenditure.	Health	insurance	is	expected	to	reduce	this	expenditure.	However,	the	overall	evidence	on	the	effect	of	health	insurance	in	reducing	OOP	expenditure	is	less	homogeneous	compared	with	its	effect	on	utilisation.	Findings	from	Chapter	4	show	that	the	majority	of	studies	identified	that	health	insurance	had	a	beneficial	effect	in	reducing	OOP	expenditure,	however	in	specific	contexts,	health	insurance	may	increase	OOP	expenditure	instead	(	Wagstaff	et	al.,	2009;	Wagstaff	and	Lindelow,	2008;	Ekman,	2007;	Dong	et	al.,	1999;).	The	updated	review	in	Chapter	5	identified	additional	studies	on	financial	protection	and	found	a	similar	pattern	of	mixed	
		 258	
findings:	16	out	of	46	studies	found	no	effect	and	four	studies	showed	increased	OOP	health	expenditure	following	the	introduction	of	health	insurance.	Restricting	the	evidence	to	randomised	trials	in	LMICs,	three	studies	reported	reduced	OOP	health	expenditure	(Levine,	Polimeni	and	Ramage,	2016;	Grogger	et	al.,	2015;	Fink	et	al.,	2013)	and	one	study	reported	no	effect	(Raza	et	al.,	2016).			Studies	from	developing	countries	also	provide	evidence	that	subsidised	public	health	insurance	does	not	always	reduce	health	spending.	Bernal	et	al.	(2014)	found	that	subsidised	health	insurance	in	Peru	increased	OOP	health	expenditure,	particularly	at	the	high	end	of	the	distribution	of	expenditure.	They	argue	that	their	finding	may	be	explained	by	the	idea	that	individuals	reach	maximum	levels	of	coverage	and	then	pay	for	complex	treatments	themselves.	Wagstaff	et	al.	(2009)	evaluated	a	heavily	subsidised	voluntary	health	insurance	programme	for	rural	residents	in	China	and	found	that	it	did	not	reduce	OOP	health	spending	per	outpatient	or	inpatient	visit.	They	suggest	that	their	finding	might	be	driven	by	a	fee-for-service	payment	mechanism	which	may	result	in	higher	health	care	costs.	Palmer	et	al.	(2015)	evaluated	Vietnam’s	health	insurance	for	children	and	also	found	that	the	insurance	did	not	decrease	OOP	health	expenditure.	They	linked	this	finding	to	the	fact	that	the	enrolees	sought	care	in	a	more	specialised	facilities	without	seeking	a	referral	from	a	primary	facility,	which	resulted	in	the	enrolees	making	their	own	health	care	payments.		Within	Chapter	5,	I	also	identified	two	studies	from	Indonesia	offering	conflicting	evidence	in	relation	to	the	evaluation	of	Askeskin,	a	subsidised	health	insurance	programme	for	poor	people	in	Indonesia.	One	study	found	that	Askeskin	reduced	OOP	health	expenditure	while	the	other	found	opposite	findings	(Aji	et	al.,	2013;	Sparrow,	Suryahadi	and	Widyanti,	2013).	Sparrow,	Suryahadi,	and	Widyanti	(2013)	evaluated	the	Askeskin	programme	by	analysing	national	socioeconomic	survey	(Susenas)	panel	datasets	(2005–2006)	using	a	PSM-DID	approach	and	found	that	Askeskin	increased	OOP	health	expenditure	and	budget	shares,	particularly	in	urban	areas.	However,	they	were	unable	to	discern	the	reasons	for	this	increased	spending.	Meanwhile,	Aji	et	al.	(2013)	evaluated	Askeskin	by	analysing	the	IFLS	2000	and	2007	
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datasets	with	Instrumental	Variables	(IV)	and	Fixed	Effect	(FE)	and	found	that	Askeskin	reduced	OOP	health	expenditure,	even	though	it	was	only	significant	at	the	10	percent	level.	I	applied	a	different	specification	for	my	model	compared	with	Aji	et	al.’s	model	by	including	more	objective	need	factors,	such	as	the	number	of	acute	and	chronic	conditions	and	disability	conditions,	whereas	Aji	et	al.	only	included	a	dummy	for	subjective	well-being	and	a	dummy	for	limitations	in	relation	to	activities	in	daily	life.			Upon	reflection	of	the	evidence	provided	in	Chapters	4	and	5,	the	hypothetical	direction	of	the	effect	of	health	insurance	on	financial	protection	was	becoming	less	clear.	Nevertheless,	my	empirical	findings	from	Chapter	8	found	that	the	JKN	programme	had	no	significant	effect	on	both	individual	and	household	OOP	health	expenditure,	either	for	outpatient	or	inpatient	care.	While	the	coefficients	of	OOP	health	expenditure	were	positive	in	almost	all	of	the	models,	none	of	these	were	statistically	significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	Only	the	overall	household	OOP	health	expenditure	had	a	positive	coefficient	that	was	significant	at	10	percent	(under	the	PSM-DID	model).	In	addition,	I	also	found	that	the	JKN	programme,	overall,	had	no	significant	effect	on	catastrophic	health	expenditure	events.			It	is	also	likely	that	people	did	not	seek	care	before	the	introduction	of	the	JKN	programme	period	and	still	did	not	seek	care	after	the	treatment	period,	hence	their	zero	spending.	This	implies	that	the	utilisation	effect	precedes	the	expenditure	effect,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	4.	When	the	insurance	fails	to	increase	utilisation,	it	is	expected	that	there	will	be	no	effect	on	the	health	expenditure.	In	this	study,	this	scenario	is	unlikely	because	the	JKN	programme	increased	utilisation	for	both	the	contributory	and	the	subsidised	groups.			Another	explanation	is	that	some	of	the	JKN	enrolees	might	prefer	not	to	use	JKN	benefits	for	seeking	care,	especially	in	outpatient	care.	Qualitative	findings	from	two	randomised	trials	in	health	insurance	suggest	that	patients	perceived	the	quality	of	services	from	providers	contracted	by	the	health	insurance	scheme	to	be	lower	than	those	offered	by	private	providers,	and	that	this	lower	quality	may	be	associated	with	
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the	capitation	payments	employed	by	the	insurance	schemes	(Raza	et	al.,	2016;	Fink	et	al.,	2013).	Incidentally,	the	JKN	programme	also	uses	capitation	to	pay	primary	care	providers	in	both	public	health	centres	and	contracted	private	provision.	Capitation	entails	that	health	care	providers	receive	an	initial	lump	sum	of	money	for	patients	who	register	with	them	and	in	return	agree	to	provide	services	in	the	future	under	conditions	and	terms	laid	down	by	the	contract	with	the	insurer.	Under	a	simple	capitation	payment	system,	providers	are	encouraged	to	keep	the	patients	healthy	by	prioritising	preventive	care	and	retain	more	money	by	cutting	down	the	amount	of	medical	treatment	that	is	offered	(Gosden	et	al.,	2000).	This	process	may	lead	to	a	better	quality	of	care,	but	this	will	take	a	long	time	to	happen	as	clinical	processes	change	slowly.	In	addition,	they	may	also	be	disincentivised	to	perform	well	for	sicker	patients	as	this	will	attract	greater	numbers	of	sick	and	expensive	patients	with	a	flat	payment	in	return	(Matsaganis	and	Glennerster,	1994).			Evidence	of	the	capitation	payment	effect	on	the	quality	of	care	is	mixed.	A	review	undertaken	in	the	United	States	showed	an	equal	number	of	the	statistically	significant	positive	and	negative	effects	of	managed	care	on	quality	of	care	(Miller	and	Luft,	1997).	A	qualitative	study	using	in-depth	interviews	in	Burkina	Faso	found	that	insufficient	levels	of	capitation	payments,	the	infrequent	schedule	of	capitation	payments,	and	the	lack	of	a	payment	mechanism	for	reimbursing	service	fees	were	perceived	as	significant	sources	of	health	worker	dissatisfaction	and	loss	of	work-related	motivation	(Robyn	et	al.,	2014).	Based	on	my	experience	working	as	a	doctor	in	Indonesia,	general	practitioners	are	often	reluctant	to	change	clinical	practice,	especially	if	they	perceive	the	change	as	a	challenge	to	their	authority	or	a	threat	to	their	income.	This	resistance	is	similar	to	doctors’	resistance	to	health	care	information	technology	because	doctors,	just	like	other	professions,	tend	to	maintain	the	status	quo	by	resisting	change	and	reverting	back	to	the	original	state	(Bhattacherjee	and	Hikmet,	2007).	In	response	to	an	initial	increase	in	patient	visits	due	to	the	introduction	of	a	capitation	model	(Gosden	et	al.,	2000),	doctors	are	likely	to	rush	the	consultation	and	limit	the	amount	of	prescriptions	and	laboratory	testing,	which	may	in	turn	be	perceived	by	patients	as	a	lower	quality	of	health	care.	Although	it	can	be	argued	that	patients	may	be	not	the	best	judge	of	care	quality	
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(Miller	and	Luft,	1997),	reduced	prescribing	and	consultation	time	are	likely	to	deter	patients	from	seeking	care	and	facilitate	the	search	for	private	providers.				This	limited	finding	should	not	be	interpreted	that	JKN	has	no	impact	at	all	since	my	identification	strategy	excluded	some	other	population	that	are	covered	by	JKN.	For	example,	I	excluded	the	JKN	enrolees	from	private	formal	sector	employment	and	civil	servants	because	of	their	affiliation	with	the	old	insurance	system	before	the	introduction	of	JKN	in	2014.	It	will	be	a	challenge	to	estimate	the	causal	effect	from	these	populations	because	any	observed	effect	may	be	explained	by	their	previous	insurance	status.	However,	if	one	is	interested	in	evaluating	the	intention-to-treat	impact	of	the	new	reform,	it	may	be	appropriate	to	include	these	populations	in	the	treatment	group.			It	should	also	be	noted	that	actual	cost,	rather	than	potential	cost,	is	analysed	in	this	study.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	6,	zero	health	expenditure	may	reflect	the	zero	cost	from	utilising	health	care	(i.e.	actual	cost)	or	zero	from	an	inability	to	utilise	the	care	(i.e.	potential	cost).	In	this	analysis,	zero	expenditure	is	therefore	considered	to	be	true	zero,	regardless	of	an	individual’s	ability	to	seek	care.			Considering	the	generous	medical	benefit	and	almost	no	cost-sharing	mechanism,	it	is	expected	that	we	will	see	reduced	OOP	health	expenditure	among	the	insured.	Nevertheless,	no	reduction	in	OOP	health	spending	may	still	be	considered	an	improvement	in	the	sense	that	JKN	did	not	increase	OOP	spending	despite	increased	utilisation.	Assuming	the	insured	could	not	access	the	care	and	had	zero	expenditure	prior	to	the	introduction	of	the	JKN	programme,	having	increased	utilisation	with	no	increased	OOP	health	expenditure	after	enrolment	implies	that	the	insurance	still	has	a	protective	effect.					
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10.2.3.2 Possible explanations for non-zero expenditure among the insured 		There	are	several	reasons	which	may	explain	the	existence	of	OOP	spending	among	JKN	insured	patients.	First,	the	providers	may	prescribe	non-generic	medication	to	JKN	insured	patients.	In	order	to	contain	the	costs,	JKN	only	covers	a	list	of	approved	medications	that	often	excludes	branded	drugs.	Under	JKN	regulations,	health	providers	are	allowed	to	prescribe	branded	drugs	and	charge	the	patients	for	them	if	there	is	no	alternative	(Thabrany,	2016).	It	is,	therefore,	in	the	providers’	interest	to	stock	fewer	generic	drugs	as	a	reason	for	prescribing	branded	drugs	to	JKN	patients.			Another	likely	possibility	is	the	penalty	imposed	on	the	insured	if	they	want	to	upgrade	their	class	of	hospital	ward	(Kesehatan,	2017).	A	higher	class	of	hospital	ward	means	that	patients	can	enjoy	more	privacy	and	access	to	hospital	amenities.	The	insured	from	wealthier	backgrounds	may	consider	upgrading	even	with	some	cost-sharing	because	they	still	benefit	from	the	price	reduction	effect	of	the	insurance,	even	if	it	is	not	totally	free.	The	provider,	such	as	hospitals	or	clinics,	may	also	prescribe	non-generic	medications	that	are	not	covered	by	the	insurance	and	pass	on	this	cost	to	the	patients,	even	though	the	law	stipulates	that	all	of	the	insured	under	the	JKN	programme	must	not	be	charged	with	any	fee,	with	the	exception	of	the	hospital	ward	upgrade	(Gultom,	Jaya	and	Atmiroseva,	2015).			Another	source	of	potential	spending	for	JKN	enrolees	occurs	when	a	patient	seeks	medical	care	at	a	more	costly	facility.	In	Chapter	3,	it	was	explained	that	the	JKN	contributory	group	must	pay	a	monthly	premium	based	on	the	hospital	ward	class	which	determines	access	to	certain	hospital	services.	Changing	ward	class	is	possible	but	the	patients	must	pay	for	the	difference	in	medical	costs	between	the	original	class	and	the	upgraded	class	(Kesehatan,	2017).	It	is	also	likely	that	enrolees	seek	care	from	secondary	or	tertiary	care	facilities	without	a	referral	from	their	GP,	which	fits	with	the	findings	from	another	health	insurance	study	in	Vietnam	(Palmer	et	al.,	2015).				
		 263	
A	final	explanation	for	additional	fees	borne	by	the	JKN	insured	is	the	persistence	of	illegal	fees	that	existed	prior	to	the	reform	taking	place.	Following	the	decentralisation	policy	in	the	early	2000s,	public	health	facilities	have	been	treated	as	vehicles	for	generating	rents	for	bureaucrats	in	local	government	(Andrew,	2012).	My	private	discussions	with	administrative	staff	when	I	was	working	in	a	public	health	facility	revealed	that	fees	generated	by	the	public	health	facilities	did	not	go	towards	their	daily	budgets	but	instead	served	as	a	source	of	income	for	the	local	government.	Furthermore,	there	was	pressure	to	meet	a	specific	target	each	month,	which	resulted	in	additional	pressure	to	charge	patients	more	fees.	As	this	practice	of	illegal	fees	was	widespread	before	the	concept	of	health	insurance	was	introduced,	patients	might	not	realise	that	they	are	currently	being	treated	unfairly	and	accept	the	fees	instead.		
 Health	status	(blood	pressure)		Improving	the	population’s	health	status	should	be	the	primary	long-term	outcome	of	health	insurance,	but	few	studies	have	attempted	to	measure	this,	and,	unlike	utilisation	and	financial	protection,	there	are	multiple	choices	of	outcomes	for	different	medical	conditions.	An	obvious	candidate	for	a	more	general	health	outcome	measure	is	the	mortality	rate	because	it	is	often	the	end	result	of	many	acute	conditions,	such	as	infectious	diseases,	obstetrics	emergencies,	cardiovascular	emergencies	and	cancers.	However,	unlike	in	developed	countries	where	the	recording	of	vital	registrations	has	reached	>90	percent,	vital	registration	systems	in	developing	countries	are	mostly	incomplete	or	outdated;	this	is	a	particular	problem	within	countries	in	Africa,	Southeast	Asia	and	the	Western	Pacific	(Mathers	et	al.,	2005).	Indonesia	has	no	reliable	vital	registration	system	in	place.	The	census	might	provide	a	reliable	estimate	of	the	mortality	rate,	but	the	last	census	was	conducted	in	2010,	four	years	before	the	introduction	of	the	JKN	programme.	The	next	census	will	be	conducted	in	2020.	Thus,	the	mortality	rate	is	not	a	viable	option	for	my	study	at	the	moment.			
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In	Chapter	5,	I	identified	twelve	studies,	with	considerable	variation	in	the	precise	health	measure	under	consideration,	including	the	mortality	rate	(child,	adult	and	maternal),	the	health	index,	nutrition	status	for	children,	and	blood	pressure.	Nine	out	of	twelve	of	the	studies	indicated	the	positive	effect	of	health	insurance	on	various	health	statuses.	For	my	empirical	study	on	health	status	in	Chapter	9,	I	chose	blood	pressure	as	a	health	outcome	because	it	has	been	investigated	in	other	health	insurance	evaluations,	including	the	famous	RAND	health	insurance	experiment	and	the	recent	Oregon	Medicaid	experiment	(	Hendriks	et	al.,	2014;	Baicker	et	al.,	2013;	Sosa-Rubí,	Galárraga	and	López-Ridaura,	2009;	Newhouse	and	Insurance	Experiment	Group,	1993).	My	findings	showed	that	the	JKN	programme	had	no	significant	effect	on	modifying	blood	pressure	in	terms	of	systolic	and	diastolic	measures.	However,	the	JKN	programme	might	increase	awareness,	treatment	and	the	control	rate	of	hypertension	among	the	contributory	group.	Meanwhile,	the	JKN	programme	had	only	a	limited	effect	on	improving	the	control	rate	of	hypertension	among	the	subsidised	group.			The	favourable	effect	in	terms	of	increasing	awareness	and	rate	of	treatment	among	the	contributory	group	is	expected	based	on	the	findings	in	Chapter	7.	I	have	shown	that	the	contributory	group	increased	their	utilisation	of	outpatient	and	inpatient	services.	As	greater	awareness	and	higher	treatment	rates	reflect	better	access	to	diagnosis	and	management	of	hypertension,	an	increased	effect	for	both	indicators	is	expected	due	to	better	access	to	care	as	a	result	of	the	JKN	programme	among	the	contributory	group.			Based	on	the	review	of	reviews	and	the	updated	review	in	Chapters	4	and	5,	there	are	three	main	reasons	for	a	‘no	effect’	finding	in	the	health	insurance	evaluation.	First,	the	outcome	measure	may	not	have	matched	the	goals	of	the	scheme.	In	the	context	of	the	JKN	programme,	this	should	not	be	a	major	problem	because	hypertension	management	can	be	influenced	by	health	insurance.	People	with	chronic	diseases	are	more	likely	to	gain	benefits	from	health	insurance	as	they	are	expected	to	have	more	visits	to	the	doctors.			
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Second,	health	status	is	considered	to	be	a	long-term	impact,	therefore	more	time	is	required	for	the	effects	to	be	revealed	in	the	data.	Several	evaluation	studies	in	other	countries	have	also	reported	a	no	insurance	effect	on	health	status	but	they	associated	this	with	the	short	time	period	between	the	introduction	of	the	insurance	programme	and	the	start	of	its	evaluation	(King	et	al.,	2009;	Chen	and	Jin,	2012;	Cheng	et	al.,	2015).	Although	it	has	been	5	years	since	the	introduction	of	JKN	(in	January	2014),	the	IFLS	data	was	available	only	9	months	after	the	start	date	(September	2014).	Thus,	the	effect	on	health	status	may	not	yet	be	fully	realised	in	my	data.			The	third	factor,	and	perhaps	the	most	important,	is	the	dependence	of	health	status	on	other	short-term	effects,	as	shown	in	the	conceptual	framework	in	Chapter	9.	Before	the	improvement	of	health	status	becomes	discernible	in	the	data,	it	requires	a	prior	positive	correlation	between	health	insurance	and	short-term	outcomes,	such	as	utilisation	of	health	care	services.	The	effect	on	health	status	may	only	be	realised	if	either	utilisation	or	financial	protection	are	affected	by	the	insurance	programme.	While	there	is	evidence	that	JKN	has	encouraged	its	enrolees	to	utilise	more	health	care,	financial	protection	has	not	yet	been	ensured.	Increased	utilisation	does	not	always	improve	health	outcomes	(Ross	and	Mirowsky,	2000).	It	is	therefore	suggested	that	the	effects	of	both	utilisation	and	financial	protection	have	to	be	realised	simultaneously	before	any	effect	on	health	status	can	be	observed.			
 Quality	of	care		While	the	debates	in	both	health	financing	and	quality	of	care	aim	to	maximise	the	health	benefits	with	the	given	resources	in	a	sustainable	manner,	the	financing	debate	traditionally	places	less	focus	on	clinical	care	or	patient	outcome	objectives	and	more	on	affordability	and	efficiency	(McLoughlin	and	Leatherman,	2003).	However,	the	health	insurance	incentive	structure	can	influence	health	provider	choice	between	quality	and	cost	(Morrisey	et	al.,	1984).	It	is	argued	that	in	a	health	care	market	characterised	by	high	levels	of	asymmetrical	information	between	
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patients,	payers	and	providers,	changes	in	quality	are	harder	to	detect	when	it	is	costly	to	monitor	and	health	insurance	may	incentivise	the	provider	to	focus	on	a	measure	of	quality	that	is	less	costly	to	monitor	(Weisbrod,	1991).		The	relationship	between	health	insurance	and	quality	of	care	is	less	well	documented	in	the	literature	compared	with	access	to	care	and	financial	protection.	From	the	review	of	reviews	in	Chapter	3,	only	one	review	reports	care	quality	as	a	component	of	the	study’s	outcomes.	Spaan	et	al.	(2012)	found	that	3	out	of	8	studies	reported	a	positive	relationship	between	community-based	health	insurance	(CBHI)	and	quality	of	care	but	none	of	these	studies	is	considered	to	be	of	a	high	quality	in	terms	of	mitigating	insurance	selection	bias.	In	theory,	CBHI	may	improve	the	quality	of	care	through	increased	utilisation	patterns	and	subsequent	income	generation.	This	increased	quality	may	also	help	to	attract	more	people	to	join	the	scheme,	but	there	is	little	evidence	to	support	the	positive	impact	of	CBHI	on	quality	of	care.	For	example,	one	CBHI	scheme	in	Hanang	district,	Tanzania,	helped	to	generate	additional	resources	to	purchase	drugs	and	equipment	and	refurbish	health	facilities	(Chee,	Smith	and	Kapinga,	2002)	but	this	improvement	was	found	to	be	sub-optimal	(Kamuzora	and	Gilson,	2007).	Another	study	focusing	on	a	CBHI	scheme	in	Burundi	reported	that	health	workers	discriminated	against	CBHI	enrolees	and	provided	preferential	treatment	to	patients	paying	in	cash	(Arhin,	1994).	It	is	unlikely	that	we	will	see	any	significant	effect	on	the	quality	of	care,	given	the	sub-optimal	income	generation	due	to	low	enrolment	rates	encountered	in	many	CBHI	schemes	in	other	countries	(Hounton,	Byass	and	Kouyate,	2012;	Dong	et	al.,	2009;	Nkoa	and	Ongolo-Zogo,	2009;	Basaza,	Criel	and	Van	der	Stuyft,	2008;	Kamuzora	and	Gilson,	2007;	De	Allegri	et	al.,	2006).	The	only	exception	is	Rwanda,	which	achieved	the	highest	rate	of	health	insurance	enrolment	(81.6	percent	by	the	beginning	of	2015)	in	sub-Saharan	Africa	(Chemouni,	2018).	It	is	also	argued	that	‘CBHI’	in	Rwanda	has	transformed	itself	into	a	form	of	SHI	given	its	mandatory	enrolment	since	2006	and	the	more	prominent	role	of	central	government	in	the	management	of	all	CBHI	schemes	since	2015	(Ridde	et	al.,	2018),	both	of	which	are	not	traditionally	found	in	CBHI.			
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Regarding	the	evidence	for	quality	improvement	in	countries	implementing	SHI,	Spaan	et	al.	(2013)	found	that	2	out	of	8	studies	reported	a	positive	effect	on	quality	of	care,	measured	by	the	increased	rate	of	antenatal	care	among	insured	pregnant	women	in	the	Philippines	(Kozhimannil	et	al.,	2009)	and	Ghana	(Mensah,	Oppong	and	Schmidt,	2010).	However,	it	can	also	be	argued	that	increased	antenatal	care	visits	are	more	likely	to	reflect	increased	utilisation	rather	than	increased	quality	of	care.	Therefore,	there	is	no	strong	evidence	that	SHI	has	any	significant	effect	on	quality	of	care.			Focusing	on	several	randomised	controlled	studies	identified	in	Chapter	5,	quality	of	care	is	still	not	the	primary	objective	of	health	insurance	evaluation.	Only	one	study	in	the	Philippines	reported	a	positive	impact	on	quality	of	care,	but	the	design	of	the	insurance	explicitly	included	accreditation	and	a	provider	payment	system	which	aimed	to	increase	quality	of	care	(Quimbo	et	al.,	2010).	While	other	studies	did	not	include	quality	measures	as	their	primary	outcome,	some	authors	often	complemented	their	findings	with	qualitative	studies	suggesting	a	perceived	lower	quality	of	care	by	enrolees	(Levine	et	al.,	2016;	Raza	et	al.,	2015;	Fink,	et	al.,	2013).	In	addition,	these	authors	further	suggest	that	the	adopted	prospective-payment	system	might	impair	the	quality	of	care	provided	by	the	contracted	clinics	due	to	the	pressures	of	needing	to	preserve	more	income.	Thus,	the	connection	between	health	insurance	and	quality	of	care	may	depend	more	explicitly	on	the	chosen	payment	provider	system.		
Section	10.3 	Strengths	and	limitations		Alongside	the	empirical	contribution	of	my	evaluation	of	the	JKN	programme,	I	have	attempted	to	offer	several	contributions	to	the	theories	in	related	fields	of	study.	In	terms	of	the	model	of	access	to	care,	this	study	confirms	that	financial	incentive	in	itself	is	inadequate	for	improving	a	population’s	access	to	care,	especially	for	poor	people.	Demand-side	initiatives,	such	as	health	insurance,	vouchers	or	cash	transfers,	need	to	be	coupled	with	improvements	in	the	supply	of	health	care.	People	who	enrolled	in	the	JKN	contributory	group	are	more	likely	to	be	more	affluent	than	the	subsidised	group	and	they	already	have	the	advantage	of	easier	physical	access	to	
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clinics	and	hospitals,	for	example	by	living	in	an	urban	area.	The	introduction	of	the	JKN	programme	which	aims	to	cover	all	citizens	by	2019	is	the	ideal	means	for	them	to	afford	health	insurance	because	its	premium	is	relatively	cheaper	than	private	insurance.	Borrowing	the	concept	of	the	‘three	phases	of	delay’	from	the	maternal	mortality	literature	(Thaddeus	and	Maine,	1994)	health	insurance	is	beneficial	for	removing	the	first	delay	of	deciding	to	seek	care.	The	second	delay,	reaching	an	adequate	health	care	facility,	is	related	to	physical	accessibility	factors,	such	as	the	distribution	of	facilities,	travel	time	and	transportation;	and	the	final	delay	is	related	to	quality	of	care	at	the	facility.	Individuals	who	were	enrolled	in	the	contributory	group	had	essentially	moved	past	all	three	barriers,	but	the	subsidised	group	were	still	unable	to	pass	the	second	delay.			The	second	contribution	made	by	this	research	is	that	I	am	able	to	show	that	the	impact	of	the	JKN	programme	is	considerably	heterogeneous,	depending	on	the	enrolees’	ability	to	pay.	Had	I	conducted	the	study	focusing	on	JKN	enrolees	as	a	whole,	this	difference	in	impact	might	not	have	been	revealed.	Without	any	complex	analysis,	anecdotal	evidence	from	social	media	and	newspapers	had	already	indicated	that	public	health	centres	and	hospitals	were	overcrowded	in	the	first	year	of	the	JKN	era	(i.e.	2014).			The	third	contribution	relates	to	the	effect	of	health	insurance	on	financial	protection.	The	JKN	programme	is	perceived	as	‘free	care’	for	its	enrolees	and	it	is	assumed	that	the	programme	will	provide	adequate	financial	protection.	However,	this	study	has	shown	that	the	JKN	programme	has	not	necessarily	reduced	OOP	spending	among	its	enrolees.	My	finding	adds	to	a	growing	literature	pointing	to	the	inability	of	health	insurance	to	protect	individuals	or	households	from	budgetary	shocks	associated	with	seeking	medical	care	(Raza	et	al.,	2016;	Palmer	et	al.,	2015;	Bernal,	Carpio	and	Klein,	2014;	Thornton	et	al.,	2010;	Wagstaff	et	al.,	2009;	Wagstaff	and	Lindelow,	2008).	It	was	suggested	in	the	previous	sub-section	that	the	sources	of	OOP	spending	among	JKN	enrolees	include	prescription	costs,	cost-sharing	due	to	an	upgraded	service	and	illegal	treatment	costs.			
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Lastly,	my	study	is	the	first	health	insurance	evaluation	in	Indonesia	to	attempt	to	explore	the	effect	on	health	outcome.	The	JKN	programme	had	no	significant	effect	on	modifying	blood	pressure	in	terms	of	systolic	and	diastolic	measures.	However,	the	programme	has	had	a	positive	effect	on	increasing	awareness,	accessing	treatment	and	controlling	the	rates	of	hypertension	among	the	contributory	group,	although	the	latter	finding	did	not	always	show	consistent	results.	Meanwhile,	the	JKN	programme	had	only	a	limited	effect	on	improving	the	control	rate	of	hypertension	among	the	subsidised	group.	Even	if	it	is	argued	that	health	status	may	not	have	changed	within	the	several	months	following	the	introduction	of	the	JKN	programme	in	January	2014,	my	study	nonetheless	reveals	an	early	indication	that	the	enrolees,	especially	those	in	the	contributory	group,	may	have	better	access	to	treatment,	which	involves	hypertension	management.	Further	research	on	this	finding	would	be	welcomed	when	the	next	IFLS	data	is	published	in	two	to	three	years.				Several	limitations	are	apparent,	despite	my	efforts	to	minimise	potential	weaknesses	in	the	study.	First,	some	supply	factors	have	not	been	controlled	adequately,	such	as	the	distance	to	the	nearest	facilities	or	the	quality	of	the	health	workforce.	These	are	all	factors	that	may	play	a	role	in	determining	enrolment	among	the	contributory	group	(Mebratie	et	al.,	2015).	IFLS	data	provide	detailed	information	about	health	facilities,	but	this	is	only	available	for	the	facilities	that	were	visited	by	the	respondents.	This	excludes	facilities	that	might	be	closer	in	distance	but	were	not	visited	by	the	respondents.	If	it	is	argued	that	better	facilities	attract	more	people	to	use	more	services,	then	information	about	all	available	health	facilities	around	the	sample	area	is	needed.	Nevertheless,	I	have	attempted	to	control	for	supply-side	factors	by	including	the	density	of	health	facilities	available	in	the	villages	/	townships	in	which	the	respondents	were	living.			Second,	the	IFLS	is	not	representative	of	all	Indonesian	provinces,	and	thus	it	cannot	produce	a	national	estimate.	The	IFLS	excluded	most	eastern	Indonesian	provinces	which	are	considered	to	be	underdeveloped	compared	with	their	western	counterparts.	Another	dataset	that	encompasses	all	Indonesian	provinces	is	available	from	the	Indonesian	National	Socioeconomic	Survey	(Susenas)	(BPS	Indonesia,	
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2017b)	but	this	does	not	provide	adequate	health	insurance	status	information	or	data	on	health	care	utilisation.	In	addition,	I	found	that	Susenas	is	not	consistent	in	collecting	health	expenditure	data,	based	on	my	initial	effort	to	analyse	Susenas	data	in	my	second	year.	The	expenditure	variable	in	Susenas	does	not	measure	a	household’s	out-of-pocket	expenditure,	because	it	includes	the	approximated	value	of	any	subsidy	received	by	the	household	in	obtaining	goods	and	services.	Analysis	based	on	Susenas	data	has	been	shown	to	produce	the	misleading	conclusion	of	a	reduced	household	health	care	burden	(Johar	et	al.,	2017).	In	addition	to	the	limitations	of	the	Susenas	dataset,	the	IFLS	is	the	only	Indonesian	panel	dataset	available	for	evaluating	the	JKN	programme,	hence	its	inclusion	in	this	study.	Considering	IFLS	provinces	are	more	developed	than	the	non-IFLS	provinces,	my	findings	may	show	the	upper	limit	of	the	true	impact.	It	is	likely	that	the	JKN	programme	will	have	a	much	more	limited	impact	in	the	non-IFLS	provinces	due	to	the	lack	of	health	care	facilities	in	under-developed	regions,	but	the	extent	to	which	this	is	accurate	is	another	empirical	question.			Third,	this	study	can	only	offer	a	rapid	evaluation	of	the	JKN	programme	considering	the	short	gap	between	the	introduction	of	the	JKN	and	the	IFLS	survey.	It	is	possible	that	the	JKN	effect	will	be	more	discernible	once	the	coverage	is	nearly	universal.	Nevertheless,	this	study	still	offers	an	important	finding	that	can	inform	policymakers	in	responding	to	issues	related	to	the	implementation	of	the	JKN	programme.			Fourth,	data	collection	for	the	IFLS	survey	was	conducted	in	the	period	between	September	2014	and	March	2015.	Since	the	questionnaire	regarding	inpatient	care	has	a	12-month	recall	period,	it	is	likely	that	patients	sought	care	before	the	introduction	of	the	JKN	programme.	Fortunately,	IFLS	data	allow	the	analyst	to	separate	respondents	based	on	the	time	of	data	collection	and	I	have	shown	that	the	impact	of	the	JKN	programme	on	inpatient	utilisation	may	change	slightly	in	magnitude	but	still	retain	the	same	direction.		
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Section	10.4 	Policy	implications		While	it	is	encouraging	to	witness	the	positive	impact	on	utilisation,	the	greater	effect	observed	on	the	contributory	group	indicates	a	potential	adverse	selection	effect	among	the	more	affluent	population.	Given	the	fact	that	the	subsidised	group	accounts	for	the	largest	proportion	of	the	insured	population,	their	subsidies	paid	for	by	the	government	also	contribute	a	majority	to	the	JKN	budget.	As	government	subsidy	is	subject	to	political	intervention,	the	JKN	programme	should	decrease	its	reliance	on	the	subsidies	in	order	to	maintain	its	sustainability	in	the	long	term.	Thus,	the	government	should	devise	a	stronger	policy	in	enforcing	the	mandatory	contribution	stipulated	by	the	SJSN	law.	Expanding	the	membership	will	increase	the	risk	pooling	and	decrease	the	dependency	of	the	JKN	budget	on	government	subsidies.	This	is	arguably	better	to	ensure	the	sustainability	of	the	JKN	programme	in	the	future.			Following	the	limited	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	the	subsidised	group	despite	its	large	contribution	(i.e.	the	government	subsidy)	to	the	JKN	budget,	it	is	tempting	to	compartment	the	funding	between	the	subsidised	and	contributory	groups	to	protect	the	benefit	for	poorer	people.	This	is	unlikely	to	strengthen	the	JKN	programme	because	the	strength	of	the	JKN	programme	as	a	social	health	insurance,	as	described	in	Chapter	2,	lies	in	its	massive	risk	pooling	to	transfer	income	from	the	healthy	to	the	sick.	Any	division	in	risk	pooling	is	likely	to	further	weaken	the	viability	of	the	JKN	programme	as	a	single	payer	system.	When	the	risk	pooling	is	unable	to	sustain	the	increased	demand	from	the	contributory	group,	the	restriction	of	JKN	medical	benefits	and	rising	premiums	are	inevitable.	Catastrophic	consequences	due	to	adverse	selection	are	likely	to	happen,	as	predicted	in	Chapter	2	(Cutler	and	Zeckhauser,	1998).	The	healthier	enrolees	will	stop	their	membership,	leaving	JKN	with	sicker	enrolees	who	will	keep	contributing	to	rising	costs.	This	cycle	will	continue	until	JKN	is	unable	to	sustain	the	potential	rising	costs	which	may	lead	to	the	collapse	of	the	JKN	programme	and	a	reversal	to	its	precursors	(Askes,	Jamsostek,	and	Jamkesmas)	leaving	the	non-poor	people	working	in	informal	sectors	uninsured.		
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	This	study	also	suggests	that	the	government	should	put	greater	focus	on	the	availability	of	health	care	facilities	in	the	less	affluent	areas,	such	as	the	eastern	part	of	Indonesia.	Health	insurance	can	only	be	useful	if	the	enrolees	have	easy	access	to	the	nearest	health	facility.	Health	insurance	may	be	effective	in	alleviating	the	demand-side	barrier,	but	other	policies	concerning	the	provision	and	quality	of	care	remain	important	in	tackling	supply-side	barriers.	This	study	has	confirmed	that	the	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	utilisation	is	stronger	in	the	areas	with	a	high	density	of	health	care	providers,	especially	urban	areas.	Therefore,	improving	access	to	care	requires	a	more	concerted	effort	from	the	local	government	responsible	for	the	management	of	the	health	workforce	and	infrastructure	in	their	area.	The	central	government	may	need	to	devise	an	incentive	for	the	local	governments	to	encourage	their	efforts	in	improving	public	health	infrastructure.		While	this	study	found	no	statistically	significant	effect	on	OOP	health	expenditure,	there	is	still	an	indication	that	the	overall	health	care	cost	to	be	paid	by	the	JKN	programme	will	keep	increasing	considering	the	positive	effect	on	utilisation.	It	is	inevitable	that	BPJS	as	the	administrator	of	the	JKN	programme	needs	to	mitigate	the	rising	health	care	costs	in	the	future.	Cost-sharing	mechanisms	might	be	too	politically	unpopular	and	could	further	deter	utilisation	among	the	poorest.	Therefore,	it	is	necessary	for	the	JKN	programme	to	move	from	passive	to	more	strategic	purchasing	by	identifying	the	services	that	need	to	be	prioritised	and	the	more	cost-effective	interventions	to	be	covered	by	the	programme.	As	the	biggest	payer	in	the	Indonesian	health	care	system,	BPJS	can	play	a	more	significant	role	in	leading	the	negotiations	of	drug	prices	in	Indonesia,	which	may	lower	the	overall	health	expenditure	in	the	long	run.			The	government	also	needs	to	invest	more	in	producing	good	quality	data	to	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	important	public	policies.	Even	though	IFLS	data	provide	one	of	the	longest	sets	of	longitudinal	cohort	data,	survey	funding	is	primarily	received	from	donor	countries.	Considering	the	volatility	in	development	aid	and	the	improved	
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status	of	Indonesia	from	a	low-income	to	a	lower-middle	income	country,	it	is	necessary	for	Indonesia	to	become	self-sufficient	in	generating	good	quality	data.			Many	LMICs	have	experimented	with	the	introduction	of	performance-based	financing	(PBF)	in	addition	to	the	existing	health	insurance	scheme,	aiming	to	mitigate	the	perceived	lower	quality	of	care.	PBF	refers	to	financial	incentives	in	which	payment	depends	explicitly	on	the	quantity	and	quality	of	services	delivered	(Soucat	et	al.,	2017).	In	theory,	improved	quality	of	care	due	to	the	implementation	of	PBF	may	make	health	insurance	more	attractive,	which	in	turn	will	increase	the	enrolment	rate.	Furthermore,	PBF	is	able	to	change	processes	of	decision	making	in	allocation	away	from	historical	budgeting	to	a	more	data-driven	output	orientation	(World	Bank,	2014).	The	move	to	more	strategic	purchasing	may	help	the	JKN	programme	to	contain	the	costs	while	maintaining	high	quality	care,	at	minimum	quality	attributes	that	can	be	measured	efficiently.	The	government	needs	to	invest	sufficient	time	in	designing	the	PBF	scheme,	taking	into	account	lessons	from	other	countries	and	the	differences	in	context	and	objectives	(Renmans	et	al.,	2016).			
Section	10.5 	Agenda	for	future	research		First,	for	a	better	understanding	of	the	channels	between	health	insurance	and	relevant	outcomes,	there	is	a	need	to	go	beyond	quantitative	evidence	alone,	and	combine	the	quantitative	findings	with	qualitative	insights.	This	is	particularly	important	when	we	are	trying	to	interpret	some	of	the	counterintuitive	results	encountered	in	the	studies.	This	type	of	qualitative	study	should	analyse	the	underlying	socioeconomic	and	cultural	drivers	of	low	registration	and	non-usage	of	Indonesia’s	public	health	insurance	scheme	among	informal	sector	workers.	Since	many	studies	have	been	conducted	in	the	area	of	low	CBHI	enrolment	in	LMICs,	the	proposed	qualitative	study	may	also	develop	a	theoretical	framework	based	on	those	existing	studies	and	look	for	more	in-depth	insights	in	the	context	of	Indonesia.	Considering	the	vast	diversity	of	Indonesia,	it	is	worth	carrying	out	the	qualitative	study	on	several	different	large	islands,	at	the	very	least.		
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	Second,	there	is	a	need	to	develop	more	comprehensive	measures	of	financial	protection.	Some	authors	have	suggested	certain	alternatives,	either	by	manipulating	the	standard	health	expenditure	data	from	surveys	(Moreno-Serra,	Millet	and	Smith,	2011)	or	by	collecting	more	comprehensive	data	from	augmented	survey	questionnaires	(Ruger,	2012).	Future	evaluation	studies	are	encouraged	to	utilise	more	comprehensive	measures	to	provide	a	more	robust	analysis	of	the	effect	of	health	insurance	on	financial	protection.			Third,	considering	the	greater	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	the	contributory	group,	there	is	a	potential	inequality	as	a	side	effect	of	its	implementation.	Future	research	needs	to	explore	the	extent	to	which	the	JKN	programme	closes	or	widens	the	gap	of	access	to	care	and	financial	protection	between	the	poorest	and	the	most	affluent.			Fourth,	BPJS	as	the	single	payer	has	the	potential	to	gather	a	sizeable	amount	of	claim	data	which	will	allow	researchers	to	predict	the	pattern	of	health	expenditure	and	signs	of	moral	hazard,	especially	for	non-life-threatening	conditions.	Since	rising	health	expenditure	is	likely	to	follow	given	the	increased	demand	for	the	generous	medical	benefits	of	the	JKN	programme,	BPJS	should	develop	a	more	strategic	approach	to	budget	deficit	prevention,	informed	by	sound	reasoning	and	robust	evidence.			
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Appendices	
Table	A-1	Search	strategies	for	the	review	of	review	in	Chapter	4		Databases	 	Database	of	Abstracts	and	Reviews	of	Effect	(DARE)	Host	 Centre	for	Reviews	and	Disseminations	(CRD)	Date	of	search	 01	December	2017	Years	covered	 1965	to	December	2017	Search	strategy	 Any	field:	health	insurance	NOT	cost-effectiveness		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 284	records		 Databases	 Cochrane	Database	of	Systematic	Reviews	Host	 Wiley	online	library	Date	of	search	 07	March	2016	Years	covered	 1965	to	March	2016	Search	strategy	 (all	search	terms	are	in	title,	abstract,	and	keywords)	#1												((developing	next	countr*)	or	("low	income”	next	countr*)	or	(“middle	income”next	countr*)	or	(under-developed	next	countr*)	or	(less-developed	next	countr*)	or	("third	world”next	countr*))	#2		 MeSH	descriptor	Developing	Countries	explode	all	trees			#3			 MeSH	descriptor	Insurance,	Health	explode	all	trees			 	#4		 insurance	 	#5		 (#1	OR		#2)	 	#6		 (#3	OR	#4)	 	#7	 (#5	AND	#6)		 		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 198	records			 Databases	 CINAHL	Plus	Host	 EBSCO		Date	of	search	 1	December	2017	Years	covered	 1965	to	December	2017	Search	strategy	 S1	 (MH	"Insurance,	Health+")	S2	 (MH	“Prospective	Payment	System+”)	S3	 TI	health	insurance	S4	 Health	insurance	S5	 (MH	"Insurance,	Health,	Reimbursement+")	S6	 	(MH	"Health	Insurance	Exchanges")	S7	 S1	OR	S2	OR	S3	OR	S4	OR	S5	OR	S6	S8	 ("developing	countr*"	or	"developing	countr*"	or	"low	income	countr*"	or	"middle	income	countr*"	or	"under-developed	countr*"	or	"less-developed	countr*"	or	"third	world	countr*")	S9	 	(MM	"Developing	Countries")	S10	 TI	(Bangladesh	or	Benin	or	“Burkina	Faso”	or	Burundi	or	“Central	African	Republic”	or	Chad	or	Comoros	or	Congo	or	Kongo	or	Eritrea	or	Ethiopia	or	Gambia	or	Guinea	or	“Guinea-Bissau”	or	Haiti	or	Kenya	or	Kyrgyz	or	Liberia	or	Madagascar	or	Malawi	or	Mali	or	Mozambique	or	Myanmar	or	Nepal	or	Niger	or	Rwanda	or	
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“Sierra	Leone”	or	Somalia	or	Tajikistan	or	Tanzania	or	Togo	or	Uganda	or	Zimbabwe)	S11	 TI	(South	Sudan	or	Kiribati	or	Lao	or	Samoa	or	“Solomon	Islands”	or	“Timor	Leste”	or	Tuvalu	or	Vanuatu	or	Afghanistan	or	Bhutan)	S12	 TI	(Armenia	or	Bolivia	or	Cameroon	or	“Cape	Verde”	or	Congo	or	“Côte	d’Ivoire”	or	Djibouti	or	Egypt	or	“El	Salvador”	or	Georgia	or	Ghana	or	Guatemala	or	Guyana	or	Honduras	or	Indonesia	or	Lesotho	or	Mauritania	or	Moldova	or	Morocco	or	Nicaragua	or	Nigeria	or	Pakistan	or	“Papua	New	Guinea”	or	Paraguay	or	Philippines	or	“Sao	Tome	and	Principe”	or	Senegal	or	“Sri	Lanka”	or	Sudan	or	Syrian	or	Ukraine	or	Uzbekistan	or	Vietnam	or	Yemen	or	Zambia)	S13	 TI	(Albania	or	Algeria	or	Angola	or	Argentina	or	Azerbaijan	or	Belarus	or	“Bosnia	and	Herzegovina”	or	Botswana	or	Brazil	or	Bulgaria	or	China	or	Colombia	or	“Costa	Rica”	or	Cuba	or	“Dominican	Republic”	or	Ecuador	or	Gabon	or	Hungary	or	Iran	or	Iraq	or	Jamaica	or	Jordan	or	Kazakhstan	or	Lebanon	or	Libya	or	Malaysia	or	Mauritius	or	Mexico	or	Montenegro	or	Namibia	or	Panama	or	Peru	or	Romania	or	Serbia	or	“South	Africa”	or	Thailand	or	Yugoslav	or	Macedonia	or	Tunisia	or	Turkey	or	Turkmenistan	or	Venezuela)	S14	 S8	OR	S9	OR	S10	OR	S11	OR	S12	OR	S13	S15	 AB	review*	OR	TI	review*	S16	 (MM	"Systematic	Review")	S17	 (MM	"Meta	Analysis")	S18	 S15	OR	S16	OR	S17	S19	 S7	AND	S14	AND	S18		 	Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 196		 Databases	 Econlit	1886	to	2017		Host	 OvidSP		Date	of	search	 1	December	2017	Years	covered	 1965	to	December	2017	Search	strategy	 1.				Developing	Countries.kw.		2.				(developing	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		3.			(under-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		4.			(less-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		5.			(third-world	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		6.			low	income	countr$.tw.		7.			middle	income	countr$.tw.		8.				or/1-7		9.			(Albania	or	Algeria	or	Angola	or	Argentina	or	Azerbaijan	or	Belarus	or	Bosnia	or	Botswana	or	Brazil	or	Bulgaria	or	China	or	Colombia	or	Costa	Rica	or	Cuba	or	Dominican	Republic	or	Ecuador	or	Gabon	or	Hungary	or	Iran	or	Iraq	or	Jamaica	or	Jordan	or	Kazakhstan	or	Lebanon	or	Libya	or	Malaysia	or	Mauritius	or	Mexico	or	Montenegro	or	Namibia	or	Panama	or	Peru	or	Romania	or	Serbia	or	South	Africa	or	Thailand	or	Yugoslav	or	Macedonia	or	Tunisia	or	Turkey	or	Turkmenistan	or	Venezuela).tw.			10.		(Armenia	or	Bolivia	or	Cameroon	or	Cape	Verde	or	Congo	or	Cote	d	Ivoire	or	Djibouti	or	Egypt	or	El	Salvador	or	Georgia	or	Ghana	or	Guatemala	or	Guyana	or	Honduras	or	Indonesia	or	Lesotho	or	Mauritania	or	Moldova	or	Morocco	or	Nicaragua	or	Nigeria	or	Pakistan	
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or	Papua	New	Guinea	or	Paraguay	or	Philippines	or	Sao	Tome	Principe	or	Senegal	or	Sri	Lanka	or	Sudan	or	Syrian	or	Ukraine	or	Uzbekistan	or	Vietnam	or	Yemen	or	Zambia).tw.		11.	(South	Sudan	or	Kiribati	or	Lao	or	Samoa	or	Solomon	Islands	or	Timor	Leste	or	Tuvalu	or	Vanuatu	or	Afghanistan	or	Bhutan).tw.		12.	(Bangladesh	or	Benin	or	Burkina	Faso	or	Burundi	or	Central	African	Republic	or	Chad	or	Comoros	or	Congo	or	Kongo	or	Eritrea	or	Ethiopia	or	Gambia	or	Guinea	or	Guinea-Bissau	or	Haiti	or	Kenya	or	Kyrgyz	or	Liberia	or	Madagascar	or	Malawi	or	Mali	or	Mozambique	or	Myanmar	or	Nepal	or	Niger	or	Rwanda	or	Sierra	Leone	or	Somalia	or	Tajikistan	or	Tanzania	or	Togo	or	Uganda	or	Zimbabwe).tw.		13.	(africa	or	asia	or	"latin	america	and	the	caribbean").gr.		14.	or/9-13		15.	8	or	14	16.	insurance.mp.	[mp=heading	words,	abstract,	title,	country	as	subject]	17.	review$.ab.	18.	review$.ti.	19.	21	or	22	20.	15	AND	16	AND	19		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 194	records			 Databases	 Embase	1974	to	2017			Host	 OvidSP		Date	of	search	 1	December	2017	Years	covered	 1965	to	December	2017	Search	strategy	 1					Social	Insurance/		2					Public	Health	Insurance/		3					National	Health	Insurance/	4					health	insurance.ti.		5					(social	adj5	insurance$).tw.		6					(community	adj5	insurance$).tw.		7					(health	insurance	adj3	program$).tw.		8					universal	health	insuranc$.tw.		9					affordable	health	insuranc$.tw.		10					(health	insurance	adj3	scheme$).tw.		11					micro	health	insurance$.tw.		12					or/1-11		13					Developing	country/		14					(developing	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		15					(under-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		16					(less-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		17					(third-world	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		18					low	income	countr$.tw.		19					middle	income	countr$.tw.		20					or/13-19	20					exp	Africa/		21					exp	"South	and	Central	America"/		22					Mexico/		23					exp	Caribbean	Islands/		24					exp	Eastern	Europe/		25					exp	Pacific	islands/		26					exp	Southeast	Asia/		
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27					exp	south	asia/		28					middle	east/		29					china/	30					korea/	31					mongolia/		32					philippines/		33					taiwan/		34					iran/		35					iraq/		36					jordan/		37					lebanon/		38					palestine/		39					syrian	arab	republic/		40					"turkey	(republic)"/		41					yemen/		42					asia/		43					kazakhstan/		44					kyrgyzstan/		45					tajikistan/		46					turkmenistan/		47					uzbekistan/		48					exp	Indian	Ocean/			49.	(Albania	or	Algeria	or	Angola	or	Argentina	or	Azerbaijan	or	Belarus	or	Bosnia	or	Botswana	or	Brazil	or	Bulgaria	or	China	or	Colombia	or	Costa	Rica	or	Cuba	or	Dominican	Republic	or	Ecuador	or	Gabon	or	Hungary	or	Iran	or	Iraq	or	Jamaica	or	Jordan	or	Kazakhstan	or	Lebanon	or	Libya	or	Malaysia	or	Mauritius	or	Mexico	or	Montenegro	or	Namibia	or	Panama	or	Peru	or	Romania	or	Serbia	or	South	Africa	or	Thailand	or	Yugoslav	or	Macedonia	or	Tunisia	or	Turkey	or	Turkmenistan	or	Venezuela).tw.			50.	(Armenia	or	Bolivia	or	Cameroon	or	Cape	Verde	or	Congo	or	Cote	d	Ivoire	or	Djibouti	or	Egypt	or	El	Salvador	or	Georgia	or	Ghana	or	Guatemala	or	Guyana	or	Honduras	or	Indonesia	or	Lesotho	or	Mauritania	or	Moldova	or	Morocco	or	Nicaragua	or	Nigeria	or	Pakistan	or	Papua	New	Guinea	or	Paraguay	or	Philippines	or	Sao	Tome	Principe	or	Senegal	or	Sri	Lanka	or	Sudan	or	Syrian	or	Ukraine	or	Uzbekistan	or	Vietnam	or	Yemen	or	Zambia).tw.			51.	(South	Sudan	or	Kiribati	or	Lao	or	Samoa	or	Solomon	Islands	or	Timor	Leste	or	Tuvalu	or	Vanuatu	or	Afghanistan	or	Bhutan).tw.			52.	(Bangladesh	or	Benin	or	Burkina	Faso	or	Burundi	or	Central	African	Republic	or	Chad	or	Comoros	or	Congo	or	Kongo	or	Eritrea	or	Ethiopia	or	Gambia	or	Guinea	or	Guinea-Bissau	or	Haiti	or	Kenya	or	Kyrgyz	or	Liberia	or	Madagascar	or	Malawi	or	Mali	or	Mozambique	or	Myanmar	or	Nepal	or	Niger	or	Rwanda	or	Sierra	Leone	or	Somalia	or	Tajikistan	or	Tanzania	or	Togo	or	Uganda	or	Zimbabwe).tw.			53					or/12-52		54					or/1-11		55					53	and	54			56				(((comprehensive*	or	integrative	or	systematic*)	adj3	(bibliographic*	or	review*	or	literature))	or	(meta-analy*	or	metaanaly*	or	"research	synthesis"	or	((information	or	data)	adj3	synthesis)	or	(data	adj2	extract*))).ti,ab.	or	(cinahl	or	(cochrane	adj3	trial*)	or	embase	or	medline	or	psyclit	or	(psycinfo	not	"psycinfo	database")	or	pubmed	or	scopus	or	"sociological	abstracts"	or	"web	of	science").ab.	or	
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("cochrane	database	of	systematic	reviews"	or	evidence	report	technology	assessment	or	evidence	report	technology	assessment	summary).jn.	or	Evidence	Report:	Technology	Assessment*.jn.	or	((review	adj5	(rationale	or	evidence)).ti,ab.	and	review.pt.)	or	meta-analysis	as	topic/	or	Meta-Analysis.pt.		57		review$.ab.	58		review$.ti.	59		55	AND	(56	OR	57	OR	58)		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 752		 Databases	 Ovid	MEDLINE(R)	
	Host	 OvidSP		Date	of	search	 1	December	2017	Years	covered	 1965	to	December	2017	Search	strategy	 1					Insurance,	Health/		2					Insurance,	Health,	Reimbursement/		3					Insurance,	Hospitalization/		4					Insurance,	Major	Medical/		5					Insurance,	Physician	Services/		6					Insurance,	Surgical/		7					Single-Payer	System/		8					exp	Insurance	Coverage/		9					health	insurance.ti.		10					(social	adj5	insurance$).tw.		11					(community	adj5	insurance$).tw.		12					(health	insurance	adj3	program$).tw.		13					universal	health	insuranc$.tw.		14					affordable	health	insuranc$.tw.		15					(health	insurance	adj3	scheme$).tw.		16					micro	health	insurance$.tw.		17					or/1-16		18					Developing	Countries/		19					(developing	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		20					(under-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		21					(less-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		22					(third-world	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		23					low	income	countr$.tw.		24					middle	income	countr$.tw.		25					or/18-24		26					exp	Africa/		27					exp	South	America/		28					exp	Central	America/		29					Mexico/		30					Latin	America/		31					exp	caribbean	region/		32					exp	Europe,	Eastern/		33					pacific	islands/		34					exp	melanesia/		35					exp	asia,	central/		36					exp	asia,	southeastern/		37					exp	asia,	western/		38					exp	china/		39					mongolia/		
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40					exp	indian	ocean	islands/		41					or/25-40		42.		(Albania	or	Algeria	or	Angola	or	Argentina	or	Azerbaijan	or	Belarus	or	Bosnia	or	Botswana	or	Brazil	or	Bulgaria	or	China	or	Colombia	or	Costa	Rica	or	Cuba	or	Dominican	Republic	or	Ecuador	or	Gabon	or	Hungary	or	Iran	or	Iraq	or	Jamaica	or	Jordan	or	Kazakhstan	or	Lebanon	or	Libya	or	Malaysia	or	Mauritius	or	Mexico	or	Montenegro	or	Namibia	or	Panama	or	Peru	or	Romania	or	Serbia	or	South	Africa	or	Thailand	or	Yugoslav	or	Macedonia	or	Tunisia	or	Turkey	or	Turkmenistan	or	Venezuela).tw.		43.		(Armenia	or	Bolivia	or	Cameroon	or	Cape	Verde	or	Congo	or	Cote	d	Ivoire	or	Djibouti	or	Egypt	or	El	Salvador	or	Georgia	or	Ghana	or	Guatemala	or	Guyana	or	Honduras	or	Indonesia	or	Lesotho	or	Mauritania	or	Moldova	or	Morocco	or	Nicaragua	or	Nigeria	or	Pakistan	or	Papua	New	Guinea	or	Paraguay	or	Philippines	or	Sao	Tome	Principe	or	Senegal	or	Sri	Lanka	or	Sudan	or	Syrian	or	Ukraine	or	Uzbekistan	or	Vietnam	or	Yemen	or	Zambia).tw.		44.		(South	Sudan	or	Kiribati	or	Lao	or	Samoa	or	Solomon	Islands	or	Timor	Leste	or	Tuvalu	or	Vanuatu	or	Afghanistan	or	Bhutan).tw.		45.		(Bangladesh	or	Benin	or	Burkina	Faso	or	Burundi	or	Central	African	Republic	or	Chad	or	Comoros	or	Congo	or	Kongo	or	Eritrea	or	Ethiopia	or	Gambia	or	Guinea	or	Guinea-Bissau	or	Haiti	or	Kenya	or	Kyrgyz	or	Liberia	or	Madagascar	or	Malawi	or	Mali	or	Mozambique	or	Myanmar	or	Nepal	or	Niger	or	Rwanda	or	Sierra	Leone	or	Somalia	or	Tajikistan	or	Tanzania	or	Togo	or	Uganda	or	Zimbabwe).tw.		46					42	or	43	or	44	or	45		47					41	or	46		48					17	and	47		49					(((comprehensive*	or	integrative	or	systematic*)	adj3	(bibliographic*	or	review*	or	literature))	or	(meta-analy*	or	metaanaly*	or	"research	synthesis"	or	((information	or	data)	adj3	synthesis)	or	(data	adj2	extract*))).ti,ab.	or	(cinahl	or	(cochrane	adj3	trial*)	or	embase	or	medline	or	psyclit	or	(psycinfo	not	"psycinfo	database")	or	pubmed	or	scopus	or	"sociological	abstracts"	or	"web	of	science").ab.	or	("cochrane	database	of	systematic	reviews"	or	evidence	report	technology	assessment	or	evidence	report	technology	assessment	summary).jn.	or	Evidence	Report:	Technology	Assessment*.jn.	or	((review	adj5	(rationale	or	evidence)).ti,ab.	and	review.pt.)	or	meta-analysis	as	topic/	or	Meta-Analysis.pt.	50				review$.ti.	51				review$.ab.	52			49	OR	50	OR	51	53			48	AND	52		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 442		 Databases	 Science	Citation	Index	Expanded	(SCI-EXPANDED)		
	Social	Sciences	Citation	Index	(SSCI)		
	Arts	&	Humanities	Citation	Index	(A&HCI)		
	Conference	Proceedings	Citation	Index-	Science	(CPCI-S)		
	Conference	 Proceedings	 Citation	 Index-	 Social	 Science	 &	 Humanities	 (CPCI-
SSH)		Host	 ISI	Web	of	Science		Date	of	search	 1	December	2017	Years	covered	 1965	to	December	2017	
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Search	strategy	 #1		 ts=("developing	countr*"	or	"developing	countr*"	or	"low	income	countr*"	or	"middle	income	countr*"	or	"under-developed	countr*"	or	"less-developed	countr*"	or	"third	world	countr*")	#2		 TS=(Bangladesh	or	Benin	or	“Burkina	Faso”	or	Burundi	or	“Central	African	Republic”	or	Chad	or	Comoros	or	Congo	or	Kongo	or	Eritrea	or	Ethiopia	or	Gambia	or	Guinea	or	“Guinea-Bissau”	or	Haiti	or	Kenya	or	Kyrgyz	or	Liberia	or	Madagascar	or	Malawi	or	Mali	or	Mozambique	or	Myanmar	or	Nepal	or	Niger	or	Rwanda	or	“Sierra	Leone”	or	Somalia	or	Tajikistan	or	Tanzania	or	Togo	or	Uganda	or	Zimbabwe)	#3		 TS=(	South	Sudan	or	Kiribati	or	Lao	or	Samoa	or	“Solomon	Islands”	or	“Timor	Leste”	or	Tuvalu	or	Vanuatu	or	Afghanistan	or	Bhutan)	#4		 TS=(Armenia	or	Bolivia	or	Cameroon	or	“Cape	Verde”	or	Congo	or	“Côte	d’Ivoire”	or	Djibouti	or	Egypt	or	“El	Salvador”	or	Georgia	or	Ghana	or	Guatemala	or	Guyana	or	Honduras	or	Indonesia	or	Lesotho	or	Mauritania	or	Moldova	or	Morocco	or	Nicaragua	or	Nigeria	or	Pakistan	or	“Papua	New	Guinea”	or	Paraguay	or	Philippines	or	“Sao	Tome	and	Principe”	or	Senegal	or	“Sri	Lanka”	or	Sudan	or	Syrian	or	Ukraine	or	Uzbekistan	or	Vietnam	or	Yemen	or	Zambia)	#5		 TS=(Albania	or	Algeria	or	Angola	or	Argentina	or	Azerbaijan	or	Belarus	or	“Bosnia	and	Herzegovina”	or	Botswana	or	Brazil	or	Bulgaria	or	China	or	Colombia	or	“Costa	Rica”	or	Cuba	or	“Dominican	Republic”	or	Ecuador	or	Gabon	or	Hungary	or	Iran	or	Iraq	or	Jamaica	or	Jordan	or	Kazakhstan	or	Lebanon	or	Libya	or	Malaysia	or	Mauritius	or	Mexico	or	Montenegro	or	Namibia	or	Panama	or	Peru	or	Romania	or	Serbia	or	“South	Africa”	or	Thailand	or	Yugoslav	or	Macedonia	or	Tunisia	or	Turkey	or	Turkmenistan	or	Venezuela)	#6		 ts=(social	same	"health	insurance"	)	#7		 ts=	(Community	SAME	"health	insurance")	#8		 ti="health	insurance"	#9		 ts=("health	insurance"	same	scheme*)	#10		 ts=("health	insurance"	same	program*)	#11		 ts="universal	health	insurance"	#12		 ts="affordable	health	insurance"	#13		 ts=(micro*	same	"health	insurance")	#14		 ts=(public	same	"health	insurance")	#15		 #6	or	#7	or	#8	or	#9	or	#10	or	#11	or	#12	or	#13	or	#14	#16		 #15	AND	(#1	OR	#2	OR	#3	OR	#4	OR	#5)	#17										TS=(	review*)	#18								 		#16	AND	#17		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 284	
Table	A-2.	Search	strategies	for	the	updated	review	in	Chapter	5		 Databases	 CINAHL	Plus	Host	 EBSCO		Date	of	search	 8	September	2016	Years	covered	 January	2010	to	September	2016	Search	strategy	 S17								S15	AND	S16	S16								Limiters	to	2010-2016		S15								S7	AND	S14	S14								S8	OR	S9	OR	S10	OR	S11	OR	S12	OR	S13		S13	 	 TI	 (Albania	 or	 Algeria	 or	 Angola	 or	 Argentina	 or	 Azerbaijan	 or	Belarus	or	“Bosnia	and	Herzegovina”	or	Botswana	or	Brazil	or	Bulgaria	or	China	or	Colombia	or	“Costa	Rica”	or	Cuba	or	“Dominican	Republic”	or	Ecuador	or	Gabon	or	Hungary	or	 Iran	or	 Iraq	or	 Jamaica	or	 Jordan	or	Kazakhstan	or	Lebanon	or	Libya	or	Malaysia	or	Mauritius	or	Mexico	or	Montenegro	 or	 Namibia	 or	 Panama	 or	 Peru	 or	 Romania	 or	 Serbia	 or	“South	 Africa”	 or	 Thailand	 or	 Yugoslav	 or	 Macedonia	 or	 Tunisia	 or	Turkey	or	Turkmenistan	or	Venezuela	S12	TI	 (Armenia	or	Bolivia	or	Cameroon	or	 “Cape	Verde”	or	Congo	or	“Côte	d’Ivoire”	or	Djibouti	or	Egypt	or	“El	Savador”	or	Georgia	or	Ghana	or	 Guatemala	 or	 Guyana	 or	 Honduras	 or	 Indonesia	 or	 Lesotho	 or	Mauritania	or	Moldova	or	Lorocco	or	Nicaragua	or	Nigeria	or	Pakistan	or	“Papua	 New	 Guinea”	 or	 Paraguay	 or	 Phillippines	 or	 “Sao	 Tome	 and	Principe”	 or	 Senegal	 or	 “Sri	 Lanka”	 or	 Sudan	 or	 Syrian	 or	 Ukraine	 or	Uzbekistan	 or	 Vietnam	 or	 Yemen	 or	 Zambia)	S11	 TI	 (South	 Sudan	 or	Kiribati	or	Lao	or	Samoa	or	“Solomon	Islands”	or	“Timor	Leste”	or	Tuvalu	or	Vanuatu	or	Afghanistan	or	Bhutan)		S10	TI	(Bangladesh	or	Benin	or	“Burkina	Faso”	or	Burundi	or	“Central	African	Republic”	or	Chad	or	Comoros	or	Congo	or	Kongo	or	Eritrea	or	Ethiopia	or	Gambia	or	Guinea	or	 “Guinea-Bissau”	or	Haiti	or	Kenya	or	Kyrgyz	or	Liberia	or	Madagascar	or	Malawi	or	Mali	or	Mozambique	or	Myanmar	or	Nepal	or	Niger	or	Rwanda	or	“Sierra	Leone”	or	Somalia	or	Tajikistan	or	Tanzania	or	Togo	or	Uganda	or	Zimbabwe)		S9	(MM	"Developing	Countries")		S8	 ("developing	 countr*"	 or	 "developing	 countr*"	 or	 "low	 income	countr*"	or	 "middle	 income	 countr*"	or	 "under-developed	 countr*"	or	"less-developed	countr*"	or	"third	world	countr*")	S7	S1	OR	S2	OR	S3	OR	S4	OR	S5	OR	S6		S6	(MH	"Insurance,	Health,	Reimbursement+")		S5	(MH	"Insurance,	Health,	Reimbursement+")		S4	Health	insurance	S3	TI	health	insurance	S2	(MH	“Prospective	Payment	System+”)		S1	(MM	"Insurance,	Health+")	Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 839			 Databases	 Econlit	1886	to	September	2015,				Host	 OvidSP		Date	of	search	 8	September	2016	Years	covered	 2010	to	September	2016	Search	strategy	 1					Health	Insurance.kw.		2					health	insurance.ti.		3					(social	adj5	insurance$).tw.	4					(community	adj5	insurance$).tw.		5					(health	insurance	adj3	program$).tw.		6					universal	health	insuranc$.tw.		7					affordable	health	insuranc$.tw.		
		 284	
8					(health	insurance	adj3	scheme$).tw.	9					micro	health	insurance$.tw.	10			or/1-9		11				Developing	Countries.kw.		12				(developing	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		13			(under-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		14			(less-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		15			(third-world	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		16			low	income	countr$.tw.		17			middle	income	countr$.tw.		18				or/11-17		19			(Afghanistan	or	Guinea-Bisau	or	Rwanda	or	Bangladesh	or	Haiti	or	Senegal	or	Benin	or	Kenya	or	Sierra	Leone	or	Burkina	Faso	or	Korea	or	Somalia	or	Burundi	or	Kyrgyz	Republic	or	Tajikistan	or	Cambodia	or	Lao	or	Tanzania	or	Central	African	Republic	or	Liberia	or	Togo	or	Chad	or	Madagascar	or	Uganda	or	Comoros	or	Malawi	or	Uzbekistan	or	Congo	or	Mali	 or	 Vietnam	 or	 Eritrea	 or	 Mauritania	 or	 Yemen	 or	 Ethiopia	 or	Mozambique	or	Zambia	or	Gambia	or	Myanmar	or	Zimbabwe	or	Ghana	or	Nepal	or	Guinea	or	Niger).tw.		20					(Albania	or	Honduras	or	Paraguay	or	Angola	or	India	or	Philippines	or	Armenia	or	Indonesia	or	Samoa	or	Azerbaijan	or	Iran	or	Sao	Tome	or	Belize	or	 Iraq	or	Solomon	Islands	or	Bhutan	or	 Jordan	or	Sri	Lanka	or	Bolivia	or	Kiribati	or	Sudan	or	Cameroon	or	Kosovo	or	Swaziland	or	Cape	Verde	or	Lesotho	or	Syria$	or	China	or	Maldives	or	Thailand	or	Congo	or	Marshall	Islands	or	Timor-Leste).tw.		21					(Micronesia	or	Tonga	or	Djibouti	or	Moldova	or	Tunisia	or	Ecuador	or	 Mongolia	 or	 Turkmenistan	 or	 Egypt	 or	 Morocco	 or	 Ukraine	 or	 El	Salvador	 or	 Nicaragua	 or	 Vanuatu	 or	 Georgia	 or	 Nigeria	 or	 Gaza	 or	Guatemala	or	Pakistan	or	Guyana	or	Papua	New	Guinea	or	"West	Bank"	or	Cote	DIvoire).tw.		22	 	 	 	 	 (Algeria	 or	 Grenada	 or	 Peru	 or	 Samoa	 or	 Jamaica	 or	 Poland	 or	Argentina	 or	 Kazakhstan	 or	 Romania	 or	 Belarus	 or	 Latvia	 or	 Russian	Federation	or	Bosnia	or	Herzegovina	or	Lebanon	or	Serbia	or	Botswana	or	Libya	or	Seychelles	or	Brazil	or	Lithuania	or	South	Africa	or	Bulgaria	or	Macedonia	or	St	Kitts	or	Chile	or	Malaysia	or	St	Lucia	or	Colombia	or	Mauritius	 or	 St	 Vincent	 or	 Grenadines	 or	 Costa	 Rica	 or	 Mayotte	 or	Suriname	or	Cuba	or	Mexico	or	Turkey	or	Dominica	or	Montenegro	or	Uruguay	or	Dominican	Republic	or	Namibia	or	Venezuela	or	Fiji	or	Palau	or	Gabon	or	Panama).tw.		23					(afghanistan	or	africa	or	albania	or	algeria	or	angola	or	antigua	or	antilles	or	arab	countries	or	argentina	or	armenia	or	asia	or	asia	pacific	or	azerbaijan	or	balkans	or	bangladesh	or	belarus	or	belize	or	benin	or	bhutan	or	bolivia	or	bosnia	herzegovina	or	botswana	or	brazil	or	bulgaria	or	 burkina	 faso	or	burundi	 or	 cambodia	 or	 cameroon	or	 caribbean	or	central	africa	or	central	african	republic	or	central	america	or	central	asia	or	chile	or	china	or	colombia	or	congo	or	costa	rica	or	croatia	or	cuba).ct.		24	 	 	 	 	 ("democratic	 republic	 of	 the	 congo"	 or	 developing	 countries	 or	djibouti	 or	 dominica	 or	 dominican	 republic	 or	 e	 africa	 or	 e	 asia	 or	 e	europe	or	ecuador	or	egypt	or	el	salvador	or	eritrea	or	ethiopia	or	fiji	or	gabon	or	gambia	or	georgia	or	ghana	or	grenada	or	guatemala	or	guinea	or	guinea	bissau	or	guyana	or	haiti	or	honduras	or	india	or	indonesia	or	iran	or	iraq	or	ivory	coast	or	jamaica	or	jordan).ct.		25					(kazakhstan	or	kenya	or	kiribati	or	korea	or	kyrgyzstan	or	laos	or	latin	america	or	lebanon	or	lesotho	or	liberia	or	libya	or	macedonia	or	madagascar	or	maghreb	or	malawi	or	malaysia	or	maldives	or	mali	or	marshall	islands	or	martinique	or	mauritania	or	mauritius	or	melanesia	or	 mexico	 or	 micronesia	 or	 middle	 east	 or	 mongolia	 or	 morocco	 or	
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mozambique	or	myanmar	or	n	africa	or	n	korea	or	namibia	or	ne	asia	or	nepal	 or	 nicaragua	 or	 niger	 or	 nigeria	 or	 oceania	 or	 pacific	 islands	 or	pakistan	or	palestine	or	panama	or	papua	new	guinea	or	paraguay	or	peru	or	philippines	or	polynesia	or	puerto	rico).ct.		26					(syria	or	tajikistan	or	tanzania	or	thailand	or	timor	leste	or	tobago	or	togo	or	tonga	or	trinidad	or	"trinidad	and	tobago"	or	tunisia	or	turkey	or	turkmenistan	or	uganda	or	ukraine	or	uruguay	or	ussr	or	uzbekistan	or	vanuatu	or	venezuela	or	vietnam	or	w	africa	or	w	indies	or	yemen	or	zambia	or	zimbabwe).ct.		27					(africa	or	asia	or	"latin	america	and	the	caribbean").gr.		28					or/19-27		29					18	or	28		30					10	and	29		31					Limit	30	to	yr	=”2010-Current”		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 486	records			 Databases	 Embase	1974	to	2016	September,				Host	 OvidSP		Date	of	search	 8	September	2016	Years	covered	 2010	to	September	2016	Search	strategy	 1					Social	Insurance/		2					Public	Health	Insurance/		3					National	Health	Insurance/	4					health	insurance.ti.		5					(social	adj5	insurance$).tw.		6					(community	adj5	insurance$).tw.		7					(health	insurance	adj3	program$).tw.		8					universal	health	insuranc$.tw.		9					affordable	health	insuranc$.tw.		10					(health	insurance	adj3	scheme$).tw.		11					micro	health	insurance$.tw.		12					or/1-11		13					Developing	country/		14					(developing	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		15					(under-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		16					(less-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		17					(third-world	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		18					low	income	countr$.tw.		19					middle	income	countr$.tw.		20					or/13-19	20					exp	Africa/		21					exp	"South	and	Central	America"/		22					Mexico/		23					exp	Caribbean	Islands/		24					exp	Eastern	Europe/		25					exp	Pacific	islands/		26					exp	Southeast	Asia/		27					exp	south	asia/		28					middle	east/		29					china/	30					korea/	31					mongolia/		
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32					philippines/		33					taiwan/		34					iran/		35					iraq/		36					jordan/		37					lebanon/		38					palestine/		39					syrian	arab	republic/		40					"turkey	(republic)"/		41					yemen/		42					asia/		43					kazakhstan/		44					kyrgyzstan/		45					tajikistan/		46					turkmenistan/		47					uzbekistan/		48					exp	Indian	Ocean/		49					(Afghanistan	or	Guinea-Bisau	or	Rwanda	or	Bangladesh	or	Haiti	or	Senegal	or	Benin	or	Kenya	or	Sierra	Leone	or	Burkina	Faso	or	Korea	or	Somalia	or	Burundi	or	Kyrgyz	Republic	or	Tajikistan	or	Cambodia	or	Lao	or	Tanzania	or	Central	African	Republic	or	Liberia	or	Togo	or	Chad	or	Madagascar	or	Uganda	or	Comoros	or	Malawi	or	Uzbekistan	or	Congo	or	Mali	 or	 Vietnam	 or	 Eritrea	 or	 Mauritania	 or	 Yemen	 or	 Ethiopia	 or	Mozambique	or	Zambia	or	Gambia	or	Myanmar	or	Zimbabwe	or	Ghana	or	Nepal	or	Guinea	or	Niger).tw.		50					(Albania	or	Honduras	or	Paraguay	or	Angola	or	India	or	Philippines	or	Armenia	or	Indonesia	or	Samoa	or	Azerbaijan	or	Iran	or	Sao	Tome	or	Belize	or	 Iraq	or	Solomon	Islands	or	Bhutan	or	 Jordan	or	Sri	Lanka	or	Bolivia	or	Kiribati	or	Sudan	or	Cameroon	or	Kosovo	or	Swaziland	or	Cape	Verde	or	Lesotho	or	Syria$	or	China	or	Maldives	or	Thailand	or	Congo	or	Marshall	Islands	or	Timor-Leste).tw.		51					(Micronesia	or	Tonga	or	Djibouti	or	Moldova	or	Tunisia	or	Ecuador	or	 Mongolia	 or	 Turkmenistan	 or	 Egypt	 or	 Morocco	 or	 Ukraine	 or	 El	Salvador	 or	 Nicaragua	 or	 Vanuatu	 or	 Georgia	 or	 Nigeria	 or	 Gaza	 or	Guatemala	or	Pakistan	or	Guyana	or	Papua	New	Guinea	or	"West	Bank"	or	Cote	DIvoire).tw.		52	 	 	 	 	 (Algeria	 or	 Grenada	 or	 Peru	 or	 Samoa	 or	 Jamaica	 or	 Poland	 or	Argentina	 or	 Kazakhstan	 or	 Romania	 or	 Belarus	 or	 Latvia	 or	 Russian	Federation	or	Bosnia	or	Herzegovina	or	Lebanon	or	Serbia	or	Botswana	or	Libya	or	Seychelles	or	Brazil	or	Lithuania	or	South	Africa	or	Bulgaria	or	Macedonia	or	St	Kitts	or	Chile	or	Malaysia	or	St	Lucia	or	Colombia	or	Mauritius	 or	 St	 Vincent	 or	 Grenadines	 or	 Costa	 Rica	 or	 Mayotte	 or	Suriname	or	Cuba	or	Mexico	or	Turkey	or	Dominica	or	Montenegro	or	Uruguay	or	Dominican	Republic	or	Namibia	or	Venezuela	or	Fiji	or	Palau	or	Gabon	or	Panama).tw.		53					or/12-52		54					or/1-11		55					53	and	54		56					limit	55	to	yr="2010	-Current"		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 3913	records			 Databases	 Ovid	MEDLINE(R)			
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Host	 OvidSP		Date	of	search	 8	September	2016	Years	covered	 January	2010	to	September	2016	Search	strategy	 1					Insurance,	Health/		2					Insurance,	Health,	Reimbursement/		3					Insurance,	Hospitalization/		4					Insurance,	Major	Medical/		5					Insurance,	Physician	Services/		6					Insurance,	Surgical/		7					Single-Payer	System/		8					exp	Insurance	Coverage/		9					health	insurance.ti.		10					(social	adj5	insurance$).tw.		11					(community	adj5	insurance$).tw.		12					(health	insurance	adj3	program$).tw.		13					universal	health	insuranc$.tw.		14					affordable	health	insuranc$.tw.		15					(health	insurance	adj3	scheme$).tw.		16					micro	health	insurance$.tw.		17					or/1-16		18					Developing	Countries/		19					(developing	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		20					(under-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		21					(less-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		22					(third-world	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		23					low	income	countr$.tw.		24					middle	income	countr$.tw.		25					or/18-24		26					exp	Africa/		27					exp	South	America/		28					exp	Central	America/		29					Mexico/		30					Latin	America/		31					exp	caribbean	region/		32					exp	Europe,	Eastern/		33					pacific	islands/		34					exp	melanesia/		35					exp	asia,	central/		36					exp	asia,	southeastern/		37					exp	asia,	western/		38					exp	china/		39					mongolia/		40					exp	indian	ocean	islands/		41					or/25-40		42					(Afghanistan	or	Guinea-Bisau	or	Rwanda	or	Bangladesh	or	Haiti	or	Senegal	or	Benin	or	Kenya	or	Sierra	Leone	or	Burkina	Faso	or	Korea	or	Somalia	or	Burundi	or	Kyrgyz	Republic	or	Tajikistan	or	Cambodia	or	Lao	or	Tanzania	or	Central	African	Republic	or	Liberia	or	Togo	or	Chad	or	Madagascar	or	Uganda	or	Comoros	or	Malawi	or	Uzbekistan	or	Congo	or	Mali	 or	 Vietnam	 or	 Eritrea	 or	 Mauritania	 or	 Yemen	 or	 Ethiopia	 or	Mozambique	or	Zambia	or	Gambia	or	Myanmar	or	Zimbabwe	or	Ghana	or	Nepal	or	Guinea	or	Niger).tw.		43					(Albania	or	Honduras	or	Paraguay	or	Angola	or	India	or	Philippines	or	Armenia	or	Indonesia	or	Samoa	or	Azerbaijan	or	Iran	or	Sao	Tome	or	Belize	or	 Iraq	or	Solomon	Islands	or	Bhutan	or	 Jordan	or	Sri	Lanka	or	Bolivia	or	Kiribati	or	Sudan	or	Cameroon	or	Kosovo	or	Swaziland	or	Cape	
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Verde	or	Lesotho	or	Syria$	or	China	or	Maldives	or	Thailand	or	Congo	or	Marshall	Islands	or	Timor-Leste).tw.		44					(Micronesia	or	Tonga	or	Djibouti	or	Moldova	or	Tunisia	or	Ecuador	or	 Mongolia	 or	 Turkmenistan	 or	 Egypt	 or	 Morocco	 or	 Ukraine	 or	 El	Salvador	 or	 Nicaragua	 or	 Vanuatu	 or	 Georgia	 or	 Nigeria	 or	 Gaza	 or	Guatemala	or	Pakistan	or	Guyana	or	Papua	New	Guinea	or	"West	Bank"	or	Cote	DIvoire).tw.		45	 	 	 	 	 (Algeria	 or	 Grenada	 or	 Peru	 or	 Samoa	 or	 Jamaica	 or	 Poland	 or	Argentina	 or	 Kazakhstan	 or	 Romania	 or	 Belarus	 or	 Latvia	 or	 Russian	Federation	or	Bosnia	or	Herzegovina	or	Lebanon	or	Serbia	or	Botswana	or	Libya	or	Seychelles	or	Brazil	or	Lithuania	or	South	Africa	or	Bulgaria	or	Macedonia	or	St	Kitts	or	Chile	or	Malaysia	or	St	Lucia	or	Colombia	or	Mauritius	 or	 St	 Vincent	 or	 Grenadines	 or	 Costa	 Rica	 or	 Mayotte	 or	Suriname	or	Cuba	or	Mexico	or	Turkey	or	Dominica	or	Montenegro	or	Uruguay	or	Dominican	Republic	or	Namibia	or	Venezuela	or	Fiji	or	Palau	or	Gabon	or	Panama).tw.		46					42	or	43	or	44	or	45		47					41	or	46		48					17	and	47		49					Limit	48	to	yr=”2010-Current”		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 1963			 Databases	 Science	Citation	Index	Expanded	(SCI-EXPANDED)		
	Social	Sciences	Citation	Index	(SSCI)		
	Arts	&	Humanities	Citation	Index	(A&HCI)		
	Conference	Proceedings	Citation	Index-	Science	(CPCI-S)		
	Conference	 Proceedings	 Citation	 Index-	 Social	 Science	 &	
Humanities	(CPCI-SSH)		Host	 ISI	Web	of	Science		Date	of	search	 8	September	2016	Years	covered	 January	2010	to	September	2016	Search	strategy	 #21		 #16	or	#17	or	#18	or	#19	or	#20	#20		 #15	AND	#5	#19		 #15	AND	#4	#18		 #15	AND	#3	#17		 #15	AND	#2	#16		 #15	AND	#1	#15		 #6	or	#7	or	#8	or	#9	or	#10	or	#11	or	#12	or	#13	or	#14	#14		 ts=(public	same	"health	insurance")	#13		 ts=(micro*	same	"health	insurance")	#12		 ts="affordable	health	insurance"	#11		 ts="universal	health	insurance"	#10		 ts=("health	insurance"	same	program*)	#9		 ts=("health	insurance"	same	scheme*)	#8		 ti="health	insurance"	#7		 ts=	(Community	SAME	"health	insurance")	#6		 ts=(social	same	"health	insurance"	)	#5		 TS=(Algeria	or	Grenada	or	Peru	or	Samoa	or	Jamaica	or	Poland	or	Argentina	or	Kazakhstan	or	Romania	or	Belarus	or	Latvia	or	Russia	or	Bosnia	 or	Herzegovina	 or	 Lebanon	 or	 Serbia	 or	 Botswana	 or	 Libya	 or	Seychelles	or	Brazil	or	Lithuania	or	Africa	or	Bulgaria	or	Macedonia	or	"St	Kitts"	or	Chile	or	Malaysia	or	"St	Lucia"	or	Colombia	or	Mauritius	or	"St	Vincent"	or	Grenadines	or	"Costa	Rica"	or	Mayotte	or	Suriname	or	Cuba	
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or	 Mexico	 or	 Turkey	 or	 Dominica	 or	 Montenegro	 or	 Uruguay	 or	"Dominican	Republic"	or	Namibia	or	Venezuela	or	Fiji	or	Palau	or	Gabon	or	Panama)	#4		 TS=(Albania	 or	 Honduras	 or	 Paraguay	 or	 Angola	 or	 India	 or	Philippines	or	Armenia	or	Indonesia	or	Samoa	or	Azerbaijan	or	Iran	or	"Sao	Tome"	or	Belize	or	Iraq	or	"Solomon	Islands"	or	Bhutan	or	Jordan	or	"Sri	 Lanka"	 or	Bolivia	 or	Kiribati	 or	 Sudan	 or	 Cameroon	 or	Kosovo	 or	Swaziland	or	"Cape	Verde"	or	Lesotho	or	Syria*	or	China	or	Maldives	or	Thailand	or	Congo	or	"Marshall	Islands"	or	Timor-Leste)	#3		 TS=(Micronesia	or	Tonga	or	Djibouti	or	Moldova	or	Tunisia	or	Ecuador	or	Mongolia	or	Turkmenistan	or	Egypt	or	Morocco	or	Ukraine	or	"El	Salvador"	or	Nicaragua	or	Vanuatu	or	Georgia	or	Nigeria	or	Gaza	or	Guatemala	or	Pakistan	or	Guyana	or	"Papua	New	Guinea"	or	"West	Bank"	or	Cote	DIvoire)	#2		 TS=(Afghanistan	 or	 Guinea-Bisau	 or	 Rwanda	 or	 Bangladesh	 or	Haiti	or	Senegal	or	Benin	or	Kenya	or	"Sierra	Leone"	or	"Burkina	Faso"	or	Korea	or	Somalia	or	Burundi	or	Kyrgyz	or	Tajikistan	or	Cambodia	or	Lao	or	Tanzania	or	"Central	African	Republic"	or	Liberia	or	Togo	or	Chad	or	Madagascar	or	Uganda	or	Comoros	or	Malawi	or	Uzbekistan	or	Congo	or	Mali	 or	 Vietnam	 or	 Eritrea	 or	 Mauritania	 or	 Yemen	 or	 Ethiopia	 or	Mozambique	or	Zambia	or	Gambia	or	Myanmar	or	Zimbabwe	or	Ghana	or	Nepal	or	Guinea	or	Niger)	#1		 TS=("developing	 countr*"	 or	 "developing	 countr*"	 or	 "low	income	 countr*"	 or	 "middle	 income	 countr*"	 or	 "under-developed	countr*"	or	"less-developed	countr*"	or	"third	world	countr*")		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 1313	records					 	
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A-3	 Detailed	 questionnaire	 of	 quality	 of	 effectiveness	 estimates	 from	 non-
randomised	studies	QuEENS	
	
General	issues	(Questions	1-5)			
Question	1.	Have	different	methods	been	compared	within	the	study?		It	is	reasonable	for	any	study	attempting	to	estimate	treatment	effects	to	implement	a	number	of	methods	based	on	different	assumptions.	This	could	be	used	to	gauge	the	sensitivity	of	 the	 results	 to	 the	 assumptions	underpinning	 the	models.	At	 the	 same	time,	 adopting	 a	 number	 of	 approaches	 forces	 the	 analyst	 to	 think	 about	 the	assumptions	embedded	in	each	of	the	methods	and	their	plausibility	and	helps	focus	on	 those	 of	 most	 importance.	 However,	 different	 methods	 might	 be	 estimating	different	treatment	parameters	and	therefore	different	numerical	parameters	might	be	the	result	of	this.	The	possible	answers	to	the	above	question	are	as	follows:		(a)	Yes		Results	 from	methods	which	 assume	 selection	 on	 observables	 are	 contrasted	with	other	methods,	including	those	assuming	selection	on	unobservables.		(b)	Partially		Results	from	different	methods	are	contrasted	but	all	the	methods	rely	on	the	same	assumption	 about	 selection,	 either	 selection	 on	 observables	 or	 selection	 on	unobservables.		(c)	No.			
Question	2.	Have	the	results	of	the	study	been	compared	to	others	in	the	literature?		Similar	to	Question	1	above,	a	study	should	compare	its	results	to	those	found	in	the	literature.	Given	that	they	would	relate	to	different	methods	and/or	different	datasets,	one	 would	 expect	 differences	 in	 the	 results	 but	 consistency	 between	 them	 (or	inconsistencies	 that	 are	 easily	 explained)	 will	 give	 credibility	 to	 the	 results.	 The	possible	answers	here	are:		(a)	Yes,	compared	to	alternative	methods	using	the	same	dataset.		(b)	Yes,	compared	to	similar	methods	using	other	data	sources.		(c)	 Not	 compared	 –	 no	 other	 estimates	 found	 in	 the	 literature.	 This	 option	should	 be	 selected	when	 there	 is	 an	 indication	 that	 a	 search	was	 conducted	 in	 the	literature	but	no	other	related	estimates	were	found.		(d)	Not	compared.			
Question	3.	Is	there	a	discussion	of	what	treatment	effect	is	identified	and	of	the	
assumptions	needed?		Usually	the	parameter	of	interest	in	economic	evaluations	for	NICE	is	the	ATE	but	in	some	cases	it	might	be	the	ATT.	The	parameter	of	interest	in	the	analysis	should	match	the	parameter	of	interest	in	the	economic	evaluation.	In	Section	2,	the	different	types	of	 treatment	 effects	 that	 can	 be	 identified	were	 discussed	 and	were	 related	 to	 the	different	approaches	and	their	assumptions.	Any	study	should	show	an	awareness	of	this	issue.	For	example,	if	one	is	willing	to	make	the	assumption	of	homogeneity	in	the	treatment	effect,	then	it	is	straightforward	to	identify	the	ATE.	With	heterogeneity,	the	ATT	might	be	identified	under	weak	assumptions.	However,	the	ATE	may	need	a	much	more	stringent	set	of	assumptions.	If	the	parameter	of	interest	is	the	ATT,	this	is	not	a	problem.	A	good	study	should	justify	how	the	estimated	treatment	effect	related	to	the	treatment	 effect	 of	 interest,	 together	 with	 their	 underpinning	 assumptions.	 The	possible	options	to	be	selected	are	as	follows:		
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(a)	Discussion	of	effect	and	assumptions.		(b)	Discussion	of	effect	but	not	the	assumptions.		(c)	Discussion	of	the	assumptions	but	not	the	effect.		(d)	No	discussion	of	either.			
Question	4:	 Is	 the	model	chosen	consistent	with	the	outcome	variable	 if	using	a	
parametric	method?		The	 distribution	 of	 the	 outcome	 variable	 should	 inform	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 type	 of	regression	model	 to	use.	 For	 example	probit/logit	models	 can	be	used	with	binary	outcomes,	 generalised	 linear	models	 can	 be	 very	 useful	 in	 cases	where	 the	 data	 is	highly	skewed,	etc.	The	possible	options	to	be	selected	are	as	follows:		(a)	Yes		(b)	Unclear		(c)	No			
Question	5:	Were	any	checks	conducted	on	the	model	specification?		Specification	checks	should	be	conducted	on	the	models.	The	appropriate	checks	will	depend	 on	 the	model	 used.	 For	 example	 linear	 regression	models	 can	 be	 assessed	using	 plots	 of	 the	 residuals	 or	 more	 formally	 using	 misspecification,	heteroskedasticity,	 autocorrelation,	 normality,	 etc.	 tests	 based	 on	 the	 residuals;	 if	using	 kernel	 regression	 or	matching	 it	 is	 important	 to	 check	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	results	 to	 the	 choice	 of	 bandwidth	 and	 matching	 algorithm	 respectively	 (see	Wooldridge,	Jones	and	Rice,	Kreif	et	al.14,15,57).	The	possible	options	to	be	selected	are	as	follows:		(a)	Yes,	appropriate	(detail	which)		(b)	Yes,	but	inappropriate	or	not	enough		(c)	No	checks	reported			
Methods	assuming	selection	on	observables	(Questions	6-8)		
Question	6.	On	selection:	Is	the	assumption	of	selection	on	observables	assessed?		The	methods	presented	in	Section	2.2	are	based	on	the	assumption	that	selection	is	on	observables.	Strictly	speaking,	selection	is	on	both	observables	and	unobservables	but	the	unobservables	are	not	correlated	with	the	outcomes	and	thus,	their	presence	does	not	induce	confounding.	This	assumption	is	often	controversial	and	cannot	be	tested	directly	although	placebo	tests	can	sometimes	be	used.	A	convincing	argument	should	put	 forward	 to	 substantiate	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 selected	variables	are	 sufficient	and,	once	used	in	the	analysis,	there	are	no	remaining	unobserved	variables	affecting	both	the	treatment	and	the	outcome.	The	following	options	are	available:		(a)	 Yes,	 expert	 literature/opinion	 cited.	 The	 analyst	 justifies	 the	 assumption	with	reference	to	a	priori	knowledge	in	the	expert	literature	or	if	this	is	lacking	with	reference	 to	 expert	 opinion.	 Sometimes	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 assess	 this	 assumption	indirectly	by	testing	if	a	treatment	effect	is	zero	when	it	is	known	that	it	is.	For	example,	if	 there	 is	 access	 to	 two	different	 control	 groups,	 one	 can	 check	 that	 the	 treatment	effect	is	zero	between	the	two	groups	or	one	can	use	a	variable	known	not	to	have	an	effect	to	estimate	the	treatment	effect.		(b)	Yes,	theoretical	reasoning	given.	The	analyst	justifies	the	assumption	with	a	sensible	theoretical	argument	but	does	not	refer	to	the	literature.		(c)	No.			
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Question	7.	What	checks	were	conducted	to	assess	overlap?		All	 methods	 assuming	 selection	 on	 unobservables	 rely	 on	 good	 overlap	 in	 the	distribution	 of	 the	 covariates	 between	 the	 treatment	 and	 control	 groups.	 Even	 if	ignorability	holds,	 the	results	will	be	suspect	 if	 there	is	 lack	of	overlap	between	the	treatment	 and	 control	 groups.	 Lack	 of	 overlap	 implies	 that	 regression	 estimates	extrapolate	 to	 regions	well	 outside	 the	 sample,	might	 cause	 instability	 in	 estimates	using	IPW	and	call	into	question	matching	estimates	of	the	average	treatment	effect	as	it	will	not	be	possible	to	find	matches	for	some	individuals.		(a)	Yes,	thorough	checks.	As	a	starting	point,	it	is	useful	to	report	normalised	differences	in	covariates	for	the	treatment	and	the	control	groups	to	check	if	overlap	is	 a	 problem.	Normalised	differences	 above	0.25	have	been	 suggested	 as	 signalling	problems	with	overlap.	It	is	important	to	emphasise	that	normalised	differences	are	different	from	the	usual	t-statistics	of	the	difference	in	means	between	the	treatment	and	 control	 groups.	 Looking	 at	 one	 covariate	 at	 a	 time	 and	 focusing	 only	 on	 one	moment	 (the	mean)	 in	 its	 distribution	 is	 insufficient.	 Other	more	 thorough	 checks	include	comparing	histograms	or	kernel	plots	of	the	covariates	for	the	treatment	and	the	control	groups,	quantile-quantile	(QQ)	plots,	higher	moments	and	cross	moments	of	 covariate	 distributions.	 If	 there	 are	 many	 covariates	 or	 the	 propensity	 score	 is	estimated	as	part	of	the	model,	a	better	alternative	is	to	present	distributions	of	the	propensity	score	by	treatment	group	because	we	are	trying	to	assess	if	there	are	any	areas	where	the	density	of	the	covariates	is	zero	for	one	group	and	non-zero	for	the	other.	Note	that	the	overlap	in	the	covariates	will	most	likely	be	assessed	as	part	of	a	nonparametric	regression	method	for	example.		(b)	Yes,	minimum	checks.	These	include	normalised	differences	at	the	very	least	and	perhaps	some	but	not	all	of	the	additional	checks	reported	in	(a).		(c)	No	checks	reported.			
Question	 8:	 Has	 balancing	 of	 the	 covariates	 been	 checked	 after	 matching	 and	
propensity	score	methods?		Matching	and	propensity	score	methods	should	achieve	balancing	of	the	covariates.		(a)	 Yes,	 minimum	 checks.	 The	 analyst	 can	 use	 normalised	 differences	appropriate	for	each	methods	in	covariates	for	the	treatment	and	the	control	groups	or	weighted	normalised	differences	in	the	case	of	IPW	as	in	Austin.45		(b)	Yes,	more	thorough	checks.	Other	more	thorough	checks	include	comparing	histograms	or	kernel	plots	of	the	covariates	for	the	treatment	and	the	control	groups,	or	if	matching	on	the	propensity	score	comparing	distributions	of	the	propensity	score	by	treatment.		(c)	No	checks	reported.			
Methods	using	the	propensity	score	(Questions	9-10)		
Question	9:	Is	the	propensity	score	function	sufficiently	flexible?		It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 the	 propensity	 score	 function	 needs	 to	 be	 sufficiently	flexible	and	therefore	should	include	not	just	the	variables	in	levels	but	also	squares	and	interactions.	Clearly,	the	flexibility	will	depend	on	the	size	of	the	dataset.	One	can	also	use	semiparametric/non-parametric	functions	to	model	the	propensity	score.	The	available	choices	for	this	question	are:		(a)	Yes,	includes	interactions	or	different	functions	of	the	covariates		(b)	Yes,	flexible	due	to	semiparametric/non-parametric	specification		(c)	Unlikely	to	be	flexible	enough		(d)	Unclear	or	not	reported		
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Question	10:	Are	potential	IVs	excluded	from	the	set	of	conditioning	variables?		Variables	 that	 should	 be	 included	 in	 the	 conditioning	 set	 are	 variables	 measured	before	 the	assignment	 to	 treatment	 takes	place,	 including	past	outcomes.	Variables	that	are	potential	IVs	should	not	be	included	because	they	have	been	shown	to	increase	the	bias	in	matching	type	estimators	unless	they	are	exogenous.	Even	in	this	case,	when	they	do	not	cause	a	bias,	they	will	increase	the	asymptotic	variance	of	the	estimate.	The	available	choices	are:		(a)	Yes		(b)	Some	variables	might	present	a	problem		(c)	IV	clearly	included			
Matching	methods	(Questions	11-14)		
Question	11:	Are	there	data	quality	issues?		An	 important	 issue	 in	matching	 is	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 data.	 For	 the	 treatment	 effect	calculated	using	matching	to	be	convincing,	the	data	and	the	definitions	for	the	treated	and	 control	 groups	 must	 be	 comparable.	 The	 assumption	 of	 no	 unobserved	confounders	 remaining	 which	 affect	 both	 the	 treatment	 and	 the	 outcome	 is	 more	compelling	 if	 the	 treated	and	controls	come	from	the	same,	or	at	 least	very	similar,	environment.	It	is	also	important	that	the	dataset	includes	a	good	number	of	variables	that	can	be	used	for	matching	and	that	the	sample	sizes	before	matching	are	big	enough	so	there	are	plenty	of	potential	matches.	Accordingly,	the	following	subcategories	are	available:		(a)	 Data	 and	 definitions	 comparable	 for	 treated	 and	 control	 groups:	Yes/No/Unclear	or	not	reported.		(b)	 Treated	 and	 control	 come	 from	 the	 same	 area	 or	 environment:	Yes/No/Unclear	or	not	reported.		(c)	Rich	set	of	variables:	Yes,	available	and	used/Not	available	or	not	used.		(d)	Reasonable	sample	sizes:	Yes,	likely/	No.		
Question	 12:	 For	 Nearest	 Neighbour	 matching:	 Has	 bias	 adjustment	 been	
conducted	if	more	than	one	variable	was	included?		Abadie	and	Imbens61,62	showed	that	the	estimator	obtained	using	Nearest	Neighbour	matching	is	biased	if	matching	on	more	than	one	continuous	covariate	and	proposed	a	bias	adjustment.	 Imbens	and	Wooldrige13	highlight	 the	cases	under	which	 the	bias	will	be	small	in	practice.		(a)	Yes		(b)	No			
Question	13:	Is	the	choice	of	replacement	(with/without)	reasonable?		Matching	without	replacement	if	the	control	group	is	small	might	result	in	bad	matches	which	increase	the	bias	of	the	estimator.	Matching	with	replacement	might	result	in	the	same	individuals	in	the	control	group	being	matched	to	in	areas	of	the	propensity	score	where	there	are	many	more	treated	observations	than	controls.	This	means	that	some	untreated	individuals	may	be	matched	repeatedly.	One	of	the	following	options	should	be	selected:		(a)	Yes		(b)	Likely		(c)	No			
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Question	 14:	 Is	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 number	 of	 matches/caliper	 matching/radius	
matching	reasonable?		There	is	a	trade-off	between	bias	and	variance	which	the	analyst	needs	to	take	into	account.	Note	that	this	is	a	subjective	decision	and	there	is	not	much	known	about,	for	example,	how	to	select	the	number	of	matches.		(a)	Yes		(b)	Likely		(c)	No		
IV	methods	(Questions	15-18)		
Question	15:	Is	the	instrument	well	justified?		An	IV	variable	needs	to	affect	the	treatment	directly	but	the	outcome	only	indirectly	through	 its	 effect	 on	 the	 treatment.	 This	 exclusion	 restriction	 is	 key	 but	 cannot	 be	tested	directly.	If	there	is	more	than	one	IV,	one	can	test	over-identifying	restrictions	(see	Question	17)	but	in	most	cases	one	needs	to	rely	on	the	published	literature	and	expert	opinion.		(a)	Yes,	theoretically		(b)	Yes,	citing	expert	literature		(c)	No			
Question	16:	Is	the	sample	size	relatively	large?		IV	methods	 are	 biased	 on	 finite	 samples	 but	 they	 are	 consistent	 in	 large	 samples.	Therefore	it	is	important	that	they	are	used	in	relatively	large	datasets.		(a)	Yes		(b)	No			
Question	 17:	 If	 more	 than	 one	 IV,	 is	 the	 test	 of	 over-identifying	 restrictions	
reported?		A	 test	of	over-identifying	restrictions	 is	essentially	a	 test	of	 instrument	validity	and	should	be	reported	whenever	there	are	more	instruments	than	endogenous	variables.	If	the	number	of	endogenous	variables	is	the	same	as	the	number	of	instruments,	one	can	always	create	additional	instruments	by	interacting	the	IV	with	other	covariates	in	the	 model.	 Note	 that	 rejection	 of	 the	 hypothesis	 could	 be	 due	 to	 a	 failure	 of	 the	instrument	but	also	to	model	misspecification.		(a)	Yes		(b)	No			
Question	18:	Is	a	weak	instrument(s)	test	reported?		Weak	instruments	lead	to	an	increase	in	the	bias	of	the	estimator.	Simple	correlations	or	partial	correlations	can	be	used	in	the	first	instance.	More	formal	tests	such	as	that	reported	in	Cragg	and	Donald63	could	also	be	used.		(a)	Yes		(b)	No		
Difference	in	Differences	(Questions	20-23)		The	 following	 sets	 of	 questions	 relate	 to	 assumptions	 that	 are	 untestable	 and	 it	 is	therefore	 important	 that	 the	 analyst	 justifies	 them	with	 reference	 to	 the	 published	literature	or	expert	opinion.			
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Question	20:	Does	the	intervention	generate	exogenous	variation?	(not	applicable	
if	natural	experiment)		The	 DiD	 approach	 makes	 use	 of	 interventions	 or	 events	 which	 induce	 random	assignment	of	the	individual	to	the	treatment	and	control	groups	or	at	least	random	eligibility.	This	is	similar	to	the	exogenous	variation	in	the	treatment	variable	achieved	by	randomisation.	In	general,	this	is	not	applicable	for	natural	experiments	although	it	is	 always	 appropriate	 to	 assess	 if	 the	 natural	 experiment	 generated	 exogenous	variation.		(a)	Yes,	highly	likely		(b)	Unlikely		(c)	Not	applicable			
Question	21:	Is	the	assumption	of	common	trends	across	groups	reasonable?		Differential	 trends	might	arise	 if	 for	example,	 the	 treatment	and	control	groups	are	based	in	different	areas	with	different	trends	in	the	outcomes,	or	when	external	shocks	to	 the	outcome	happen	at	different	 time	points.	The	differential	 trend	adjusted	DID	estimator	can	be	used	is	the	trends	might	not	be	the	same	and	the	analyst	has	access	to	historical	data	(see	Section	2.5.1).		(a)	Yes,	highly	likely		(b)	Unlikely			
Question	22:	Is	 it	reasonable	to	assume	that	there	is	no	selection	of	unobserved	
temporary	individual	specific	shocks?		This	 question	 relates	 to	 the	 Ashenfelter’s	 dip	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section.	 If	individuals	are	able	to	change	their	behaviour	before	the	timing	of	the	treatment	to	manipulate	their	probability	of	getting	the	treatment,	the	DID	method	will	not	be	able	to	identify	the	correct	treatment	effect.		(a)	Yes,	highly	likely		(b)	Unlikely		
Question	23:	Is	the	assumption	of	no	systematic	composition	changes	within	each	
group	reasonable?	(applicable	with	repeated	cross-sections,	not	with	longitudinal	
data)		The	DiD	method	 is	 able	 to	 remove	 the	unobserved	 individual	 effect	using	 repeated	cross-sections	 only	 if	 there	 are	 no	 composition	 changes	 in	 the	 groups	 so	 that	 the	average	unobserved	individual	effect	remains	the	same	before	and	after	the	treatment	or	intervention.		(a)	Yes,	highly	likely		(b)	Unlikely		(c)	Not	applicable			
Regression	Discontinuity	Design	(Questions	24-25)		
Question	24:	Is	the	sample	size	relatively	large?		In	 common	with	 IV	methods,	 the	 regression	 discontinuity	 design	 identifies	 a	 local	parameter	and	therefore	the	estimates	may	not	be	very	precise	if	the	sample	size	is	small.		(a)	Yes		(b)	No			
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Question	 25:	 Is	 the	 assumption	 that	 individuals	 are	 not	 able	 to	 affect	 the	
instrument	to	change	the	likelihood	of	participation	reasonable?		The	regression	discontinuity	design	will	in	general	not	be	able	to	identify	the	required	treatment	 effect	 if	 individuals	 are	 able	 to	 manipulate	 the	 instrument	 to	increase/decrease	their	likelihood	of	participation.	In	this	case,	individuals	below	and	above	the	threshold	are	different	in	terms	of	the	unobservables.		(a)	Yes		(b)	No	
Table	A-4	Summary	of	all	included	studies	(N	=	68)	
ID	 Study	 Type	of	Study		 QUEENS	 GRADE	 Utilisation	 Financial	Protection		 Health	Outcomes	
1	 Babiarz	et	al	(2010).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
Difference	in	difference	(DID).	Data:	Household	Survey.	N=6,201	
2	 Low	 5%	increase	in	village	clinics	use,	but	no	change	in	overall	medical	care	use.		 OOP	spending	fell	by	19%,	2%-point	reduction	in	the	likelihood	of	catastrophic	health	expenditure	and	2%-point	reduction	in	the	likelihood	of	financing	medical	care	through	asset	sales	or	borrowing	
		
2	 Galarraga	et	al.	(2010).	Country:	Mexico.	Scheme:	SHI	
Instrumental	variables	(IV),	bivariate	probit,	and	two-stage	residual	inclusion	(2SRI).	Data:	Household	survey.	N=20,792	
2	 Low	 		 SP	Impact	Survey:	Outpatients	expenses	decreased	by	$447;	hospitalization	by	$450;	and	medicines	by	$111	pesos	per	year.	Reduced	Catastrophic	health	expenditure	event	by	4.6	%	points	with	bivariate	probit	and	4.7	%	points	with	2SRI.	ENSANUT:	Conclusion	is	similar,	but	lower	magnitude.	171;	175;	360;	3.6;	3.7	
	
3	 Koch	and	Alaba	(2010).	Country:	South	Africa.	Scheme:	SHI	
Propensity	score	matching	(PSM).	Data:	Household	survey.	N=4,780	
1	 Low	 	 The	analysis	suggests	that	rural	households	would	accommodate	the	increased	insurance	burden	by	either	decreasing	other	food	expenditures	by	about	20%	or	by	decreasing	their	transportation	and	communication	budgets	by	about	15%.	Similar	result	for	urban	population	
	
4	 Trujillo	et	al.	(2010).	Country:	Colombia.	Scheme:	SHI	
IV.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=1,438	
1	 Low	 People	in	contributory	system	were	25.9	percent	more	likely	to	report	use	of	preventive	visits	compared	with	people	in	subsidized	system.	People	in	subsidized	system	is	not	likely	to	take	preventive	effort	compared	with	uninsured	population.	Ex	ante	moral	hazard	is	suggested	
		 	
5	 Hou	and	Chao	(2011)	Country:	Georgia	Scheme:	SHI	
Regression	Discontinuity	(RD)	and	two-part	model	(2PM)	Data:	Administrative	data	N:	29460	
3	 Medium	 MIP	beneficiaries	are	nine	time	more	likely	to	utilize	acute	surgeries	compared	to	non-MIP	beneficiaries.	The	poorest	are	47%	more	likely	to	have	acute	surgery	compared	than	the	richest	and	13%	more	likely	to	have	planned	surgeries.	No	significant	difference	for	baby	deliveries	
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6	 Panpiemras	et	al.	(2011).	Country:	Thailand.	Scheme:	SHI	
Fixed	effect	(FE).	Data:	Household	survey.	N=63360	
1	 Low	 The	number	of	outpatients	increased	by	55.98%	while	the	outpatient	visits	increased	by	41.34%	after	the	UC	program	was	implemented.	However,	similar	results	were	not	found	for	inpatients.	The	effect	of	the	UC	program	faded	away	quickly	in	the	subsequent	years.		
		 	
7	 Quimbo	et	al.	(2011)	Country:	The	Philippines	Scheme:	SHI	
DID.	Data:	Randomised	study.	N	=	1100	
3	 Medium	 		 		 Being	confined	in	an	intervention	hospital	decreases	the	likelihood	of	being	CRP-positive	and	being	wasted	by	4	and	9	percentage	points.	Patients	in	the	intervention	are	12	%	and	9	%	more	likely	to	have	health	improvement	for	not	wasted	and	CRP-negative	respectively.		
8	 Sepehri	et	al.	(2011).	Country:	Vietnam.	Scheme:	CBHI	
Fixed	and	random	effect.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=6,037	
1	 Low	 	 In	fixed	effect	model,	CHI	and	VHI	did	not	have	any	impact	on	OOP,	but	HIP	have	16%	reduction	effects	
	
9	 Sosa-Rubi,	Salinas-Rodriguez,	and	Galarraga.	(2011).	Country:	Mexico.	Scheme:	SHI	
DID	and	IV.	Data:	Household.	N=	?	
2	 Low	 	 At	the	local	level	(regional	clusters)	we	did	not	find	an	effect	of	the	SP.	At	the	household	level,	we	found	a	protective	effect	of	SP	on	CHE	and	the	OOP	health	payments	in	outpatient	and	hospitalization	in	rural	areas;	and	a	significant	effect	on	the	reduction	of	OOP	payments	in	outpatient	health	services	in	urban	zones.		
	
10	 Blanchet	et	al.	(2012).	Country:	Ghana.	Scheme:	SHI	
PSM.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=2543	
1	 Low	 Keeping	all	other	factors	constant,	NHIS-enrolled	women	are	40	%	more	likely	to	have	attended	a	clinic	over	the	past	year,	and	they	have	about	57	%	more	prescriptions.	Most	remarkably,	NHIS	enrolled	women	appear	nearly	twice	as	likely	(83	per	cent	more	likely)	to	have	stayed	overnight	at	a	hospital	than	non-enrolled	women	
		 	
11	 Chen	and	Jin	(2012).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
DID-PSM.	Data:	Census.	N=3977	-	950,681	
3	 Low	 	 		 The	NCMS	has	no	obvious	effect	in	reducing	the	incidence	of	child	or	maternal	mortality	at	the	village	level.	the	NCMS	has	no	significant	effect	on	school	enrolment	once	we	control	for	the	endogenous	introduction	and	take-up	of	the	NCMS	
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12	 Dhillon	et	al.	(2012).	Country:	Rwanda.	Scheme:	CBHI	
FE	with	IV	(Arellano-Bond	approach).	Data:	Household	survey.	N=84-950	
1	 Low	 The	removal	of	financial	barriers	had	the	single	greatest	impact	on	monthly	utilisation	rates.	Its	coefficient	estimate	of	0.6	indicates	that	the	effect	of	the	event	of	removing	financial	barriers	resulted	in	a	near	100%	increase	in	utilisation	from	the	rate	of	0.65	visits	per	capita	per	year	before	the	intervention	
		 	
13	 Fan	et	al.	(2012)	Country:	India	Scheme:	SHI	 DID,	Quintile	Regression,	and	matching	method.	Data:	Household	Survey.	N=	11,881	
3	 Low	 		 Households	in	Phase	I	districts	experienced	significantly	reduced	per	capita	per	month	inpatient	health	expenditure	by	Rs.	12,	but	not	outpatient	spending.	The	first	2	months	of	implementation	of	Phase	II	did	not	significantly	reduce	per	capita	inpatient	spending	(with	effects	in	the	expected	direction),	although	Phase	II	significantly	reduced	per	capita	outpatient	drug	spending.	
	
14	 Lu	et	al.	(2012).	Country:	Rwanda.	Scheme:	CBHI	
PSM;	2SRI;	IV.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=1,000	-	6,334	
2	 Low	 Mutuelles	enrollees	were	more	likely	to	use	medical	services	than	those	without	any	insurance	after	controlling	for	other	factors.	The	odds	of	using	medical	care	increased	by	2	for	Mutuelles	enrollees.	among	under-five	children	that	reported	diarrhoea,	fever,	or	ARI	in	the	two	weeks	prior	to	the	survey,	Mutuelles	enrollees	were	more	likely	to	use	medical	care.	among	women	who	delivered	children	in	the	survey	years,	Mutuelles	enrollees	were	more	likely	to	use	skilled	birth	attendance.	
Mutuelles	households	were	less	likely	to	incur	catastrophic	health	spending.	 	
15	 Lu,	Liu,	and	Shen	(2012).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
2PM	and	hurdle	model	with	PSM	and	IV.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=1170	-	2740	
2	 Low	 We	have	found	that	the	CMS	pilot	programs	have	had	a	significant	and	positive	effect	on	the	probability	of	seeking	medical	care	(the	estimate	1.569)	and	the	number	of	visits	(The	marginal	effect:	1.20).	
The	CMS	programs	did	not	seem	to	have	had	a	significant	impact	on	households’	out-of-pocket	health	expenditure	and	on	reducing	catastrophic	spending	
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16	 Nguyen	(2012).	Country:	Vietnam.	Scheme:	CBHI	
PSM	combined	with	DID;	Compared	with	IV	and	Fixed	effect	separately.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=6780	
3	 Low	 The	voluntary	health	insurance	helps	the	insured	people	increase	the	annual	outpatient	and	inpatient	visits	by	around	45%	and	70%,	respectively.		
The	effect	of	voluntary	health	insurance	on	out-of-pocket	expenses	on	health	care	services	is	not	statistically	significant	
	
17	 Parmar	et	al.	(2012).	Country:	Burkina	Faso.	Scheme:	CBHI	
FE	and	IV.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=890	
2	 Low	 	 With	OLS,	insurance	had	no	significant	impact	on	per	capita	household	assets.	In	the	2SLS,	insurance	had	a	positive	effect	on	per	capita	household	assets	(24.6	percent).	By	FE,	insurance	increased	per	capita	household	assets	by	1	percent	at	10	percent	significant	level	
	
18	 Robyn	et	al.	(2012).	Country:	Burkina	Faso.	Scheme:	CBHI	
FE.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=2820	
3	 Medium	 Odds	ratios	of	1.33	and	1.23	suggested	that	individuals	residing	in	areas	with	insurance	scheme	were	marginally	more	likely	to	seek	treatment	in	general,	and	also	to	seek	facility-based	professional	care	but	it	is	not	statistically	significant	
		 	
19	 Robyn	et	al.	(2012).	Country:	Burkina	Faso.	Scheme:	CBHI	
Multinomial	Logit	and	PSM.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=1240	
1	 Low	 while	enrolment	may	lead	to	improved	access	to	facility	care	within	the	formal	health	system,	the	insured	population	continues	to	actively	seek	drugs	from	the	informal	sector,	resulting	in	a	continued	high	prevalence	of	self-medication	within	the	household.	
		 		
20	 Wirtz	et	al.	(2012).	Country:	Mexico.	Scheme:	SHI	
Heckman	selection	model	and	PSM&IV.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=28,260	
2	 Low	 		 Being	affiliated	with	SP	reduced	the	probability	of	incurring	medicine	expenditure	by	9.7%	and	the	annual	amount	spent	for	medicine	by	US$24.51	but	showed	no	significant	effect	on	the	percentage	of	medicines	expenditure	on	the	AE	in	comparison	to	households	without	health	insurance.		
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21	 Yilma	et	al.	(2015).	Country:	Ethiopia.	Scheme:	CBHI	
FE	and	PSM.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=9455	
1	 Low	 		 We	find	a	negative	impact	on	the	probability	of	having	outstanding	loans	ranging	between	4%	and	5%,	depending	on	methods	and	control	groups,	which	translates	to	about	13%	of	baseline	values.	There	are	also	negative	coefficients	for	the	amount	of	outstanding	loans	although	these	are	imprecise.	Estimates	for	all	types	of	livestock	are	not	statistically	significant.	
	
22	 Aji	et	al.	(2013).	Country:	Indonesia.	Scheme:	SHI	
IV	and	FE.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=6335	
2	 Low	 		 Askeskin	decreased	out-of-pocket	expenditures	by	34%	and	Askes	by	55%	compared	with	non-Askeskin	and	non-Askes,	respectively	
	
23	 Avilla-Burgos	et	al.	(2013).	Country:	Mexico.	Scheme:	SHI	
PSM.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=12,250	
1	 Low	 	 SP	reduces	the	likelihood	of	HE	in	3.6	and	7.1%	in	households	with	patients	diagnosed	with	DM	and/or	hypertension,	respectively	 		
24	 Camacho	and	Conover	(2013).	Country:	Colombia.	Scheme:	SHI	
RD.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=40,931	
3	 Low	 		 	 The	Subsidized	Regime	had	a	significant	and	positive	effect	on	health,	reducing	the	incidence	of	low	birth	weight	between	1.7	and	3.8	percentage	points.	We	find	that	the	direction	of	the	impact	on	very	low	birth	weight,	an	indicator	for	the	baby	being	preterm,	and	for	5-minute	Apgar	score	show	an	improvement	in	newborn	health,	but	these	results	are	not	always	significant	
25	 Cheung	and	Padieu	(2013).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
IV.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=933	 2	 Low	 		 A	significant	and	negative	impact	of	insurance	on	participant's	saving	in	third	quantiles.	No	significant	impact	on	the	poorest	nor	the	richest.	No	significant	effect	on	health	expenditure	regardless	of	its	income	quantiles	
	
26	 Fink	et	al.	(2013).	Country:	Burkina	Faso.	Scheme:	CBHI	
IV.	Data:	Randomised	study.	N=12,118	
3	 Medium	 		 The	average	person	would	save	about	US$	3.8	per	year.	the	insurance	rollout	was	associated	with	about	a	30%	reduction	in	the	likelihood	of	catastrophic	expenditure	in	targeted	areas.		
The	introduction	of	the	insurance	scheme	did	not	have	any	effect	on	health	outcomes	for	children	and	young	adults,	but	appears	to	have	increased	mortality	among	individuals	aged	65	and	older.	
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27	 Hassan	et	al.	(2013).	Country:	Colombia.	Scheme:	SHI	
Poisson	and	probit	with	two-stage	nonlinear	method	of	moments.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=12,975	
1	 Low	 Individuals	who	are	involved	in	the	program	visit	a	doctor	21%	less	frequently	for	preventive	health	care	purposes	than	individuals	who	are	not	in	this	program.	there	is	a	positive	effect,	which	means	that	individuals	enrolled	in	this	program	have	a	higher	probability	of	hospitalization.	
		 	
28	 Jing	et	al.	(2013).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
DID.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=1681	
1	 Low	 	 Controlling	for	household	demographic	characteristics,	the	coefficient	of	the	interaction	term	was	negative	but	not	statistically	significant,	suggesting	that	the	reimbursement	policies	for	chronic	disease	in	the	NCMS	programs	were	not	significantly	effective	in	reducing	household	CHE	
	
29	 Miller	et	al.	(2013).	Country:	Colombia.	Scheme:	SHI	
Fuzzy	RD	and	IV.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=4219	and	3334	
3	 Low	 SR	enrolment	is	associated	with	a	29-percentage	point	increase	in	the	probability	of	a	preventive	physician	visit	in	the	past	year,	a	13-percentage	point	increase	in	reported	physician	visits	because	of	health	problems	within	the	past	30	days,	and	a	1.50	more	growth-monitoring	and	well-care	visits	in	the	past	year	compared	to	uninsured	children	
SR	enrolment	lowers	mean	inpatient	spending	by	about	60,000	pesos	(α=0.10)	or	30	%	reduction.	There	is	no	statistically	significant	association	for	outpatient	care.		
SR	enrolment	is	associated	with	1.4	fewer	child	days	absent	from	usual	activities	due	to	illness	in	the	past	month	(α=0.05).	Enrolment	is	also	associated	with	an	18-percentage	point	reduction	in	the	self-reported	incidence	of	cough,	fever,	or	diarrhoea	among	children	in	the	preceding	two	weeks	(but	it	is	not	statistically	significant	at	conventional	levels	
30	 Nguyen	and	Wang	(2013).	Country:	Vietnam.	Scheme:	SHI	
DID.	Data:	Household	Survey.	N=628	-	1209	
2	 Low	 Overall	pattern	of	increased	use	of	secondary	hospitals	and	decreased	use	of	tertiary	hospitals.	the	use	of	secondary	hospitals	increased	significantly	for	both	0–3	and	4–5	years	age	groups	by	0.02	and	0.03	admissions	per	year,	respectively.	Number	of	sick	days	among	the	age	group	4–5years	reduced	by	0.81	as	a	result	of	FCCU6.	Compared	with	the	baseline	value	of	3.06,	this	represents	26%	reduction.		
The	probability	of	having	large	OOP	in	this	group	went	down	by	1.7	percentage	point,	which	represents	nearly	60%	of	the	baseline	value	(0.027).	
	
31	 Sparrow	et	al.	(2013).	Country:	Indonesia.	Scheme:	SHI	
DID	and	PSM.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=34,525	
2	 Low	 The	difference	results	suggest	that	Askeskin	increased	outpatient	utilization	by	0.062	visits	per	person	per	month	(vppm),	while	kernel	matching	yields	an	impact	of	0.079	vppm.			
Askeskin	coverage	seems	to	increase	OOP	payments	and	budget	shares,	in	particular	in	urban	areas,	although	the	propensity	score	matching	results	show	larger	standard	errors.	Evidence	of	increased	incidence	of	catastrophic	spending	at	a	15	percent	threshold,	but	not	significant	with	PSM	
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32	 Zoidze	et	al.	(2013).	Country:	Georgia.	Scheme:	SHI	
DID.	Data:	household	survey.	N=?	 1	 Low	 Individuals	with	acute	sicknesses	in	the	preceding	30	days	are	more	likely	to	report	using	health	services	and	report	a	substantial	increase	in	utilisation	from	2007,	with	66%	consulting	a	health	care	provider	in	2010	compared	with	57%	in	2007.	However,	the	individuals	with	chronic	illnesses	utilised	less	services	resulting	in	zero	net	effect	for	an	overall	use	of	services	
Less	OOP	expenditure	for	inpatient	services	(−227	Gel	per	episode)	and	total	monthly	health	care	payments	(−27	Gel),	but	a	dramatic	increase	in	the	shares	of	the	general	population	facing	the	catastrophic	health	expenditure	from	11.7%	in	2007	to	24.8%	in	2010	
	
33	 Abrokwah	et	al.	(2014).	Country:	Ghana.	Scheme:	SHI	
OLS	with	proxy	and	2PM.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=1012	
1	 Low	 Having	insurance	increases	the	number	of	prenatal	care	visits	by	24%	relative	to	being	uninsured.		 The	predicted	total	out-of-pocket	spending	on	prenatal	care	for	an	insured	pregnant	woman	is	about	C|	3,600	($0.40)	for	her	first	prenatal	care	visit,	while	the	predicted	total	spending	for	an	uninsured	pregnant	woman	stands	at	about	C|	21,600	($2.40)	for	her	first	visit	
	
34	 Bai	and	Wu	(2014).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
DID	and	matching	method.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=17,715	
3	 Low	 		 Insurance	coverage	on	average	stimulated	nonmedical	consumption	by	5.5%	for	the	insured	(p<0.1).	the	insurance	effect	does	not	appear	to	be	driven	by	the	crowd-in	story	because	the	NCMS	effect	is	substantial	even	for	households	that	do	not	incur	medical	expenditures.	the	insurance	effect	increases	with	the	generosity	of	insurance	coverage	at	the	county	hospitals.		
	
35	 Bernal	et	al.,	(2014).	Country:	Peru.	Scheme:	SHI	
Fuzzy	RD.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=4161	
3	 Low	 Being	covered	by	health	insurance	increases	the	probability	of	visiting	a	doctor	in	the	four	weeks	prior	to	the	interview	by	51.5	percentage	points.	The	probability	of	obtaining	medicines	in	the	same	four	weeks	increases	by	52.7	percentage	points.	The	probability	of	being	vaccinated	in	the	three	months	prior	to	the	interview	increases	by	28.9	percentage	points,	and	women	at	fertile	age	are	65.0	percentage	points	more	likely	to	control	their	pregnancy	in	the	previous	twelve	months	
We	find	that	health	insurance	coverage	increases	the	probability	that	individual	health	expenditures	exceed	5	and	10	percent	of	the	per	capita	household	income	by	40.6	and	29.1	respectively.	Overall,	it	is	remarkable	that	we	never	find	a	negative	effect	on	either	expected	health	expenditures	or	measures	of	variability	or	risk	of	high	expenditures.	
	
36	 Chen	et	al.	(2014).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
Bivariate	probit.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=43,381	
2	 Low	 Increased	the	likelihood	of	hospitalisation	in	the	past	year	(1.8%	probit);	increased	the	likelihood	of	refused	inpatient	treatment	in	the	past	year;	increased	outpatient	health	services	utilisation	(1.7%).		
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37	 Guindon	(2014).	Country:	Vietnam.	Scheme:	SHI	
DID,	FE,	and	DID-PSM;	2PM.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=6775	
2	 Low	 HCFP	coverage	is	not	found	to	impact	the	utilization	of	outpatient	services	with	the	exception	that	HCFP	coverage	appears	to	increase	the	probability	of	having	had	at	least	one	outpatient	visit.	Using	PSM	the	magnitude	is	smaller	for	outpatient,	but	bigger	for	inpatient	admissions.		
		 	
38	 Hendriks	et	al.	(2014).	Country:	Nigeria.	Scheme:	CBHI	
DID.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=413	 1	 Low	 		 		 Systolic	blood	pressure	decreased	by	10.41	mm	Hg	(P	<	.001)	from	2009	to	2011	in	the	program	area.	This	reduction	was	5.24	mm	Hg	(P	=	.02)	greater	compared	with	the	control	area.	Diastolic	blood	pressure	decreased	by	4.27	mm	Hg	(P	<	.001)	in	the	program	area,	2.16mmHg	(P	=	.04)	greater	reduction	compared	with	the	reduction	in	the	control	area,	where	diastolic	blood	pressure	decreased	by	2.11	mm	Hg.	Self-reported	general	use	of	health	care	resources	increased	in	the	program	area	and	decreased	in	the	control	area	and	it's	significantly	different	between	areas	when	corrected	for	confounders	(OR,	2.47;	P	=	.006)	
39	 Hou	et	al.	(2014).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
FE	with	2PM	&	Generalized	Linear	Model.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=1,478	-	28,824		
2	 Low	 A	1-percentage	point	increase	in	NCMS	generosity	raises	the	probability	of	using	inpatient	care	by	0.004,	which	corresponds	to	an	increase	of	about	7.5%	compared	with	the	overall	sample	probability	(0.053).		the	SPA	(Social	pooling	account)	system	for	outpatient	care	proves	to	be	more	effective	in	improving	access	than	the	system	of	household	MSAs	(medical	saving	account)	
No	effects	are	found	of	NCMS	on	spending	in	the	full	sample,	but	conditional	upon	use,	NCMS	reduces	the	share	of	OOP	spending	for	an	outpatient	visit.	More	worrisome	is	that	we	find	higher	NCMS	cover	to	raise	total	spending	per	hospitalization	and	to	increase	the	OOP	spending	per	inpatient	stay	(among	the	users)	
	
40	 Liu	and	Zhao	(2014).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
IV.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=628	 2	 low	 Participation	in	the	URBMI	has	significantly	increased	the	probability	of	individuals’	use	of	formal	medical	care,	by	10–15	percentage	points,	increased	likelihood	of	outpatient	by	7-13	%,		increased	the	number	of	inpatient	days	by	0.35-0.5	days	but	not	the	probability.		
Joining	URBMI	resulted	in	an	increase	in	out-of-pocket	health	expenditures	of	about	11–172	RMB,	although	the	coefficients	are	insignificant	
	
41	 Liu,	Wu,	and	Liu	(2014).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
Structural	equation	modelling.	Data:	survey.	N-1645	
1	 low	 		 Taking	the	direct	and	indirect	effects	together,	patients	enrolled	in	the	scheme	had	to	pay	351	yuan	more	out-of-pocket	than	the	uninsured,	although	this	total	effect	was	statistically	insignificant	(for	NCMS)	
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42	 Nguyen	(2014).	Country:	Vietnam.	Scheme:	SHI	
PSM.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=15,550	
1	 Low	 On	average,	a	person	with	compulsory	insurance	pays	0.47	visits	to	health	care	facilities	more	than	their	uninsured	counterpart.	there	is	no	moral	hazard	or	adverse	selection	in	using	inpatient	services.	
		 		
43	 Pfutze	(2014).	Country:	Mexico.	Scheme:	SHI	
Weighted	Exogenous	Sampling	Max	Likelihood.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=836,809	
2	 Low	 	 		 The	risk	of	a	child	dying	in	the	first	month	of	life	is	reduced	by	close	to	5	out	of	1,000	(or	0.5%)	for	the	population	at	large	and	by	around	7	out	of	1,000	(0.7%)	for	the	program’s	target	population.	
44	 Sheth.	(2014)	Country:	India.	Scheme:	CBHI	 DID.	Data:		Randomised	Study	N=1311	 3	 Low	 Contrary	to	the	majority	of	studies	evaluating	CBHI,	the	author	found	that	the	insurance	contract	does	not	increase	health	care	consumption.	Instead,	the	author	found	limited	suggestive	evidence	of	the	insurance	possibly	reducing	the	consumption	and	expenditure	of	health	care.			
Limited	suggestive	evidence	of	the	insurance	possibly	reducing	the	consumption	and	expenditure	of	health	care.		
	
45	 Sood	et	al.	(2014).	Country:	India.	Scheme:	SHI	
RD	and	DID.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=986	-	22,796	
2	 low	 Although	this	result	was	not	significant	at	the	95%	level,	the	point	estimate	was	large	and	approached	significance,	which	could	suggest	of	a	positive	effect	on	utilization	
The	scheme	was	associated	with	a	34%	reduction	in	out-of-pocket	health	expenditure	for	admission	to	hospital	for	covered	conditions	 The	mortality	rate	from	conditions	covered	by	the	scheme	was	0.32%	in	eligible	households	compared	with	0.90%	in	ineligible	households	(difference	of	0.58	percentage	points,	95%	confidence	interval	0.40	to	0.75;	P<0.001;	64%	risk	reduction).		
46	 Yuan	et	al.	(2014).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
DID.	Data:	Administrative	data.	N=720	 2	 Low	 		 The	DID	regression	analysis	showed	no	impact	of	benefit	design	on	patients’	out-of-pocket	expenses,	which	indicates	that	the	expansion	of	public	health	insurance	coverage	did	not	have	any	effect	on	relieving	financial	burden	of	disease	for	AMI	patients		
	
47	 Alkenrack	and	Lindelow	(2015).	Country:	Lao.	Scheme:	CBHI	
PSM.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=3000	
2	 Low	 CBHI	members	were	almost	twice	as	likely	as	non-members	to	have	had	an	inpatient	visit	in	a	1-year	period.	Regarding	source	of	care,	the	matched	estimates	show	that	CBHI	members	were	significantly	more	likely	than	non-members	to	visit	both	district	and	provincial	hospitals,	for	both	inpatient	and	outpatient	care.		
No	significant	difference	in	expenditures	between	the	insured	and	uninsured.	This	lack	of	difference	in	spending	indicates	positive	financial	protection	in	that	the	insured	are	using	more	services,	paying	less	at	the	point	of	service,	but	spending	approximately	the	same	amount	overall	as	the	uninsured.	
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48	 Atella,	Brugiavini,	and	Pace.	(2015).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
Finite	Mixture	Model	(Bayesian).	Data:	Household	survey.	N=3166	
2	 Low	 		 In	particular,	we	find	that	out-of-pocket	expenses	decrease	only	for	high	income	individuals	with	good	health	status	and	the	saving	rate	increases	only	for	low	income	individuals	with	good	health	status.		
	
49	 Brugiavini	and	Pace	(2015).	Country:	Ghana.	Scheme:	NHI	
IV.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=9,396	
2	 Low	 The	NHIS	enrolment	positively	affects	the	probability	of	formal	antenatal	check-ups	before	delivery,	the	probability	of	delivery	in	an	institution	and	the	probability	of	being	assisted	during	delivery	by	a	trained	person.		
On	the	contrary,	we	find	that,	once	the	issue	of	self-selection	is	considered,	the	NHIS	enrolment	does	not	have	a	significant	effect	on	out-of-pocket	expenditure	at	the	extensive	margin	
	
50	 Cheng	et	al.	(2015).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
PSM	and	DID.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=6598	
3	 Low	 We	also	find	that	the	elderly	participants	are	more	likely	to	get	adequate	medical	services	when	sick,	which	provides	a	good	explanation	for	the	beneficial	health	effects	of	the	NCMS.	Furthermore,	it	is	found	that	low-income	seniors	benefit	more	from	NCMS	participation	in	terms	of	health	outcomes	and	perceived	access	to	health	care		
We	find	no	evidence	that	the	NCMS	has	reduced	the	elderly	enrolees’	out-of-pocket	spending.		 We	find	no	significant	effect	of	the	NCMS	on	3-year	mortality	for	the	previously	uninsured	elderly	in	NCMS-exposed	counties,	although	there	is	moderate	evidence	that	NCMS	is	associated	with	reduced	mortality	for	the	elderly	enrolees.	
51	 Fenny	et	al.	(2015).	Country:	Ghana.	Scheme:	SHI	
Mulitnomial	Logit.	Data:	household	survey.	N=11,089	
1	 Low	 those	insured	are	6	times	more	likely	to	choose	regional/district	hospitals	and	health	centres/clinics	and	11	times	more	likely	to	choose	private	hospitals/clinics	over	informal	care	when	compared	to	those	uninsured	and	this	is	significant	at	1%		
		 	
52	 Ghislandi,	Manachotphong,	and	Perego.	(2015).	Country:	Thailand.	Scheme:	SHI	
Triple	DID	with	PS;	Double	Robust.	Data:	Household	data.	N=15,022	
2	 Low	 UHC	increases	individuals’	likelihood	of	having	an	annual	check-up,	especially	among	women.	Regarding	health	care	consumption,	we	observe	that	UHC	increases	hospital	admissions	by	over	2%and	increases	outpatient	visits	by	13%.		
		 	
53	 Gotsadze	et	al.	(2015).	Country:	Georgia.	Scheme:	SHI	
DID.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=11,663	
1	 Low	 MIP-enrolled	individuals	were	marginally	(by	2%)	more	likely	to	utilize	any	formal	health	care	services	(P<0.1).		 The	largest	reduction	was	observed	for	inpatient	spending—at	227	Gel	per	case.	Although	most	financial	impact	indicators	for	the	overall	sample	revealed	marginal	statistical	significance	(P<0.1)	
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54	 Grogger	et	al.	(2015).	Country:	Mexico.	Scheme:	SHI	
Logistic	regression.	Data:	Randomised	study	N=83,000	
3	 Medium	 	 In	rural	areas,	remote	from	health-care	facilities,	or	proximate	only	to	facilities	with	limited	staffing,	the	programme	has	not	reduced	catastrophic	out-of-pocket	health	expenditures.	In	rural	areas	proximate	to	larger	facilities,	in	contrast,	the	programme	has	provided	considerable	financial	protection.	Also	in	urban	areas,	SP	has	substantially	reduced	catastrophic	out-of-pocket	health	spending	among	beneficiaries		
	
55	 Jung	and	Streeter	(2015).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
SSM	+	2PM	and	IV.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=50,591	
2	 Low	 		 Our	results	from	a	selection	model	with	instrumental	variables	suggest	that	having	health	insurance	reduces	the	expected	OOP	health	expenditure	of	an	individual	by	29.42%	unconditionally.	Meanwhile,	conditional	on	being	subjected	to	positive	health	expenditure,	health	insurance	helps	reduce	OOP	spending	by	44.38%.			
	
56	 Limwattananon	et	al.	(2015).	Country:	Thailand.	Scheme:	SHI	
DID	and	GLM;	censored	quintile	regression.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=26,557	
2	 Low	 In	terms	of	utilization,	we	get	a	highly	significant	DID	estimate	of	one	percentage	point,	which	is	16%	of	the	baseline	admission	probability	of	the	treatment	group.	It	is	almost	three	percentage	points	for	the	elderly,	while	the	point	estimate	is	only	half	a	point	and	not	significant	for	children	
The	reform	reduced	OOP	spending	by	an	average	of	almost	19	Baht	(~$0.47)	per	person	per	month	and	by	28%	relative	to	what	spending	would	have	been	in	the	absence	of	the	policy.	The	reform	is	estimated	to	have	reduced	the	probability	of	spending	at	least	10%	of	the	household	budget	on	health	care	by	a	significant	1.6	percentage	points	(38%).	
	
57	 Makhloufi	et	al.	(2015).	Country:	Tunisia.	Scheme:	SHI	
PSM.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=6538	
1	 Low	 Given	illness	amongst	the	MHI	enrolees,	the	increases	in	outpatient	and	inpatient	care	range	from	18.8	to	21.4	%point	and	from	25.8	to	38	%	point,	respectively,	compared	with	a	significant	increase	in	outpatient	of	about	15	%	point	in	the	rural	areas	and	no	significant	increase	in	inpatient	care.		
The	excluded	households	appeared	to	spend	almost	twice	as	much	on	healthcare	as	the	MAS	beneficiaries	(25.1	for	the	excluded	vs.	13.85	for	MAS	beneficiaries),	while	their	average	healthcare	expenditure	appeared	to	be	slightly	higher	than	that	of	the	MHI	enrolees	(25.1	for	the	excluded	vs.	23.1	for	the	MHI).	this	indicates	that	although	MHI	seems	to	have	an	effect	on	the	use	of	healthcare,	its	effect	on	healthcare	expenditures	appears	to	be	rather	modest,	as	it	does	not	significantly	reduce	healthcare	expenditure	of	insured	beneficiaries	compared	with	excluded	individuals	and	MAS	beneficiaries.	
	
58	 Palmer	et	al.	(2015).	Country	Vietnam.	Scheme:	NHI	
RD.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=18,517	
3	 Low	 Insurance	increases	the	probability	of	an	inpatient	visit	by	6.8%	and	an	outpatient	visit	by	21.7%;	the	average	number	of	inpatient	and	outpatient	visits	increases	by	1.13	and	0.75,	respectively.	
	The	impact	of	insurance	on	expenditures	is	positive	for	both	service	types.	However,	the	impact	is	not	statistically	significant.	
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59	 Pfutze	(2014).	Country:	Mexico.	Scheme:	SHI	
Weighted	Exogenous	Sampling	Max	Likelihood.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=27,455	
1	 Low	 	 	 For	the	target	population,	a	one	percentage	point	increase	in	eligibility	is	found	to	decrease	miscarriages	by	.04	percentage	point	at	the	average	
60	 Yang	and	Wu	(2015).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
2PM;	PSM	and	DID;	Heckman	Selection	model.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=4084	
2	 Low	 	 The	PSM	with	DID	estimates	for	outpatient	costs.	The	results	show	a	trend	of	increase	in	pre-reimbursement	outpatient	costs	(gross	billed)	between	the	treatment	group	compared	with	the	control	group	(P<0.1).	The	results	also	show	that	there	is	no	significant	difference	in	post	reimbursement	outpatient	costs	(OOP	payments)	for	the	control	group	and	treatment	group	after	NCMS	reimbursement	
	
61	 Yilma	et	al.	(2012).	Country:	Ghana	Scheme:	SHI	
PSM	and	FE.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=761	
3	 Low	 Like	the	non-parametric	estimation,	the	fixed	effects	model	indicates	that	in	100	insured	households,	around	20	people	do	not	sleep	under	STNs	due	to	insurance	uptake.	Health	insurance	apparently	increases	the	benefit	of	curative	care	relative	to	preventive	care,	and	most	strongly	so	if	the	level	of	effort,	cost	and	discomfort	involved	in	prevention	is	higher	(the	case	of	STNs).	
	 	
62	 Aryeetey	et	al.	(2016).	Country:	Ghana.	Scheme:	NHI	
IV-FE.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=3128	
2	 Low	 	 Our	results	revealed	that	enrolment	into	health	insurance	reduces	household	OOPE	by	86	%.	The	effect	of	health	insurance	is	protective	i.e.	insured	households	were	3	%	less	likely	to	incur	CE	and	7.5	%	less	likely	to	fall	into	poverty.	
	
63	 Levine,	Polimeni,	and	Ramage	(2016).	Country:	Cambodia.	Scheme:	CBHI	
IV.	Data:	Randomised	study.	N=5,000	
3	 Medium	 Insured	households	were	15.8	percentage	points	more	likely	to	use	a	health	centre	for	first	treatment	(P	<	0.001)	and	10.7	and	8.0	percentage	points	less	likely	to	visit	a	private	doctor	or	drug	seller	for	first	treatment	compared	to	the	control	group.	No	statistically	significant	impact	of	SKY	on	first	treatment	at	a	public	hospital			
No	impact	on	overall	wealth;	households	that	purchased	SKY	due	to	the	steep	discount	were	10.8	percentage	points	less	likely	than	the	control	to	have	at	least	one	of	these	adverse	economic	outcomes	
There	is	no	significant	difference	between	treated	and	control	households	for	this	index	of	health	measures	
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64	 Liao,	Gilmour,	and	Shibuya	(2015).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
PSM.	Data:	Household	Survey.	N=9971	
1	 Low	 Among	diagnosed	hypertensives,	health	insurance	increased	the	probability	that	they	would	receive	treatment	by	28.7%	(95%	CI:	10.6–46.7%,	p-value	0.001)	compared	to	propensity	matched	individuals	who	were	not	covered	by	health	insurance	
	 	
65	 Nguyen	(2016).	Country:	Vietnam.	Scheme:	NHI	
FE.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=5013	
2	 Low	 In	2010-2012,	The	student	health	insurance	and	free	health	insurance	programs	increased	the			number	of	health	care	visits	of	children	by	approximately	13.6	and	66.1	%,	respectively.		
Having	free	health	insurance	reduced	the	out-of-pocket	health	expenditures	per	visit	by	around	15.8	in	the	period	2006–2008	and	63.4	%	in	the	period	2010–2012.	Student	insurance	has	no	effect	
	
66	 Peng	and	Conley	(2015).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
IV	and	DID.	Data:		Household	survey.	N=8309	
2	 Low	 	 	 NCMS	does	significantly	decrease	children’s	malnutrition	probability	by	6.5	%	points.	The	OLS	estimations	show	that	the	average	3-day	food	consumption	of	women	at	child-bearing	age	increases	by	261	calories	after	enrolling	in	the	NCMS.		
67	 Raza	et	al.	(2016).	Country:	India.	Scheme:	CBHI	
IV.	Data:	Randomised	study.	N=21,372	
3	 Medium	 Our	analysis	reveals	that	the	schemes	had	no	impact	on	access	to	outpatient	or	inpatient	care.		 We	do	not	find	any	impact	on	healthcare	expenditure.		
	
68	 Rivera-Hernandez	et	al.	(2016)	Country:	Mexico.	Scheme:	SHI	
FE-IV.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=5307	
2	 Low	 The	effect	of	SP	on	use	of	insulin	and/or	oral	agents	was	marginally	significant	(p	=	.051),	showing	a	tendency	that	SP	beneficiaries	with	diabetes	were	more	likely	to	use	pharmacological	treatment.	No	significant	difference	was	found	for	antihypertensive	medication	for	SP	enrolees	as	opposed	to	the	uninsured.	
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Table	A-5	Rosenbaum	bounds	analysis	for	the	JKN	Contributory	group	(Chapter	7)		 Any	Outpatient	 	 #	visit	(total)	 	 #	visit	(Public)	 	 #	visit	(Private)	 Any	Inpatient	 	 #	visit	(total)	 	 #	visit	(Public)	 	 #	visit	(Private)	Gamma	 P+	 P-	 	 P+	 P-	 	 P+	 P-	 	 P+	 P-	 P+	 P-	 	 P+	 P-	 P+	 P-	 P+	 P-	 P+	 P-		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	1	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.01	 0.01	 	 0.03	 0.03	 	 0.08	 0.08	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	1.1	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.13	 0.00	 	 0.16	 0.00	 	 0.43	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	1.2	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.50	 0.00	 	 0.45	 0.00	 	 0.82	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	1.3	 0.01	 0.00	 	 0.86	 0.00	 	 0.75	 0.00	 	 0.97	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.03	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	1.4	 0.06	 0.00	 	 0.98	 0.00	 	 0.92	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.10	 0.00	 	 0.01	 0.00	 	 0.01	 0.00	1.5	 0.22	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.98	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.26	 0.00	 	 0.03	 0.00	 	 0.03	 0.00	1.6	 0.48	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.47	 0.00	 	 0.06	 0.00	 	 0.06	 0.00	1.7	 0.31	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.68	 0.00	 	 0.12	 0.00	 	 0.12	 0.00	1.8	 0.13	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.84	 0.00	 	 0.21	 0.00	 	 0.21	 0.00	1.9	 0.04	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.93	 0.00	 	 0.33	 0.00	 	 0.33	 0.00	2	 0.01	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 		 0.97	 0.00	 		 0.45	 0.00	 		 0.45	 0.00		
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Table	A-6	Rosenbaum	bounds	analysis	for	the	JKN	Subsidised	group	(Chapter	7)			 	 Any	Outpatient	 	 #	visit	(total)	 	 #	visit	(Public)	 	 #	visit	(Private)	 Any	Inpatient	 	 #	visit	(total)	 	 #	visit	(Public)	 	 #	visit	(Private)	Gamma	 P+	 P-	 	 P+	 P-	 	 P+	 P-	 	 P+	 P-	 P+	 P-	 	 P+	 P-	 P+	 P-	 P+	 P-		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	1	 0.11	 0.11	 		 0.99	 0.99	 		 0.42	 0.42	 		 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.24	 0.24	 		 0.18	 0.18	 		 0.75	 0.75	1.1	 0.41	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.65	 	 0.92	 0.03	 	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.71	 0.02	 	 0.53	 0.03	 	 0.93	 0.44	1.2	 0.05	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.06	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.23	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.96	 0.00	 	 0.84	 0.00	 	 0.99	 0.19	1.3	 0.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.82	 0.02	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.97	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.06	1.4	 0.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.99	 0.07	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.01	1.5	 0.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 1.00	 0.17	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	1.6	 0.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 1.00	 0.34	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	1.7	 0.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 1.00	 0.52	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	1.8	 0.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 1.00	 0.34	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	1.9	 0.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 1.00	 0.20	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	2	 0.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 1.00	 0.10	 0.00	 		 1.00	 0.00	 		 1.00	 0.00	 		 1.00	 0.00	
Table	A-7	Logit	regression	table	for	JKN	participation	among	the	contributory	
group	
Variables	 Coefficient	 Standard	error	 P	-	value	 Upper	95%	CI	 Lower	95%	CI		      Sampling	weight	 0.23	 0.12	 0.06	 -0.01	 0.47	Age		 -0.01	 0.02	 0.68	 -0.04	 0.03	Gender	(1	=	male)	 -0.21	 0.08	 0.01	 -0.36	 -0.07	Single	 0.48	 0.22	 0.03	 0.05	 0.91	Married	 0.59	 0.19	 0.00	 0.22	 0.97	Urban	 0.79	 0.10	 0.00	 0.60	 0.98	Primary	education	 0.04	 0.22	 0.87	 -0.39	 0.46	Secondary	education	 0.63	 0.22	 0.01	 0.19	 1.08	College	education	 1.17	 0.28	 0.00	 0.63	 1.72	Higher	education	 1.10	 0.26	 0.00	 0.59	 1.62	Assets	index	 0.13	 0.03	 0.00	 0.07	 0.19	Number	of	acute	conditions	 0.09	 0.05	 0.05	 0.00	 0.18	Number	of	chronic	condition	 0.18	 0.18	 0.31	 -0.17	 0.54	Any	disability	 0.67	 0.32	 0.04	 0.04	 1.30	Density	of	outpatient	care	facilities	 0.37	 0.18	 0.04	 0.01	 0.72	Density	of	inpatient	care	facilities	 -1.80	 0.82	 0.03	 -3.41	 -0.19	Assets	index	-	squared	 0.04	 0.01	 0.00	 0.01	 0.06	Age-	squared	 0.00	 0.00	 0.94	 0.00	 0.00	Density	outpatient	-	squared	 0.00	 0.01	 0.37	 -0.02	 0.01	Density	inpatient	-	squared	 0.17	 0.09	 0.08	 -0.02	 0.35	Acute	conditions	-	squared	 -0.01	 0.01	 0.08	 -0.02	 0.00	Chronic	conditions	-	squared	 -0.04	 0.07	 0.55	 -0.17	 0.09	Constant	 -3.70	 0.48	 0.00	 -4.64	 -2.77		 	
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Table	A-8	Logit	regression	table	for	JKN	participation	among	the	subsidised	
group	
Variables	 Coefficient	 Standard	error	 P	-	value	 Upper	95%	CI	 Lower	95%	CI		      Sampling	weight	 0.11	 0.09	 0.19	 -0.06	 0.28	Age		 0.00	 0.01	 1.00	 -0.02	 0.02	Gender	(1	=	male)	 -0.09	 0.05	 0.10	 -0.20	 0.02	Single	 -0.24	 0.13	 0.06	 -0.50	 0.01	Married	 0.20	 0.10	 0.04	 0.01	 0.39	Urban	 0.53	 0.06	 0.00	 0.40	 0.65	Primary	education	 0.15	 0.10	 0.12	 -0.04	 0.34	Secondary	education	 -0.05	 0.11	 0.67	 -0.26	 0.17	College	education	 -0.77	 0.29	 0.01	 -1.33	 -0.21	Higher	education	 -0.78	 0.25	 0.00	 -1.26	 -0.29	Assets	index	 -0.44	 0.03	 0.00	 -0.49	 -0.39	Number	of	acute	conditions	 0.05	 0.03	 0.12	 -0.01	 0.10	Number	of	chronic	condition	 0.14	 0.13	 0.30	 -0.12	 0.40	Any	disability	 0.14	 0.26	 0.59	 -0.37	 0.66	Density	of	outpatient	care	facilities	 -0.14	 0.27	 0.61	 -0.68	 0.40	Density	of	inpatient	care	facilities	 2.78	 2.00	 0.17	 -1.15	 6.71	Recipients	of	unconditional	cash	transfer	 0.76	 0.06	 0.00	 0.65	 0.87	Assets	index	-	squared	 -0.07	 0.01	 0.00	 -0.08	 -0.05	Age-	squared	 0.00	 0.00	 0.22	 0.00	 0.00	Density	outpatient	-	squared	 0.02	 0.02	 0.18	 -0.01	 0.05	Density	inpatient	-	squared	 -1.52	 0.81	 0.06	 -3.11	 0.07	Acute	conditions	-	squared	 0.00	 0.00	 0.25	 -0.01	 0.00	Chronic	conditions	-	squared	 -0.08	 0.06	 0.19	 -0.19	 0.04	Constant	 -1.76	 0.31	 0.00	 -2.36	 -1.15			 	
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